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vAbstract
Equity capital is a major source of capital for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 
because of their limitation in accumulating internal capital due to higher payout 
requirements. REITs, like other public entities, raise equity capital from subscribing 
investors by issuing units through initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs). Both offerings, however, require direct costs to pay for 
underwriters and other miscellaneous necessities, and indirect costs through pricing 
the offerings below the expected closing market price on the initial day of trading, to 
attract subscribing investors to bear the risk of aftermarket valuation and liquidity 
uncertainty. The costs of raising equity capital are well-addressed in the literature, 
particularly for industrial firms (Butler, Grullon and Weston, 2005; Chen and Ritter, 
2000; Kim, Palia and Saunders, 2010; Lee, Lochhead, Ritter and Zhao, 1996).
However, the REIT industry does not have any contemporary evidence since the 
global financial crisis of the integrated costs of raising equity capital.
This thesis investigates the costs of raising equity capital with the sample of both 
IPOs and SEOs for U.S. REITs from 1996 to 2010. U.S. REITs are the most mature 
and have the largest market capitalization in the REIT world. The findings 
complement the well-documented notion of economies of scale in the total direct 
costs which have experienced a declining trend over time. The total direct costs of 
IPOs average 8.43%, consisting of underwriting fees of 6.47% and non-underwriting 
other direct expenses of 1.96%, whereas the total direct costs of SEOs average 4.63% 
consisting of 4.17% of the underwriting discount (also known as the spread) and 
0.46% of non-underwriting other direct expenses. The indirect costs through 
underpricing of IPOs average 3.07%, and have experienced a declining trend, while 
those of SEOs averaged 1.18% with a rising trend during the sample period. 
The study contributes to the literature by documenting a number of new and 
significant factors that influence the direct and indirect costs of both IPOs and SEOs. 
Ownership limit, which confines an individual investor to a certain percentage of 
ownership in a REIT, and the number of adverse risk factors stated in the prospectus, 
both appear to influence the direct costs of U.S. REIT IPOs. The ownership limit 
positively influences the direct costs while the number of adverse risk factors 
identified in the prospectus is negatively related to the direct costs. The effect of 
vi
ownership limit might be attributed to its adverse effect on the aftermarket liquidity, 
while the effect of the number of risk factors might be attributed to the reduced 
litigation risk of underwriters. The study also finds that IPOs with a higher 
proportion of shares offered compared to post-IPO volume, leave less money for 
subscribers through underpricing, while those intending to use the offer proceeds for 
working capital, leave more money for subscribers.
The study further contributes with the findings that the level of underwriting by 
representative underwriters negatively explains the underwriting discount, while 
underwriting syndicate size and multiple book-managing underwriters positively 
determine underwriting discounts in REIT SEOs. The higher the number of 
representative underwriters in the syndicate suggests less money is left through 
underpricing SEOs.
The study also contributes by documenting that the industry-dominating underwriter 
and state of incorporation significantly influence the direct and indirect costs of IPOs 
and SEOs. Additionally, this study finds the indirect costs are higher for both IPOs 
and SEOs issued during the global financial crisis period. These are new and 
significant findings in the industry.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1   Introduction
This chapter presents the introduction to the thesis on the costs of raising equity 
capital for U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) for 1996-2010. REITs 
originated in the 1960s in the US as trust entities to provide smaller investors with an 
investment opportunity into large-scale diversified real estate properties at lower 
costs and risk. REITs are trusts managed by trustees, owned by 100 or more persons 
with a limitation of five or fewer persons confining their ownership to within 50 
percent. They also need to meet a number of statutory requirements such as at least 
75 percent of their total invested assets must be represented by real estate assets, at 
least 75 percent of their income must be derived as rents and interest from real estate 
properties, and at least 90 percent of their taxable income must be distributed as 
dividends. By meeting these requirements, they enjoy an exemption from corporate 
tax (Chan, Erickson and Wang, 2003).
REITs can diversify their investments in different types of real estate properties and 
their operations are highly regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) adhering to the high standard of corporate governance, financial reporting and 
information disclosure. The ownership structure permits equity REITs to generate 
income from rent revenues, and mortgage REITs to earn interest income from the 
mortgage of properties. 
REITs commence their operations of acquiring investment properties by raising 
equity capital from initial investors through issuing units of interest to investing 
subscribers in an Initial Public Offering (IPO).They subsequently finance their 
growth operations by raising seasoned equity through issuing Seasoned Equity 
Offerings (SEOs). Their tax-exempt status gives them little tax-based incentive to 
raise debt capital, and their higher payout requirement allows them to accumulate 
only a small amount of retained earnings. Hence, they are substantially dependent on 
the equity capital market for their operations and, indeed, to be able to exist. 
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION
2
In raising equity capital through IPOs and SEOs, REITs need to hire underwriters to 
facilitate the entire process. The underwriters demand underwriting fees (also known 
as spreads) for their services. The issuing firms also incur some “other direct 
expenses”, such as listing on a trading exchange, paying for accountants and legal 
advisers, printing, engraving and other necessary matters to successfully float their 
issues. These two constituents of costs are known as the “total direct costs” (or 
simply “direct costs”) of raising equity capital. Beyond these two components of 
direct costs, issuers often leave some “money on the table” for the subscribing 
investors as an incentive for bearing the risk of uncertainty in the valuation and 
liquidity in the secondary market. Underwriters, who are involved in the initial 
valuation, may also set the offer price below the expected initial market price. The
money left through pricing the unit or share below the closing market price on the 
offer day is known as “underpricing”. This underpricing is an indirect component of 
the costs of raising equity capital.
This research intends to contribute and complement the literature with cross-
sectional determinants of both the direct and indirect costs of raising equity capital 
with samples of U.S. REIT IPOs and SEOs during 1996-2010. The sample period 
starts from January 1996 to capture the effect of widespread subprime real estate 
mortgage lending which started in the mid-1990s (Sanders, 2008). For cross-
sectional determinants, the research is based primarily on the information stated in 
the offer prospectuses along with some relevant data from sources like the Center for 
Research on Securities Prices (CRSP) for historical market prices, Jay Ritter’s Home 
page for underwriter reputation at http//bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/Rank.xcl, and 
publications of the National Association of REITs. The analyses are performed by 
graphical presentations, univariate and bivariate results, and OLS and Tobit
regression coefficients along with their level of significance. 
The overall study is structured as follows: chapter two reports the literature review; 
chapter three describes the sample data, sample selection, study methods and 
variables with empirical evidence; chapter four presents the descriptive statistics of 
the costs of both IPOs and SEOs; chapters five and six present the analysis on the 
direct and indirect costs of IPOs respectively. Similarly, chapters seven and eight 
present the analysis on the direct and indirect costs of SEOs respectively and, finally, 
chapter nine concludes the overall thesis.
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This chapter, however, proceeds as follows: section 1.2 explains the motivation of
the study, section 1.3 summarizes the findings, and section 1.4 links the contributions 
of the study. Finally, section 1.5 concludes the chapter.
1.2   Motivation of the Thesis
The evidence shows that the underwriting spreads for industrial IPOs are clustered at 
certain percentages with an increasing trend over time (Chen and Ritter, 2000; Kim, 
et al., 2010) and across countries (Butler and Huang, 2003; Torstila, 2003). Chen and 
Ritter (2000) report IPO issuers pay higher underwriting spreads in the USA than in 
other countries including the U.K., Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, and Taiwan. They 
also state that this variation might be attributed to the differences in regulations, 
associated costs and the lawsuit potential. The literature on underwriting spreads for 
industrial SEOs shows lower spreads and lower clustering than those for industrial 
IPOs (Butler, et al., 2005; Chen and Ritter, 2000). This evidence supports the cross-
sectional variation in underwriting spreads across countries and over time. 
REIT industry has grown over time and across countries in terms of assets, market 
capitalization and trading volume. For instance, total assets owned by the industry 
increased from $200 million to over $500 billion from the mid-1960s to the end of 
2010; the market capitalization rose from $1.5 billion with 34 REITs in 1971 to 
$389.30 billion with 153 REITs in 2010; and the daily trading volume increased 
from $100 million in 1994 to $3.4 billion in 2010 (Block, 2011). The economic 
significance of the industry is also worth mentioning because REITs paid $18 billion 
in dividends during 2010.1 U.S. REITs are the largest and most mature in the REIT 
world. 
Further, REITs are liquid and transparent (Buttimer, Hyland and Sanders, 2005; 
Dolvin and Pyles, 2009) and the inclusion of REITs in a portfolio works as a 
defensive stock (Glascock, Michayluk and Neuhauser, 2004), works as an inflation-
hedged investment vehicle (Ting, Gunasekarage and Power, 2005), and offers long-
term and international diversification benefits (Lim, McGreal and Webb, 2008; 
MacKinnon and Al Zaman, 2009).
1 REITWATCH (January 2011) monthly by National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts
(NAREIT) and Block (2011).
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The economic significance and the historical asset growth perspectives suggest that 
the costs of raising equity capital for REITs are an important area for research. The 
literature so far shows that most of the existing research on the costs of raising equity 
capital is concentrated on industrial firms, and particularly on the indirect cost of 
underpricing.2 Most of these studies explore the cross-sectional determinants of the 
indirect cost of underpricing of IPOs and SEOs. Carter and Dark (1990), Corwin and 
Harris (2001), Kim, et al. (2010) and Butler, et al. (2005), however, concentrate on 
explaining the cross-sectional variation of underwriting spreads for industrial 
companies.3 These features motivate the need to study U.S. REITs in more detail.
1.3 Research Gap
REITs raise relatively larger amounts of initial equity capital (Dolvin and Pyles, 
2009) but are usually excluded in most of the studies on direct costs of raising equity 
capital due to their different industrial structure and regulations, until Chen and Lu
(2006) explored the underwriting spreads along with their determinants for U.S. 
REIT IPOs. They document significant cross-sectional variation, with only 31% of 
their IPOs paying exactly at 7%. Their findings, with the sample period ending in 
1999, expected lower underwriting spreads over time. This prediction opens an 
avenue to explore underwriting costs of REIT IPOs for the post 1999 period.
REITs frequently raise seasoned equity capital to fund their capital intensive 
investment. However, the REIT literature lacks any evidence of direct costs of 
raising such equity except a recent unpublished work by Gokkaya, et al. (2011)
which  explored the cross-sectional variation in underwriting spreads with U.S. REIT 
SEOs for 1993-2007. REITs, since origination, have undergone a number of 
amendments in their regulations. More specifically, in 1992 they experienced 
changes in the organizational structure of an umbrella partnership (UPREIT), and the
REIT Modernization Act 1999, which became effective from 2001, changed the 
payout ratio from 95% to 90%. Moreover, the REIT industry has gone through the 
2 For details see Lee, et al. (1996), Chen and Ritter (2000), Kim, et al. (2010), Torstila (2003), Liu and 
Ritter (2011), Engelen and Essen (2010), Corwin and Schult (2005), and Boulton, et al. (2011) for 
IPOs; and Mola and Loughran (2004), Butler, et al. (2005), Jeon and Ligon (2011), and Huang and 
Zhang (2011) for SEOs.
3 Carter and Dark (1990), Corwin and Harris (2001) and Kim, et al. (2010) report cross-sectional 
determinants of underwriting spreads for industrial IPOs. Similarly, Kim, et al. (2010) and Butler, et 
al. (2005) report cross-sectional determinants of underwriting spreads for industrial SEOs.
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recent global financial crisis (GFC) bursting in August 2007 which might be 
attributed to the sharp downturn of real estate prices (Laopodis, 2009). Additionally, 
the S&P500 index started incorporating some REITs in its index from 2001. The 
changes in economy and regulations might affect the costs of raising equity capital, 
particularly the seasoned equity capital. However, the literature lacks any evidence of 
direct costs of REIT SEOs for the post 2007 period.
Another constituent of the direct costs for both IPOs and SEOs is expenses directly 
incurred by the issuers which average approximately 25%-50% of underwriting 
spreads of raising equity capital. Chemmanur, Paeglis and Simonyan (2010), Corwin 
and Harris (2001), Gerbich, et al. (1995), Kaserer and Kraft (2003) and Lee, et al. 
(1996) investigate the cross sectional variation in such expenses for industrial 
companies only. This leaves an avenue to investigate the cross sectional variation in 
such expenses for REITs.
Furthermore, the underwriting syndicate structure has been reported in the literature 
of both industrial IPOs and SEOs as a determinant in explaining the components of 
both direct and indirect costs of raising equity capital (Corwin and Schultz, 2005; 
Huang and Zhang, 2011; Jeon and Ligon, 2011). The REIT literature is yet to report 
any effect of underwriting syndicate structure in explaining the costs of raising 
equity capital.
The literature on both industrial IPOs and SEOs supports a declining trend of 
underwriting spreads over time (Kim and Saunders, 2010). In contrast, the literature 
depicts an increasing indirect cost of underpricing for both industrial IPOs (Loughran 
and Ritter, 2004; Lowry, Officer and Schwert, 2010) and industrial SEOs (Corwin, 
2003; Kim and Shin, 2004). The inter-temporal variation in IPO underpricing might 
be attributed to the hot periods (Loughran and Ritter, 2002) and an increasing 
emphasis on analyst coverage (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Similarly, the rising 
indirect costs of SEOs may be attributed to the changes in the regulations and the 
economy affecting both IPOs and SEOs (Corwin, 2003; Kim and Shin, 2004). This
inter-temporal variations in the costs of raising equity capital by industrial firms raise 
questions whether such trends affect REITs in raising their equity capital from the 
same capital market. Hence, a study with contemporary evidence of the costs of 
raising equity capital by incorporating more cross-sectional determinants,
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particularly, the structure of underwriting syndicate and examining the post-GFC 
period suits to the U.S. REITs.
1.4 Research Questions
The thesis investigates the costs of raising equity capital for U.S. REITs with a 
sample of 127 IPOs and 800 SEOs during 1996-2010. Specifically, the thesis 
investigates the factors determining the cross sectional variations in direct and 
indirect costs of raising equity capital by issuing IPOs and SEOs. More specifically, 
it covers the four integrated components of such costs by addressing the following 
four research questions.
1. Total direct costs consisting of underwriting spreads and non-underwriting 
other expenses directly incurred by the issuers in raising equity capital by 
issuing Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). The thesis expects a declining trend of 
such costs during the sample period.
2. Total direct costs consisting of underwriting spreads and non-underwriting 
other expenses directly incurred by the issuers in raising equity capital by 
issuing Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs). The thesis expects, similar to the 
IPOs, a declining trend of such costs during the sample period.
3. Indirect cost through underpricing the IPOs. The thesis expects a rising trend 
of such indirect cost during the sample period.
4. Indirect cost through underpricing the SEOs. The thesis expects, similar to 
the IPOs, a rising trend of such indirect costs during the sample period.
1.5 Findings of the Thesis
1.5.1   Levels of Costs
Total direct costs for IPOs average 8.43% and consist of 6.47% of underwriting fees 
and 1.96% of non-underwriting other expenses, while these costs for SEOs average 
4.63% consisting of 4.17% of the underwriting discount and 0.46% of the non-
underwriting other expenses. Indirect costs of underpricing average 3.07% and 
1.18% for IPOs and SEOs, respectively. 
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1.5.2   Common Findings
The study finds that IPOs experience a declining trend in both direct costs and 
indirect costs, while SEOs experience a declining trend in direct costs but a rising 
trend in indirect costs. The levels of direct costs are found to explain the indirect 
costs and they may substitute for each other. Both IPOs and SEOs issued during the 
post-GFC period leave more money for subscribing investors. Consistent with the 
industrial firms’ evidence, offer size is found as the key determinant of all levels of 
costs for both IPOs and SEOs because it negatively determines direct costs, which 
might be attributed to economies of scale, but positively influences indirect costs 
which might be attributed to placement pressure. 
1.5.3 Underwriting Syndicate Structure
The study finds that the role, position, level of underwriting and reputation of 
underwriters in the syndicate and even underwriter industry dominance, determine 
the costs of raising equity capital. More specifically, the study finds that hiring well-
reputed underwriters, in general, reduces costs for both IPOs and SEOs. However, 
hiring the industry-dominant underwriter (Merrill Lynch) (or a syndicate led by 
Merrill Lynch) raises the issuing costs, which might be attributable to the 
imperfection or oligopolies in the underwriting market (Liu and Ritter, 2011; Mola 
and Loughran, 2004). The underwriting syndicate size also affects the costs because 
it negatively determines the direct costs for IPOs and the indirect costs for SEOs, but 
its relation is quadratic in determining the SEO underwriting discount (Jeon and 
Ligon, 2011). Multiple book-managing underwriters in a syndicate positively 
influence the total direct costs of SEOs. In addition, the level of underwriting by the 
representative underwriters negatively determines the SEOs’ direct costs. All of this 
evidence suggests that the underwriting syndicate structure affects the costs of 
raising equity capital.
1.6 Contribution of the Thesis
The thesis complements the well-documented notion of economies of scale in regard 
to total direct costs of both IPOs and SEOs, and produces recent evidence on these 
costs with respect to the proceeds raised (Chen and Ritter, 2000; Lee and Masulis, 
2009; Lee, et al., 1996). It also complements the existing evidence of the trend of 
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different levels of costs except for IPO underpricing of raising equity capital (Kim, et 
al., 2010; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). The contribution of this thesis can be 
summarized as follows:
First, it contributes to the literature on the cross-sectional determinants of non-
underwriting other direct expenses of both REIT IPOs and SEOs.
Secondly, it contributes to the literature on the cross-sectional determinants of the 
levels of SEO underwriting by the representative underwriters.
Thirdly, it contributes to the literature with evidence that the SEO underwriting 
discount (also known as the spread) is a negative function of the level of
underwriting by the representative underwriters (Bairagi and Dimovski, 2012b).
Fourthly, it contributes to the literature by complementing the industrial evidence 
that SEO underwriting costs are a quadratic function of underwriting syndicate size 
(Jeon and Ligon, 2011).
Fifthly, it contributes to the literature with evidence that the ownership limit for an 
individual investor, industry-dominating underwriting syndicates and dominating 
auditors are determinants of the costs of raising equity capital for REITs. The 
industry-dominating underwriter or underwriting syndicate as a determinant of costs 
supports the notion of the existence of oligopolies in the REIT underwriting market 
(Liu and Ritter, 2011).
Sixthly, it contributes to the literature with evidence that the incorporation law of 
Maryland affects the direct costs of both IPOs and SEOs.
Seventhly, it contributes to the literature with the evidence that the number of 
adverse risk factors disclosed in the IPO prospectuses negatively determines the total
direct costs, and that underpricing is higher for IPOs with a larger proportion of 
shares relative to the post-IPO outstanding volume.
Eighthly, it contributes to the literature with the evidence that the direct costs may 
explain the indirect costs. This evidence may help managers of REITs in allocating 
total costs of raising equity capital between these two components.
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1.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents the background, motivation, findings and contribution, along 
with the structure, of the thesis which is investigating the costs of raising equity 
capital for U.S. REITs through IPOs and SEOs. The U.S. REITs, which are the 
largest in the world in terms of their market share, have grown over time in terms of 
market capitalization, daily trading volume, distribution of dividends and amounts of 
capital raised from the equity market. The empirical evidence on the costs of raising 
equity capital is voluminous for industrial firms, but the majority of those studies 
usually exclude REITs from their sample because of different regulations and the 
organizational structure of REITs. However, most of the studies on REITs 
concentrated on the indirect costs while ignoring the significance of the direct costs. 
Further, REITs, since their origination, have undergone several amendments in their 
regulations along with changes in the economic environment. Hence, REITs warrant 
contemporary evidence on their costs of raising equity capital. 
The findings of this thesis are significant because REITs commence their major 
acquisition of capital intensive properties with equity capital raised by IPOs, and 
frequently raise seasoned equity capital to fund their growth opportunities. They are 
dependent on such equity capital because of the statutory limitations on accumulating 
their internal equity capital due to their higher distributional requirement. Hence, the 
costs of raising equity capital for REITs warrants research. The findings will 
contribute some new determinants to the REIT literature which may benefit 
managers of REITs in making equity raising decisions, policy makers in formulating 
regulations, and investors in making investment decisions.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1   Introduction
This chapter presents the literature review in two major sections consisting of 
institutional background and costs of raising equity capital. REITs, which evolved in 
the 1960s in the US as the entities primarily engaged in real estate investment in the 
financial sector, provide investors with greater benefits of diversification, liquidity,
higher dividend yield and inflation-hedged investment over the long-run in 
comparison to stocks and broader common stock indices (Block, 2011). The 
literature shows that the costs of raising equity capital by issuing IPOs and SEOs for 
REITs are relatively lower than for industrial firms. The costs are determined mostly 
by the amount of equity raised, holdings by institutional investors, organizational 
structure, valuation uncertainty and placement difficulty.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 overviews the institutional 
background consisting of history, requirements, benefits, types, organizational 
structure, management type, and the life-cycle of REIT performance. Section 2.3 
presents the literature which is split into direct and indirect costs of raising equity 
capital by issuing IPOs and SEOs for both industrial and REIT firms. Finally, section 
2.4 concludes the chapter.
2.2   Institutional Background
2.2.1 History
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are trust entities that own and sometimes 
develop commercial properties. They are taxed as trusts with an exemption from tax 
on their taxable income provided they satisfy several organizational, investment and 
operational tests on a year-by-year basis. The Massachusetts business trust formed in 
the mid-19th century in Boston was the first type of legal entity allowed to invest in 
real estate and can be thought of as pioneering the concept of modern REITs. 
REIT history can be traced back to post-World War II when a limited partnership 
form was widely used as a vehicle for pooled real estate investment. President 
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Dwight D. Eisenhower finally signed the REIT Act on September 14, 1960, in a bill 
to amend the Internal Revenue Code with respect to the Excise Tax on Cigars 
Extension of 1960.4 The main objective of creating REITs was to give all investors 
an opportunity to invest in large-scale diversified portfolios of income-producing real 
estate at a reduced cost and risk, and with a significantly lower initial investment.
The law originally defined a REIT as “an unincorporated association with multiple 
trustees as managers and having transferable shares of beneficial interest” and 
allowed it to raise equity capital from general investors by selling units.5 Subsequent 
to the creation of REITs, 15 REITs applied to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission during the first six months of 1961 and raised $125 million by issuing 
units.6 REITs can also be defined as corporations, trusts, or associations that meet the 
four requirements of organizational, distributional, income test and asset tests under 
section 856 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).7 The IRC mandates a business 
entity to meet these requirements to ensure that the REIT operates primarily as a 
passive real estate investment vehicle. 
Continental Mortgage Investors was the first REIT listed on the NYSE. Globally, the 
REIT model started to spread after the Netherlands passed the REIT legislation in 
June 1965. The National Association of Real Estate Investment Funds, the 
predecessor of the National Association of REIT (NAREIT), was formed on 
September 15, 1960. The NAREIT unveiled the first REIT index in January of 1972 
for benchmarking the price and total return investment performance, and also 
instigated the index of Equity, Mortgage and Hybrid REITs. The first healthcare 
REIT was founded by Bruce Thompson and Frederic Wolfe, called the Health Care 
Fund, in June of 1970 (the name was changed to Health Care REIT, Inc. (HCN) in 
4 He initially vetoed the first REIT bill passed by Congress in 1956.
5 The Literature Review is mainly a compilation based on Kelley (1998), Chan, et al. (2003) and 
Block (2011).
6 The REITs created during 1960-61 were Bradley Real Estate Investors, Continental Mortgage 
Investors, First Mortgage Investors, First Union Real Estate (now Winthrop Realty Trust, NYSE: 
FUR), Pennsylvania REIT (NYSE: PEI) and Washington REIT (NYSE: WRE); however, only the 
latter three are still in existence (NAREIT).
7 The sections from 856 to 860 of the IRC pertain to REITs. Since its inception, the IRC has 
experienced several amendments in 1969, 1976, and 1984, until the major amendment in 1986. 
Finally, the Revenue Act of 1997 (REIT Simplification Act) substantially changed the REIT 
provisions after Tax Reforms made in 1986. At last, the REIT Modernization Act 1999, which 
became effective in early 2001, allows REITs to own taxable REIT subsidiaries (TRS) to provide 
services to its tenants and also reduces the taxable income distribution from 95% to 90%.
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1985). Congress enacted the foreclosure8 provision in the tax rules in 1974 (50th
Anniversary of REITs, www.nareit.com).
2.2.1.1   Organizational Requirements
The Internal Revenue Code requires a REIT to satisfactorily meet the following six 
organizational qualifications:
i. The REIT must be managed by one or more trustees or directors for the entire 
taxable year.
ii. The beneficial ownership of the REIT must be evidenced by fully transferable 
shares.
iii. The REIT must be an entity that would be taxable as a domestic corporation 
or trust.
iv. The REIT can be neither a financial institution (i.e., banks, chartered savings 
institutions and small business investment companies) nor an insurance 
company.
v. The beneficial ownership of the REIT must be held by 100 or more persons.
vi. Five or fewer persons cannot hold more than fifty percent of a REIT’s 
outstanding equity during the last six months of each taxable year.
2.2.1.2   Income Tests
The REIT must satisfy different income tests intended to limit the investment to real 
estate and certain other types of passive investment. The income tests require a REIT 
to derive a minimum of 75% of its gross income from rents from real estate property 
or interest on mortgage financing. 
2.2.1.3   Assets Tests
The assets tests intend to ensure that a REIT primarily holds real property or assets 
related to real property ownership at the close of each quarter of a taxable year and, 
8 Foreclosure property rules allow a REIT to take possession of the mortgage property through 
proceedings of foreclosure or default, and to operate the possessed property for 90 days before 
employing an independent contractor.
CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW
13
specifically, it must satisfy the following four tests relating to the nature and 
diversification of its assets:
i. It must hold at least 75% of the value of its total assets in qualified 
real estate assets, cash, cash items and government securities; 
ii. It must not hold more than 25% of its total assets in securities, other 
than those securities included in the 75% asset test; 
iii. Its holdings in the 25% asset class, may not exceed 5% of the value of
its total assets, and generally may not exceed 10% by vote or value of 
any one issuer's outstanding securities; and 
iv. Its holdings in any taxable REIT subsidiaries may not exceed 20% of 
its total assets.
2.2.1.4   Distribution Requirements
The distribution requirements of section 857 of the IRC are intended to ensure that a 
REIT operates as a pass-through entity. These requirements allow a REIT to deduct 
the amount of dividends paid and capital gains for tax purposes provided it 
distributes at least 90% of its annual ordinary taxable income to its shareholders. 
2.2.2 REIT Benefits
A REIT provides its investors with a number of benefits as described below: 
2.2.2.1   Diversification 
A REIT provides investors with diversification benefits across different market 
conditions. The Dynamic Conditional Correlation with Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (DCC-GARCH) on Correlation and Beta between 
REITs and Dow Jones (DJ) Total Market from 1972-2011, suggest that REITs are 
well-diversified in comparison to the broad market. Both correlation and beta, as 
reported in Figure 2.1 following, are approximately 60% with respect to the DJ Total 
Market. REITs also provide diversification benefits in a mixed asset portfolio as the 
holding period increases (Lee and Stevenson, 2005).
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Figure 2.1: REIT Correlation and REIT Beta Relative to Dow Jones Total Market
Source: http://www.reit.com/REIT101/REITAttributes/Diversification.aspx
2.2.2.2   Dividends
During the period from 1972 to 2010, REITs have yielded a consistent annual 
dividend income of around 8.3%, constituting approximately 60% of average total 
annual returns of 13.75% earned from both operations and capital gain. They have 
provided inflation-adjusted steady dividend flows over time because their income 
comes from rents which tend to increase with inflation. More particularly, Figure 2.2 
shows that the annual REIT dividend growth has exceeded the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) in every year (except 2002 and 2009) since 1992. Hence, REITs can be 
regarded as an inflation-proof investment. 
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Figure 2.2: REIT Dividend Growth per share vs Consumer Price Index 1992-2011
Source: http://www.reit.com/REIT101/REITAttributes/Dividends.aspx
2.2.2.3   Liquidity
REIT stock is now traded on the major U.S. stock exchanges and has achieved a 
growing investor base over the past decades; the daily trading volume in dollars has 
increased many times since their inception, to average $4 bn per day in December 
2012. This increased trading volume over time has reduced the risk of illiquidity for 
investment in REIT stocks. 
2.2.2.4   Performance
REITs offer strong long-term total returns as reported in the NAREIT which shows 
that equity REITs outperformed, on average by 1 percentage point per year, both the 
broad equity market and other forms of real estate investment during the period 
1978-2010. Figure 2.3 following supports this by showing that the FTSE NAREIT 
Equity Index grows at 12.6% on average, against 11.1% for S&P500 during the same 
period. 
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Figure 2.3: REIT Performance in Comparison to Other Indices
Source:http://www.reit.com/REIT101/REITAttributes/InvestmentPerformance.aspx
2.2.2.5   Transparency
REITs provide tax transparency because they distribute consistently higher dividends 
which eliminate double taxation and leave individual investors to pay the taxes. They 
also provide operating transparency because they are registered and regulated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission adhering to a high standard of corporate 
governance, financial reporting and information disclosure.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence shows that REITs make large-scale investments 
in income-producing, real estate properties with strong and reliable rental and 
dividend income, and have utilized professional management as well as superior 
long-term risk-adjusted returns, liquidity and transparency in public capital markets. 
2.2.3 Types of REITs
REITs can be classified into three major types based on asset holdings, namely, 
equity, mortgage and hybrid REITs. 
2.2.3.1    Equity REIT
An equity REIT owns and operates income-producing real estate with income 
primarily generated from the rental revenues from the property. Hence, it is 
responsible for the equity ownership of the real estate properties. It is like a real 
estate operating company involved in a wide range of real estate activities, including 
leasing, maintenance and development of real estate properties, and providing 
services to tenants. 
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Since early 1990, NAREIT started classifying equity REITs into eight major 
categories based on their concentration of holdings of property types, as follows:
i. Industrial and office REIT which specializes in either industrial or office 
properties, or both.
ii. Retail REIT which specializes in strip centers, larger malls, and other 
types of retail properties.
iii. Residential REIT which owns multifamily apartments or developments 
for manufactured housing.
iv. Lodging/Resort REIT which specializes in lodging and resorts, holding 
ownership in hotels, motels, and resort properties.
v. Self-Storage REIT which specializes in the ownership and management 
of self-storage units.
vi. Healthcare REIT which owns hospitals and other healthcare facilities.
vii. Specialty REIT which owns properties such as golf courses, timberland, 
prisons, and many other specific types of real estate that don't fall into 
another category.
viii. Diversified REIT which invests in more than one type of property.
Ambrose and Linneman (2001) classify REITs into property types based on the 
percentages of investment concentrated in a particular property. However, a REIT is 
usually classified as a particular property type when the investment in that property is 
at least 75% of the total assets.
2.2.3.2    Mortgage REIT
A mortgage REIT is intended to lend money directly to the real estate owners or 
extend credit indirectly through acquisition of mortgage-backed securities. It 
typically finances properties managed by property managers with equity in the 
properties. Its income is primarily from the interest on the mortgage loans. A 
mortgage REIT can manage its interest rates and credit risk through securities of 
mortgage investments, dynamic hedging and other derivative strategies. 
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2.2.3.3    Hybrid REIT
Another relatively uncommon type is the hybrid REIT which invests in both equity 
properties and mortgage properties. It is actually a combination of investment 
strategies with both equity and mortgage properties.
2.2.4 REIT Organizational Structure
2.2.4.1   UPREIT Structure
The UPREIT9 is a derivation of the REIT and offers additional advantages to 
sponsors along with all the advantages of a basic REIT. It is a combination of a 
partnership and a REIT, and emerges with the formation of a limited partnership by 
“sponsors” who transfer their properties to the limited partnership in exchange for 
the limited partnership interests securitized as operating partnership (OP) units. 
Simultaneously, a REIT raises capital through public offerings and contributes to the 
limited partnership in return for a general partnership interest. The resulting 
partnership is known as an umbrella partnership, or UP, and is managed by a general 
managing partner who satisfies the REIT requirements of section 856. The ultimate 
objective of this derivation is to defer the tax burden of capital gains for the 
transferring owners. However, sponsors who transfer their properties to the UP can 
also avoid the 5/50 rule which restricts the concentration of more than 50% of REIT 
ownership by fewer than 5 persons. An UPREIT enjoys an advantage over a 
traditional REIT in the costs of acquiring properties because it offers partnership 
units to purchase properties.
The OP units are exchangeable for either cash or common stock after a lockup period 
of usually one or two years, and can also be used as collateral to finance the personal 
needs of the holder. The OP unit holders with large economic interests at stake and 
expertise in developing and managing properties are motivated to actively monitor 
the firm’s management. Their experienced monitoring increases the firm’s value 
(Han, 2006), however, it also creates tax-induced conflicts of interest in managing 
such properties (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997). An UPREIT particularly suffers from 
9 It stands for Umbrella Partnership REIT and literally can be thought of as an umbrella with 
numerous spines all connecting at its top. The spines can be thought of as the partners in the limited 
partnership. The staff and handle can be thought of as the managing partner of the UPREIT (Cornell,
1997).
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flexibility in disposing of the properties at a favorable value, which might result in 
refraining from maximization of firm value. The UPREIT structure was evolved in 
1992 with the first IPO ushered in by Taubman Centers (Chen and Lu, 2006). They 
are, typically, confined to equity REITs which are mostly incorporated under 
Maryland incorporation law. 
2.2.4.2   DownREIT
A DownREIT owns and operates properties rather than interests in a controlled 
partnership that owns and operates separate properties. A DownREIT can also 
acquire property through issuing partnership units, however, unlike an UPREIT, it 
can own multiple partnerships at the same time and may own assets at both the REIT 
and partnership levels. Hence, a DownREIT enjoys additional flexibility over an 
UPREIT because it can form multiple partnerships with each property acquisition. 
Despite its flexibility over UPREITs, it also suffers from the complexity of owning 
multiple partnerships, and particularly in the maintenance of tax records.
2.2.5 REIT Management
Unlike stocks or bonds, real estate assets need active management to lease, operate 
and finance the properties. The original charter envisioned a REIT as a passive 
investment vehicle, like mutual funds, and required the hiring of external 
professional managers and advisors to manage its day-to-day operations, including 
the purchasing and financing of properties. The REIT property can be managed by an 
internally or externally hired manager who is usually responsible for the day-to-day 
operations related to leasing, management, maintenance and operational aspects of 
properties. The REIT advisor is responsible for selecting the properties to purchase 
or sell, executing investment strategies, and dealing with the acquisition and
disposition of properties. Hence, an advisor plays a key role in making decisions 
regarding hiring managers and service providers for the properties (Sun, 2010).
An external advisor is affiliated with an outside advisory firm, however, the same 
firm can legally provide advisory services to many REITs and, sometimes, advisors 
may also perform the role of managers. External advisors and managers, however, 
might not make the best decisions in favor of shareholders. Hence, an inherent 
conflict of interest between external advisors and shareholders might be present and 
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could be responsible for the relatively slow growth of REITs prior to 1986 (Chan, et 
al., 2003).
To mitigate the effects of agency problems and conflicts, the private-letter rulings 
from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of 1986 relaxed the restrictions of 
mandatorily engaging an external entity of both advisors and managers, and allowed 
a REIT to hire its own employees to advise and manage its properties. Since the IRS 
1986 ruling, a REIT can hire its own advisors such as ordinary employees who might 
be compensated for their efforts along with incentives based on some performance 
measures. 
New Plan Realty Trust claims to be the first REIT to convert from external to 
internal advisor status in 1988, despite several other REITs also claiming that they 
started the conversion process from early 1986. However, conversions gained 
momentum after the benefits of conversion became widely evident, and the 
momentum flourished after the conversion of Kimco Realty’s IPO in 1991 (Chan, et 
al., 2003).
2.2.6 REIT Industry Life-cycle10
The REIT industry during the 1960s only consisted of 10 REITs of any significant 
size. The assets owned by the entire industry during the mid-1960s totalled just over 
$200 million, whereas, by the end of 2010 the industry owned over $500 billion 
worth. The performance of early REITs was quite good, with total returns averaging 
11.5% compared with 6.7% for the S&P500 from 1963-70.
The REIT industry during the 1970s experienced a  turbulent adolescence as a result 
of a tumultuous economy driven by OPEC-led explosions in oil prices. The industry 
expanded with 58 new mortgage REITs from 1968-1970, and total assets 
mushroomed from $1 billion in 1968 to $20 billion by the mid-1970s. Financially, it 
performed quite well with total returns averaging 12.9% compared with 5.8% for the 
S&P500 from 1963-1970. However, the negative performance of the mortgage 
REITs during the 1970s changed investors’ views of the entire REIT industry.
10 The REIT Industry Life-cycle is mainly based on Block (2011), Investing in REITs: Real Estate 
Investment Trusts, Bloomberg Press.
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Excessive inflation during the 1970s drove investors to pour their capital into real 
estate, creating a real estate bear market. This trend was also boosted by the 
Economic Recovery Act of 1981 which allowed real estate owners to use 
depreciation as a tax shelter for other income. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
mentioned above, which allowed REITs to internalize their advisory and 
management services, contributed to the reduction of conflicts of interest between 
management and shareholders. Overall, in the 1980s, there were a number of quality 
REITs with experienced management and a good performance track-record. 
During the 1980s, the industry experienced a substantial improvement in 
performance due to the lower prices resulting from a bear market in the latter 1980s. 
More particularly, substantial dividend yields and earnings growth made REIT stock 
irresistibly enticing to investors from 1991-1993. Hence, Many REITs started raising 
capital through equity offerings and additional borrowings to purchase foreclosed 
properties from banks and insurance companies. The industry experienced a 
tremendous boom in 1993 when REITs raised $13.2 billion by issuing 50 IPOs and 
50 SEOs. Subsequent to 1993, the industry raised another $7.11 billion in 1994 by 
issuing 45 IPOs and 52 SEOs.
Despite a significant loss in REIT stock prices after 1994, the industry delivered an 
average total return of 35.3% and 20.3% in 1996 and 1997, respectively, when 
institutional investors started investing in real estate. The bear market began in 
October 1997, however, due to the unprecedented demand for REIT shares, REITs 
were able to issue shares at a 30% premium over estimated net asset value (NAV) 
even six months before this bear market. In 1997 they raised $32.7 billion by issuing 
26 IPOs and 292 SEOs. REITs again experienced a vicious bear market during 1998 
and 1999, with stocks dropping by 22.3% and 12.2%, respectively. This downturn in 
the real estate market continued during the recession of 2000-2001.
The REIT industry performed quite well from 2000 through to early 2007, which 
could be attributed to the rising commercial real estate prices and participation by 
value and income-oriented investors. However, the industry experienced a 
devastating bear market starting from February 2007 until early 2009 which could 
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possibly be attributed to the relaxed subprime lending. The MCSI U.S. REIT index11
(price-only index) experienced a closing peak of 1233.66 on February 7, 2007, 
before it started to reverse its climb. The ensuing reversal of the REIT bear market 
continued until it bottomed at a low of 287.87 on March 6, 2009. Over 76% of equity 
REIT market capitalization evaporated during those two years, however, this 
evaporated market capital started to rebound sharply in early 2009 and 2010, and 
slowly recovered the bear market losses. This was partially strengthened by the IRS 
Revenue Procedure 2008-68, issued in December 2008, which allowed REITs to 
partially pay dividends under certain conditions. The reduced dividend payout 
enabled some REITs to reduce their debt obligations related to delivering (reduced 
leverage) capital structure. Overall, the REIT stock market began to stabilize in 2010. 
The following figure (Figure 2.4) depicts the performance of equity REITs over the 
21 years from 1990 to 2010. The figure depicts the equity REITs performing well 
and competitively over a 20-year period in comparison to the S&P500 and the 
Russell 2000 and, more particularly, the REIT industry outperformed those indices 
from 2003 to early 2009. It also shows that their higher performance continued 
during 2010.
Figure 2.4: Performance of equity REIT index based on S&P500 and Russell 2000
Source: REITWATCH, January, 2011.
11 MSCI (Morgan Stanley Composite Index) for U.S. REITs excludes mortgage REITs and represents 
approximately 85% of total U.S. REITs since its base date of December 30, 1984.
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The REIT equity index which has been maintained by NAREIT from 1972 
experienced 12.04% average annual growth, compared with 10.04% for S&P500, 
8.44% for the NASDAQ Composite, and 6.80% for the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, during the 1972-2010 period. The NAREIT monthly statistics of January 
2011 also report that there are 153 REITs in the FTSE all REIT Index, and 135 
REITs are traded on the NYSEs, with a daily trade volume of $3.8 billion in 
December 2010 (REITWATCH, January 2011). 
Table 2.1 presents the growth of the REIT sector into all REITs, equity REITs, 
mortgage REITs and Hybrid REITs for 21 years during 1990-2010 in both numbers 
and market capitalization. The table depicts that Hybrid REITs decrease over time, 
the number of all REITs was the highest in 1994 and the market capitalization was 
the highest in 2006. After 2006, the market capitalization continued declining until 
the end of 2009. This might be attributed to the effect of the GFC. In 2010, both the 
number and the market capitalization increased from the previous year. This increase
might be attributed to the raising of more equity capital in 2010 by issuing 10 IPOs.
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Table 2.1: Year wise FTSE listed U.S. REITs and their year end market capitalization ($ in 
million) for 21 years during 1990-2010.
All REITs Equity Mortgage Hybrid
Year of
REITs N
Market
Capitalization N
Market
Capitalization N
Market
Capitalization N
Market
Capitalization
1990 119 8,737.1 58 5,551.6 43 2,549.2 18 636.3
1991 138 12,968.2 86 8,785.5 28 2,586.3 24 1,596.4
1992 142 15,912.0 89 11,171.1 30 2,772.8 23 1,968.1
1993 189 32,158.7 135 26,081.9 32 3,398.5 22 2,678.2
1994 226 44,306.0 175 38,812.0 29 2,502.7 22 2,991.3
1995 219 57,541.3 178 49,913.0 24 3,395.4 17 4,232.9
1996 199 88,776.3 166 78,302.0 20 4,778.6 13 5,695.8
1997 211 140,533.8 176 127,825.3 26 7,370.3 9 5,338.2
1998 210 138,301.4 173 126,904.5 28 7,916.2 9 6,480.7
1999 203 124,261.9 167 118,232.7 26 4,441.7 10 1,587.5
2000 189 138,715.4 158 134,431.0 22 2,652.4 9 1,632.0
2001 182 154,898.6 151 147,092.1 22 3,990.5 9 3,816.0
2002 176 161,937.3 149 151,271.5 20 7,146.4 7 3,519.4
2003 171 224,211.9 144 204,800.4 20 14,186.5 7 5,225.0
2004 190 305,025.1 150 273,629.0 33 24,774.1 7 6.622.0
2005 197 330,691.3 152 301,491.0 37 23,393.7 8 5,806.6
2006 183 438,071.1 138 400,741.4 38 29,195.3 7 8,134.3
2007 152 312,009.0 118 288,694.6 29 19.054.1 5 4,260.3
2008 136 191,651.0 113 176,237.7 20 14,280.5 3 1,132.9
2009 142 271,199.1 115 248,355.1 23 22,103.2 4 740.8
2010 153 389,295.4 126 358,908.1 27 30,387.2 -- --
Source: Compiled from REITWATCH, January 2011. The FTSE NAREIT Hybrid index was 
discontinued on December 17, 2010.
Table 2.2 presents the ownership and property wise market capitalization for 153 
FTSE listed REITs as at 31st December 2010. The table depicts that the market 
capital for equity REITs is nearly 92% against 8% by mortgage REITs. Among 
property sectors, REITs investing in retail properties comprise nearly 25% of the 
total market capitalization. The table also shows that per capita market capitalization 
is the highest for the regional malls. Furthermore, the table indicates that the sub-
sector of office, regional malls, and apartments dominate the Industrial/Office, retail, 
and residential sectors, respectively. The healthcare dominates the non-grouped other 
sectors. The non-property Mortgage Based Securities (MBS) is dominated by home 
financing REITs.
Table 2.2: Property wise market capitalization for 153 FTSE listed U.S. REITs at 31st December 
2010.
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Property Type N Market Capitalization($ in billions)
% of FTSE 
All REITS
Panel A
Equity and Mortgage REITs 153 389.30 100.00
Equity 126 358.91 92.19
Mortgage 27 30.39 7.81
Panel B: Equity 126 358.91 92.19
Industrial/Office 32 70.60 18.14
Industrial 8 17.68 4.54
Office 18 44.15 11.34
Mixed and others 6 8.78 2.25
Retail 28 96.23 24.72
Shopping Centers 17 32.00 8.22
Regional Malls 7 56.81 14.59
Free Standing/Outlet centers 4 7.41 1.90
Residential 18 55.14 14.15
Apartments 15 52.63 13.52
Manufactured Homes 3 2.51 0.64
Diversified 14 28.71 7.37
Lodging Resorts 13 23.40 6.01
Healthcare 13 42.35 10.88
Self-Storage 4 20.71 5.32
Specialty/Timber 4 21.77 5.59
Panel C: Mortgage Based 
Securities (MBS) 27 30.39 7.81
Home Financing 15 27.06 6.95
Commercial Financing 12 3.33 0.85
Total 153 389.30 100.00
Table 2.2 presents the distribution of market capitalization for 153 FTSE listed U.S. REITs as at 31st
December 2010 in seven columns. The first column presents the property type; the second presents the 
number of sub-sector wise property type while the third column presents the total number of property 
type. Similar to the second and the third columns, the fourth column presents the amount of market 
capitalization of sub-sector wise property type while the fifth column presents the total amount of 
market capitalization of property type. The column six and seven report the percent of sub-property 
sector and property sector of all REITs in FTSE index, respectively.
Table 2.3 presents the global listed REIT market across 21 countries. It shows 495
listed REITs as at April 2010, of which 70 REITs are in emerging stage. The market 
capital of REITs in emerging stage constitute 1.9% of the global REIT market. 
REITs across continents shows that Americas, Europe, Oceania, Asia, and  Africa 
constitute 55.3%, 20.7%, 12.3%, 11.0% and 0.7% of the global market, respectively. 
Among the 21 countries, the U.S. REITs constitute the largest market capital of
51.5% followed by Australia of 11.9%. REITs of USA, Netherlands, UK, France, 
Hong Kong, Australia and Singapore have more than $1 billion of per capita market 
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capitalization as at December 2009 (Global REIT report 2010, Ernst & Young). The 
US REITs are the largest in the global REIT market with average market capital of 
US $1.91 billion followed by those of Netherlands with US $ 1.87 billion as at 
December 2009. The Global REIT report 2010 also shows that Australian REITs pay 
investors the highest weighted average dividend yield of 9.7% followed by those of 
Singapore of 8.9%, whereas US REITs pay 5.6%.
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Table 2.3: Global Listed REIT Market in 21 Countries
Listing Country Number ofREITs
% of global listed
REIT market
Asia 95 11.0%
Asia Developed 64 10.3%
Hong Kong 7 1.7%
Singapore 37 5.2%
Japan 20 3.4%
Asia Emerging 31 0.7%
Malaysia 12 0.3%
South Korea 5 0.1%
Taiwan 8 0.3%
Thailand 6 0.1%
Amercias 204 55.3%
Americas Developed 204 55.3%
Canada 32 3.9%
US 172 51.5%
Europe 123 20.7%
Europe Developed 89 20.2%
Belgium 14 1.1%
France 45 10.9%
Germany 2 0.1%
Italy 1 0.1%
Netherlands 8 2.1%
UK 19 5.8%
Europe Emerging 34 0.5%
Bulgaria 19 0.0%
Greece 2 0.1%
Turkey 13 0.4%
Oceania 68 12.3%
Oceania Developed 68 12.3%
Australia 60 11.9%
New Zealand 8 0.4%
Middle East & Africa 5 0.7%
Middle East & Africa Emerging 5 0.7%
South Africa 5 0.7%
Global REIT 495 100.0%
Global Developed 425 98.1%
Global Emerging 70 1.9%
Source: Compiled from Global Property Insight, Macquarie Research, April 2010.
2.2.7   Total Proceeds Raised by the REIT Industry during 1990-2010
Table 2.4 presents the amount of equity capital raised by U.S. REITs through IPOs 
and SEOs during the last 21 years from 1990 to 2010. The table shows that the 
industry raised the maximum amount of equity capital scaled in dollars 2010, by 
issuing IPOs and SEOs in 1997. The largest IPOs and SEOs were issued in 2006 and 
CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW
28
2010, respectively. During this period the industry issued a maximum number of 50 
IPOs and 297 SEOs in 1993 and 1997, respectively.
Table 2.4: Amount of equity capital raised by IPOs and SEOs over 21 years during 1990-2010.
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1990 10 882 1,361 136 8 389 600 75 1,962
1991 8 808 1,206 151 20 786 1,173 59 2,379
1992 8 919 1,344 168 24 1,055 1,542 64 2,886
1993 50 9,335 13,356 267 50 3,856 5,517 110 18,872
1994 45 7,176 10,061 224 52 3,945 5,531 106 15,593
1995 8 939 1,287 161 93 7,321 10,031 108 11,318
1996 6 1,108 1,492 249 139 11,201 15,081 108 16,573
1997 26 6,297 8,318 320 292 26,378 34,846 119 43,164
1998 17 2,129 2,776 163 297 19,379 25,265 85 28,040
1999 2 292 375 188 29 1,966 2,526 87 2,901
2000 0 0 0 11 1,172 1,474 134 1,474
2001 0 0 0 58 4,204 5,170 89 5,170
2002 3 608 736 245 85 5,785 7,001 82 7,737
2003 8 2,646 3,134 392 82 5,471 6,481 79 9,615
2004 29 7,980 9,193 317 79 7,338 8,453 107 17,646
2005 11 3,789 4,224 384 71 8,521 9,499 134 13,723
2006 5 2,271 2,452 490 75 15,695 16,946 226 19,398
2007 4 1,820 1,909 477 56 11,854 12,433 222 14,342
2008 2 491 504 252 60 11,132 11,427 190 11,931
2009 9 2,990 3,014 335 87 21,244 21,417 246 24,431
2010 9 1,975 1,975 219 91 23,639 23,639 260 25,614
The table consists of 10 columns with the leftmost column presenting the year of raising equity 
capital. The second, third, fourth and fifth columns present the number of IPOs, the total amount of 
equity in millions of nominal dollars, the total amount of equity in millions of GDP inflated dollars in 
year 2010, and average amount of equity in 2010 dollars, respectively, during the year for IPOs. 
Similarly, the sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth columns present the number of SEOs, total amount of 
equity in millions of nominal dollars, the total amount of equity in millions of GDP inflated dollars in 
year 2010, and average amount of equity in 2010 dollars, respectively, during the year for SEOs. The 
rightmost column presents the total amount of equity (in million) raised by both IPOs and SEOs in 
2010 dollars.
2.3   Costs of Raising Equity Capital
REITs raise equity capital by issuing both IPOs and follow-on or SEOs to finance 
their acquisition of equity properties and Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS). 
Issuers, however, need to incur direct costs consisting of underwriting commissions 
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to underwriters for their facilitating services during the entire issuing process, and 
non-underwriting expenses directly incurred to pay for registration on the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, listing on the trading exchange, hiring accountants, legal 
advisors, engraving, printing, advertising, and some out-of-pocket expenses which 
are considered essential to the offer. Another component of the costs of raising 
equity capital is the indirect cost through underpricing, which is the percentage of the 
offer price below the closing market price on the offer day with respect to the offer 
price. The literature shows a wide range of empirical evidence on the costs of raising 
equity capital for both industrial and REIT firms. The following sections present an 
overview of the empirical evidence on the costs of raising equity capital for both 
industrial and REIT firms. 
2.3.1   Costs of IPOs
2.3.1.1   Direct Costs of Industrial Company IPOs
Works by both Ritter (1987) and Lee, et al. (1996) on US IPOs and Chen and Wu 
(2002) on Hong Kong IPOs document economies of scale12 in total direct costs, 
while Kaserer and Kraft (2003) with German IPOs couldn’t detect any economies of 
scale. Ritter (1987) documents 14.03% and 17.74% direct cash expenses consisting 
of underwriting commission and other direct expenses for 664 firm commitment, and 
364 best efforts U.S. IPOs, respectively, from 1977-1982. Lee, et al. (1996) find total 
direct costs to average around 11.0% of gross proceeds for 1,767 industrial company 
IPOs during the period of 1990-1994. Their direct costs ranged from 16.96% for 
proceeds of less than $10 million, to 5.72% for proceeds of $500 million and above. 
Chen and Wu (2002) find direct costs to average 10.44% of gross proceeds during 
1991-1996 on their sample of 281 IPOs in Hong Kong. Their direct costs ranged 
from 4.97% to 17.65% of gross proceeds, demonstrating a declining trend in direct 
costs as gross proceeds increased. Kooli and Suret (2002) document 14.39% and 
19.19% for 114 firm commitment and 104 best effort Canadian IPOs, and 10.44% 
and 6.22% for 1,148 firm commitment and 40 best effort U.S. IPOs. 
Ritter (1987) reports 8.67% and 10.26% underwriting commissions for 664 firm 
commitment and 364 best efforts U.S. IPOs, respectively, from 1977-1982. Barry, 
12 Direct costs decrease with increasing IPO size.
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Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1991) report 8.73% for 723 firm commitment industrial 
IPOs over 1983-1987. The underwriting spread of Lee, et al. (1996) averaged 7.31% 
of gross proceeds and ranged from 9.05% for proceeds of less than $10 million to 
5.21% for proceeds of $500 million and over. Their findings suggest economies of 
scale exist for underwriting spreads. Chen and Wu (2002) indirectly calculated the 
direct costs of issuing IPOs because Hong Kong IPO issuers did not disclose the 
underwriting spread separately in their prospectuses during their sample period.
The underwriting spread, as documented by Chen and Ritter (2000) in the U.S., is 
7% in more than 90% of the offerings. Torstila (2001a) in European capital markets 
documents an average of 4%, Kaserer and Kraft (2003) in Germany report 5.01%, 
and Corwin and Schultz (2005) in another U.S. study report exactly 7% in 76.7% of 
their 1,638 IPOs during 1997-2002. A number of other studies also support the 
economies of scale in underwriting spread.13 Underwriting direct costs may, 
however, follow a U-shaped pattern, as documented in Kaserer and Kraft (2003),
which is attributed to the effects of diminishing returns, bearing higher risk (Hansen 
and Torregrosa, 1992), and economies of scale for larger offers.
Non-underwriting direct expenses as a percentage of gross proceeds appear 
proportionally higher for smaller offerings, and are directly incurred by the issuer 
(Beatty and Welch, 1996; Chen and Mohan, 2002; Corwin and Harris, 2001; Lee, et 
al., 1996; Ritter, 1987). Ritter (1987) finds such expenses to average 5.36% and 
7.48% for the firm commitment and best efforts IPOs, respectively. Barry, et al. 
(1991) report such expenses to average 6.31% and 2.98% for offers with and without 
warrants, respectively. Lee, et al. (1996) document these expenses to average around 
3.69%, with some evidence of economies of scale. Kooli and Suret (2002) report 
3.33% and 2.66% for 1,148 firm commitment and 40 best-effort U.S. IPOs, 
respectively, during 1997-1999. Kaserer and Kraft (2003) report 2.76%, with offer 
size and offering complexities as significant determinants of expenses. 
13 For details see Logue (1973), Carter and Dark (1990), Pugel and White (1988), Lee, et al. (1996),
Chishty, Hasan and Smith (1996) and Torstila (2001b).
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2.3.1.2   Direct Costs of REIT IPOs
Little was explored about the direct costs of raising REIT equity capital before Chen 
and Lu (2006), because all previous studies covered only indirect costs in terms of 
underpricing (or initial returns to subscribers) as a cost of going public, and ignored 
the magnitude of the direct costs incurred by the issuers in raising equity capital. 
They report equally (value) weighted underwriting gross spreads of 6.78% (6.56%) 
for 197 U.S. REIT IPOs from 1980-1999 to 7.19% (6.91%), and 6.65% (6.49%) 
from 1980-1989 and 1990-1999 with a sample of 49 and 148, respectively. They
argued that underwriters and investors were not very familiar with the REIT product 
(compared to industrial company IPOs) during their sample period. 
In Australia, Dimovski (2006) and Dimovski and Brooks (2007) report average 
underwriting fees of 3.3% and document economies of scale in direct costs for 
Australian REIT (Listed Property Trust) IPOs during the period 1994-2004. 
2.3.1.3   Indirect Costs of Industrial Company IPOs
Underpricing, as an indirect cost (Ritter, 1987) for companies going public, leaves 
money on the table14 for subscribing investors, thence leaving less proceeds (Mola 
and Loughran, 2004), which is costly to the issuing firm (Carter and Manaster, 
1990). This underpricing is, however, necessary to induce uninformed investors who 
otherwise participate in IPOs when they expect a positive return (Baron, 1982; Rock, 
1986), because uninformed investors can get allocations of IPOs which may even 
result in negative returns (Ritter and Welch, 2002). Underpricing is also needed for 
the existence of the IPO market in an economy in the long run (Ljungqvist, 2007)
and substantial differences exist across countries. For example, Engelen and Essen 
(2010) report the overall average underpricing of 24.97% across 21 countries for the 
period of 2000-2005, ranging from 3.67% overpricing in Israel to 40% underpricing 
in Spain15. Similarly, Boulton, Smart and Zutter (2011) document 36.5% average 
underpricing, with 10,783 IPOs across 37 countries for the period of 1998-2008.
Boulton, et al. (2011) also report large variations in IPO initial returns across 
14 It is the absolute amount in dollars and is the product of the number of shares issued, and gives the 
difference between the closing market price on the first trading day and the offer price per share.
15 Engelen and Essen (2010) report underpricing ranges from 3%–14% in France, 11%–30% in 
Australia, 30%–47% in Taiwan, 48%–64% in Greece, 74%–78.5% in Brazil, and 127%–949% in 
China.
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countries, ranging from less than 2% in Argentina to 120.7% in China. The extreme 
underpricing in Chinese IPOs is, however, attributed to the political risk (Jenkinson 
and Ljungqvist, 2001). Further, most of the theories posit ex-ante uncertainty arising 
from both firm-specific and issue-specific risk factors behind underpricing (Engelen 
and Essen, 2010; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). The evidence of industrial IPOs also 
supports substantial underpricing in recent times, even amid increased competition 
and without any barrier of underwriters to enter the underwriting market. For 
instance, Liu and Ritter (2011) report average underpricing of 24% with industrial 
IPOs in the U.S during 1993-2008, despite the large number of underwriters 
competing for deals. They argue that the underwriting market is not perfectly 
competitive; rather, they found a series of local oligopolies in the underwriting 
market. In support of their evidence they argue that a limited number of underwriters 
can provide customized services to issuers who emphasize non-price dimensions, 
such as underwriter quality, industry expertise, and analyst coverage, instead of 
maximizing their IPO offer proceeds.
2.3.1.4   Indirect Costs of REIT IPOs
Consistent with industrial IPOs (Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Ritter and Welch, 2002),
REIT16 IPOs experienced inter-temporal differences in underpricing which, on 
average, ranged from 2.82% overpricing (negative underpricing) to 4.30% 
underpricing during 1971-2010 (Bairagi and Dimovski, 2011; Chen and Lu, 2006; 
Joel-Carbonell and Rottke, 2009; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997; Wang, Chan and Gau, 
1992). The reasons for these inter-temporal differences are discussed in Ling and 
Ryngaert (1997) and Wang, et. al (1992). For example, Ling and Ryngaert (1997)
stated that active management after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 led to additional 
uncertainty about the market value of firms. The enactment of umbrella partnership 
structures, (UPREIT) ushered in by Taubman Centers in 1992 (Chen and Lu, 2006),
also triggered additional uncertainty in REIT IPOs. The management of UPREIT 
properties could also create conflicts of interest due to the different interests of 
management and shareholders and also due to their level of expertise (Ling and 
Ryngaert, 1997). Wang, et al. (1992), however, stated two possible reasons for the 
difference in REIT IPO underpricing over time, and particularly from traditional 
16 A REIT commences its major operations primarily with the proceeds raised by issuing IPOs.
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industrial IPOs. One of their conjectures argues for more uninformed heterogeneous 
subscribing investors for REITs prior to 1990. Another conjecture argues for tangible 
asset bases of IPO issuing REITs. Subsequent empirical evidence, however, fails to 
support either of these two conjectures in explaining the difference in REIT IPO 
underpricing. More specifically, the evidence of persistent lower underpricing (Chan, 
et al., 1998) throughout the 1990s, despite the similar level of institutional ownership 
between REITs and traditional IPOs, raises doubts about the applicability of the 
investor base in explaining the differences in underpricing. Another study of Chan, et 
al. (2001) in Hong Kong also raises suspicions that the underlying asset base of 
REITs holding tangible real estate properties completely explains the different levels 
of underpricing in IPOs. 
More particularly, Wang, et al. (1992) document 2.82% overpricing with their 87 
IPOs spanning 1971-1988. Overpricing is also partially documented in the REIT IPO 
literature (Buttimer, et al., 2005; Chan, et al., 2003; Chen and Lu, 2006). Contrary to 
overpricing, the literature also reports underpricing (Below, Zaman and McIntosh, 
1995; Chen and Lu, 2006; Dolvin and Pyles, 2009; Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans, 2000; 
Ling and Ryngaert, 1997). REIT IPOs, however, leave less money on the table than 
the traditional industrial IPOs due to the higher transparency, lower information 
asymmetry, larger offer size, and higher quality of underwriters (Buttimer, et al.,
2005; Dolvin and Pyles, 2009). Dolvin and Pyles (2009) report REIT IPOs leave 
4.61% (absolute) less money on the table than traditional non-REIT IPOs, but still 
report substantial underpricing of 3.72% by 209 REIT IPOs during 1986-2004. Chen 
and Lu (2006), consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis of Rock 
(1986), attribute the different levels of underpricing to information asymmetry, and 
report -1.30% (overpricing) and 4.30% underpricing during 1980-1989 and 1990-
1999 with their sub-samples of 49 and 148, respectively. Recent evidence also 
supports substantial underpricing by REIT IPOs. For example, Joel-Carbonell and 
Rottke (2009) with their sample of 90 IPOs during 1992-2007 and Bairagi and 
Dimovski (2011) with their sample of 123 IPOs during 1996-2010 report 
underpricing of 4.30% and 3.18%, respectively. 
REIT IPOs outside US also experience underpricing. For example, the studies by 
Kutsuna, et al. (2008) with 40 Japanese REITs, Ooi (2009) with 20 Singaporian 
REITs and Dimovski (2010) with 45 Australian REITs document 0.5% 
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(insignificant), 11.82% (significant) and 3.37% (significant) underpricing, 
respectively. For better understanding at a glance, Table 2.6 compiles and presents 
the evidence of IPO underpricing for U.S. REITs, U.S. industrial firms, and 
international industrial firms in panels A, B and C, respectively.
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Table 2.5: IPO underpricing for U.S. REITs, U.S. Industrial and International Industrial firms.
Authors/
Studies
Sample
Period
Sample
Size
Underpricing
in %
Panel A: US REIT IPOs
Wang, et al. (1992) 1971-1988 87 -2.82
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) 1991-1994 85 3.60
Ghosh, et al. (2000) 1992-1996 61 3.47
Chan, et al. (2003) 1970-1979 24 -3.10
1980-1989 78 -3.14
1990-2000 159 2.36
Buttimer, et al. (2005) 1980-2001 163 2.47
Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu (2008) 1980-1998 189 0.27
Chen and Lu (2006) 1980-1989 49 -0.30
1990-1999 148 4.30
Dolvin and Pyles (2009) 1986-2004 209 3.72
Joel-Carbonell and Rottke (2009) 1991-2008 90 4.30
Bairagi and Dimovski (2011) 1996-2010 123 3.18
Panel B: U.S. Industrial IPOs
Ritter (1987) Firm commitment
                      Best efforts
1977-1980 664
364
14.80
47.78
Ibbotson, Sindeler and Ritter (1988) 1960-1987 16.30
Megginson and Weiss (1991) 1983-1987 320 7.10
Jegadeesh, Weinstein and Welch (1993) 1980-1986 1,985 9.78
Michaely and Shaw (1994) 1984-1988 947 7.27
Beatty and Welch (1996) 1992-1994 960 11.70
Lee, et al. (1996) 1990-1994 1,767 12.05
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) 1991-1995 1,376 13.80
Chen and Mohan (2002) 1990-1992 806 11.23
Ritter and Welch (2002) 1980-2001 6,238 18.80
Kim, et al. (2010) 1980-2000 4,875 21.24
Purnanadam and Swaminathan (2004) 1980-1997 2,288 11.40
Loughran and Ritter (2004) 1980-2003 6,391 18.70
Chung, Li and Yu  (2005) 1996-2001 1,547 42.58
Leone, Rock and Willenborg (2007) 1993-1994 787 11.60
Chemmanur and Yan (2009) 1990-2000 884 24.00
Liu and Ritter (2011) 1993-2008 4,510 24.40
Panel C: International IPOs
Engelen and Essen (2010)
with 21 countries
2000-2005 2,920 24.97
Boulton, et al. (2011)
with 37 countries
1998-2008 10,783 36.50
Source: Compiled by the author.
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2.3.2   Costs of SEOs
2.3.2.1   Direct Costs of Industrial Company SEOs
The total direct costs,17 consisting of both underwriting discounts and non-
underwriting other direct expenses of raising equity capital for industrial company 
SEOs, range from 4%-7% (Cannon and Cole, 2011; Corwin, 2003; Eckbo and 
Masulis, 1992; Lee, et al., 1996; Smith, 1977). Hence, the total direct costs represent 
both a significant proportion of publicly-traded firms’ new equity proceeds (Eckbo,
Masulis and Norli, 2007) and a significant capital loss to the firms raising such 
equity (Lee and Masulis, 2009). A larger portion of the total direct costs is, however, 
the underwriting discount directly allowed to the underwriters as compensation for 
their services in facilitating the entire SEO issuing process.18 The evidence shows 
that this underwriting discount for industrial SEOs varied on average from 4.80% to 
5.46% from 1971-2007.19
17 Total direct costs are the sum of underwriting spreads and other direct expenses. Smith (1977)
reports these costs as 6.17% with a sample of 484 SEOs during 1971-1975; Bhagat and Frost (1986)
with 479 and 73 SEOs for negotiated and competitive offerings, respectively during 1973-1980 report 
these costs average 4.43% and 3.44%; Eckbo and Masulis (1992) report these costs as 6.09% and 
4.23% with a sample of 351 and 369 industrial and public utilities SEOs, respectively, during 1963-
1981; Lee, et al. (1996) report 7.11% with 1,593 SEOs during 1990-1994; and Corwin (2003) reports 
6.65% with 4,454 SEOs during 1980-1998. Underwriting spreads, including management fee, 
underwriting fee and selling concession, are paid or allowed to underwriters involved in facilitating 
the process. Other direct expenses include registration fees to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, accounting fees, printing and engraving expenses, Federal Revenue Stamps, state taxes, 
legal fees and auditing fees (Lee, et al., 1996; Ritter, 1987; Smith, 1977).
18 Smith (1977) reports underwriting spreads constitute nearly 81.36% (5.02/6.17); Bhagat and Frost 
(1986) report this from 87.57% (3.10/3.54) to 88.71% (3.93/4.43); Eckbo and Masulis (1992) report 
this 70% and 88% with industrial and public utilities SEOs, respectively, during 1963-1981; Lee, et al.
(1996) show that such discount is nearly 76% (5.44/7.11); and Corwin (2003) reports it as 80% 
(5.32/6.65).
19 Smith (1977) reports 5.02% with 484 SEOs during 1971-1975; Bhagat and Frost (1986) 3.93% and 
3.10% for negotiated and competitive underwriting with 479 and 73 SEOs, respectively, during 1973-
1980; Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) report 5.01% with 283 SEOs during 1978-1986; Eckbo and 
Masulis (1992) report 4.29% and 3.73% with a sample of 351 and 639 industrial and public utilities 
SEOs, respectively, during 1963-1981; Lee, et al. (1996) report 5.44% with 1,593 SEOs during 1990-
1994; Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) report 5.38% with 1,325 SEOs during 1990-1997; Corwin (2003)
reports 5.32% with 4,454 during 1980-1998; Mola and Loughran (2004) report 5.10% with 4,814 
SEOs during 1986-1999; Butler, et al. (2005) report 4.80% with 2,387 SEOs during 1993-2000; Lee 
and Masulis (2009) report 5.09% with 963 SEOs during 1990-2002; Gao and Ritter (2010) report
4.82% with 3,276 SEOs during 1996-2007; Kim, et al. (2010) report 5.46% with 4,348 equity SEOs 
during 1980-2000; Jeon and Ligon (2011) report 5.06% with 2,071 SEOs during 1997-2007; and
Huang and Zhang (2011) report 5.29% with 2,281 SEOs during 1995-2004.
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2.3.2.2   Direct Costs of REIT SEOs
The REIT SEO literature shows that the underwriting discount ranges from 4.10% to 
4.20% (Bairagi and Dimovski, 2012b; Gokkaya, et al., 2011). Hence, the empirical 
evidence so far shows that the underwriting discount for REIT SEOs is relatively 
lower than that of industrial SEOs. This finding is strongly supported by the 0.84% 
lower gross underwriting spreads for REIT SEOs than for the matching non-REIT 
SEOs of Gokkaya, et al. (2011). The SEO underwriting discount of their study 
averages 4.17%, which is also much lower than the industrial evidence.
Another constituent of the total direct costs of raising equity capital are the expenses 
other than the underwriting discount directly incurred by the issuing firm. Such 
expenses for industrial SEOs represent around 22% of the total direct costs.20 The 
other direct expenses of this study average 0.46% and constitute nearly 10% 
(0.46/4.63) of the total direct costs, which average 4.63%. This finding suggests that 
REIT SEOs pay, on average, lower other direct expenses (non-underwriting) than 
industrial SEOs. These lower other direct expenses might be attributed to the relative 
transparency and certainty in cash flows and more frequent visits to the seasoned 
equity market by the REIT firms (Ghosh, et al., 2000; Hardin III and Hill, 2008).
2.3.2.3   Indirect Costs of Industrial Company SEOs
The indirect costs of raising seasoned equity capital are the money left on the table 
for subscribing investors through underpricing, that is, pricing the offer below the 
closing market price on the offer day, or through discounting, that is, setting the offer 
price at a discount from the closing market price on the day before the offer (Parsons 
and Raviv, 1985; Smith, 1977). The demonstration of Loderer, et al. (1991) supports 
underpricing but not discounting, especially if the market is efficient and trading is 
restricted. 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) decompose the indirect costs of seasoned equity into 
expected discounting and unexpected underpricing. The expected discounting is the 
predictable component at the close of trading the day before the offer begins, 
20Smith (1977) reports other direct expenses average 19% (1.15/6.17) of the total direct costs; Bhagat 
and Frost (1986) report these expenses average from 11%-12% of the total direct costs; Eckbo and 
Masulis (1992) report 30% and 12% with industrial and public utilities SEOs, respectively, during 
1963-1981; Lee, et al., (1996) report other direct expenses as 24% (1.67/7.11) of the total direct costs;
and Corwin (2003) report these expenses as 20% (1.33/6.65) of the total direct costs.
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whereas, the unanticipated underpricing can be discovered after the final offer price 
is made public at the eleventh-hour. These two components of indirect costs are zero 
on average, but not equal if offer discounting is informative and, thus, affect the 
offer-day return. The offer-day return is the percentage change of the closing market 
price on the day before the offer and the closing market price on the offer-day.
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) also depict the relationship between underpricing, 
discounting and offer-day return using U, D and R, and measure it as logarithms of 
the ratio of the offer-day’s closing price (P1) to the offer price (P0); the prior day’s 
closing price (P-1) to the offer price (P0); and the offer day’s closing price (P1) to the 
prior day’s closing price (P-1), respectively. 
The logarithms from the following identity results in underpricing as the sum of 
discounting and offer-day returns, i.e., U=D+R.
If the offer discount is informative, the offer-day return becomes zero and results in 
underpricing equal to offer discounts (Kim, et al., 2010). The literature of both 
taxpaying industrial firms and REITs shows that the stock market, in general, 
responds negatively to the announcement of SEOs (Masulis and Korwar, 1986). This 
may be due to the investors’ negative attitude toward the issuing firm’s operating 
cash flows (inadequate operating cash flows to meet capital needs), or investors may 
presume that the issuing firm’s stock is overvalued. The information discrepancy 
between management and investors regarding the value of existing assets or future 
prospects drives this negative response. This is supported by the findings of 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) that lead underwriters possess economically significant 
information that investors do not have in the eleventh-hour information. Their 
evidence also indicates that lead underwriters strategically convey their information 
by adjusting the offer price at the eleventh-hour of the final offer, hence, they use 
discounting as an effective information updating mechanism.
The SEO literature also shows that the indirect costs, irrespective of their definitions 
and computations, have increased substantially and steadily over time (Corwin, 
2003; Kim and Shin, 2004; Loderer, et al., 1991). The empirical evidence shows that 
the offer discount for industrial company SEOs varies substantially, ranging from 
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0.28% to 4% across different samples from 1963-2007.21 Similarly, the underpricing 
also varies substantially and ranges from -0.11% (overpricing) to 3.45% across 
different samples spreading from 1963 to 2007.22
This increase in SEO indirect costs over time is attributed to the adoption of Rule 
10b-21 which restricts manipulative short-selling and disallows the covering of short 
positions with newly-issued SEOs (Corwin, 2003; Kim and Shin, 2004); economic 
changes affecting both IPOs and SEOs (Corwin, 2003); and increased ability of 
underwriters to extract more rent from SEOs (Mola and Loughran, 2004). The 
enactment of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-21 on 25 
August 1988 makes the market price prior to the offer less informative, hence, a firm 
offers a high discount to market its new shares (Gerard and Nanda, 1993). The 
findings of Corwin (2003) and Kim and Shin (2004) strongly support the effect of 
Rule 10b-21 to positively affect offer price discounting, but Mola and Loughran
(2004) find no significant evidence of this Rule. In support of the effect of Rule 10b-
21, Kim and Shin (2004) report that the changed environment of SEOs, and SEOs 
themselves, are not enough to explain the rising SEO discount. Mola and Loughran 
(2004) posit that underwriters use analyst research coverage in underwriting business 
and analyst coverage is the source of their increased bargaining power, because 
issuers prefer underwriters with high-quality analysts in the belief that transmitting 
influential research reports will elevate their post-issue stock price. This increased 
ability of underwriters in extracting rents is consistent with the oligopolistic 
underwriting market where very few underwriters can meet the differentiated needs 
of the issuer (Liu and Ritter, 2011). If the underwriters have the ability to meet the 
21 Smith (1977) report 0.54% with 328 firms during 1971-1975; Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) report 
2.47% with 1,703 SEOs during 1990-1997; Corwin (2003) reports 2.21% during 1980-1998; Mola 
and Loughran (2004) report 3% with 4,814 SEOs during 1986-1999; Kim and Shin (2004) report from 
1.34% to 2.99% with 3,304 SEOs during 1983-1998; Chemmanur, et al. (2010) report 4.03% with 
1,630 SEOs during 1993-1997; Gao and Ritter (2010) report 2.75% with 3,276 SEOs during 1996-
2007; and Huang and Zhang (2011) report 3.16% with 2,281 traditional SEOs during 1995-2004.
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) also report an average offer discount of 0.71% ranging from 0.28% to 
1.4% (Loderer, et al., 1991) for a number of studies covering 1963-1993.
22 Smith (1977) reports 0.82% with 328 firms during 1971-1975; Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) report 
2.58% with 1,703 SEOs during 1990-1997; Corwin (2003) reports 2.30% during 1980-1998; Kim and 
Shin (2004) report from 1.71% to 3.26% with 3,304 SEOs during 1983-1998; Kim and Park (2005)
report 3.45% with 1,040 SEOs during 1989-2000; Chemmanur and Yan (2009) report 2.40% with 663 
SEOs during 1990-2000; Kim, et al. (2010) report 2.99% with 4,348 SEOs during 1980-2000; Gao 
and Ritter (2010) report 3.11% with 3,276 SEOs during 1996-2007; Jeon and Ligon (2011) report 
3.05% with 2,071 SEOs during 1997-2007. Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) also report the average offer 
discount 0.56% ranging from -0.11% (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992) to 1.94% (Loderer, et al., 1991) for a 
number of studies covering 1963-1993.
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differentiated and customized needs of the issuers, they can leave more money on the 
table for their favored investor clients. By leaving more money on the table for 
favored clients, underwriters can extract higher compensation transparently than 
charging higher underwriting spreads (Mola and Loughran, 2004).
2.3.2.4   Indirect Costs of REIT SEOs
The REIT literature so far depicts the two studies by Ghosh, et al. (2000) and
Goodwin (2008) to provide evidence on cross-sectional determinants of REIT SEO 
indirect costs. Both of these studies document underpricing with respect to both the 
closing price on the day before the offer and on the offer day.23 Ghosh, et al. (2000)
document institutional ownership as a determinant of underpricing. Furthermore, 
they report that theories of IPO underpricing may also apply to the SEO underpricing 
and, in particular, SEO issue size and underwriter reputation explain REIT SEO 
underpricing. Goodwin (2008) documents a number of factors determining offer 
discount and underpricing differently. Particularly, she reports placement costs and 
valuation uncertainty as determinants of indirect costs of underpricing. She also 
reports that the umbrella partnership (UPREIT) organizational structure leaves more 
money on the table due to its inherently higher information asymmetry. Moreover, 
her evidence shows that property type-specific factors also determine REIT SEO 
indirect costs.
2.4   Conclusion
This chapter presents the evolution, structure and development of the REIT industry 
which emerged in the 1960s, as trust entities entirely involved in real estate 
investment, with tax-exempt status subject to distributing a significantly large part of 
their taxable income as dividends. REITs have equity ownership and mortgage 
obligations in properties. The equity ownership in properties can be diversified or 
concentrated in any particular property. Based on this ownership concentration in 
properties, REITs can be of many types. However, the National Association of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (NAREITs) started classifying REITs in eight major
23 Ghosh, et al. (2000) report offer discount as a percentage change of the closing price on the day 
before offer from offer price with respect to closing price on the day before offer, and underpricing as 
the percentage change of offer price from the offer day closing price with respect to offer price of 
1.14% and 0.74%, respectively. Similarly, Goodwin (2008) in her PhD dissertation reports offer 
discount of 1.77% and underpricing of 1.21%.
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categories based on their having at least 75% of investment of total assets in a 
particular type of property. The investment performance of the underlying particular 
property type reflects the performance of the REIT. The income of REITs comes 
from rent revenues generated by equity properties and interest from mortgage 
properties. These properties can be managed either by hiring their own employees or 
by hiring typical professional management. 
The literature shows that the historical trend of REIT investment returns and 
dividend yield outperformed the broad equity index returns (S&P500 and Russell 
2000) and inflation (Consumer Price Index), respectively. The NAREIT, which 
started indexing of all REIT prices from 1972, reports that the equity REIT index 
outperformed the broad equity index of S&P500 by 2% annually from 1972-2010.
The REIT industry has also experienced a significant growth in its daily trade 
turnover which reached $3.80 billion in December 2010. The FTSE NAREIT index 
consists of 153 REITs with 135 REITs traded on the NYSE in December 2010. 
REITs usually commence their acquisition of properties and mortgage obligations by 
selling trust ownership to the initial subscribing investors and, subsequently, fund 
their growth operations by selling seasoned equity in the seasoned equity market. 
Another major source of acquisition of their operations is the properties transferred 
by the owners to a limited partnership owned and managed by an Umbrella 
Partnership structure (UPREIT). An UPREIT arrangement allows owners to defer 
their tax liability on capital gains for a while under certain conditions. 
In raising the equity capital from both initial subscribing investors and the seasoned 
equity market, REITs, like their industrial counterparts, need to incur both direct and 
indirect costs. The direct costs consist of underwriting fees paid to the underwriting 
banks involved in facilitating the entire issuing process and non-underwriting other 
expenses directly incurred by the issuing REITs. The indirect costs are the money 
left for the subscribing investors by pricing the shares below the offer-day closing 
market price. 
The direct costs of raising equity capital by both industrial and REIT firms enjoy 
economies of scale with offer size. Both of these industries, however, experienced 
inter-temporal variation in raising equity capital. The literature also depicts that both 
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types of costs are relatively higher when raising equity capital from initial 
subscribers than from a seasoned equity market. 
The findings of the chapter will contribute to future research on the REIT industry, 
particularly on the costs of raising equity capital.
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CHAPTER THREE
DATA and METHODS
3.1   Introduction
This chapter presents the sources of data, methods of analysis and variables used in 
this dissertation. The chapter consists of five sections. Section 3.2 describes the 
sources of data, section 3.3 describes the sample size, section 3.4 presents the 
methods used in the analysis chapters, section 3.5 presents the variables used in the 
analysis with empirical evidence and, finally, section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.2   Data
This study is primarily based on data stated in the prospectuses of all REIT IPOs 
listed and priced on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ exchanges, as reported in the 
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trust’s (NAREIT’s) historical 
offering records during the period from January 1996 to December 2010. The year 
wise number of IPOs and SEOs, the name and ticker symbol of the REITs have been 
compiled from the SNL list of REITs, and NAREIT’s historical offerings archives. 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has mandated that all U.S. 
publicly-traded and listed companies electronically submit all filings including IPO 
prospectuses to the SEC. All REIT IPO prospectuses have been sourced from 
EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval) which automatically 
collects, validates with indexing, accepts, and forwards the submissions by the 
companies and other entities mandated by the SEC law to file forms with the SEC. 
By doing this, EDGAR primarily increases the efficiency of the securities market for 
the greater benefit of investors, corporations and the economy through receiving and 
promulgating the availability of timely, sensitive information filed with the 
regulatory agency (Chung and Yu, 2005). EDGAR has been keeping the information 
filed with the SEC on all U.S.-based publicly-listed and traded companies since 
1996. EDGAR’s SEC information has been used in a number of studies including 
Horng and Wei (1999) who used the EDGAR database for financial footnotes, Howe 
and Jain (2004) for annual reports, Loughran and Ritter (2004) for final IPO 
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prospectuses (form 424B4) after 1996, Chung, Li, and Yu (2005), and Brau, Li and 
Shi (2007) have also used EDGAR since 1996 in their studies.
Reputation ranks for lead and representative underwriters have been compiled as per 
Carter and Manaster (1990) as updated in Ritter’s homepage.24 This study considers 
the auditor who has audited the largest dollar volume of offerings during the sample 
period as a “differentiated auditor” in the REIT industry. Following Wang and 
Wilkins (2007), this variable of a differentiated auditor has been identified 
expressing the offer proceeds in 2010 purchasing power dollars using the U.S. GDP 
price deflator taken from World Development Indicators of the World Bank.25
Underwriting fees and non-underwriting other direct expenses, underwriters in the 
lead and representative positions, the number of representatives and total 
underwriters, ownership limit, number of risk factors and name of the auditors who 
audited the financial statements in the prospectuses have been hand-collected and 
compiled from respective IPO prospectuses. Data on property type, organizational 
structure, REIT type and management type are sourced from monthly REITWATCH 
published by the NAREITs. Closing market prices on both the day before the offer 
for Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) and the offer day for both IPOs and SEOs are 
collected from the Center for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP) created and 
maintained by the University of Chicago and the Bloomberg database created by 
Michael Bloomberg and maintained by Bloomberg L.P. 
The NAREIT index which has been used in calculating the REIT return volatility, 
REIT dividend yield and REIT returns over different time periods has been taken 
from the NAREIT website (www.nareit.org). The ten-year U.S. treasury interest rate 
is collected from the Bloomberg database. The primary data of all the cross-sectional 
determinants of both IPOs and SEOs are hand-collected from the final offer 
prospectuses of the corresponding IPOs and SEOs. 
3.3   Sample Size
The initial sampling period starts from January 1996 to capture the effect of 
widespread subprime real estate mortgage lending which started in the mid-1990s 
24 http// bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/Rank.xcl.
25 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
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(Sanders, 2008). Moreover, the IPO and SEO prospectuses which are primarily used 
for cross-sectional data are electronically available from 1996. This source of data 
also motivates the researcher in selecting the sample period from 1996. The total 
number of REIT IPOs issued during the sample period, as identified by this study, is 
127. The total number of SEOs included in this study is 800 out of the total SEOs of 
1,340 issued during the period from 1996 to 2010 by 196 U.S. REITs. The study 
excludes those SEOs issued to the institutional investors and those issued by the 
selling shareholders, underwriters and placement agents (Hansen and Torregrosa, 
1992). The selling shareholders can sell their holdings after the expiry of a lock-up 
period. The underwriters keep the unsold shares for the time being. The capital raised 
by both the selling shareholders and the underwriters, of course through the issuing 
company, cannot further affect the equity position of the issuing company and,
hence, cannot change the dilution effect. The underwriters are not usually involved in 
placing the offers through placement agents or those issued to the institutional 
investors.
Further, the announcement effect and the offer discount are different for SEOs issued 
through placement agents and those issued to the institutional investors because, due 
to the lock-up period, the subscribing institutional holders cannot influence the 
market with their holdings. The SEOs issued by the selling shareholders and the 
underwriters could have less of a dilution effect on the post-market price.
3.4   Methods
The reciprocal reimbursement of non-underwriting direct IPO expenses, which 
sometimes takes place between underwriters and issuers, has been taken into 
consideration and adjusted in calculating both the net underwriting and non-
underwriting other direct expenses incurred by the issuing firm.26 The direct 
underwriting fees and non-underwriting expenses have been scaled by the total 
proceeds to derive a percentage of the gross proceeds raised. For SEOs, the 
remuneration for underwriters is usually stated in the prospectus as the discount, 
26 Issuers usually pay for the non-underwriting direct expenses required for listing in the trading 
exchanges, printing, accounting, auditing, legal and due diligence, advertising, engraving etc. These 
expenses are also sometimes incurred by the concerned underwriting syndicate. In such cases 
reimbursement between issuers and underwriters takes place to determine the net underwriting fees 
and non-underwriting other direct expenses. 
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which is the difference between the final offer price and the proceeds underwriters 
pay to the issuers. This study has used the total direct costs consisting of the 
underwriting fees paid to the underwriters facilitating the entire IPO process, and the 
other expenses directly incurred by the IPO-issuing REIT as a percentage of the 
gross offer proceeds, as the dependent variable in the chapter of IPO direct costs. 
This study has also used the underwriting fees and the non-underwriting other direct 
expenses as dependent variables in explaining IPO direct costs. Similarly, it has used 
the different levels of direct costs as dependent variables in explaining the SEO 
direct costs. More specifically, it has used the total direct costs consisting of the 
underwriting discount directly allowed to the underwriters and the non-underwriting 
other expenses directly incurred by the SEO issuers separately as dependent 
variables. In explaining the SEO underwriting costs, it has also used the level of 
underwriting credited to the underwriters who represent the underwriting syndicate 
as the dependent variable.
The indirect cost of underpricing (overpricing) for both IPOs and SEOs is defined as 
the offer price below (above) the first-day closing market price on the offer-day 
expressed with respect to the offer price. Another measure of indirect costs of 
underpricing used in SEO literature is the offer discount measured as the difference 
between the closing market price on the day before the offer and the offer price, and 
is expressed with respect to both the offer price and the closing market price on the 
day before the offer. 
The study is mainly based on ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression 
analysis in explaining the marginal effect of determinants used in explaining the 
different levels of direct and indirect costs of raising equity capital by issuing IPOs 
and SEOs. It has also used the univariate, bivariate and descriptive statistics in 
analyzing primarily the effect of determinants on these costs. Further, it has also 
depicted the scatter and linear diagrams as complementary to these quantitative 
analyses. The OLS specifications used in the analysis chapters are as follows:
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The following specifications have been used in explaining IPO direct costs -
GLUHFWFRVWV   ȕ0  ȕ1OQLSRSURFHHGV  ȕ2LQGYRO  ȕ3TLQG\LHOG  ȕ4undrank + 
ȕ5topauditor + ȕ6OQQXPWRWXQGȕ7OQQXPULVNIDFWȕ8Q\VHȕ9postgfc 
ȕ10XSUHLWȕ11UHLWW\SHȕ12PHUULOOȕ13PDU\ODQGİ
XQGIHHV ȕ0 ȕ1OQLSRSURFHHGVȕ2LQGYROȕ3TLQG\LHOGȕ4XQGUDQNȕ5topauditor 
ȕ6OQQXPWRWXQGȕ7OQQXPULVNIDFWȕ8RZQOLPȕ9XSUHLWȕ10reittype 
ȕ11Q\VHȕ12merrill ȕ13PDU\ODQGİ
LSRGLUH[S ȕ0 ȕ1OQLSRSURFHHGVȕ2LQGYROȕ3TLQG\LHOGȕ4undrank 
ȕ5WRSDXGLWRUȕ6OQQXPWRWXQGȕ7OQQXPULVNIDFWȕ8pynumipo 
ȕ9XSUHLWȕ10UHLWW\SHȕ11Q\VHȕ12PHUULOOȕ13PDU\ODQGİ
The following specification has been used in explaining IPO indirect costs -
XQGSULFH ȕ0 ȕ1OQLSRSURFHHGVȕ2XQGIHHȕ3LSRGLUH[Sȕ4toprankrepund 
ȕ5WRSDXGLWRUȕ6SWLQGRIIȕ7SWKOWFDUHȕ8OQVKRIILSRȕ9corpord 
ȕ10PDU\ODQGȕ11nyse ȕ12Gȕ13Gȕ14hotperiods
ȕ15SRVWJIFȕ16XSUHLWȕ17UHLWW\SHİ
The following specifications have been used in explaining SEO direct costs -
GLUHFWFRVWV ȕ1OQVHRSURFHHGVȕ2OQSULRUPNUSULFHȕ3lQUHSXQGZULWLQJȕ4lnreloff 
ȕ5WHQ\UWUVLQWȕ6PXOWERRNPQJUVȕ7OQQXPWRWXQGȕ8lnnumtotundsqr 
ȕ9WRSDXGLWRUȕ10SUHVHRȕ11UHLWW\SHȕ12XSUHLWȕ13nyse 
ȕ14XQGUDQNȕ15PHUULOOȕ16selfmJWȕ17SWRIILQGȕ18maryland 
ȕ19SRVWJIFȕ20SRVWUPDİ
XQGGLVF ȕ1OQVHRSURFHHGVȕ2OQSULRUPNUSULFHȕ3OQUHSXQGZULWLQJȕ4lnreloff 
ȕ5WHQ\UWUVLQWȕ6PXOWERRNPQJUVȕ7OQQXPWRWXQGȕ8lnnumtotundsqr 
ȕ9WRSDXGLWRUȕ10preseo ȕ11UHLWW\SHȕ12XSUHLWȕ13nyse 
ȕ14XQGUDQNȕ15PHUULOOȕ16VHOIPJWȕ17ptoffind
ȕ18PDU\ODQGȕ19SRVWJIFȕ20SRVWUPDİ
VHRGLUH[S ȕ1OQVHRSURFHHGVȕ2lnpriormkrprice + ȕ3OQUHORIIȕ4multbookmngrs 
ȕ5OQQXPWRWXQGȕ6OQQXPWRWXQGVTUȕ7SUHVHRȕ8UHLWW\SHȕ9upreit 
ȕ10Q\VHȕ11PHUULOOȕ12VHOIPJWȕ13PDU\ODQGȕ14postgfc 
ȕ15SRVWUPDİ
repundwritinJ ȕ1OQVHRSURFHHGVȕ2OQSULRUPNUSULFHȕ3OQUHORIIȕ4multboomngrs 
ȕ5OQQXPWRWXQGȕ6OQQXPUHSXQGȕ7SUHVHRȕ8reittype 
ȕ9XSUHLWȕ10Q\VHȕ11PHUULOOȕ12SWRIILQGȕ13maryland 
ȕ14SRVWUPDİ
The following specifications have been used in explaining SEO indirect costs -
XQGSULFH ȕ0 + ȕ1unddisc + ȕ2OQVHRSURFHHGVȕ3OQSULRUPNUSULFHȕ4lnreloff 
ȕ5lnretvol + ȕ6PXOWERRNPQJUVȕ7lnnumrepunGȕ8undrank 
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ȕ9WRSDXGLWRUȕ10XSUHLWȕ11SUHVHRȕ12Q\VHȕ13merrill 
ȕ14VHOIPJWȕ15SWRIILQGȕ16PDU\ODQGȕ17SRVWJIFİ
RIIGLVF ȕ0 + ȕ1unddisc + ȕ2OQVHRSURFHHGVȕ3OQSULRUPNUSULFHȕ4lnreloff 
ȕ5OQUHWYROȕ6PXOWERRNPQJUVȕ7OQQXPUHSXQGȕ8undrank 
ȕ9WRSDXGLWRUȕ10XSUHLWȕ11SUHVHRȕ12Q\VHȕ13merrill 
ȕ14VHOIPJWȕ15SWRIILQGȕ16PDU\ODQGȕ17SRVWJIFİ
The above variables have been defined with empirical references in the analysis 
chapters where these specifications have been used.
To control for the time-fixed effects during the sample period, all of the above 
specifications have incorporated year dummies. To control for the heteroskedasticity, 
the regression specifications used robust standard errors in estimating t statistics 
which are reported beneath each coefficient. Along with t statistics, the regression 
specifications have also reported the level of significance of coefficients with 
different staric signs. To reduce the effect of multicollinearity, it has checked the 
pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients between explanatory variables. Moreover, it 
has also checked the post-regression diagnostics including the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) of each explanatory variable, linktest for model misspecification and 
omitted variable test (ovtest) for omitted variable bias. The analysis is performed 
with STATA.
3.5   Variables Affecting Costs of IPOs and SEOs
3.5.1 Offer Size 
Some of the direct costs, such as opportunity costs of underwriters’ time spent on 
conferring with the issuer and preparing prospectuses, fees paid for legal and 
accounting services, and expenses for printing and engraving services, are fixed or 
invariant of an additional amount of proceeds (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2000; Bhagat 
and Frost, 1986). The effect of the fixed component of these costs reduces the 
underwriting spreads and non-underwriting other direct expenses with increasing 
offer size (Chen and Ritter, 2000; Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Kim, et al., 2010; Lee and 
Masulis, 2009; Lee, et al., 1996). Bhagat and Frost (1986) expect these costs to 
decrease sharply for small offerings, and more slowly for larger offerings due to the 
inherent unsystematic diversifiable risk.
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The offer size is used in the underpricing literature as an exogenous determinant and 
is important for REITs which raise larger amounts than the traditional firms (Dolvin 
and Pyles, 2009; Kim, et al., 2010). Larger offers are issued by larger firms which 
have more publicly-available information and, hence, are associated with less 
asymmetric information and underpricing (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Ibbotson, 
Sindelar and Ritter, 1994; Kutsuna and Smith, 2004; Michaely and Shaw, 1994).
However, this effect is inconclusive because, after controlling for the underwriter 
prestige, Michaely and Shaw (1994) report significantly higher underpricing for a 
larger offer size in a given underwriter prestige quintile. Their finding is consistent 
with Baron (1982) that larger offers require greater distribution efforts by 
underwriters. Larger issues are distributed to a large group of investors who demand 
larger underpricing. The findings of a number of other studies are also in line with 
this (Jeon and Ligon, 2011) but report an insignificant positive effect of the offer size 
on underpricing (Corwin and Harris, 2001; Hansen, 2001).
The literature also supports underwriting spreads (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2000) and
underpricing (Dunbar, 2000) as a U-shaped function of offer size.
The REIT literature supports the positive effect of the offer size on IPO underpricing 
(Bairagi and Dimovski, 2011; Dolvin and Pyles, 2009; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997).
However, the effect is inconclusive for SEOs (Ghosh, Nag and Sirmans, 1998; 
Ghosh, et al., 2000; Goodwin, 2008). More particularly, Ghosh, et al. (1998) find no 
significant effect of the offer size on underpricing and Ghosh, et al. (2000) document 
a significant negative effect of the offer size on underpricing for post-1990 SEOs, 
whereas, Goodwin (2008) reports an insignificant (significant) negative effect on 
underpricing (offer discount). Overall, the evidence supports the inconclusive effect 
of the offer size on the costs of raising equity capital.
3.5.2 Underwriting Spreads
One of the key underwriting services provided by underwriters is the road show 
during the book-building period which spreads both private and public information 
among individual and institutional investors. This underwriting service reduces the 
information asymmetry among investors and results in flattening the negatively-
sloped demand curve to absorb the new issue without affecting the equilibrium price 
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(Huang and Zhang, 2011). So, underwriters who provide more underwriting efforts 
to reduce information asymmetry might demand greater underwriting compensation 
for their efforts. The underwriting compensation is simultaneously determined with 
the offer price within the 24 hours before the offer. 
The theoretical arguments of Chen and Ritter (2000) support a relationship between 
direct underwriting compensation and underpricing because the underwriting service 
can reduce the underpricing27 by raising the offer price (Smith, 1977).
Both the underwriting spreads (Chen and Mohan, 2002) and the underpricing signal
the quality of the firm (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; 
Welch, 1989). High quality firms may underprice more with the intention of 
subsequently raising more capital through seasoned offerings when prices are 
established, which low quality firms cannot mimic. Underwriters cover their risk by 
explicitly charging spread and implicitly underpricing the offer because, with the 
absence of competition, they could cover their risk premium by charging higher 
spread with zero underpricing. However,  due to competition and regulation, they are 
not allowed to charge beyond a ceiling level of spread, hence, they must deeply 
underprice the higher, risky firms. Hence, underwriting spread and underpricing are 
interrelated with each other and this relationship depends on the issuing firms’ 
characteristics and negotiation power, the degree of competition in the underwriting 
market and the underwriters’ pricing strategies. Kim, et al. (2010) endogenously 
determined underwriting spreads and underpricing for both IPOs and SEOs with 
3SLS, and documented a complementary association (positive).
Yeoman (2001) and Ljungqvist (2003) suggest a substitute relationship between 
underwriting spreads and underpricing for IPOs, whereas, Mola and Loughran 
(2004), Kim and Shin (2004), and Kim, et al. (2010) document a complementary 
relationship.
3.5.3 IPO Direct Expenses
IPO direct expenses are the total expenses excluding underwriting fees or spread and 
are directly incurred by the issuer to pay for registration to the Securities and 
27 Underpricing is the percentage change of offer price below the offer-day closing price with respect 
to offer price.
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Exchange Commission (SEC), listing fees to the trading exchange, to pay for 
accountants and auditors, printing, engraving, advertising, legal and due diligence, 
and some out-of-pocket essential expenses (Gerbich, et al., 1995; Ritter, 1987).
These expenses appear proportionally large for small offerings.28
Chen and Mohan (2002) suggest higher other expenses for more risky issues. They 
use non-underwriting other expenses in explaining the underwriting spread and their 
findings suggest an indirect negative effect of non-underwriting other direct expenses 
on underpricing through underwriting spread. Chemmanur and Yan (2009) document 
advertising expenses as substitutes for underpricing. As advertising expenses are 
included in non-underwriting other direct expenses, these expenses might have an 
inverse relationship with underpricing. 
3.5.4 Offer Price per Share 
The offer price per share may explain the costs of raising equity capital because 
issues with a comparatively higher offer price reflect the greater certainty of the 
valuation (Kutsuna, Dimovski and Brooks, 2008), less difficulty in attracting 
institutional investors, particularly for SEOs (Butler, et al., 2005), and the higher 
quality of the issuers (Chen and Mohan, 2002). Bradley, Cooney, Dolvin and Jordan
(2006) argued that penny stock or small offer price shares are informationally more 
problematic issues and require more value and market-related expenditure because 
they are underwritten by lower prestige underwriters and often face limited 
disclosure and reporting requirements. Beatty and Welch (1996) state that high-risk 
firms offer shares at a low offer price to attract analysts which, however, results in 
both higher transaction costs to investors and higher brokerage commissions to 
issuers. The literature also documents that the small offer price firms underperform 
the ordinary firms and are more likely to de-list for performance-related reasons 
(Beatty and Kadiyala, 2003). 
However, a number of studies on SEO indirect costs use the prior market price 
instead of the offer price in their specifications (Corwin, 2003; Huang and Zhang, 
2011; Mola and Loughran, 2004), and argue that this price is exogenous because it is 
unlikely to be affected by the spillover effect of the underwriters’ market making 
28 As a percentage of gross proceeds.
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efforts (Huang and Zhang, 2011). The evidence suggests costs of raising equity 
capital are a negative function of the offer price or share price.
3.5.5 Reputation of Underwriters
The reputation rank of underwriters facilitating the process of raising equity capital 
affects the post-offer, long-run operating and market performance of the firm 
because firms facilitated by prestigious underwriters are larger, less risky and the 
offers are issued by established firms (Carter and Manaster, 1990) which reduces the 
pricing or valuation uncertainty (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). Even well-reputed 
underwriters compete for direct underwriting costs, the competition decreases over 
time and is transferred from direct to indirect costs (Liu and Ritter, 2011). Once the 
issuers hire the well-reputed underwriters in their offer, they may require lower other 
promoting expenses which might also negatively influence the non-underwriting 
other direct expenses.
The literature shows the mixed effect of underwriter reputation on underwriting 
spread. One underwriting theory suggests that the prestigious or well-reputed 
underwriters have a lower litigation risk because they have the required expertise in 
efficiently placing a large offer. This theory expects lower underwriting spread for 
offers underwritten by well-reputed underwriters (Carter and Dark, 1990; Chen and 
Mohan, 2002; Corwin and Schultz, 2005; Livingston and Miller, 2000). Jeon and 
Ligon (2011) and Lee and Masulis (2009) report underwriter reputation negatively 
influences SEO underwriting spread. 
Another underwriting theory predicts higher underwriting spreads for hiring 
prestigious lead underwriters. This argues that the underwriting market is not purely 
competitive but, rather, is oligopolistic (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Liu and 
Ritter, 2011; Puri, 1999) where not all underwriters can meet the customized needs 
of an issuer. Liu and Ritter (2011) argue that the underwriting industry is a series of 
local oligopolies where a limited number of underwriters can provide the customized 
and desired services of a given issuer. Beatty and Welch (1996) report a premium 
underwriting spread for prestigious underwriters and argue that prestigious 
underwriters can earn higher compensation on their built-up reputation capital by 
underwriting less risky and larger issues. This argument is consistent with Butler, et 
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al. (2005), however, they report an insignificant positive effect of underwriter 
reputation on the SEO underwriting spread.
Underwriter reputation and initial returns are well-documented in IPO literature. 
Included among them are Logue (1973), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Titman and 
Trueman (1986), Maksimovic and Unal (1993), and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998).
Prestigious underwriters need to deliberately underprice the offer to reduce the risk 
of lawsuits (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001) but, at the same time, they want to 
protect their reputation capital because their reputation capital is dampened by 
excessive underpricing (Chen and Mohan, 2002). Consistent with asymmetric 
information, Rock (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), Booth and Smith (1986), and 
Carter and Manaster (1990) document lower underpricing for IPOs underwritten by 
prestigious underwriters. Contrary to this evidence, Beatty and Welch (1996), Habib 
and Ljungqvist (2001), Loughran and Ritter (2004), Chung, et al. (2005) and 
Chahine (2008) find the higher initial returns for IPOs underwritten by higher-ranked 
underwriters. A very recent paper by Liu and Ritter (2011) also confirms the higher 
underpricing for IPOs underwritten by top-tier underwriters. Liu and Ritter (2011)
argue that the certification role of underwriters is evidenced in the 1980s, but the 
studies documenting positive underpricing by prestigious underwriters have not 
clearly explained the reasons behind this transition in underpricing. They report that 
issuers are more price-sensitive and underwriters competed more for fees in the 
1980s than in later periods. They attribute the transition from a negative to a positive 
effect of underwriter reputation to the reduced competition of underwriters for fees 
during their later sub-period, and also argue that issuers pay for these non-price 
dimensions such as industry expertise and analyst coverage. 
The REIT literature reports no significant effect on underwriting spreads for IPOs 
(Chen and Lu, 2006) but significant positive effects for SEOs (Gokkaya, Hill and 
Kelly, 2011). However, the REIT evidence reports the IPOs (Bairagi and Dimovski 
2011; Chen and Lu, 2006; Dolvin and Pyles, 2009; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997) and 
SEOs underwritten by well-reputed underwriters leave less money on the table.
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3.5.6 Level of Representative Underwriting 
The empirical evidence of the effect of the lead underwriter’s reputation on the 
underwriting costs is somewhat mixed29. Mola and Loughran (2004) report the prior 
market share, reputation and the quality of the analyst group of an investment bank 
influence most of its subsequent underwriting business in seasoned offerings. Butler, 
et al. (2005) assume investment banks with better reputations have a larger market 
share. Despite the mixed effect on underwriting costs, the empirical evidence shows 
that the underwriter reputation affects the underwriting business of an underwriter. 
This led to the hypothesis that the representative underwriting banks (including the 
lead underwriter) may well influence their remuneration. The underwriters 
emphasize both their reputation and the level of their volume of shares in an offer 
when determining their compensation. The underwriters with a higher reputation but 
lower proportion of shares in an offer demand higher compensation. The rationale 
behind this lies in the fact that an offer is usually underwritten either by a single 
underwriter or a syndicate of underwriters, with a few of them acting as lead 
managers and or representatives. The offer prospectus states the underwriting 
structure with the name and the respective volume of each underwriter, along with 
the name of the underwriter who will lead and represent the underwriting syndicate. 
Lead underwriters are always included in the list of representative underwriters and 
may need to incur some hidden costs in seeking out investors and processing 
transactions. As their costs are similar to other market makers, they enjoy some
economies of scale with volume. Hence, they may take into account both the 
uncertainty of pricing the offer and the level of underwriting in the offer to reap the 
benefit of economies of scale. As such, they tend to underwrite a larger portion of the 
more certain offers, and vice versa, because high-quality underwriters may not agree 
to participate as book managers or co-managers unless they are allocated a 
sufficiently large proportion of the offer (Corwin and Schultz, 2005).
29 Pugel and White (1988) and Carter and Dark (1990) report that the underwriter’s reputation is a
significant negative determinant of underwriting spread, but Chishty, et al. (1996) report it as an 
insignificant negative determinant of underwriting spread. Dunbar (1995) also documents a significant 
negative determinant of total cost spread, whereas How and Yeo (2000), Butler, et al. (2005) find an 
insignificant positive effect on underwriting fees, but Lee and Masulis (2009) report a significant 
negative effect on underwriting fees. This is further developed in Bairagi and Dimovski (2012b). 
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Thus, if the underwriters with higher reputations are offered a relatively small 
proportion of the offer, they may not be able to receive a competitive remuneration 
from such an offer and, hence, need higher underwriting compensation. 
Alternatively, if the representative underwriters consider the offer to have less 
uncertainty in its pricing, they compete to raise their underwriting proportion/level 
and demand lower compensation. Consistent with the findings of Bairagi and 
Dimovski (2012b), this study expects the level of representative underwriting to 
significantly negatively influence SEO underwriting discount and thence total direct 
costs.
3.5.7 Relative Offer Size
The offer size relative to the outstanding shares prior to the offer reflects the 
market’s capacity to absorb the offered shares, because it measures the size of the 
offer relative to the size of the market for the firm’s shares (Corwin, 2003). As the 
relatively larger offer seeks more capital relative to the firm’s size, it raises the 
uncertainty costs of adverse selection and placement pressure (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 
2003). The relatively larger offers shift the upward supply curve to move further 
right along the negatively-sloped demand curve (Huang and Zhang, 2011). As the 
relative offer size adversely affects the uncertainty costs of adverse selection and 
placement pressure, underwriters may face difficulty in placing SEOs with a 
relatively larger offer size and may leave more money on the table through 
underpricing to attract investors.
3.5.8 Prior Stock Return Volatility 
Stock return volatility reflects the ex-ante uncertainty of the issuing firm and can be 
measured as the standard deviation of the daily change in stock prices for the period 
prior to the offer (Corwin, 2003; Kim and Park, 2005). The prior stock return 
volatility can determine the steepness of the downward sloping demand curve 
because the residual return volatility can be used to measure the slope of the demand 
curve (Gao and Ritter, 2010; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002). The higher prior 
stock return volatility drives up the ex-ante liquidity uncertainty, which raises the 
slope of the demand curve and results in a lower equilibrium price. Hence, 
underwriters use the offer price discount to reward investors for their downside risk 
of liquidity uncertainty for higher prior stock return volatility. The empirical 
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evidence supports this prediction by reporting a significantly positive effect of prior 
stock return volatility on both the underpricing and offer price discount of SEOs 
(Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Huang and Zhang, 2011; Jeon and 
Ligon, 2011; Kim and Park, 2005). However, the findings of Kim, et al. (2010)
report an insignificant positive effect, whereas Goodwin (2008) reports an 
insignificant negative effect on the indirect costs.
3.5.9 Yields on Ten-Year Treasury Securities 
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) argue that the fall in interest rates results in low yields on 
fixed-income securities and the declines in current yields make the real estate 
securities relatively more attractive to investors due to their ‘yield plays’. As yields 
positively affect the relative attractiveness of real estate securities to investors, these 
may reflect the placement pressure of the real estate securities. Hence, underwriters 
may demand higher compensation during a period of high yields from Treasury 
securities. Bairagi and Dimovski (2012b) document interest yields on ten-year 
treasury securities as a significant positive determinant of SEO underwriting 
discount.
3.5.10 Industry Return Volatility 
Underwriters consider the volatility of the industry (price) index return prior to the 
offer as a signal of risk to investors and, for this, they may associate industry return 
volatility with underwriting spreads. Chen and Lu (2006) used the standard deviation
of the monthly National Association of REIT (NAREIT) index returns over 12 
months prior to an IPO as a proxy for volatility in the REIT industry and find a 
positive effect on gross underwriting spreads. Chen and Lu (2006) argue for higher 
underwriting fees for greater perceived industry risk for IPOs issued following higher 
industry return volatility. 
3.5.11 Industry Dividend Yield
The dividend yields are dividends relative to the stock’s market prices. Dividend 
yield30 in the quarter prior to IPO may influence the demand for new equity by an 
30 NAREIT dividend yield denotes dividend on industry price index and is sourced from NAREIT 
(National Association of Real Estate Investment Trust).
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IPO (Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu, 2005). This derived demand for new equity induces 
firms to supply more or less REIT IPOs in the market. Hartzell, et al. (2005) use 
REIT dividend yield as a determinant of both REIT IPO supply (number of REIT 
IPOs) and demand (initial day return), and argue that IPO supply is a function of an 
ex-ante perception of some market participants, specifically, REIT IPO issuers. They 
find that the supply of REIT IPOs is positively determined by both the underlying 
real estate market and the REIT prices, and these two components, to some extent, 
are included in REIT dividend yield. Low dividend yield induces firms to go public 
which generates more REIT IPOs following the lower level of NAREIT industry 
dividend yield. The more IPOs during a quarter cause underwriting services to be 
thinly stretched (Jeon and Ligon, 2011) or efficiently used, which may make 
underwriters charge higher or lower underwriting fees, and issuers spend more or 
less on non-underwriting efforts, and vice versa.
3.5.12 Top Auditor
The certifying role of the industry-dominating auditor is expected to reduce the costs 
of raising equity capital due to the higher reliability of financial statements audited 
by such an auditor (Wang and Wilkins 2007). Subscribing investors primarily rely on 
the financial statements prepared and audited by the accounting and auditing firms. 
Hence, the reputation of the auditing firm is viewed by the investors as a signal of the 
firm quality and accuracy of information, because investors imperfectly know the 
true value of the firm and believe that a prestigious auditor can more precisely 
estimate the true value of the firm. Further, a firm with more favorable private 
information tends to hire a prestigious audit firm, which cannot be mimicked by a 
firm with less favorable private information because prestigious auditors presumably 
charge higher fees (Beatty, 1989; Francis and Simon, 1987; Mayhew and Wilkins, 
2003; Titman and Trueman, 1986).
Consistent with Carter and Manaster’s (1990) findings that higher quality 
underwriters market lower-risk IPOs to protect their reputation capital developed 
over time, Michaely and Shaw (1995) argue that higher-quality auditors also market 
lower-risk firms to protect their long established reputations. In addition, most 
accounting firms specialize their auditing practices in a particular industry because 
they believe that industry specialization leads to higher-quality audits and, hence, 
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reduces financial fraud (Carcello and Nagy, 2004). Mayhew and Wilkins (2003)
argue that audit firms with a large market share within an industry can develop more 
industry-specific knowledge and expertise and are able to spread industry-specific 
training costs over more clients. The findings of Wang and Wilkins (2007) suggest 
that an industry-dominating auditor benefits the clients in terms of reduced capital 
raising costs.
3.5.13 Pre-SEO
The literature shows that firms visiting the equity market frequently to raise capital 
are able to reduce the information asymmetry because their prior issues provide more 
information to the investors (Ghosh, et al., 2000; Goodwin, 2008; Mola and 
Loughran, 2004). Moreover, the knowledge of the investors on the prior performance 
of the firm may reflect less placement pressure for the underwriters and even for the 
issuers. Hence, issuers may have more bargaining power regarding the underwriting 
discount.
Furthermore, underwriters can better predict the investors’ behavior for the issues by 
visiting the seasoned equity market more frequently. The combined effect of 
underwriters’ bargaining power and the reduced information asymmetry may raise 
the slope of the negatively-sloped costs curve. The literature suggests a negative 
effect on underpricing of frequently visiting the equity market (Ghosh, et al., 2000; 
Goodwin, 2008; Mola and Loughran, 2004).
3.5.14 Property Type
The REIT industry started to classify REITs into different property sectors based on 
the similarities in the characteristics of properties in a portfolio (Chan, et al., 2003).
For example, REITWATCH of July 1999 reports nine different property categories 
such as lodging/resorts, diversified, healthcare, industrial/office, mortgage-backed 
securities, residential, retail, self-storage and specialty. The lease maturities of 
different property types might also determine the needs of capital in a particular 
property type. For example, REITWATCH of July 1999 reports the largest amount 
of initial capital was raised by the industrial/office sector, which might be 
attributable to the longer maturities of lease contracts for industrial/office property 
(Gokkaya, et al., 2011).
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The performance of underlying properties might affect the stock market performance 
of different REIT property types. For example, by analyzing stock index 
performance over three sub-periods from 1976 to 1995, Mueller and Laposa (1996)
report that REIT stock performance is related to the property sector concerned. 
Similar evidence is reported by Chen and Peiser (1999) who report the underlying 
property market positively determined the cross-sectional average return 
performances of the concerned sector from 1993-1997. Young (2000), however, 
finds integration in the equity REIT market and reports that the underlying property 
market is not an important determinant of REIT stock movement. The finding of 
Gyourko and Nelling (1996) also suggests that investors may not get significant 
benefit by investing in a portfolio solely based on investment property. However, 
their evidence reports property type is a significant determinant of firm beta.
The REIT literature shows that internally-generated capital varies across property 
sectors. Ambrose and Linneman (2001) report the lowest payout ratios for 
industrial/office property sectors and suggest that these sectors can utilize retained 
earnings to fund their growth. The largest source of internal capital may give this 
sector relatively stronger bargaining power with underwriters in raising equity 
capital. Moreover, the long-term lease contracts of industrial/office property result in 
certainty of rental income which reduces the volatility of cash flows and may 
inversely affect the adverse selection of investment. The nature of the property types 
affects ex-ante uncertainty of the firm due to the different level of management 
commitment. For example, Ling and Ryngaert (1997) state that the degree of risk 
varies between industrial warehouse and factory outlets, and the importance of 
management commitment also varies between industrial properties and more 
management-intensive hotels. This is also strongly supported by the evidence of 
difference in performance of REITs between diversified properties and specialized 
properties (Benefield, Anderson and Zumpano, 2009).
Brau and Heywood (2008) suggest an inter-temporal pattern of healthcare REITs. 
Chen and Lu (2006), Ling and Ryngaert (1997), and Sahi and Lee (2001) report 
significant differences in IPO underpricing across property types. Gokkaya, et al. 
(2011) report lower underwriting spreads for REIT SEOs investing in 
industrial/office property. Goodwin (2008) has not found any significant effect on 
CHAPTER THREE DATA and METHODS
60
SEO indirect costs. This evidence suggests that the underlying property type might 
have an influence on the costs of raising equity capital.
3.5.15 Percentage of Shares Offered in the IPO
The percentage of shares offered in the IPO with respect to the IPO outstanding 
volume measures the retention by existing owners (Bairagi and Dimovski, 2011; 
Ritter, 1984). This is opposite to the overhang which is the number of shares retained 
relative to the total number of shares issued (Bradley and Jordan, 2002; Chung, et al.,
2005; Dolvin and Pyles, 2009; Loughran and Ritter, 2004) and predicts higher 
underpricing for greater participation by existing owners. Overhang in REIT IPOs is 
significantly lower than industrial IPOs, because REITs usually commence their 
operation with IPO proceeds (Dolvin and Pyles, 2009). More specifically, Dolvin 
and Pyles (2009) state that “firms that have high underpricing may actually have 
lower issuance cost if owners retain a large portion of shares”.
3.5.16 Intended Usage of IPO Proceeds
The rules of the SEC mandate the IPO-issuing firms to disclose their intended use of 
proceeds. To meet this requirement, issuers may choose to disclose in detail or with a 
vague overview because both affect their indirect cost of underpricing. For example, 
to reduce the money left on the table, issuers want to reduce the ex-ante uncertainty31
by disclosing the dollar details of the intended use of IPO proceeds. However, 
alternatively, they may intentionally give a vague overview because of the fear of 
releasing proprietary information and the constrained flexibility32 in using such 
proceeds as per their needs (Leone, et al., 2007). Their results suggest that use-of-
proceeds disclosure aids investors in evaluating IPOs by narrowing the dispersion in 
their estimated secondary market value. Leone, et al. (2007) document that IPOs 
disclosing detailed intended uses of proceeds leave less money on the table through 
reduced underpricing. 
31 Ex-ante uncertainty positively influences underpricing (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Rock, 1986).
32 Leone, et al. (2007) report that their consultations with investment bankers and securities lawyers 
confirm that typical issuers prefer vague disclosure because SEC rules require them to report ex post 
on the uses of the proceeds.
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3.5.17 Maryland State of Incorporation
The corporate decision-makers of firms going public consider a number of factors 
such as the applicability of the state’s law, availability of the state’s courts, and use 
of the state administrative services including corporate franchise tax, before they 
incorporate in a particular state. The state also competes in the market for 
incorporations by customizing their corporate laws to the taste of corporate decision-
makers (Kahan and Kamar, 2000). Hartzell, et al. (2008) report 68% of their sample 
REIT IPOs are incorporated in Maryland. However, Maryland provides strong anti-
takeover protection and management entrenchment which might cause conflicts of 
interest between management and shareholders, and requires higher initial returns 
through underpricing to compensate the shareholder. 
Each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia in the U.S.A. has its own 
corporate law of incorporation with a unique court system to resolve corporate 
disputes. However, Delaware and Maryland attract most of the corporations by 
customizing its corporate laws to satisfy the taste of the firms going public. Delaware 
is dominant in attracting about half of all U.S. public corporations (Kahan and Kamar 
2000). The evidence also shows that investors get higher value if the firm is 
incorporated in Delaware because Delaware provides better facilities in takeover bids 
(Daines, 2001). REITs incorporated in Maryland can also enjoy minimum franchise 
corporate tax. All these factors make Maryland a management-friendly state which, 
again, might influence the costs of raising equity capital.
3.5.18 Multiple Book-running Managers 
Along with the reputation of the lead underwriter, the number of lead underwriters in 
an underwriting syndicate may affect the costs of raising equity capital. The 
underwriting syndicate commences its operation after appointment of a book 
manager who ferociously competes to be in the top position of a syndicate for the 
largest, most desirable offers. This competition is fierce because the position as a 
book manager ensures future underwriting business along with a large share of the 
underwriting spread. The role of underwriter in the syndicate affects the distribution 
of the underwriting spread because the management fee of the gross underwriting 
spread is allocated between book managers and co-managers, with the book 
manager, typically, receiving a larger allocation. Moreover, a large portion of the 
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gross spread is a selling concession constituting, typically, 60% allocated among the 
underwriters based on the selling allocation. The book manager allocates the selling 
credits to the underwriters in the syndicate and keeps the largest allocation for the 
institutional invetsment. Hence, the position of book manager in an underwriting 
syndicate brings in more underwriting rental as well as the possibility of being 
selected as a book manager in future syndicates. Thus, the benefits of a book-
managing position in a syndicate motivate prestigious book-managing underwriters 
not to include other underwriters as joint book-managing underwriters unless s/he 
gets sizable allocations.33
The empirical evidence of SEO underwriting shows mixed effects from multiple 
book-managing underwriters on underwriting spreads. Jeon and Ligon (2011) report 
higher underwriting spreads, while Butler, et al. (2005) document lower underwriting 
spreads for SEOs with multiple book-managing underwriters. Butler, et al. (2005)
argue that the coordination of multiple book-managers can more efficiently manage 
the selling and underwriting syndicates than a single-book manager. Thus, the 
number of book-managing underwriters may influence such costs. 
3.5.19 Underwriter Syndicate Size
Underwriters in the syndicate perform the function of distributing shares to the 
potential investors. A large number of underwriters in the syndicate help the 
managing underwriter to perform the distribution function efficiently and, thereby, 
reduce the risks of distribution. However, at the same time, having multiple
underwriters can lead to other problems such as selling their portion to speculative 
investors or flippers34 and having it returned to the managing underwriter. Bhagat 
and Frost (1986) state that an underwriting syndicate reduces the unsystematic risk 
associated with a larger offer. Also, larger underwriting syndicates generally 
decrease the risks involved in successful distribution (Carter and Dark, 1990),
significantly allocate more stocks to retail investors (Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri, 
2002) and require significantly fewer price revisions (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr., 
2003).
33 For details, please see Corwin and Schultz (2005) which contains the basis of most of this concept.
34 Short-term investors who spin shares out into public markets for a quick profit.
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The empirical evidence of the underwriting syndicate size on underwriting spreads is 
inconclusive because, for example, Carter and Dark (1990) report a statistically 
significant negative effect of the syndicate size on underwriting fees, whereas, 
Corwin and Schultz (2005) report that issuers benefit from more underwriters in the 
syndicate. Their findings also imply increased underwriting spreads for larger 
syndicates. This is consistent with Bhagat and Frost (1986), that is, that the size of 
the syndicate positively influences the cost of organizing and managing the 
syndicate. Jeon and Ligon (2011) document SEO underwriting spreads as a quadratic 
function of the number of co-managers, with spreads first rising but ultimately 
declining with the number of co-managers. 
3.5.20 Individual Ownership Limit 
Ownership limit for an individual investor, as stated in the offer prospectus, affects 
the post-offer liquidity of stock by determining the number of shareholders. Large 
numbers of small shareholders raise the aftermarket liquidity of the IPOs because 
liquidity is the presence of continuous trading which, in turn, is affected by the size 
of the shareholder base (Demsetz, 1968). Active participation of the small 
shareholders in the aftermarket trading enhances the aftermarket liquidity. This 
trading liquidity is one of the important objectives of any IPO (Pham, Kalev and 
Steen 2003). The merits and demerits of enhancing trading liquidity through 
ownership dispersion are specifically stated in Pham, et al. (2003). The literature 
shows a mixed effect of ownership concentration on a firm’s value, because 
empirical evidence supports a higher firm value for both a higher (Amihud and  
Mendelson, 1986) and a lower level of liquidity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 confined the ownership limit for a REIT 
individual investor. More specifically, to comply with this Code, REIT charters 
usually prohibit any person from acquiring or holding, directly or indirectly, stock in 
excess of a certain percentage of the aggregate outstanding shares. A higher 
ownership limit reduces the number of total shareholders which, however, makes it 
cost-effective to collect additional information not readily available to them 
regarding the firm’s true value (Booth and Chua, 1996). Hence, to actively control 
and monitor the firm’s activities, IPO issuers sacrifice the aftermarket liquidity 
consideration of shares (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Pham, et al., 2003) by raising 
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the concentration of ownership through higher ownership limits for a single 
shareholder. As an ownership limit might affect the post-offer liquidity, it can also be 
expected that it might influence the costs of raising equity, particularly for IPOs.
3.5.21 Number of Potential Risk Factors 
The number of risk factors listed in the IPO prospectus can be used as a proxy for 
information asymmetry, and reduced underwriters’ liability (Beatty and Welch, 
1996) due to adverse disclosures and disclosure-related costs (Verrecchia, 2001).
Simunic (1987) and Leone, et al. (2007) discuss the number of risk factors listed in 
an IPO prospectus. Beatty and Welch (1996) argue that firms can reduce expert 
compensation by citing more adverse risk factors in the prospectus, because section 
11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes reduced liability for issuers when they 
indicate more adverse risk factors in the prospectus. Based on this argument, it can 
be expected that disclosing the potential adverse risks can signal lower information 
asymmetry and underwriters’ liability which, in turn, motivate underwriters to charge 
lower fees and require issuers to spend a lower amount on non-underwriting other 
direct expenses. 
3.5.22 Global Financial Crisis
The widespread availability of risk-priced mortgage credit (subprime) along with the 
low interest rates, lax mortgage standards and unusually strong purchases of houses 
as second homes as well as for investment, caused U.S. house prices to sharply 
increase between 1998 and 2006 (Wheaton and Nechayev, 2008). U.S. federal 
monetary policy changed and the interest rate rose during 2006-2007 which led to 
increased foreclosure35 rates during 2006-2007 when a large number of homeowners 
failed to pay their mortgage obligations in response to rising interest rates. More 
foreclosures led to bigger home inventories for the lending financial institutions 
which, ultimately, resulted in mismatching of the demand and supply of houses. This 
mismatching of demand for and supply of home inventory led to falling house prices 
in 2006-2007 and resulted in many financial institutions going bankrupt (Laopodis, 
2009). The U.S. subprime mortgage-led mismatching of the housing inventory 
35 A cour ruling which allows lenders to possess the mortgage properties provided borrowers failed to 
pay the regular instalments.
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caused the financial crisis in U.S. markets which inevitably spread into global 
financial markets (Zandi, 2008). This global financial crisis also negatively affected 
the issuances of global IPOs (Boulton, et al., 2011). Ling and Ryngaert (1997) 
describe a similar type of real estate recession leading to a flood of foreclosures and 
bankruptcies in many financial institutions.
The recent global financial crisis which erupted in August 2007 (Gordon and 
Valentine, 2009) is, thus, attributed to the sharp downturn in real estate prices 
(Laopodis, 2009). It can, therefore, be expected that such a real estate led financial 
crisis might raise the uncertainty among REIT participants about the stock value and 
raise the costs of raising equity capital during the global financial crisis period.
3.5.23 Umbrella Partnership REIT structure
The umbrella partnership36 REIT structure (UPREIT) is the combination of a 
partnership and a REIT. It originated after the formation of a limited partnership by 
“sponsors” who, subsequent to formation of the UPREIT, transfer their properties to 
the UPREIT in exchange for limited partnership interests in terms of operating 
partnership units, or OP units. It also offers all the tax advantages of the basic REIT 
(Cornell, 1997). The first UPREIT IPO was ushered in by Taubman Centers in 1992 
(Chen and Lu, 2006). The OP units are exchangeable for either cash or common 
stock after a lock-up period of usually one or two years, and can also be used as 
collateral to finance the personal needs of the holder. The OP unit holders, with large 
economic interest at stake and expertise in developing and managing properties, are 
motivated to actively monitor the firm’s management. Their experienced monitoring 
may increase the firm value (Han, 2006) but also creates tax-induced conflicts of 
interest in managing such properties (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997). As the presence of 
an UPREIT structure positively contributes to the firm’s value (Han, 2006) and can 
use its available tax advantages to acquire properties at lower prices, it implicitly 
reduces its costs of capital (Hartzell, Sun and Titman, 2006). An UPREIT structure
also reduces liquidity risk and attracts more investors (Chen and Lu, 2006), which 
may motivate underwriters to demand a lower underwriting discount. However, the 
36Cornell (1997) describes the literal meaning of an umbrella partnership using the analogy of an 
umbrella which has numerous spines connected at its tip, staff and handle. The staff and handle of an 
umbrella represent the limited partners and managing partner of an UPREIT.
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valuation uncertainties arising from conflicts of interest in managing UPREIT 
properties (Harrison, Panasian and Seiler, 2011; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997) require 
more money to be left for subscribing investors. 
3.5.24 Equity REIT Type
REITs are categorized into equity, mortgage, and hybrid REITs based on the 
investment concentration in their portfolio of assets, as defined by the National 
Association of REIT (NAREIT). A portfolio of equity REITs is tangible, 
infrequently-traded, immobile, and requires more active management (hotels, 
apartments, shopping centers, industrial warehouses, etc.), whereas, that of a 
mortgage REIT consists of frequently-traded financial assets requiring more passive 
management efforts (Glascock, Hughes and Varshney, 1998) which generates fixed 
income (Brown, 2000). Equity REITs and mortgage REITs mandatorily possess at 
least 75% of their assets in income-generating real estate property and mortgage 
obligations, respectively (Glascock, Lu and So, 2000). This difference in portfolio 
holdings makes cash flows of equity REIT IPOs more volatile and less predictable 
(Chen and Lu, 2006).
Glascock, et al. (1998) document the post-IPO higher liquidity of equity REITs than 
that of mortgage REITs in terms of bid-ask spread. However, stock returns of equity 
REITs perform better than that of mortgage REITs during a real estate downturn. 
This is due to the significantly higher financial distress-related costs incurred by 
mortgage REITs (Brown, 2000). Chan, Leung and Wang (1998) find some evidence 
of institutional investors preferring equity REIT IPOs. 
Further, the lower predictability and higher volatility of cash flows of equity REIT 
IPOs may need more underwriting and non-underwriting resources. Below, et al.
(1995) report higher underpricing for equity REIT IPOs during 1972-1988, which is 
consistent with Wang, et al. (1992). Chen and Lu (2006) report 3.2% underpricing 
for 132 equity REIT IPOs, against 0.63% for 17 mortgage REIT IPOs, and attribute 
this difference to the higher transparency of mortgage REITs with less volatile and 
more predictable cash flows. However, as the stocks in the SEOs already have a 
trading history, these predictions are relatively easier to make for SEOs of equity 
REITs. 
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3.5.25 Trading Exchange 
Listing on a trading exchange is important to the IPO issuers because trading 
exchanges can affect trading costs and the post-listing liquidity of the stocks due to 
the different trading technologies used. The NYSE has a broad investor base, 
credible certification, higher liquidity, less chance of delisting and better marketing 
efforts. Moreover, listing on the NYSE increases the liquidity and may signal 
positive information (Clayton and MacKinnon, 2000; Grammatikos and 
Papaioannou, 1986; Kadlec and McConnell, 1994; Sanger and McConnell, 1986).
Due to this higher liquidity and lower trading costs, issuers - particularly foreign 
firms (Foucault and Parlour, 2004) and those with larger offers (Angel and Aggarwal 
(working papers); Corwin and Harris, 2001) - choose the NYSE for listing (Cowan, 
Carter, Dark and Singh, 1992) because liquidity inversely affects the information 
asymmetry of REITs (Clayton and MacKinnon, 2000). However, the NYSE 
relatively charge higher fees compared to other trading exchanges (Corwin and 
Harris, 2001; Foucault and Parlour, 2004).
3.5.26 REIT Dominating Underwriter 
Underwriters can use their fees as a determinant of their future underwriting 
business. More specifically, Dunbar (2000) argues that less-established underwriting 
firms can attract underwriting business by reducing their fees, whereas established 
underwriting firms can increase their fees as compensation for using their reputation. 
Chen and Ritter (2000) argue that underwriter spreads signal the quality of 
underwriting and that “An underwriter charging a low fee might raise concerns 
about its willingness to engage in price stabilization, provide analyst coverage, 
exercise care in helping to write a prospectus, aggressively market a deal, and so 
forth”. Further, they also argue that “Reputation effects overcome some of the 
information asymmetries: If Goldman Sachs decided to cut its spreads, few issuers 
would conjecture that it had become a low-quality underwriter” (p. 1124).
A number of studies assume an imperfectly competitive underwriting industry in 
explaining capital raising costs (Hoberg, 2007). Most of these studies assume tacit 
collusion among underwriters resulting from their information heterogeneity or 
capacity constraints and barriers to entry into the industry. Liu and Ritter (2011)
assume and model that each industry has some underwriters with differentiated 
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market power and issuers are also willing to pay for these differentiated services. 
Quality of underwriting also depends on underwriting spreads because underwriting 
spreads affect the underwriting services including price stabilization, levels of 
analyst coverage, underwriters’ efforts in preparing prospectuses, aggressiveness in 
marketing an offer, and so forth (Chen and Ritter, 2000). The arguments of Butler, et 
al. (2005) that well-reputed underwriters may earn substantial rents from SEO 
underwriting, and the findings of Beatty and Welch (1996) that well-reputed 
underwriters can earn a premium on their built-up reputation capital, posit that 
issuers need to pay more for hiring top-ranked industry-differentiated underwriters. 
Aggarwal, et al. (2002) support this expectation by reporting higher initial returns for 
IPOs underwritten by underwriters with higher market share.
3.5.27 Prior Year Number of IPOs
The literature shows that IPOs in the most recent past have an information spillover 
effect on the indirect costs of underpricing. More specifically, the number of IPOs 
issued  recently signals the investors about the price for the current offer (Benveniste,
Ljungqvist, Wilhelm and Yu, 2003; Chung, et al., 2005; Ellul and Pagano, 2006),
because Benveniste, et al. (2003) document that information production about 
common stock valuation spills over. Benveniste, et al. (2003) report that the number 
of IPOs issued during the prior quarter significantly negatively affects underpricing 
in the current quarter due to the spillover effect of information production, whereas, 
Chung, et al. (2005) find the number of IPOs issued during the current month has a 
negative effect on underpricing. 
3.5.28 IPOs During Hot Periods
IPO issuances substantially fluctuate over time in an economy, and even in an 
industry or sub-industry, due to the emerging opportunities in that economy or 
industry. When an economy or an industry, or a sub-industry in an economy, 
experiences an unusually high volume of offerings or a radical surge with 
considerably more IPOs or a very few IPOs, the IPO market is referred to as 
experiencing a “hot period” or “cold period”, respectively (Buttimer, et al., 2005; 
Helwege and Liang, 2004). Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) first document the hot issue 
markets of IPOs. The finance literature attributes this IPO volume variance to market 
irrationality (Lerner, 1994; Rajan and Servaes, 1997; Ritter, 1984) and characterizes 
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hot markets as the presence of both extremely high initial returns (Ibbotson, et al.,
1988; Ibbotson, et al., 1994; Lowry, et al., 2010), irrationally optimistic investors 
(Ljungqvist, Nand and Singh, 2006), and extraordinarily high volatility of initial 
returns (Lowry, et al., 2010).
The rational model of Pastor and Veronesi (2005) attributes IPO volume fluctuations 
to the varying market conditions, and they expect higher stock prices in hot than in 
cold markets. Finance professionals have tended to explain the reasons for the 
volume variation over time. Lowry (2003), in her study on “Why does IPO volume 
fluctuate so much?”, consolidates three general hypotheses to better explain the 
reasons of IPO volume variation. Her three hypotheses are capital demand 
hypothesis, information asymmetry hypothesis, and investor sentiment hypothesis. 
The capital demand hypothesis posits that changes in economic conditions make 
better profit opportunities for a privately-owned firm, which induces the privately-
owned firm to raise capital by issuing equity or bonds. When aggregate demand for 
capital increases, more firms go to the IPO market.
The information asymmetry hypothesis, which asserts adverse selection costs due to  
the information asymmetry between managers and investors, also changes over time. 
Her information asymmetry hypothesis predicts an inverse relation between 
information asymmetry and IPO volume issuance. 
Finally, her investor sentiment hypothesis posits the level of variation in investor 
optimism over time. Hence, overly optimistic investors usually pay more for firms 
than they are worth. The findings of Lee et al. (1996) and Rajan and Servaes (1997)
are consistent with this hypothesis. The findings of Lowry (2003), however, 
document firm’s capital demand and investor sentiment to determine the IPO volume 
variation. 
Buttimer, et al. (2005), however, find the capital demand hypothesis best describes 
the general REIT IPO volume variation because their evidence is weak in favor of 
the information asymmetry hypothesis, and goes against the investor sentiment
hypothesis. The evidence of Brau and Heywood (2008) is, thus, in contrast to that of 
Buttimer, et al. (2005) because Brau and Heywood (2008), with 23 healthcare REIT 
IPOs and 118 healthcare REIT SEOs from 1978-2007, report evidence against the 
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capital demand hypothesis but in favor of both information asymmetry and investor 
sentiment hypotheses. The different findings within the REIT industry strongly 
support the findings of Helwege and Liang (2004) that IPO volume variation tends to 
concentrate even in a sub-industry. Sahi and Lee (2001) report higher underpricing 
for property IPOs during the boom period.
3.5.29 Internally-Managed REIT
REITs were mandatorily managed by external management until the private letter 
rulings of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1986 relaxed them, allowing them to 
make their own investment decisions and to manage the day-to-day operations of 
their properties (Brockman, French and Tamm, 2008; Sun, 2010). However, the 
hiring of managers from outside sources potentially creates conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and the external professionals.
3.5.30 Post REIT Modernization Act 1999
President Bill Clinton signed the REIT Modernization Act 1999 (RMA)37 on
December 17, 1999, which became effective from January 1, 2001 (Howe and Jain, 
2004). Howe and Jain (2004), based on the analysis of Edwards (1999), discussed the 
expected benefits of the RMA to the REIT industry. Included were the benefits of 
Taxable REIT Subsidiaries (TRSs), a reduction in the mandatory payout level,
benefits of healthcare and lodging REITs, and other regulatory changes. The TRS 
provision of RMA allowed a REIT to set up a taxable subsidiary (with up to 100 per 
cent ownership) to provide ancillary services to its tenants and others. However, it 
also imposed size limits and provided strict financial and operating guidelines. The 
TRSs under the RMA are expected to generate higher revenues and profitability from 
an additional revenue stream and, hence, may result in reduced volatility of revenues. 
Howe and Jain (2004) report reduced systematic risk after enactment of the RMA. 
The RMA reduced the mandatory distribution requirement of earnings from 95% to 
90%, which may increase the flow of internal capital for REITs to fund their growth. 
As mortgage REITs cannot use depreciation tax shields, Howe and Jain (2004)
37 The RMA was part of the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999.
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expect the effect of reduced dividend payouts to bring a relatively more positive 
wealth effect for mortgage REIT shareholders than for equity REIT shareholders. 
The RMA allowed healthcare REITs to hire an independent contractor to operate 
healthcare facilities without a lease for up to six years. The RMA also gave 
healthcare REITs greater flexibility during foreclosure at the end of the lease period. 
Howe and Jain (2004) expect the RMA to positively affect the share prices of 
healthcare REITs.
The RMA provisions also relaxed some of the regulatory guidelines. They included 
the calculation of personal property rents from an adjusted tax basis to a fair market 
value, enabling shareholders to test the corporation as an independent contractor, and 
technical changes in the distributional requirement of pre-REIT earnings and profits 
after becoming or merging with a REIT. Howe and Jain (2004) argue that these 
regulatory changes might affect the demand and thereby result in a benefit for the 
REIT industry. 
Overall, the RMA provisions reduced the payout requirement and the systematic risk, 
along with positively affecting the demand for the REIT industry. The combined 
effect of the RMA provisions, therefore, might raise the bargaining strength of the 
issuer, and reduce the uncertainty of underwriters for SEOs issued after the 
enactment of the RMA1999 in January 2001. 
3.6   Conclusion
This chapter presents the sources of both IPOs and SEOs, methods of analysis and 
the variables used in the analysis. The chapter reports that Electronic Data Gathering 
Analysis and Review (EDGAR) is the main source of both IPO and SEO 
prospectuses. Closing marketing prices are collected from the Center for Research on 
Securities Prices (CRSP) and Bloomberg databases. The World Development 
Indicator, NAREIT, and Ritter’s home page have been used as sources for GDP price 
deflation/inflation, industry-related data and underwriter reputations. The overall 
analysis is based on descriptive statistics, graphical presentations, univariate, 
bivariate, ordinary least squares regressions and Tobit regressions. Variables used in 
the analysis chapters are briefly discussed with the empirical evidence related to both 
industrial and REIT IPOs and SEOs. Table 3.1 in Appendix presents the variables 
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along with their expected effects in influencing the direct and indirect costs of both 
IPOs and SEOs.
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Appendix
Table 3.1: Variables along with their expected effect in influencing both direct and indirect costs
Variable Expected Signs
IPOs SEOs
Direct 
Costs
Indirect 
Costs
Direct 
Costs
Indirect 
Costs
Offer size - +/- - +/-
Underwriting Spreads N/A - N/A -
Other direct expenses N/A - N/A -
Offer price - - - -
Underwriter reputation +/- +/- +/- +/-
Level of Representative Underwriting N/A N/A - N/A
Relative offer Size N/A N/A + +
Prior Stock Return Volatility N/A N/A N/A +
Yields on ten-year Treasury Securities N/A N/A + N/A
REIT Industry Return Volatility + N/A N/A N/A
Industry Dividend Yield (NAREIT) +/- +/- N/A N/A
Top Auditor (REIT Dominating) - - - -
Pre-SEO N/A N/A - -
Property Type N/A +/- - -
Percentage of Shares Offered in IPO N/A - N/A N/A
Intended Use of IPO Proceeds N/A + N/A N/A
Maryland Incorporation Law +/- +/- - -
Multiple Book-Running Managers N/A N/A + +/-
Underwriting Syndicate Size - N/A +/- N/A
Individual Ownership Limit for IPOs + N/A N/A N/A
Number of Potential Risk Factors - N/A N/A N/A
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) + + + +
Umbrella Partnership REITs Structure - + - +
Equity REIT Type + + - N/A
Trading Exchange (NYSE) + - - -
REIT Dominating Underwriter + N/A + +
Prior Year Number of IPOs N/A - N/A N/A
IPOs during hot periods N/A + N/A N/A
Internally Managed REITs N/A N/A +/- +/-
Post REIT Modernization Era N/A N/A - -
Source: Prepared by Author
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CHAPTER FOUR
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
4.1   Introduction
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics for the costs of raising equity capital 
with the sample of 127 IPOs and 800 SEOs issued by U.S. Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs) during 1996-2010. The sample period is divided into three sub-
periods of 1996-2000, 2001-2006 and 2007-2010 to explore any trends in such costs. 
The period 1996-2000 is split because the REIT Modernization Act 1999 
(RMA1999) became effective from January 2001 (Howe and Jain, 2004) and the 
S&P500 started to include some of the REITs in its index from 2001 (Laopodis, 
2009). The RMA1999 was expected to reduce the systematic risk and also the 
mandatory dividend payout for REITs from 95% to 90%. The sub-period 2007-2010 
is explored because of the recent global financial crisis (GFC) which began in 
August 2007 (Gordon and Valentine, 2009) due to a sharp downturn in real estate 
prices (Laopodis 2009). Hence, capital raising costs might be influenced differently 
in the post-2007 period. 
The chapter presents the different levels of costs involved in issuing both IPOs and 
SEOs and, initially, analyses their potential determinants based on tabulations, 
graphical presentations, and univariate and bivariate differences. The preliminary 
analysis of the chapter relies on differences between means and medians of different 
sample groups and portfolios, and their level of significance based on student’s t 
statistics and nonparametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Rank Sum (z) statistics along 
with their associated p values (Lee and Masulis, 2009). Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon is 
used to test the robustness of student’s t statistics because it is robust for data which 
might suffer from non-normality. To understand the pattern of normality of the 
variables, the skewness and kurtosis of the variables have also been reported. The 
nominal offer proceeds (realproceeds) of IPOs and SEOs averaged $231.54 
($273.00) and $138.97 ($157.49) million, respectively. This implies that IPOs, on 
average, raised substantially larger proceeds than SEOs. 
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The results report the direct costs of IPOs average 8.43%, consisting of the 
underwriting fees of 6.47% and the non-underwriting other direct expenses of 1.96%. 
Moreover, the chapter reports the total costs of issuing IPOs average 11.49% 
including the indirect cost of underpricing of 3.07%. 
The direct costs of SEOs average 4.63%, consisting of the underwriting discounts 
(spreads) of 4.17% and the non-underwriting other direct expenses of 0.47%. The 
total costs of SEOs averaged 5.80%, including the indirect cost of underpricing of 
1.18%. The results are consistent with those of industrial firms, reporting 
substantially higher costs for IPOs than for SEOs (Kim, et al., 2010). The results also 
complement the substantially lower direct costs and indirect costs of raising seasoned 
equity capital for REITs compared to industrial firms (Goodwin, 2008; Lee and 
Masulis, 2009).
The descriptive statistics report that both the direct and the indirect costs of 
underpricing decrease over time for IPOs, while those of SEOs decrease for 
underwriting discounts but increase for the indirect costs during this sample period. 
Consistent with the existing literature, underwriting costs enjoy economies of scale
with offer size (Lee, et al., 1996) due to the fixed components of the underwriting 
costs, but the indirect cost of underpricing for both IPOs and SEOs (Corwin, 2003) is 
a positive function of offer size. 
The asset holdings (equity/mortgage) and organizational structure of REITs are 
found to influence the costs of raising equity capital. More specifically, the statistics 
show equity REITs incur higher costs for IPOs but lower costs for SEOs, than 
mortgage REITs. Issues with umbrella partnership structures (UPREITs) pay lower 
compensation to underwriters but leave higher initial returns to the subscribing 
investors of both IPOs and SEOs. The higher indirect cost of underpricing for REITs 
with an UPREIT structure, in comparison to traditional REITs, is, however, 
statistically significant for SEOs but not for IPOs, and is consistent with the literature 
(Chen and Lu, 2006; Goodwin, 2008).
The state of incorporation and concentration in particular property types are found to 
affect issuing costs. Specifically, the results report Maryland as the dominant state, 
attracting 85% of IPOs and 80% of SEOs by extending its management-friendly 
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corporate regulations (Hartzell, et al., 2008). Both IPOs and SEOs incorporated in 
Maryland pay lower compensation to underwriters, but leave more money to the 
initial investors. However, the mean difference of lower underwriting direct costs is 
only statistically significant for IPOs. 
The results report significantly higher total costs for IPOs which are concentrated in 
industrial and office property, and lower total costs for those involved in mortgage 
backed securities (MBS). However, such property type concentration amongst SEO-
issuing REITs does not affect capital raising costs, except with healthcare REITs 
which leave significantly less money on the table (Table 4.1.10) (Brau and Heywood, 
2008).
Further, management structure, an industry-dominating auditor, a trading exchange 
where issues are listed, the reputation of underwriters, and the underwriting syndicate 
structure are also found to influence the issuing costs of both IPOs and SEOs. The 
results suggest that both IPOs and SEOs with internal managers incur higher total 
costs. 
Consistent with the existing evidence, the results also report lower underwriting and 
total costs for both IPOs and SEOs traded on the NYSE and audited by the industry-
dominating auditor (Ernst & Young). The effect of an industry-dominating auditor is 
significantly stronger for IPOs than for SEOs. IPOs and SEOs with higher ranked 
underwriters incur lower costs, and the significance is stronger for underwriting costs 
of IPOs and underpricing of SEOs. The level of representative underwriting is 
reported to inversely affect the costs of underwriting of SEOs. The underwriting 
syndicate size positively influences the direct costs of SEOs (Corwin and Schultz, 
2005).
This chapter contributes to the literature in a number of ways. It provides the 
literature with the underwriting and non-underwriting other direct expenses for both 
IPOs and SEOs after the bursting of the dot.com bubble in 2000 and, in particular, 
extends the works of Chen and Lu (2006) on IPOs, and Goodwin (2008) on SEOs of 
REITs. It also complements the effects of syndicate structure discussed in Corwin 
and Schultz (2005) and Huang and Zhang (2011).
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 present the 
descriptive statistics for IPOs and SEOs, respectively. Section 4.4 concludes the 
chapter.
4.2   Descriptive Statistics for REIT IPOs
This part concentrates on describing the statistics of the costs of raising equity capital 
by 127 U.S. REIT IPOs issued from 1996-2010. Table 4.1.1 presents the year and the 
three sub-periods’ average costs as a percentage of offer proceeds during 1996-2010.
The table shows that the number of REIT IPOs during the sample period peaked in 
both 1997 and 2004, with 1999 and 2008 experiencing the lowest number of 2 IPOs 
in those years. The table presents the year and the three sub-periods, the number of 
IPOs and the amount of IPO proceeds during the corresponding year and the sub-
periods in first, second and third columns, respectively. The underwriting fees 
(undfees), as presented in the fourth column, show a declining trend over the three 
sub-periods. The next four columns present IPO-related direct expenses (excluding 
underwriting fees) incurred by the issuing firm (ipodirexp); total direct costs 
(directcosts) consisting of both underwriting fees and IPO-related other direct 
expenses; underpricing (undprice) as a percentage change of offer price from the 
closing market price on the first trading day with respect to the offer price; and the 
total costs (totalcosts) consisting of both the total direct costs and the underpricing. 
The IPOs paid the lowest average underwriting fees of 6.05% and the highest of 
6.99% in 2006 and 2003, respectively. These IPOs, however, experienced an average 
overpricing of -1.70% (meaning an offer price is higher than the first-day closing 
market price) and the highest underpricing of 7.06% in 2009 and 1997, respectively. 
Similarly, in terms of the direct IPO-related expenses incurred, the lowest and the 
highest costs averaged 0.54% and 2.99% in 2008 and 1999, respectively. The highest 
and the lowest total costs of 15.81% and 5.23% were incurred in 1997 and 2009, 
respectively.
Overall, the equally-weighted costs of underwriting fees, other direct expenses, total 
direct costs, underpricing and total costs average 6.47%, 1.96%, 8.43%, 3.07% and 
11.49%, respectively. The declining trend of these costs over time reflects the
significance and acceptability of REITs to investors.
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Table 4.1.1: Year and sub-period wise distribution of the costs of raising equity capital for 127 
U.S. REITs IPOs during 1996-2010
Year of
IPO N ipoamount undfees ipodirexp directcosts undprice totalcosts
1996 4 248.89 6.44 1.94 8.38 4.69 13.07
1997 27 197.03 6.70 2.05 8.75 7.06 15.81
1998 15 130.86 6.36 2.24 8.60 0.96 9.56
1999 2 146.00 6.57 2.98 9.54 1.26 10.80
2002 3 202.73 6.75 2.60 9.35 -1.22 8.13
2003 7 309.32 6.96 1.40 8.36 4.70 13.06
2004 29 222.59 6.53 2.05 8.57 4.84 13.41
2005 11 296.93 6.23 1.78 8.01 0.95 8.96
2006 5 391.48 6.05 1.84 7.88 1.75 9.63
2007 4 403.89 6.31 0.74 7.05 -0.37 6.69
2008 2 220.00 6.62 0.54 7.16 -0.21 6.95
2009 9 288.90 5.68 1.25 6.93 -1.70 5.23
2010 9 191.95 6.59 2.83 9.38 -0.93 8.45
1996-2000 48 178.55 6.57 2.14 8.71 4.72 13.42
2001-2006 55 262.76 6.49 1.92 8.41 3.43 11.85
2007-2010 24 265.97 6.21 1.70 7.89 -1.06 6.83
Total 127 231.54 6.47 1.96 8.43 3.07 11.49
Where column 1 depicts the year and three sub-periods, and column 2 depicts the number of IPOs 
issued during the year and the corresponding sub-period. Column three presents the average IPO 
proceeds in nominal dollars in each year and corresponding sub-period. Next five columns show 
average costs in percentage.  The row labelled Total at the bottom of the table shows the total number 
of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in the second column and the equally-weighted average costs in 
subsequent five columns. The column heading ipoproceeds denote the IPO proceeds in nominal 
million dollars, undfees denote the underwriting fees, ipodirexp denotes non-underwriting other direct 
IPO related expenses, directcosts denotes the direct costs consisting of undfees and ipodirexp,
undprice denotes the indirect costs of underpricing and totalcosts denotes the total costs consisting of 
both directcosts and undrice. All costs are as percentage of offer proceeds.
4.2.1   Graphical Presentation of Costs
4.2.1.1   Scatter Plot of Underwriting Fees and IPO Proceeds
Figure 4.1.1 depicts the scatter plot of underwriting fees scaled as a percentage of 
offer proceeds, and the natural logarithm of proceeds for 127 REIT IPOs issued from 
1996-2010. The trend of fitted values clearly supports economies of scale in IPO 
underwriting fees, which is broadly similar to previous studies (Corwin and Harris, 
2001; Lee, et al., 1996; Ritter, 1987), and unlike the U-shaped (Altinkilic and 
Hansen, 2000; Chen and Lu, 2006; Hansen and Torregrosa, 1992) pattern to offer 
size. This study has checked the univariate relation with quadratic function between 
underwriting fees and offer size, however, find no significance.
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Figure 4.1.1: Scatter diagram of underwriting fees as a percentage of proceeds and natural logarithm 
of proceeds for 127 REIT IPOs during 1996-2010.
4.2.1.2   Scatter Plot of Underpricing and IPO Proceeds
Figure 4.1.2 depicts the scatter plot of underpricing as a percentage of offer proceeds 
and the natural logarithm of gross proceeds for 127 REIT IPOs issued during 1996-
2010. It depicts underpricing as a positive function of IPO gross proceeds.38 Beatty 
and Ritter (1986) and Chung, et al. (2005) document underpricing as a negative 
function of IPO proceeds. Dunbar (2000) documents underpricing as a U-shape 
pattern with the offer size. The results with both of my nominal and real proceeds, 
however, show underpricing as a positive function of offer size.
38 Ling and Ryngaert (1997) and Dolvin and Pyles (2009) report IPO offer size as an insignificant 
positive, but Bairagi and Dimovski (2011) document offer size as a significant positive determinant of
REIT IPO underpricing. Corwin and Harris (2001) and Hansen (2001) also report an insignificant 
positive effect with industrial IPOs.
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Figure 4.1.2: Scatter diagram of underpricing as a percentage of the proceeds and the natural 
logarithm of proceeds for 127 REIT IPOs during 1996-2010.
4.2.1.3   Linear Trend of Underwriting Fees and IPO Proceeds
Figure 4.1.3 depicts the trend of underwriting fees as a percentage of IPO proceeds 
for 127 REIT IPOs issued during 1996-2010. The figure shows a downward trend of 
underwriting fees over time with a number of turning points. The declining trend of 
underwriting fees over time is consistent with the IPO literature (Kim, et al., 2010)
and also with the expectation of Chen and Lu (2006), that both underwriters and 
investors will be familiar with REIT IPOs and, hence, underwriters may charge 
lower fees over time. 
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Figure 4.1.3: Trend of underwriting fees as a percentage of offer proceeds 127 REIT IPOs issued 
during 1996-2010.
4.2.1.4   Linear Trend of Underpricing and IPO Proceeds
Figure 4.1.4 presents the trend of underpricing for 127 REIT IPOs issued during 
1996-2010. It shows a declining trend of REIT IPO underpricing over the period, 
with two major peaks in 1997 and 2004. The declining trend of underpricing over 
time is consistent with the REIT IPO underpricing literature (Chen and Lu, 2006) but 
is inconsistent with the industrial IPO literature (Kim, et al., 2010). The two peaks 
are consistent with the hot IPO periods in REITs (Buttimer, et al., 2005; Chen and 
Ritter, 2000; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). The literature also supports the inter-
temporal variations in IPO underpricing (Loughran and Ritter, 2004).
Figure 4.1.4: Linear trend of underpricing as a percentage of proceeds for 127 REIT IPOs issued 
during 1996-2010.
4.2.2 Costs of Equity and Mortgage REIT IPOs
4.2.2.1   Equity REIT IPOs
Table 4.1.2 presents the year and the three sub-periods’ average costs as a percentage 
of offer proceeds for 77 equity REIT IPOs issued from 1996-2010. All levels of costs 
including equally-weighted average costs of underwriting fees, non-underwriting 
other direct expenses, total direct costs, underpricing and total costs are much higher 
than that of the full sample. This indicates that the initial estimation of cash flows for 
IPOs with equity investments may be comparatively more uncertain. The higher 
underpricing for equity REITs is consistent with Chen and Lu (2006) and Wang, 
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Chan and Gau (1992) but the higher underwriting fees are inconsistent with the 
findings of Chen and Lu (2006). This difference might be attributed to their first sub-
sample period of 1980-1989 during which they report only 49 REIT IPOs with 
equally-weighted underwriting fees of 7.19%, which are much higher than their 
overall sample average of 6.78%. During their first sub-period, REIT IPOs were 
offered on average 1.30% higher than the first-day closing market price (i.e., an 
average overpricing of 1.30%). This study attributes this inconsistency of 
underpricing between this result and that of Chen and Lu (2006) to the sample 
period, particularly their first sub-period. Analogous to the overall sample, my equity 
sub-sample also has no IPO during 2000-2001, with peaked year of issue remaining 
in both 1997 and 2004. Beyond this, there was no equity IPO in my sample in 2008. 
The equity REITs paid the lowest average underwriting fees of 5.82% in 2006, and 
the highest fees of 6.95% in 2003. These IPOs did not actually leave any money but 
rather gave negative returns of 0.93% on average to the initial subscribers (i.e., an 
overpricing of 0.93%) in 2007, however, they left the highest average underpricing 
of 7.15% in 2006. The equally-weighted average costs of underwriting fees, other 
direct expenses, direct costs, underpricing and total costs are 6.54%, 2.37%, 8.91%, 
4.20% and 13.11%, respectively. Overall, this sub-sample experiences a declining 
trend of costs in terms of underwriting fees, underpricing and total costs over the 
three sub-periods. The other direct expenses incurred by these IPOs are higher as a 
percent particularly during the post global financial crisis. These might be attributed 
to the diseconomies of scale of these expenses during this period.
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Table 4.1.2: Year and sub-period wise distribution of the costs of raising equity capital by 77 
U.S. Equity REIT IPOs during 1996-2010
Year of
IPO N ipoproceeds undfees ipodirexp directcosts undprice totalcosts
1996 4 248.89 6.44 1.94 8.38 4.69 13.07
1997 18 217.72 6.69 2.57 9.26 5.98 15.24
1998 8 151.04 6.51 2.62 9.12 4.46 13.59
1999 2 146.00 6.57 2.98 9.54 1.26 10.80
2002 2 258.60 6.62 2.10 8.72 0.10 8.82
2003 5 380.91 6.95 1.45 8.40 5.61 14.00
2004 18 248.67 6.56 2.25 8.81 6.62 15.43
2005 7 209.03 6.34 2.43 8.77 0.75 9.52
2006 2 792.84 5.82 1.04 6.86 7.15 14.01
2007 2 432.75 5.99 1.05 7.05 -0.93 6.11
2009 2 275.00 6.13 2.88 9.00 -0.20 8.80
2010 7 195.32 6.59 3.23 9.82 -0.83 8.98
1996-2000 32 200.46 6.61 2.53 9.13 5.15 14.28
2001-2006 34 292.55 6.53 2.09 8.62 4.91 13.53
2007-2010 11 253.01 6.39 2.77 9.17 -0.74 8.43
Total 77 248.63 6.54 2.37 8.91 4.20 13.11
Where column 1 depicts the year and the three sub-periods and column 2 depicts the number of IPOs 
issued during the year and the corresponding sub-period. Column three presents the average IPO 
proceeds in nominal dollars in each year and the corresponding sub-period. Next five columns show 
average costs in percentage.  The row labelled Total at the bottom of the table shows the total number 
of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in the second column and the equally-weighted average costs of 
raising equity capital by 77 U.S. equity REIT IPOs during the period of 1996-2010 in subsequent five 
columns. The column heading ipoproceeds denotes the IPO proceeds in nominal million dollars, 
undfees denotes the underwriting fees, ipodirexp denotes the non-underwriting other direct IPO 
related expenses, directcosts denotes the direct costs consisting of undfees and ipodirexp, undprice
denotes indirect costs of underpricing and totalcosts denotes the total costs consisting of both 
directcosts and undrice.
4.2.2.2   Mortgage REIT IPOs
Table 4.1.3 is analogous to Table 4.1.2 but reports results for the 50 mortgage REIT 
IPOs out of the total sample of 127 IPOs during 1996-2010. The underwriting fees, 
other direct expenses, total direct costs, underpricing and total costs average 6.35%, 
1.34%, 7.68%, 1.32% and 9.00%, respectively. 
No mortgage REIT IPO was issued in 1996, with the highest issues in a single year 
occurring in 1997 and 2004. These mortgage REIT IPOs paid the lowest 
underwriting fees of 5.56% in 2009 and the highest fees of 7.00% during 2002-2003.
However, these IPOs resulted in, on average, 3.85% negative returns to initial 
subscribing investors (overpricing) in 2002, and left the highest returns of 9.22% 
through underpricing in 1997. 
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Overall, this mortgage REIT IPO sub-period experiences a declining trend of costs in 
terms of underwriting fees, underpricing and total costs over the three sub-periods. 
Table 4.1.3: Year and the sub-period wise distribution of the costs of raising equity capital for 
50 U.S. Mortgage REIT IPOs during 1996-2010.
Year of
IPO N ipoproceeds undfees ipodirexp directcosts undprice totalcosts
1997 9 155.64 6.72 1.01 7.73 9.22 16.96
1998 7 107.81 6.19 1.82 8.01 -3.05 4.96
2002 1 91.00 7.00 3.59 10.59 -3.85 6.74
2003 2 130.95 7.00 1.28 8.29 2.43 10.72
2004 11 179.90 6.48 1.71 8.19 1.92 10.12
2005 4 450.74 6.04 0.64 6.69 1.29 7.99
2006 3 123.90 6.20 2.37 8.57 -1.86 6.71
2007 2 375.02 6.62 0.44 7.06 0.20 7.26
2008 2 220.00 6.62 0.54 7.16 -0.21 6.95
2009 7 292.87 5.56 0.78 6.34 -2.12 4.22
2010 2 180.00 6.62 1.40 7.83 -1.25 6.58
1996-2000 16 134.71 6.49 1.37 7.85 3.85 11.71
2001-2006 21 214.54 6.43 1.65 8.08 1.04 9.12
2007-2010 13 276.93 6.05 0.79 6.81 -1.34 5.47
Total 50 205.22 6.35 1.34 7.68 1.32 9.00
Where column 1 depicts the year and three sub-periods and column 2 depicts the number of IPOs 
issued during the year and the corresponding sub-period. Column three presents the average IPO 
proceeds in each year and the corresponding sub-period. Next five columns show average costs in 
percentage.  The row labelled Total at the bottom of the table shows the total number of Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) in the second column and the equally-weighted average costs of raising capital by 50 
U.S. mortgage Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) IPOs during the period of 1996-2010 in 
subsequent five columns. The column heading ipoproceeds denotes the IPO proceeds in nominal 
million dollars, undfees denotes the underwriting fees, ipodirexp denotes the non-underwriting other 
direct IPO related expenses, directcosts denotes the direct costs consisting of undfees and ipodirexp,
undprice denotes the indirect costs of underpricing and totalcosts denotes the total costs consisting of 
both directcosts and undrice. All costs are as percentage of offer proceeds.
4.2.2.3   Costs Difference between Equity and Mortgage REIT IPOs
Table 4.1.4 presents the test statistics of the difference in costs between equity and 
mortgage REIT IPOs, and complements the prior discussions by reporting the 
absolute higher costs for equity REIT IPOs. This study has used student’s absolute 
(t) and nonparametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Rank-Sum absolute (z) along with 
their corresponding p-values to test the significance of the difference between the 
two sample groups. All levels of costs, except higher underwriting fees, are 
statistically significant. It implies that equity REITs incur higher non-underwriting 
direct expenses and leave more money on the table. The statistically significant 
higher underpricing for equity REIT IPOs is consistent with the absolute higher 
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underpricing reported in the literature (Chen and Lu, 2006). It suggests that initial 
valuation of equity REIT IPOs is more uncertain due to their tangible asset holdings.
Table 4.1.4: Tests of differences in costs between equity and mortgage REITs for 127 IPOs 
issued by U.S. REITs during 1996-2010.
Variable N undfees ipodirexp directcosts undprice totalcosts
Equity REIT 77 6.54 2.37 8.91 4.20 13.11
Mortgage REIT 50 6.35 1.34 7.68 1.32 9.00
Difference 0.19 1.03 1.23 2.88 4.11
t-statistics 1.62 3.60 3.66 2.14 3.06
p-value 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
Wilcoxon Rank (Z) 0.61 4.08 3.82 2.78 3.85
p-value 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
The column heading undfese denotes the underwriting fees, ipodirexp denotes the non-underwriting
other IPO-related direct expenses, directcosts denotes the direct costs consisting of undfees and 
ipodirexp, undprice denotes the indirect costs of underpricing and totalcosts denotes the total costs 
consisting of both directcosts and undprice. All costs are as percentage of gross equity proceeds.
4.2.3 Costs of IPOs with UPREIT structure
Table 4.1.5 presents the year and three sub-period analyses of 72 REIT IPOs with an 
umbrella partnership structure (UPREIT), along with their associated levels of 
average issuing costs as a percentage of offer proceeds during 1996-2010. There 
were no UPREIT IPOs in 2000-2001 and 2008, with the largest number of issues in 
2004 (16 issues). They paid the lowest and the highest underwriting fees of 5.60% 
and 7.13% in 2009 and 1999, respectively. Their indirect cost ranges from 
overpricing of 3.03% to the underpricing of 9.94%, and their total costs range from 
the lowest to the highest of 3.38% and 18.54% in 2009 and 1997, respectively. The 
equally-weighted underwriting fees, other direct expenses, direct costs, underpricing 
and total costs average 6.37%, 2.29%, 8.65%, 3.23% and 11.88%, respectively, and 
are broadly in line with the existing literature (Chen and Lu, 2006). Overall, the sub-
sample with an UPREIT structure experienced a declining trend of costs in terms of 
other direct expenses and underpricing over the three sub-periods.
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Table 4.1.5: Year and sub-period wise distribution of the costs of raising equity capital by 72 
U.S. REIT IPOs with UPREIT structure during 1996-2010.
Year of
IPO N undfees ipodirexp directcosts undprice totalcosts
1996 4 6.44 1.94 8.38 4.69 13.07
1997 12 6.35 2.25 8.61 9.94 18.54
1998 8 6.22 2.54 8.75 1.89 10.64
1999 1 7.13 5.42 12.54 2.08 14.62
2002 2 6.62 2.10 8.72 0.10 8.82
2003 5 6.95 1.45 8.40 5.61 14.00
2004 16 6.40 2.68 9.08 2.99 12.08
2005 7 6.34 2.43 8.77 0.75 9.52
2006 2 5.82 1.04 6.86 7.15 14.01
2007 2 5.99 1.05 7.05 -0.93 6.11
2009 5 5.60 0.81 6.41 -3.03 3.38
2010 8 6.67 3.06 9.68 -0.20 9.48
1996-2000 25 6.36 2.42 8.77 6.21 11.73
2001-2006 32 6.45 2.30 8.75 2.99 12.00
2007-2010 15 6.22 2.04 8.24 -1.24 6.54
Total 72 6.37 2.29 8.65 3.23 11.88
The first and the 2nd column labelled year of IPO and N present the year with three sub-periods and 
the number of IPOs issued during the corresponding year and three sub-periods, respectively. The row 
labelled total shows the total number of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in the second column and the 
next four columns present the equally-weighted average costs of raising equity capital by 72 U.S. 
REITs IPOs with umbrella partnership (UPREIT) structure from 1996-2010. The column heading 
undfees denotes the underwriting fees, ipodirexp denotes the non-underwriting other IPO-related 
direct expenses, directcosts denotes the direct costs consisting of undfees and ipodirexp, undprice
denotes the indirect costs of underpricing and totalcosts denotes the total costs consisting of both 
directcosts and undrice. All costs are as percentage of offer proceeds. 
4.2.3.1   Difference in Costs between UPREIT and Traditional REIT IPOs
Table 4.1.6 presents the test statistics of differences in costs for REIT IPOs with an 
UPREIT and traditional organizational structure. The table shows lower underwriting 
fees with a significant mean difference for REITs with an UPREIT structure, but, in 
turn, they incur significantly higher non-underwriting other direct expenses. The 
higher mean and median underpricing for UPREITs in comparison to traditional 
REIT IPOs is statistically insignificant but consistent with the findings of Chen and 
Lu (2006). The median higher direct costs and total costs are statistically significant 
at 10%. 
Inspection of the data reveals that the average offer size for UPREIT IPOs is larger 
($255 million) than that of traditional IPOs ($201 million). The average underwriter 
rank for UPREIT IPOs is 7.70 against 7.38 for traditional IPOs. Additionally, both 
average offer size and top-ranked underwriter are greater in UPREIT IPOs. The data 
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shows the offer size of UPREIT IPOs with an average lead underwriter ranks greater 
than, or equal to 8.0, averaged $304 million against $185 million for traditional IPOs 
with an average lead underwriter ranked less than 8.0. The larger offer size and 
higher ranked underwriters might result in lower underwriting fees for UPREIT 
IPOs. Overall, both mean and median differences indicate that UPREIT structure 
positively influences the costs of raising initial equity capital and these might be 
attributed to the dominance of conflicts of interest in managing properties over the 
cost advantage of acquiring properties.
Table 4.1.6: Tests of differences in costs of REIT IPOs with UPREIT and traditional 
organizational structure for 127 IPOs issued by U.S. REITs during 1996-2010.
Variable N undfees ipodirexp directcosts undprice totalcosts
UPREIT 72 6.37 2.29 8.65 3.23 11.88
Traditional REIT 55 6.59 1.54 8.13 2.86 10.99
Difference 0.22 0.75 0.52 0.37 0.88
t-statistics 1.91 2.58 1.50 0.27 0.64
p-value 0.06 0.01 0.14 0.79 0.52
Wilcoxon Rank (Z) 2.07 3.43 1.74 0.87 1.75
p-value 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.39 0.08
The column heading undfees denotes the underwriting fees, ipodirexp denotes the non-underwriting 
other IPO-related direct expenses, directcosts denotes the direct costs consisting of undfees and 
ipodirexp, undprice denotes the indirect costs of underpricing and totalcosts denotes the total costs 
consisting of both directcosts and undprice. All costs are as percentage of gross proceeds. The t-
statistics and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann-Whitney) are the absolute value of student’s t and the 
absolute value z of the difference between means and medians of two independent samples.
4.2.4 Distributions of REIT IPOs across States of Incorporation
Table 4.1.7 presents the year and three sub-period distributions of 127 REIT IPOs 
across different states of incorporation during the period of 1996-2010. The choice of 
incorporation affects post-IPO performance through applicability of the state’s law, 
availability of the state’s courts, and use of the state administrative services, 
including assessment of corporate franchise tax. Around 85% (108/127) of the IPOs 
in this study are incorporated in Maryland. Table 4.1.8 supports the lower 
underwriting fees and higher underpricing for IPOs incorporated in Maryland, with  
the mean difference for only underwriting fees being statistically significant. The 
lower underwriting fees might be attributed to the expertise of underwriters in 
dealing with Maryland corporate law. The higher underpricing might be ascribed to 
the anti-takeover protection to management by Maryland incorporated IPOs.
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Table 4.1.7: Year wise distribution of 127 U.S. REIT IPOs across states of incorporation during 
1996-2010.
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1996 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4
1997 18 3 0 3 0 1 1 0 1 27
1998 12 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
1999 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
2002 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
2003 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
2004 25 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 29
2005 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
2006 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
2007 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
2008 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
2009 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
2010 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
1996-2000 34 5 2 3 0 1 1 1 1 48
2001-2006 51 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 55
2007-2010 23 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
Total 108 9 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 127
Where the first column is the year along with three sub-periods and the last column is the total number 
of IPOs in the year concerned as well as in three sub-periods. The last row labelled Total shows the 
total number of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of the U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) that 
are incorporated in 9 particular states during the period of 1996-2010.
Table 4.1.8: Tests of differences in costs across the state of incorporation for 127 REIT IPOs 
issued during 1996-2010.
Variable N undfees ipodirexp directcosts undprice totalcosts
Panel A 
Maryland 108 6.41 1.96 8.37 3.11 11.48
Other States 19 6.77 1.95 8.73 2.83 11.56
Difference -0.36 0.01 -0.35 0.28 0.07
t-statistics 2.22 0.02 0.73 0.15 0.04
p-value 0.03 0.98 0.47 0.88 0.97
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Z) 1.43 0.38 0.35 0.03 0.19
p-value 0.15 0.71 0.73 0.97 0.85
The column heading undfees denotes the underwriting fees, ipodirexp denotes the non-underwriting 
other IPO-related direct expenses, directcosts denotes the direct costs consisting of undfees and 
ipodirexp, undprice denotes the indirect costs of underpricing and totalcosts denotes the total costs 
consisting of both directcosts and undprice. All costs are as percentage of gross equity proceeds. The 
t-statistics and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann-Whitney) are the absolute value of student’s t and the 
absolute value of z of the difference between means and medians of two independent samples.
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4.2.5 Costs of REIT IPOs across Property Types 
4.2.5.1   Distributions of REIT IPOs across Property Types 
Table 4.1.9 presents the year and three sub-period distributions of REIT IPOs across 
major property types during the sample period. The table reports that 35% (45/127) 
of IPOs have investments in mortgage backed securities (MBS), with nearly 25% 
(11/45) of them issued in 2004. REITs in the Industrial/Office property type issued 
the second highest number of IPOs during this sample period, with nearly 36% 
(10/28) of these property IPOs issued in 1997. These two years, 2004 and 1997, are 
regarded as hot issue periods or waves (Buttimer, et al., 2005). The objective of this 
table is to show the property type which issues the most and the fewest number of 
IPOs during the sample period. The table suggests that the Industrial/Office property 
type issued the most number of IPOs among equity REITs.
Table 4.1.9: Year and sub-period wise distributions for 127 U.S. REIT IPOs across different 
property types during 1996-2010.
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1996 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4
1997 10 7 4 1 3 1 0 1 0 27
1998 1 5 5 0 2 0 1 1 0 15
1999 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
2002 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3
2003 3 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 7
2004 3 11 3 3 1 2 4 0 2 29
2005 2 4 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 11
2006 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
2007 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4
2008 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
2009 1 7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 9
2010 3 1 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 9
1996-2000 13 12 9 1 6 1 4 2 0 48
2001-2006 10 21 4 4 2 3 6 3 2 55
2007-2010 5 12 0 1 1 2 3 0 0 24
Total 28 45 13 6 9 6 13 5 2 127
Table consists of 11 columns with the first and last column presenting the year and three sub-periods 
and the number of total IPOs in corresponding year and sub-periods, respectively. The middle 9 
columns present the number of IPOs with concentration on 9 different property types during the 
corresponding year and sub-periods. The bottom row reports the total number of IPOs with 9 different 
underling properties along with grand total.
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4.2.5.2   Costs of REIT IPOs across Property Types
Table 4.1.10 presents the distributions for 127 REIT IPOs in five panels, along with 
their associated equally-weighted average costs. The IPOs have been categorized 
based on the concentration of investment in major property types as well as sub-
property sectors. The four major property types having sub-sectors consist of 
Industrial/Office, Mortgage Backed Securities, Retail, and Residential. The five 
property types without any sub-sector are Specialty, Lodging/Resorts, Diversified, 
Healthcare and Self-Storage. The Specialty property type paid a maximum of 6.99%
for underwriting fees, whereas the Diversified type incurred the highest other direct 
expenses at 3.61%, direct costs at 10.39%, underpricing at 7.77% and total costs at 
18.16%. 
Panel A presents the Industrial/Office property type consisting of its three sub-
sectors of Office, Industry and Mixed, with the sub-sector of Office issuing 70% of 
IPOs (21/28) in the sector. The Industrial/Office property type shows equally-
weighted costs of underwriting fees, other direct expenses, direct costs, underpricing 
and total costs averaging 6.43%, 2.11%, 8.54%, 6.35% and 14.89%, respectively. In 
terms of total costs in the Industrial/Office property type, the sub-sector of Office 
experiences the highest underpricing of 7.35% and incurs total costs at 15.74%.
Panel B presents 45 IPOs with concentration in Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) 
which have two sub-sectors of Home Financing and Commercial Financing. The 
equally-weighted costs of underwriting fees, other direct expenses, direct costs, 
underpricing and total costs average 6.33%, 1.34%, 7.66%, 1.09% and 8.75%, 
respectively. In terms of the total costs, the sub-sector of Home Financing incurs 
higher underwriting fees at 6.41%, leaves more money on the table by underpricing 
of 2.66%, and incurs higher total costs of 10.31%.
Panel C presents 13 IPOs concentrating on Retail properties which have three sub-
sectors consisting of Shopping Centers, Regional, and Freestanding/outlet Centers. 
The equally-weighted costs of underwriting fees, other direct expenses, direct costs,
underpricing and total costs average 6.48%, 1.91%, 8.39%, 1.11% and 9.50%, 
respectively. Of the sub-sectors in Retail, Shopping centers incur the highest costs 
for all components except underwriting fees. The total costs incurred by the 
Shopping centers are 11.22%. 
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Panel D presents the 6 IPOs concentrating on Residential properties consisting of 
five in Apartments and one in Manufactured Homes. The equally-weighted costs of 
underwriting fees, other direct expenses, direct costs, underpricing and total costs 
average 6.33%, 2.00%, 8.33%, 0.68% and 9.01%, respectively. IPOs investing in 
Apartments incur higher costs in every component.
Panel E presents the 35 REIT IPOs concentrating on five different property types 
which do not have any sub-property sector. Among the sub-sectors, the Diversified 
property type incurred the highest costs in every individual component except 
underwriting fees. 
Overall, the table shows that the Diversified property type REIT IPOs incurred the 
highest costs at 3.61% for other direct expenses, direct costs at 10.37%, underpricing 
at 7.77% and total costs at 18.16%. These statistics suggest that the intended 
investment concentration of REIT IPOs in different property types may affect REIT 
IPO issuing costs. These also reflect that the underlying properties might affect the 
REIT performance.
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Table 4.1.10: Property wise distribution of the costs of capital raising equity capital for 127 U.S. 
REIT IPOs during 1996-2010.
Property Type N undfees ipodirexp directcosts undprice totalcosts
Panel A
Industry/Office 28 6.43 2.11 8.54 6.35 14.89
Office 21 6.38 2.02 8.40 7.35 15.74
Industry 6 6.49 2.64 9.13 3.90 13.03
Mixed and others 1 7.00 1.01 8.01 0.20 8.21
Panel B
Mortgage Based 
Securities 45 6.33 1.34 7.66 1.09 8.75
Home Financing 29 6.41 1.24 7.65 2.66 10.31
Commercial Financing 16 6.17 1.53 7.67 -1.76 5.91
Panel C
Retail 13 6.48 1.91 8.39 1.11 9.50
Shopping Center 7 6.41 2.08 8.49 2.73 11.22
Regional 5 6.46 1.93 8.39 0.10 8.50
Free Standing/
outlet centers 1 7.00 0.69 7.69 -5.21 2.48
Panel D
Residential 6 6.33 2.00 8.33 0.68 9.01
Apartment 5 6.35 2.05 8.40 0.82 9.22
Manufactured Homes 1 6.25 1.72 7.97 0.00 7.97
Panel E
Specialty 9 6.99 2.34 9.34 6.55 15.89
Lodging Resorts 13 6.50 2.25 8.75 1.19 9.94
Diversified 6 6.78 3.61 10.39 7.77 18.16
Healthcare 5 6.77 3.49 10.26 3.72 13.98
Self-Storage 2 6.25 1.66 7.91 2.28 10.19
Total 127 6.47 1.96 6.83 3.07 11.49
Where the first column shows the property type consisting of property sectors along with sub-sectors 
and the second column is the inner column showing the number of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) by 
property sub-sector; the column labelled N shows the number of IPOs issued by property main sector 
and the next four columns present the equally-weighted average costs of U.S. Real Estate Investment 
Trust (REIT) IPOs issued by different property sectors during the period of 1996-2010. The column 
heading undfees denotes the underwriting fees, ipodirexp denotes non-underwriting other direct IPO 
related expenses, directcosts denote direct costs consisting of undfees and ipodirexp, undprice
denotes indirect costs of underpricing and totalcosts denotes total costs consisting of both direct costs 
and underpricing. All costs are as percentage of gross equity proceeds.
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4.2.5.3   Differences in Costs across Major Property Types
Table 4.1.11 presents the test results on the significance of differences in costs of 
raising equity capital by REIT IPOs concentrated in Industrial/Office and MBS 
property type. The cost differences among other property types were tested but no 
significant differences were found. The results of panel A show that the 
Industrial/Office REIT IPOs leave more money on the table through higher 
underpricing than the IPOs of both MBS and other property types (Bairagi and 
Dimovski, 2011; Chen and Lu, 2006). The total costs of this property type are also 
significantly higher than those of other property types. The higher total costs are 
driven by the higher underpricing because no other level of cost is statistically 
significant. The higher underpricing might be ascribed to the valuation uncertainty of 
tangible assets in such property type.
Panel B of the table shows that REIT IPOs with investments in financial assets 
(MBS) incur lower direct and indirect costs due to the significantly lower non-
underwriting direct expenses and underpricing. The statistically significant means 
and medians of lower underpricing for IPOs concentrated in Mortgage Backed 
Securities are consistent with Chen and Lu (2006). Chen and Lu (2006) report a 
higher level of underwriting fees for Mortgage Backed Securities and partially 
attribute this to economies of scale. This sample also supports this finding because 
the average proceeds for REIT IPOs with the property type of Mortgage Backed 
Securities are lower ($214 million) than IPOs for other property types ($241 million).
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Table 4.1.11: Test of difference in costs across property types for 127 REIT IPOs issued during
1996-2010.
Variable N undfees ipodirexp directcosts undprice totalcosts
Panel A 
Industrial/Office REIT IPOs 28 6.43 2.11 8.54 6.35 14.89
Other REIT IPOs 99 6.48 1.92 8.39 2.14 10.53
Difference 0.05 0.19 0.15 4.21 4.36
t-statistics 0.36 0.55 0.35 2.68 2.72
p-value 0.72 0.58 0.73 0.01 0.01
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Z) 0.68 0.90 0.77 2.97 3.23
p-value 0.49 0.37 0.44 0.00 0.00
Panel B
MBS REIT IPOs 45 6.33 1.34 7.66 1.09 8.75
Other REIT IPOs 82 6.54 2.30 8.85 4.15 13.00
Difference 0.21 0.96 1.19 3.06 4.25
t-statistics 1.81 3.25 3.43 2.23 3.09
p-value 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Z) 0.79 3.84 3.70 2.83 3.81
p-value 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
The column heading undfees denotes the underwriting fees, ipodirexp denotes the non-underwriting 
other IPO-related direct expenses, directcosts denotes the direct costs consisting of undfees and 
ipodirexp, undprice denotes the indirect costs of underpricing and totalcosts denotes the total costs 
consisting of both directcosts and undprice. All costs are as percentage of gross equity proceeds. The 
t-statistics and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann-Whitney) are the absolute value of student’s t and the 
absolute value of z of the difference between means and medians of two independent samples.
4.2.6 Descriptive Statistics of Different Levels of Costs 
Table 4.1.12 presents the descriptive statistics in order of first quartile, mean, second 
quartile, third quartile, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis of costs for 127 REIT IPOs. The table shows that all costs are positively 
skewed and leptokurtic in magnitude. REIT IPOs, on average, incur total costs of 
around 11.50%, consisting of 8.43% direct costs and 3.07% indirect cost of 
underpricing. More specifically, underwriting fees, other direct expenses, and 
underpricing represent 56%, 17% and 27%, respectively, of total costs.
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Table 4.1.12: Descriptive Statistics of the costs of raising equity capital for 127 U.S. REIT IPOs 
during 1996-2010.
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undfees 6.24 6.47 6.48 7.00 4.00 10.00 0.66 0.39 9.86
ipodirexp 0.84 1.96 1.58 2.53 0.09 12.69 1.65 2.77 16.07
directcosts 7.41 8.43 8.03 9.28 4.50 19.69 1.95 2.36 13.28
undprice -0.67 3.07 0.20 6.25 -10.88 30.30 7.52 1.34 5.31
totalcosts 7.19 11.49 9.38 14.65 -3.25 38.31 7.67 1.21 4.92
The first column shows the different levels of issuing costs for 127 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) by 
U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) from 1996-2010. The first column presents the different 
levels of costs including undfees denoting underwriting fees, ipodirexp denoting non-underwriting 
other direct IPO related expenses, directcosts denoting total direct costs consisting of undfees and 
ipodirexp, undprice denoting indirect cost of underpricing and totalcosts denoting total costs 
consisting of both directcosts and undprice. The next 9 columns present the 1st quartile, 2nd quartile, 
3rd quartile, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of each level of costs 
respectively. All costs are as percentage of gross proceeds.
Table 4.1.13 replicates Table 4.1.12 with different sub-samples categorized and 
presented in four panels from A to D. 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of costs for 77 equity REIT IPOs and 
shows that the average of all levels of costs are higher than that of the overall sample. 
They are positively skewed and leptokurtic in magnitude. It indicates that the costs of 
these IPOs lack symmetry by having less dispersion from average costs.
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of costs for 50 mortgage REIT IPOs. The 
mean value of all these costs is below the overall sample statistics. Other than 
underwriting fees, all levels of costs are positively skewed and also leptokurtic in 
magnitude. This panel also suggests that the costs of majority of IPOs are above the 
median (half) IPOs.
Panel C presents the descriptive statistics of costs for 16 REIT IPOs hiring an 
underwriting syndicate led by the industry-dominating underwriter, Merrill Lynch. 
The panel shows that all levels of costs, except underwriting fees, are positively 
skewed and the leptokurtic total costs are driven by the leptokurtic underwriting fees 
and underpricing. The panel implies that IPO-issuing REITs may reduce their capital 
raising costs by hiring an underwriting syndicate led by an industry-dominating 
underwriter. 
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Panel D presents the descriptive statistics of costs for 31 REIT IPOs raising equity 
capital greater than or equal to the third quartile of the sample IPO proceeds ($288 
million). The panel shows that other than underwriting fees, all of the costs are 
positively skewed and all of them are leptokurtic in their magnitude. The statistics of 
the panel support economies of scale in direct costs, but the cost of underpricing is 
positively related with the IPO proceeds (Bairagi and Dimovski, 2011; Corwin and 
Harris, 2001; Dolvin and Pyles, 2009; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997) unlike the U-shape 
of Dunbar (2000).
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Table 4.1.13: Descriptive Statistics of the costs of raising equity capital for different sub-samples 
of 127 U.S. REIT IPOs during 1996-2010.
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Panel -A: Equity IPOs 
undfees 77 6.25 6.54 6.45 7.00 5.13 10.00 0.58 2.64 17.81
ipodirexp 77 1.09 2.37 1.96 3.13 0.09 12.69 1.86 2.62 13.96
directcosts 77 7.70 8.91 8.26 9.80 5.97 19.69 2.11 2.61 12.70
undprice 77 0.00 4.20 2.25 7.33 -10.00 30.30 7.79 1.24 5.04
totalcosts 77 8.31 13.11 11.09 15.52 -3.25 38.31 7.75 1.13 4.84
Panel -B: Mortgage IPOs
undfees 50 6.00 6.35 6.50 7.00 4.00 7.30 0.75 -1.03 3.46
ipodirexp 50 0.63 1.34 1.10 1.65 0.20 4.96 1.01 1.69 5.94
directcosts 50 6.58 7.68 7.63 8.33 4.50 10.96 1.37 0.43 3.29
undprice 50 -2.47 1.32 0.00 2.83 -10.88 23.91 6.78 1.56 6.02
totalcosts 50 5.54 9.00 7.74 10.83 -1.91 32.99 6.91 1.54 5.90
Panel -C: Underwriting syndicate led by Merrill Lynch Group                                    
undfees 16 6.12 6.24 6.25 6.50 5.00 7.00 0.48 -1.09 4.25
ipodirexp 16 0.60 1.79 0.94 3.05 0.20 5.35 1.69 0.98 2.56
directcosts 16 6.42 8.03 7.41 9.79 5.88 11.60 1.92 0.69 2.07
undprice 16 -0.33 2.94 1.54 3.45 -4.50 27.98 7.38 2.56 9.54
totalcosts 16 6.68 10.97 8.80 13.36 1.64 35.05 7.66 1.94 7.25
Panel -D: IPO offer amount greater than third quartile or $288 million                                          
undfees 31 6.00 6.25% 6.25 6.50 5.00 7.00 0.53 -0.49 3.18
ipodirexp 31 0.53 1.20% 0.79 1.65 0.09 5.75 1.17 2.33 8.89
directcosts 31 6.53 7.45% 7.34 7.97 5.57 11.99 1.32 1.52 6.20
undprice 31 0.00 5.44% 2.81 9.41 -4.50 27.98 7.23 1.40 4.87
totalcosts 31 7.33 12.88% 10.84 18.09 1.64 35.05 7.52 1.11 3.99
Where the first column shows the different levels of issuing costs for 127 U.S. Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs) Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) categorized into six main panels. The row heading 
undfees denotes the underwriting fees, ipodirexp denotes non-underwriting other direct IPO-related 
expenses, directcosts denote direct costs consisting of undfees and ipodirexp, undprice denotes 
indirect cost of underpricing and totalcosts denotes costs consisting of both directcosts and undprice. 
All costs are as percentage of gross offer proceeds. The column labelled N shows the number of REIT 
IPOs in each category. The next columns show the statistics of different levels of costs in order of the 
1st quartile, 2nd quartile, 3rd quartile, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis, 
respectively.
4.2.7 Descriptive Statistics for Non-Dummy Explanatory Variables 
Table 4.1.14 presents the descriptive statistics for a number of non-dummy 
explanatory variables in order of first quartile, mean, second quartile, third quartile, 
minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis in panels from A to 
F.
Panel A of the table presents the descriptive statistics of some variables indicating 
the offer characteristics and delineates that the REIT IPOs raise on average $231.54 
million (ipoproceeds) gross proceeds in nominal dollars with an average offer price 
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(offprice) and a first-day closing market price (iniprice) of $15.60 and $16.09, 
respectively. The absolute and inter-quartile ranges of IPO gross proceeds are $1390 
($1400-$10) and $175 ($287.50-$112.50) million, respectively, with positive 
skewness and leptokurtic magnitude. The inter-quartile ranges of the offer price and 
the initial closing market prices are $7.75 and $6.84, respectively. The shares offered 
in the IPO relative to the post-IPO volume in this sample averaged 71.16%, which is 
much larger than that evidenced with industrial IPOs (Chung, et al., 2005).39
Investigation of the data also reveals that 7% of the IPOs (9/127) have no existing 
ownership. This higher percentage confirms that REITs commence their operations 
with funds raised by issuing IPOs. The statistics show that the offer price, initial 
closing market prices and shares offered in the IPO (shoffipo) are all nearly normally 
distributed because they are nearly symmetrically skewed and nearly mesokurtic in 
magnitude. These statistics suggest that the effect of these variables is free from 
outliers.
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics on underwriting syndicates. The panel 
shows the average number of different levels of underwriters and their average 
ranking. These variables are reported to estimate their effect on costs of issuing IPOs 
because the evidence from the non-REIT literature reports that syndicate structure 
affects such costs (Corwin and Schultz, 2005; Jeon and Ligon, 2011). The numbers 
of book managing, representative and total underwriters are all positively skewed 
and leptokurtic in their magnitude, however, they only averaged 1.74, 3.02 and 13.85 
with maximum of 5, 9 and 45, respectively. The inter-quartile ranges of the number 
of these three levels of underwriters are 1, 2 and 15, respectively. The book-
managing underwriters are responsible for all processes of the issue (Corwin and 
Schultz, 2005; Hu, 2007; Torstila, 2001a); representative underwriters represent the 
underwriting syndicate in any issue related to dealing with the issuer. The total 
number of underwriters (Corwin and Schultz, 2005) comprises all underwriters 
irrespective of their role in the syndicate. The sample observations were reduced to 
126 because of the unavailability of information in one prospectus. The reputation 
rank of underwriters is negatively skewed but leptokurtic in magnitude. 
39 Chung, et al. (2005) report share overhang of 30.83%.
CHAPTER FOUR DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
99
Panel C presents the descriptive statistics for the returns from the NAREIT index 
which are used as a proxy for industry returns in REIT IPO research (Chen and Lu, 
2006). The sample statistics report the average volatility of the monthly NAREIT 
price index of 5.38% with an inter-quartile range of 2.71%. The average industry 
returns in terms of the change in the NAREIT price index in the current month 
(cmindret), and quarter (cqindret), of REIT IPOs are 1.85% and 6.93%, with their 
inter-quartile ranges of 5.11% and 11.48%, respectively. The study has used these 
variables as a proxy for industry or market movement, in line with Loughran and 
Ritter (2002), who report market movement positively determine underpricing. Both 
the volatility and returns of the NAREIT price index are leptokurtic and they are all 
positively skewed except the return in the current month of the IPO. 
Panel D presents the statistics of usage of IPO proceeds as stated in the prospectuses, 
and shows that the offer prospectus, on average, disclosed the specific use in 95% of 
proceeds. The percentages of the proceeds specifically disclosed for potential usage 
are 16.48%, 7.09%, 25.74%, 37.51% and 8.27% for short-term investment 
(shortinvp), fixed investment (fixinvp), acquisition investment (acqinvp), 
recapitalization (recap) and corporate working capital (corporp), respectively. The 
literature suggests that disclosing the potential use of the proceeds significantly 
affects the information asymmetry and, hence, the capital raising costs. More 
specifically, however, the higher the percentage of proceeds disclosed for specific 
usage, the lower the underpricing, thus helping the investors estimate the dispersion 
of secondary market value (Leone, Rock and Willenborg, 2007).
Panel E presents the number of REIT IPOs issued during and prior to the current 
period of the IPO. The panel reports descriptive statistics for different periods to 
estimate the sensitivity of a particular period, because the number of completed IPOs 
in the immediate prior period may affect IPO promotional costs in the current period 
due to the information spillover effect (Benveniste, et al. 2003; Chung, et al., 2005; 
Ellul and Pagano, 2006). The descriptive statistics of the panel show that the IPOs 
issued during the current month (cmnumipo), prior month (pmnumipo), current 
quarter (cqnumipo), prior quarter (pqnumipo) and prior year (pynumipo) are on 
average 2.64, 1.59, 4.61 and 10.69 with their inter-quartile range of 3, 2, 7 and 5, 
respectively. 
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Panel F presents the descriptive statistics of some variables (miscellaneous) not 
categorized in any specific group. The average ownership limit for an individual 
owner, as stated in the prospectus, is 9.29%. Annual (aindyield) and quartile industry 
(qindyield) yield, defined as dividend scaled by the price, are on average 6.16% and 
5.82%, with their inter-quartile range of 3.22% and 0.86%, respectively.
Table 4.1.14: Descriptive Statistics of major explanatory (non-dummy) variables related to the 
costs of raising equity capital for 127 U.S. REITs IPOs during 1996-2010.
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Panel A: Offer characteristics
ipoproceeds 127 112.50 231.54 199.68 287.50 10.00 1400.00 191.06 2.62 13.59
realipoproceeds 127 142.00 273.00 211.00 357.00 13.40 1510.00 220.00 2.37 11.33
offprice 127 12.25 15.60 15.00 20.00 5.00 26.00 4.46 -0.01 2.44
iniprice 127 12.51 16.09 15.60 19.35 4.50 27.75 4.77 0.16 2.70
shoffipo 122 49.89 71.16 77.94 95.18 13.28 100.00 26.36 -0.59 2.06
Panel B: Underwriting syndicate
numbookmngr 126 1.00 1.74 2.00 2.00 1.00 5.00 0.82 1.21 4.70
numrepund 124 2.00 3.02 3.00 4.00 1.00 9.00 1.75 0.97 3.59
numtotund 124 6.00 13.85 9.00 21.00 1.00 45.00 10.62 1.13 3.39
undrank 125 6.50 7.56 8.00 9.00 2.00 9.00 1.53 -0.99 3.21
undrankr 125 6.63 7.34 7.75 8.43 2.00 9.00 1.42 -0.94 3.50
Panel C: Industry returns
indvol % 127 3.18 5.18 3.94 5.89 1.62 17.37 3.66 2.25 7.47
cmindret % 127 -0.47 1.85 2.19 4.64 -15.26 12.22 4.05 -0.75 4.90
cqindret % 127 -0.09 6.93 7.72 11.39 -8.85 31.52 8.73 0.45 3.46
Panel D: Uses of IPO proceeds
shortinvp % 126 0.00 16.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 36.20 1.79 4.29
fixinvp % 124 0.00 7.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 22.61 3.38 13.14
acqinvp % 124 0.00 25.74 0.00 49.00 0.00 100.00 33.44 0.95 2.47
recap % 125 0.00 37.51 26.72 70.60 0.00 100.00 38.70 0.45 1.64
corporp % 124 0.00 8.27 0.00 4.00 0.00 100.00 21.91 3.33 13.25
Panel E: Number of REIT IPOs
cmnumipo 123 1.00 2.64 3.00 4.00 1.00 6.00 1.49 0.54 2.36
pmnumipo 123 1.00 1.59 1.00 3.00 0.00 6.00 1.41 0.80 2.89
pqnumipo 123 1.00 4.61 4.00 8.00 0.00 12.00 3.33 0.29 1.84
pynumipo 127 6.00 10.69 8.00 11.00 0.00 29.00 8.88 1.17 2.85
Panel F: Miscellaneous
ownlim % 115 9.80 9.29 9.80 9.80 4.10 9.90 1.23 -2.49 8.36
qindyield % 127 5.38 5.82 5.75 6.24 3.94 7.91 0.81 0.45 3.36
numriskfact 127 37.00 49.69 47.00 61.00 14.00 112.00 18.25 0.74 3.63
Where the first column shows the different level of possible explanatory (non-dummy) variables for 
127 U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). The column labelled 
N shows the number of REIT IPOs with the concerned variable. The next 9 columns present the 1st
quartile, 2nd quartile, 3rd quartile, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis, 
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respectively, for each level of cost. Among the variables, ipoproceeds is the average amount in 
million dollars offered or raised by issuing IPOs, realipoproceeds is the average amount in million 
dollars offered or raised by issuing IPOs as scaled in 2010 dollars using U.S. GDP deflator, offprice is 
the offer price per share, iniprice is the initial closing market price on the first day of trading, shoffipo
is the percentage of shares offered divided by the post-IPO total number of shares, numbookmngr is 
the number of book running managers, numrepund is the number of representative underwriters, 
numtotund is the number of total underwriters, indvol is the average monthly return volatility in 
terms of standard deviation of National Association of REIT (NAREIT) industry price index over the 
last 12 months prior to the concerned IPO, undrank is the average rank of lead underwriters where 
there is more than one lead underwriter as per the Carter and Manaster (1990) rank of 0-9 as updated 
in Ritter’s home page, undrankr is the average rank of representative underwriters who represent the 
underwriting syndicate as per the Carter and Manaster (1990) rank of 0-9 as updated in Ritter’s home 
page, shortinvp is the percentage of IPO proceeds to be invested in short term securities, fixinvp is 
the percentage of IPO proceeds to be invested in fixed assets, acqinvp is the percentage of IPO 
proceeds to be invested in acquisition of properties, recap is the percentage of IPO proceeds to be 
used repaying outstanding debts and liabilities, corporp is the percentage of IPO proceeds to be used 
corporate working capital, cmnumipo is the number of REIT IPOs issued in the month of concerned 
IPO, pmnumipo is the number of REIT IPOs issued in the month prior to the concerned IPO, 
pqnumipo is the number of REIT IPOs issued in the quarter prior to the concerned IPO, pynumipo is 
the number of REIT IPOs issued in the year prior to the concerned IPO, ownlim is the ownership 
limit which limits an individual to own a certain percentage of outstanding shares of the firm, 
qindyield is the percentage of quarterly REIT industry yield (NAREIT) prior to the IPO, and 
numriskfact is the number of risk factor.
4.2.8 Descriptive Statistics for Some Dichotomous Variables 
Table 4.1.15 presents the descriptive statistics in three panels from A to C for some 
of the dummy variables that might affect the capital raising costs for 127 REIT IPOs 
during 1996-2010. The table presents only four descriptive estimates which are 
mean, standard deviation (sd), skewness and kurtosis. These estimates describe the 
average value of the variables, their dispersions and pattern of distributions.
Panel A shows that 57% of the IPOs are umbrella partnerships REITs (UPREIT), 
13% use an underwriting syndicate led by Merrill Lynch group (merrill) which is 
also the REIT IPO-dominating underwriter, 82% and 88% are listed on the NYSE 
(nyse) and NYSEAMEX (nyseamex), respectively, 61% are equity REITs (reittype), 
23% used the REIT IPO dominating auditor (Ernst & Young), and 43% have a lead 
underwriter with ranking greater than or equal to 8 on the 0-9 scale of Carter and 
Manster (1990) ranking. 
Panel B of the table reports the descriptive statistics for some dummy variables 
regarding the intended use of the proceeds. The panel shows that 63% of IPO-issuing 
REITs stated that the proceeds would be used for short-term investment (shortinvd), 
14% stated fixed investment (fixinvd), 49% stated acquisition investment (acqinvd), 
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62% stated recapitalization by repaying debt capital (recapd), and 46% stated the 
proceeds would be used for corporate working capital (corpord).
Panel C presents the descriptive statistics for the dummy variables regarding the 
management type of the IPO-issuing REITs. The panel shows that 31% are self-
managed (selfmgt). Chen and Lu (2006) report lower underwriting fees but higher 
underpricing for internally-managed REIT IPOs. Inspection of this data reveals that 
internally (externally) managed REITs pay 6.59% (6.41%) underwriting fees with p-
value (t-statistics) of 0.15 (1.46), while they leave on the table, in terms of 
underpricing, 3.98% (2.66%) with p-value (t-statistics) of 0.36 (0.91). These 
statistics show that the difference in underwriting and underpricing costs in terms of 
management is statistically insignificant.
Table 4.1.15: Descriptive Statistics of major explanatory (dummy) variables related to the costs 
of raising equity capital for 127 U.S. REITs during 1996-2010.
Variable N mean sd skewness kurtosis
Panel A: REIT Type
upreit 127 0.57 0.50 -0.27 1.07
merrill 127 0.13 0.33 2.25 6.08
nyse 127 0.82 0.39 -1.66 3.74
nyseamex 127 0.88 0.32 -2.37 6.60
reittype 127 0.61 0.49 -0.44 1.19
topauditor 127 0.23 0.42 1.29 2.68
undrankd 125 0.43 0.50 0.27 1.08
Panel B: Intended use of proceeds
shortinvd 127 0.63 0.48 -0.54 1.29
fixinvd 125 0.14 0.35 2.03 5.11
acqinvd 126 0.49 0.50 0.03 1.00
recapd 126 0.62 0.49 -0.49 1.24
corpord 125 0.46 0.50 0.18 1.03
Panel C: Management type
selfmgd 127 0.31 0.46 0.84 1.70
Where the first column shows the different explanatory (dummy) variables for 127 U.S. Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). The column labelled N shows the number 
of REIT IPOs with the concerned variable. The next columns show the statistics of these variables. 
Among the variables, upreit is the dummy variable of 1 for a REIT IPO firm with an umbrella 
partnership REIT (UPREIT) structure and 0 otherwise, merrill is the dummy variable with 1 for the 
IPO issuing firm engaging underwriting syndicate led by Merrill Lynch group and 0 otherwise, nyse
is the dummy variable with 1 for IPO issuing firm listed on the NYSE and 0 otherwise, nyseamex is 
the dummy variable with 1 for an IPO-issuing firm listed on the NYSE as well as the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) and 0 otherwise, reittype is the dummy variable with 1 for an IPO-issuing firm 
concentrated in equity ownership and 0 otherwise, topauditor is the dummy variable with 1 for an 
IPO-issuing firm employing top auditor who dominates the REIT IPO market share in terms of offer 
volume in 2010 dollars and 0 otherwise, undrankd is the dummy variable with 1 for an IPO-issuing 
firm engaging underwriting syndicate who has average rank of lead underwriters greater than 8 under 
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Carter and Manaster (1990) rank of 0-9 and 0 otherwise, shortinvd is the dummy variable with 1 for 
intended use of IPO proceeds to be in short-term securities and 0 otherwise, fixinvd is the dummy 
variable with 1 for intended use of IPO proceeds to be in fixed assets and 0 otherwise, acqinvd is the 
dummy variable with 1 for intended use of IPO proceeds to be in acquisition and 0 otherwise, recapd
is the dummy variable with 1 for intended use of IPO proceeds to be in repaying outstanding debt and 
liabilities and 0 otherwise, corpord is the dummy variable with 1 for intended use of IPO proceeds for 
the purpose of corporate expenditures and working capital needs and 0 otherwise, selfmgd is the 
dummy variable of 1 for an IPO issuing firm with self-management and 0 otherwise.
4.2.9 Differences in Costs across Different Sub-Samples
Table 4.1.16 presents the mean differences alongwith the test statistics of costs for 
three pairs of sample groups and their statistics in three panels. Panel A and B 
present the sample statistics for REIT IPOs which are self-managed versus externally 
managed. The preliminary results of this study show that internally-managed REIT 
IPOs incur higher costs in raising their equity capital. In terms of the mean and 
median differences, underpricing and total costs for internally-managed REIT IPOs 
are statistically significant. 
Panel C presents the differences in costs for REIT IPOs listed on the NYSE and other 
than the NYSE. Panel C shows average absolute lower costs for IPOs listed on the 
NYSE, but only a mean difference of underwriting fees is statistically significant at 
5%. The lower costs for IPOs listed on the NYSE is consistent with the lower costs 
of 438 firm-commitment industrial IPOs between 1991 and 1996 reported by Corwin 
and Harris (2001). The median difference of lower direct costs is significant at 10%. 
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Table 4.1.16: Tests of differences in costs in terms of type of advisor, management, equity and 
organizational structure for 127 IPOs issued by U.S. REITs during 1996-2010.
Variable N undfees ipodirexp directcosts undprice totalcosts
Panel-A
Internally Advised (Self) 90 6.54 2.23 8.77 4.43 13.20
Externally Advised 37 6.28 1.31 7.59 -0.25 7.33
Difference 0.27 0.92 1.18 4.69 5.87
t-statistics 2.13 2.94 3.23 3.32 4.17
p-value 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Z) 1.19 3.48 3.69 3.71 4.67
p-value 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel-B
Self Managed 60 6.49 2.19 8.68 4.58 13.26
Externally Managed 67 6.44 1.75 8.20 1.72 9.91
Difference 0.05 0.44 0.48 2.86 3.35
t-statistics 0.45 1.50 1.41 2.17 2.51
p-value 0.65 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.01
Wilcoxon Rank (Z) 0.35 2.32 2.08 1.87 2.51
p-value 0.73 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.01
Panel-C
NYSE 104 6.41 1.96 8.37 3.00 11.37
AMEX/NASDAQ 23 6.71 1.99 8.69 3.37 12.06
Difference 0.29 0.03 0.32 0.37 0.69
t-statistics 1.96 0.08 0.72 0.21 0.39
p-value 0.05 0.94 0.47 0.83 0.70
Wilcoxon Rank (Z) 1.36 0.71 0.06 0.22 0.39
p-value 0.17 0.48 0.95 0.83 0.69
The column heading undfees denotes the underwriting fees, ipodirexp denotes the non-underwriting 
other IPO-related direct expenses, directcosts denotes the direct costs consisting of undfees and 
ipodirexp, undprice denotes the indirect costs of underpricing and totalcosts denotes the total costs 
consisting of both directcosts and undprice. All costs are as percentage of gross equity proceeds. The 
t-statistics and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann-Whitney) are the absolute value of student’s t and the 
absolute value of z of the difference between means and medians of two independent samples.
4.2.10 Differences in Costs across Underwriters and Auditors
Table 4.1.17 reports the significance of mean and median differences of costs for 
IPOs, based on the underwriter reputation and auditor’s market dominance, in five 
panels. These panels indicate whether there exists any difference in costs if the 
reputations of underwriters and auditors are changed in their different quartiles.
Panel A presents the difference for two independent samples based on the 
domination of the auditors who performed the auditing of financial statements in the 
IPO prospectuses. Consistent with Wang and Wilkins (2007) and Mayhew and 
Wilkins (2003), this study defines an industry-dominating auditor as the firm that 
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dominates the audit service for REIT IPOs in terms of the market share during this 
sample period. In doing this, it adjusted the offer size in 2010 dollars based on the 
U.S. GDP deflator. The data reports 25% (29%) of dollar adjusted (nominal dollars) 
REIT IPO amounts are audited by Ernst & Young. This auditor has audited 23% of 
IPOs in number (29/127), however, the dollar adjusted IPO amount (unadjusted) 
audited by this industry-dominating auditor averaged $295 million ($267 million) 
against $261 million ($222 million) audited by the other auditors. Panel A shows 
significant differences of means and medians of all costs between these two groups. 
It indicates that the dominance of auditor in IPOs significantly explains all levels of 
costs.
Panel B presents the test results of differences in costs for IPOs underwritten by the 
lead underwriters whose reputation is 9, and those of less than 9. It shows 30% 
(38/127) of the sampled IPOs have a lead underwriter with a reputation of 9, and 
their costs are lower than those REIT IPOs with a lead underwriter ranked less than 
9. However, the differences of means and medians between these two sampled IPOs 
are insignificant except for underwriting fees (undfees). It indicates that the 
reputation of underwriters significantly explains the underwriting fees.
Panel C also presents the same cost differences for IPOs based on the reputation of 
lead underwriters with a reputation rank greater than or equal to 8. This is reported to 
show the significance of the reputation rank of lead underwriters in explaining the 
IPO issuing costs. Panel C shows higher costs at all levels than that of panel B. It 
infers that underwriter reputation can significantly explain the IPO issuing costs and, 
more particularly, the univariate relationship is statistically significant for 
underwriting fees. This is consistent with the univariate results of Chen and Lu 
(2006) for their later sub-period (1990-1999) with 148 REIT IPOs. 
Consistent with Chen and Lu (2006), this study reports the cost differences between 
IPOs underwritten by Merrill Lynch and those underwritten by others, in panel D. 
Investigation of the sampled IPOs shows that 19% of the total IPO proceeds (both 
real and nominal) are underwritten by Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch underwrites 
larger offers than the other underwriters in both real ($410 million vs $253 million) 
and nominal proceeds ($350 million vs $214 million, on average). Panel D also 
shows that all levels of costs are lower for IPOs underwritten by Merrill Lynch but 
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the differences of means and medians of costs between Merrill Lynch and others are 
statistically insignificant. This indicates the insignificance of dominating underwriter 
in explaining IPO issuing costs.
Panel E presents the differences in costs of IPOs for which underwriters charge 
greater than or equal to 7% of gross IPO proceeds. The panel shows that 34% 
(43/127) of the sampled IPOs pay 7% and more to underwriters, and those IPOs 
leave more money on the table through underpricing. This univariate relationship is 
in contrast to Chen and Lu’s (2006) findings, who document underwriting fees as a 
substitute for underpricing, but are consistent with Kim, et al. (2010) who report 
underwriting fees complement underpricing. The results of this panel suggest that 
IPOs incurring higher underwriting fees leave more money on the table through 
underpricing.
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Table 4.1.17: Tests of differences in costs of raising equity capital in terms of quality of auditors
and underwriters for 127 IPOs issued by U.S. REITs during 1996-2010.
Variable N undfees ipodirexp directcosts undprice totalcosts
Panel-A
Dominating Auditor 
(Ernst & Young)
29 6.15 1.27 7.41 -0.51 6.89
Other Auditors 98 6.56 2.17 8.73 4.12 12.85
Difference 0.42 0.90 1.32 4.64 5.96
t-statistics 3.10 2.61 3.34 3.01 3.88
p-value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wilcoxon Rank (Z) 2.44 3.15 3.86 2.89 3.80
p-value 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel-B
Lead Underwriter=9 38 6.21 1.80 8.01 2.38 10.39
Other Underwriters 89 6.58 2.03 8.60 3.36 11.96
Difference 0.37 0.23 0.59 0.98 1.57
t-statistics 2.95 0.71 1.56 0.68 1.06
p-value 0.00 0.48 0.12 0.50 0.29
Wilcoxon Rank (Z) 2.96 0.94 1.79 1.04 1.47
p-value 0.00 0.35 0.07 0.30 0.14
Panel-C
Lead Underwriter>=8 78 6.30 1.91 8.21 2.22 10.42
Other Underwriters 49 6.73 2.05 8.77 4.22 13.20
Difference 0.43 0.14 0.57 2.20 2.78
t-statistics 3.70 0.46 1.60 1.62 2.01
p-value 0.00 0.65 0.11 0.11 0.05
Wilcoxon Rank (Z) 3.41 0.23 1.09 1.70 2.20
p-value 0.00 0.82 0.28 0.09 0.03
Panel-D
Merrill Lynch Group 16 6.24 1.79 8.03 2.94 10.97
Other Underwriters 111 6.50 1.99 8.48 3.09 11.57
Difference 0.28 0.20 0.45 0.15 0.60
t-statistics 1.47 0.44 0.86 0.07 0.29
p-value 0.14 0.66 0.39 0.94 0.77
Wilcoxon Rank (Z) 1.69 1.16 1.37 0.08 0.44
p-value 0.09 0.25 0.17 0.93 0.66
Panel-E
Underwriting fees>=7% 43 7.09 2.17 9.26 5.22 14.48
Underwriting fees<7% 84 6.15 1.86 8.00 1.97 9.97
Difference 0.94 0.31 1.26 3.25 4.51
t-statistics 10.49 1.01 3.62 2.35 3.25
p-value 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.02 0.00
Wilcoxon Rank (Z) 9.37 0.07 3.48 2.63 3.55
p-value 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.01 0.0
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The column heading undfees denotes the underwriting fees, ipodirexp denotes the non-underwriting 
other IPO related direct expenses, directcosts denotes the direct costs consisting of undfees and 
ipodirexp, undprice denotes the indirect costs of underpricing and totalcosts denotes the total costs 
consisting of both directcosts and undprice. All costs are as percentage of gross equity proceeds. The 
t-statistics and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Mann-Whitney) are the absolute value of student’s t and the 
absolute value of z of the difference between means and medians of two independent samples.
4.3   Descriptive Statistics for REIT SEOs
4.3.1 Distribution of Costs for 800 REIT SEOs
This section presents the descriptive statistics for 800 REIT SEOs from 1996-2010.
Table 4.2.1 the year and three sub-period distributions of different levels of average 
costs as a percentage of seasoned equity proceeds. The table consists of 9 columns 
with the left-most column showing the year and three sub-periods. The second and 
third columns present the total number of SEOs issued and the total number of SEOs 
sampled, respectively. The table shows that the number of both total and sampled 
REIT SEOs during the sample period substantially peaked in 1997, with 2000 
experiencing the lowest number of 4 SEOs.
The next six columns present in order the average SEO proceeds (in nominal dollars) 
raised during the year or period, average underwriting discounts (spreads) paid to the 
underwriters, SEO-related expenses directly incurred by the issuing firm (SEO Direct 
Expenses), total direct costs consisting of both underwriting discounts and SEO 
direct expenses (Direct Costs), offer discounts as a percentage change of the offer 
price from the prior day’s closing transaction price with respect to the offer price 
(Offer Discounts), underpricing as a percentage change of offer price from the 
closing market price on the first trading day (Under Price) with respect to the offer 
price, and total costs as a sum of direct costs and underpricing, respectively. The 
column of SEO proceeds shows the highest and lowest amount of average SEO 
proceeds raised of $274 million and $69 million in 2000 and 2001, respectively, 
along with the average proceeds of $138.97 million in nominal dollars. The data set 
reveals that the proceeds in 2010 dollars based on the US GDP deflator averaged 
$157.49 million.
The underwriting discount which is paid to underwriters as a percentage of offer 
proceeds, as presented in the fourth column, shows the highest discount of 4.78% in 
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1996-2000 and the lowest of 3.85% in 2001-2006. The column also reports 5.16% 
and 2.93% as the highest and the lowest in 2001 and 2004, respectively, with an 
average of 4.17%. The column of SEO-related other direct expenses averages 0.46%, 
with the highest of 0.93% and the lowest of 0.23% in 1999 and 2000, respectively. 
The direct costs column shows the direct costs average 4.63%, with the highest of 
5.85% and the lowest of 3.26% in 2001 and 2004, respectively. Both the columns of 
SEO direct expenses and total direct costs show a consecutive declining trend over 
the three sub-periods. The columns of offer discounts and underpricing are used as 
indirect costs of raising seasoned equity, and both are used as substitutes for each 
other (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Huang and Zhang, 2011; Jeon and 
Ligon, 2011; Narayanan, Rangan and Rangan, 2004). Mola and Loughran (2004)
checked the robustness with underpricing but could not detect any significant 
qualitative difference between these two alternative measures of indirect costs. 
Huang and Zhang (2011) argue for the closing market price the day before offer as 
exogenous, and Jeon and Ligon (2011) use underpricing similar to IPO underpricing, 
however, report qualitatively the same results even with a prior closing price.
The indirect cost of offer discounts averaged 1.99% during the sample period, with 
the highest and the lowest of 6.41% and 0.41% in 2009 and 1998, respectively. 
Similarly, the indirect costs of underpricing averaged 1.18% during the sample 
period, with the highest and the lowest of 4.56% and -0.16% (i.e., overpricing by 
0.16%) in 2009 and 1998, respectively. Both the indirect costs depict a rising trend in 
line with the industrial SEOs over the three consecutive sub-periods. The right-most 
column shows the total costs average 5.80% during the sample period, with the 
highest and the lowest of 8.93% and 3.85% in 2009 and 2004, respectively. The total 
costs column also shows that the sampled SEOs incurred the highest costs of 5.87% 
in the sub-period of 2007-2010.
Overall, the table delineates that a higher percentage of underwriting discounts and 
total direct costs coincided with the lowest amount of SEO offer proceeds raised in 
2001. It also delineates that the second highest amount of total costs occurred in 2001 
also coincides with the lowest amount of proceeds raised. Further, the coincidence of 
the lowest percentage of other direct expenses of 0.23% in 2000 explicitly reveals the 
size effect of proceeds on such non-underwriting other direct expenses. 
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The statistically significant univariate inverse relation of both underwriting discount 
(unddisc) and SEO direct expenses (seodirexp) with SEO offer proceeds, and 
student’s robust t statistics of -2.16 and -6.48, respectively, strongly support 
economies of scale with offer size (not reported). 
The average SEO other direct expenses for industrial SEOs of 1.96% of Lee et al. 
(1996), 1.32% of Mola and Loughran (2004) and 3.69% of Lee and Masulis (2009)
are also much higher than this result of 0.46%. The total direct costs averaging 
4.63% are lower than that of 7.11% of Lee et. al.(1996), 6.65% of Mola and Loghran
(2004) and 8.78% of Lee and Masulis (2009) for industrial SEOs. Consistent with 
industrial IPOs and SEOs, REIT SEOs incur lower total direct costs, consisting of 
both underwriting discounts and non-underwriting direct expenses, thanthose of 
REIT IPOs.40 The REIT SEO underpricing of 1.18% is significantly different from 
zero and much lower than that of REIT IPOs and industrial SEOs.41
40 The sample of 127 REIT IPOs during 1996-2010 reports the total direct costs of 8.43%, consisting 
of underwriting fees of 6.47% and non-underwriting direct expenses of 1.96%.
41 Underpricing of 3.18% is documented in Bairagi and Dimovski (2011) and 3.07% is reported in this 
study. Smith (1977) first reports 0.82% underpricing with 328 exchange-listed industrial SEOs during 
1971-1975. Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) report 0.45% with 118 SEOs during 1988-1991, Yeoman 
(2001) reports 0.27% with 1143 SEOs during 1988-1993, and Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) report 
2.58% with 1,703 SEOs during 1990-1997.
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Table 4.2.1: Year and three sub-periods wise distribution of the costs of raising seasoned equity 
capital by 800 U.S. REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
Year of
SEOs
Population
SEOs
Sampled
SEOs
SEO
Proceeds
Underwriting
Discounts
SEO direct
Expenses
Direct
Costs
Offer
Discounts
Under
Pricing
Total
Costs
1996 113 48 86.68 4.87 0.82 5.69 0.85 0.85 6.54
1997 227 119 108.19 4.84 0.50 5.34 0.64 0.24 5.58
1998 216 64 75.21 4.63 0.55 5.17 0.41 -0.16 5.02
1999 29 9 107.03 4.77 0.93 5.70 0.73 0.01 5.70
2000 11 4 274.08 4.14 0.23 4.31 1.10 2.06 6.37
2001 58 51 69.01 5.16 0.70 5.85 1.50 1.32 7.17
2002 85 53 87.49 4.43 0.62 5.02 1.36 0.79 5.81
2003 82 65 80.06 3.53 0.45 3.96 1.98 0.61 4.58
2004 79 63 96.38 2.93 0.33 3.26 1.53 0.68 3.95
2005 71 50 121.07 3.65 0.53 4.18 1.31 1.11 5.29
2006 75 62 189.28 3.68 0.34 4.03 1.41 1.21 5.24
2007 56 37 221.42 3.93 0.28 4.21 1.23 1.18 5.40
2008 60 45 200.44 3.82 0.26 4.09 2.61 1.40 5.48
2009 87 70 242.10 4.06 0.32 4.37 6.81 4.56 8.93
2010 91 60 264.76 4.15 0.25 4.33 4.50 2.09 6.42
1996-00 596 244 97.98 4.78 0.59 5.36 0.63 0.28 5.64
2000-06 450 344 108.20 3.85 0.48 4.32 1.53 0.94 5.26
2007-10 294 212 236.07 4.01 0.28 4.27 4.29 2.60 5.87
N 1340 800 800 799 792 800 800 800 800
Total 138.97 4.17 0.46 4.63 1.99 1.18 5.80
Where the columns 1-3 are in absolute number and the later five columns are in percentage. The row 
labelled N (second from bottom) shows the total number of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) in the 
respective column. The last row shows the equally-weighted average costs of raising equity capital for 
800 out of 1,340 SEOs issued by 196 U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) during the period of 
1996-2010. The column heading SEO Proceeds is the average offer proceeds in nominal million 
dollars, Underwriting Discounts denote the underwriting discounts paid to the underwriters, SEO 
Direct Expenses denotes non-underwriting other direct SEO-related expenses incurred by the issuing 
firm, Direct Costs denote direct costs consisting of Underwriting Discounts and SEO Direct 
Expenses, Offer Discounts is the percentage of offer price below the closing market price prior to the 
offer with respect to offer price, Underpricing denotes a percentage difference of offer price below 
the closing market price on the offer day and Total Costs is the sum of total direct costs and 
underpricing. All other costs are as a percentage of offer proceeds.
4.3.2 Scatter Diagram of SEO Costs
4.3.2.1   Scatter Diagram of Underwriting Discounts and SEO Proceeds
Figure 4.2.1 presents the scatter diagram of underwriting discounts and nominal SEO 
proceeds (in million dollars). My results complement the existing literature of 
economies of scale for SEO underwriting discounts by reporting a lower 
underwriting discount for larger SEO proceeds (Butler, et al., 2005; Jeon and Ligon, 
2011; Lee and Masulis, 2009; Lee, et al., 1996).
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Figure 4.2.1: Scatter diagram of underwriting discounts and nominal SEO proceeds for 800 REIT 
SEOs during 1996-2010.
4.3.2.2   Scatter Diagram of Underpricing and SEO Proceeds
Figure 4.2.2 presents the scatter diagram of underpricing and SEO proceeds (in 
nominal dollars). It shows underpricing is positively driven by SEO proceeds and is 
consistent with the expectation of Corwin (2003) who posits it is due to the 
temporary price pressure which is a positive function of larger offers.
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Figure 4.2.2: Scatter diagram of underpricing and proceeds for 800 SEOs issued by 196 REITs during
1996-2010.
Figure 4.2.3 depicts the trend of underwriting discounts and nominal SEO proceeds 
raised with 800 SEOs by 196 REITs from 1996-2010. The figure depicts a declining 
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trend of SEO underwriting discounts over time with two major turning points. The 
first major turning point starts with a declining trend after the highest point in 2001, 
and the second starts with a rising trend after the lowest point in 2004. The declining 
trend is consistent with the industrial SEO literature (Kim, et al., 2010).
Figure 4.2.3: Linear trend of underwriting discounts for 800 SEOs issued by 196 REITs during 1996-
2010.
Figure 4.2.4 presents the trend of underpricing for 800 SEOs issued by 196 REITs 
from 1996-2010. It shows a rising trend of SEO underpricing over the period, with 
two major peaks in 2000 and 2009. The rising trend of underpricing over time is 
consistent with the SEO literature (Corwin, 2003; Kim, et al., 2010; Mola and 
Loughran 2004). First peak started in 1999 and ends in 2000, and the second peak 
starts in 2008 and ends in 2009. The first peak may be attributed to the dot.com 
bubble (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr, 2003; Loughran and Ritter, 2004), and the 
second to the recent global financial crisis (GFC) which began in August 2007 
(Gordon and Valentine, 2009) which was triggered by the sharp downturn in real 
estate prices (Laopodis, 2009).
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Figure 4.2.4: Linear trend of underpricing for 800 SEOs issued by 196 REITs during 1996-2010.
4.3.3 Costs of Equity and Mortgage REIT SEOs
4.3.3.1   Distribution of Costs for 647 Equity REIT SEOs
Table 4.2.2 replicates Table 4.2.1 with 647 U.S. equity REIT SEOs from 1996-2010. 
The table shows that REIT SEOs paid 4.98%, the highest and 2.41%, the lowest 
underwriting discounts to the underwriters in 2001 and 2004, respectively, compared 
with the full sample average of 4.07%. The non-underwriting other direct expenses 
averaged 0.46%, with the highest 0.93% and the lowest 0.23% in 1999 and 2000, 
respectively, and experienced a constant downward trend over the three sub-periods. 
The total direct costs, consisting of both underwriting discounts and non-
underwriting direct expenses, averaged 4.52% with the highest of 5.71% in both 
1996 and 2001, and the lowest of 2.72% in 2004. The lowest total direct costs 
occurred from 2001-2006. 
The indirect cost of offer discount and underpricing averaged 2.03% and 1.12% with 
the highest 7.13% and 4.77%, respectively, in 2009. Both indirect costs show a 
constantly rising trend over the three sub-periods. The total costs averaged 5.64% 
with the highest 9.05% and the lowest 3.93% in 2009 and 2004, respectively. The 
highest and the lowest total costs of 6.83% and 4.75% are incurred during 2007-2010
and 2001-2006, respectively. This indicates the inter-temporal variations in costs of 
SEOs.
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Table 4.2.2: Year wise and period wise distribution of the costs for 647 U.S. REIT Equity SEOs 
during 1996-2010.
Year of
SEO
N SEO
Proceeds
(million)
Under
Discounts
SEO 
Direct
Exp
Direct
Costs
Offer
Discounts
Under
Price
Total 
costs
1996 44 82.82 4.91 0.80 5.71 0.87 0.96 6.68
1997 111 111.76 4.94 0.51 5.45 0.61 0.27 5.71
1998 60 78.15 4.59 0.53 5.11 0.40 -0.11 5.00
1999 9 107.03 4.77 0.93 5.70 0.73 0.01 5.70
2000 4 274.08 4.14 0.23 4.31 1.10 2.06 6.37
2001 30 77.15 4.98 0.73 5.71 1.78 0.67 6.38
2002 33 88.87 4.03 0.71 4.72 1.31 0.64 5.36
2003 48 81.13 3.02 0.46 3.46 2.13 0.47 3.93
2004 47 100.62 2.41 0.31 2.72 1.51 0.64 3.36
2005 41 125.52 3.61 0.50 4.11 1.30 1.12 5.23
2006 51 199.64 3.54 0.30 3.84 1.41 1.24 5.08
2007 19 227.92 3.89 0.23 4.12 0.93 0.28 4.40
2008 34 184.30 3.63 0.29 3.92 2.21 0.69 4.61
2009 67 244.69 3.96 0.31 4.28 7.13 4.77 9.05
2010 55 277.35 4.08 0.24 4.25 4.59 2.35 6.60
1996-2000 228 99.99 4.82 0.58 5.40 0.62 0.32 5.72
2001-2006 250 116.79 3.48 0.47 3.94 1.58 0.81 4.75
2007-2010 169 241.28 3.93 0.28 4.18 4.62 2.65 6.83
Total 143.39 4.07 0.46 4.52 2.03 1.12 5.64
N 647 647 646 642 647 647 647 647
Where the left-most column shows the year and three sub-periods, the column labelled N presents the 
total number of sampled equity SEOs, the column with SEO proceeds denotes the average SEO 
proceeds raised in million dollars in each year and sub-periods, respectively. The next six columns 
present the equally-weighted average costs in percentage of proceeds raised in Seasoned Equity 
Offerings (SEOs) in the concerned year or period. The row labelled N shows the total number of 
SEOs in the column. The second to last row labelled Total presents the equally-weighted average 
costs of raising equity capital for 647 out of 1,340 SEOs issued by 196 U.S. equity based Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) during the period 1996-2010. The column headed Under Discounts
denotes the underwriting discounts paid to the underwriters, SEO Direct Expenses denote non-
underwriting other direct SEO-related expenses incurred by the issuing firm, Direct Costs denote total 
direct costs consisting of Underwriting Discounts and SEO Direct Expenses, Offer Discount is the 
percentage of offer price below the closing market price prior to the offer, Under price denotes 
indirect costs of underpricing as a percentage of offer price below the closing market price of the offer 
day with respect to offer price and the totalcosts is the average of the sum of direct costs and 
underpricing. All other costs are also as a percentage of proceeds.
4.3.3.2   Distribution of Costs for 153 Mortgage REIT SEOs
Table 4.2.3 replicates  Table 4.2.2 with 153 mortgage REIT SEOs issued by the 196 
REITs during 1996-2010. The table shows that the average of proceeds raised is 
$120.26 million, with the highest $250.32 million and the lowest $31.10 million in 
2008 and 1998, respectively. It also confirms that mortgage REITs, on average, 
raised lower proceeds per issue. The highest and lowest number of SEOs issued is 21 
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and 4 in 2001 and both of 1996 and 1998, respectively. Consistent with equity REIT 
SEOs, mortgage REIT SEOs raised, on average, higher amounts of proceeds over 
subsequent sub-periods. The underwriting discounts averaged 4.61%, with the 
highest and the lowest of 5.41% and 3.45% during 2001 and 1997, respectively. The 
mortgage SEOs paid the lowest underwriting discounts of 4.11% from 1996-2000.
The non-underwriting SEO direct expenses averaged 0.47%, with the highest and the 
lowest of 1.07% and 0.19% in 1996 and 2008, respectively. The lowest of these 
expenses coincided with the average larger proceeds in 2008, which strongly 
supports economies of scale in such expenses. 
The direct costs averaged 5.08%, with the highest at 6.12% in 1998. Consistent with 
equity SEOs, the indirect costs and the total costs experience a rising trend over the 
sub-periods and are higher than that of equity SEOs. 
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Table 4.2.3: Year wise and periodical distribution of costs of raising equity capital by 153 U.S. 
REIT Mortgage SEOs during 1996-2010.
Year of
SEO
N SEO
Amount
(million)
Under
Discounts
SEO 
Direct
Exp
Direct
Costs
Offer
Discounts
Under
Price
Total
Costs
1996 4 129.09 4.41 1.07 5.48 0.57 -0.40 5.08
1997 8 58.60 3.45 0.39 3.83 1.06 -0.19 3.64
1998 4 31.10 5.13 0.99 6.12 0.51 -0.91 5.21
2001 21 57.38 5.41 0.65 6.06 1.10 2.25 8.31
2002 10 85.22 5.09 0.47 5.52 1.44 1.03 6.55
2003 17 77.04 4.97 0.43 5.38 1.56 1.02 6.40
2004 16 83.93 4.45 0.40 4.85 1.60 0.82 5.67
2005 9 100.80 3.83 0.67 4.50 1.38 1.07 5.57
2006 11 141.24 4.37 0.53 4.91 1.42 1.07 5.98
2007 18 214.55 3.97 0.34 4.31 1.55 2.14 6.45
2008 11 250.32 4.42 0.19 4.60 3.85 3.58 8.19
2009 9 224.52 4.67 0.33 5.00 4.63 3.13 8.13
2010 5 126.35 4.85 0.30 5.15 3.54 -0.73 4.42
1996-2000 16 69.35 4.11 0.71 4.82 0.80 -0.42 4.40
2001-2006 94 85.35 4.83 0.52 5.33 1.40 1.27 6.60
2007-2010 43 215.53 4.33 0.29 4.63 3.02 2.38 7.01
Total 120.26 4.61 0.47 5.08 1.79 1.41 6.49
N 153 153 153 150 153 153 153 153
Where the left-most column shows the year and three sub-periods and the column labelled N and SEO 
Amount report the total number of SEO issued and averaged amount of proceeds raised in 
corresponding year and sub-period. The next six columns present the equally-weighted average costs 
in percentage of amount raised by Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) in the concerned year or period. 
The row labelled N shows the total number of SEOs in concerned column. The row second to last 
labelled Total presents the equally-weighted average costs of raising equity capital of 153 out of 
1,340 SEOs issued by 196 U.S. mortgaged-based Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) during the 
period of 1996-2010. The column headed Under Discounts denotes the underwriting discounts paid 
to the underwriters, SEO Direct Exp denotes non-underwriting other direct SEO-related expenses 
incurred by the issuing firm, Direct Costs denote direct costs consisting of Underwriting Discounts
and SEO Direct Expenses, Offer Discounts is the percentage change of offer price below the closing 
market price prior to the offer with respect to offer price and Under price denotes indirect costs of 
underpricing as a percentage difference of offer price below the closing market price of the offer day 
with respect to offer price. All other costs are as percentage of offer proceeds.
4.3.3.3   Differences in costs between equity and Mortgage REIT SEOs
Table 4.2.4 reports the statistical difference of mean and median for different levels 
of SEO costs between equity and mortgage REITs. It shows that both the mean and 
median differences are statistically significant for underwriting discounts and total 
direct costs. The significant difference in direct costs is attributed to the difference in 
underwriting discounts as the difference of SEO direct expenses is insignificant. 
Both the mean and median differences of total costs are statistically significant, but 
only the median difference of underpricing is statistically significant. Overall, it 
shows that the mortgage REIT SEOs incur higher issuing costs due to the higher 
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costs paid to the underwriters. It suggests that expected income from assets held by 
the REITs may explain their SEO costs.
Table 4.2.4: Tests of differences in costs for equity and mortgage REIT SEOs issued by 196 U.S. 
REITs during 1996-2010.
Variable N unddisc seodirexp directcosts offdisc undprice totalcosts
Panel-A
Equity REIT SEOs 647 4.07 0.46 4.52 2.03 1.12 5.64
Mortgage REIT SEOs 153 4.61 0.47 5.08 1.79 1.41 6.49
Difference 0.54 0.01 0.56 0.24 0.28 0.85
t-statistics 4.03 0.33 3.57 0.90 0.98 2.59
p-value 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.37 0.33 0.01
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Z) 4.32 0.87 3.84 1.26 2.34 3.72
p-value 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.21 0.02 0.00
The column headed unddisc denotes the underwriting discounts paid to the underwriters, seodirexp
denotes the non-underwriting other SEO related expenses directly incurred by the issuing firm, 
directcosts denotes the total direct costs consisting of unddisc and seodirexp, offdisc is the 
percentage change of offer price below the closing market price prior to the offer with respect to offer 
price, undprice denotes the indirect costs of underpricing as a percentage difference of offer price 
below the closing market price of the offer day with respect to the offer price and the totalcosts
denotes the total costs consisting of directcosts and undprice. All costs are as a percentage of offer 
proceeds.
4.3.4 Differences of Costs between different sub-samples of SEOs.
Table 4.2.5 presents the test results on difference in the costs of raising seasoned 
equity for four independent sub-samples in panels A to D. 
Panel A presents the test results of SEOs with UPREIT and traditional structures and 
shows that 63% of the SEOs have an UPREIT structure (501/800) which pays 
significantly lower underwriting discounts to underwriters, but leaves significantly 
higher initial returns to subscribing investors. This might be attributed to the conflicts 
of interest in managing properties held by SEOs of UPREIT and traditional 
organizational structures. It also suggests that total issuing costs are not significantly 
different between SEOs of the two organizational structures (Ghosh, et al., 2000; 
Goodwin, 2008).
Panel B presents the test results for SEOs with internal and external managers, and 
reports that the cost differences of these two groups are not statistically different. It 
suggests that management of properties by own employees or by professionals is 
insignificant in raising equity capital by SEOs.
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Panel C presents the test results of cost differences for SEOs traded on the NYSE and 
those traded on the AMEX and or the NASDAQ. The results suggest significantly 
lower total costs for NYSE-traded SEOs. This is attributed to the significantly lower 
underwriting discounts, because the indirect costs of both offer discounts and 
underpricing are insignificantly higher for AMEX and NASDAQ-traded SEOs. It 
suggests that trading exchange may be a significant determinant in explaining the 
total costs of SEOs.
Finally, Panel D presents the test results of SEOs audited by the industry-dominating 
auditor (Ernst &Young) and shows that the total direct costs are significantly lower 
which leads the total costs to be significantly lower. It suggest that REIT SEO 
dominating auditor might explain the total direct costs.
Overall, the table implies that the organizational structure and trading exchange 
partially influence some of the costs of raising seasoned equity capital.
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Table 4.2.5: Tests of differences in costs of five sub-samples of SEOs issued by 196 U.S. REITs 
during 1996-2010.
Variable N unddisc seodirexp directcosts offdisc undprice totalcosts
Panel A: UPREIT vs traditional REIT SEOs
UPREIT REIT SEOs 501 3.98 0.46 4.43 2.13 1.37 5.80
Traditional REIT SEOs 299 4.50 0.46 4.95 1.76 0.85 5.80
Difference -0.52 0.00 -0.52 0.37 0.52 0.00
t-statistics 4.71 0.08 4.10 1.71 2.21 0.01
p-value 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.99
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Z) 3.61 0.04 3.33 1.49 2.06 0.47
p-value 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.64
Panel B: Internally vs Externally Managed REIT SEOs
Internally Managed SEOs 408 4.13 0.48 4.61 2.04 1.38 5.98
Externally Managed SEOs 392 4.22 0.44 4.64 1.93 0.97 5.61
Difference -0.09 0.04 -0.03 0.10 0.41 0.37
t-statistics 0.85 1.20 0.31 0.46 1.77 1.42
p-value 0.40 0.23 0.75 0.64 0.08 0.16
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Z) 0.16 0.70 0.29 0.31 1.38 1.19
p-value 0.88 0.49 0.77 0.76 0.17 0.23
Panel C: NYSE vs Other Exchange Traded SEOs
NYSE Listed SEOs 714 4.09 0.90 4.49 2.05 1.22 5.71
AMEX & NASDAQ SEOs 86 4.89 0.41 5.76 1.50 0.82 6.59
Difference -0.80 0.49 1.29 0.55 0.40 0.89
t-statistics 4.72 8.58 6.57 1.62 1.09 2.13
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.27 0.04
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Z) 5.80 5.90 6.26 0.94 1.11 2.75
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.27 0.01
Panel D: Top Auditor vs Other Auditors
Ernst & Young (Dominating) 253 3.81 0.39 4.18 2.21 0.94 5.12
Other Aditors 547 4.34 0.50 4.83 1.88 1.28 6.12
Difference -0.54 -0.11 -0.65 0.33 -0.34 -1.00
t-statistics 4.69 2.74 4.94 1.46 1.39 3.61
p-value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.17 0.00
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Z) 5.74 3.36 5.40 2.71 0.23 3.30
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.82 0.00
The column headed unddisc denotes the underwriting discounts paid to the underwriters, seodirexp
denotes the non-underwriting other SEO-related expenses directly incurred by the issuing firm, 
directcosts denotes the total direct costs consisting of unddisc and seodirexp, offdisc is the 
percentage change of offer price below the closing market price prior to the offer with respect to offer 
price, undprice denotes the indirect costs of underpricing as a percentage difference of offer price 
below the closing market price of the offer day with respect to the offer price and the totalcosts
denotes the total costs consisting of directcosts and undprice. All costs are as a percentage of offer 
proceeds.
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4.3.5 Distribution of SEOs across States of Incorporation
Table 4.2.6 presents the distribution of total SEOs across states of incorporation 
during the full sample period and the three sub-periods. The table consists of 18 
columns in total where the left and the right-most columns show the year/period and 
the number of total SEOs during the year/period, respectively. The middle 16 
columns present the total number of SEOs issued during a year/period that are 
incorporated into one of the 16 states. The table shows that Maryland is the state of 
incorporation for 80% of SEOs, followed by Delaware with 7.5%.
Table 4.2.6: Year wise and sub-period wise distribution of number of 800 U.S. REIT SEOs 
across different states of incorporation during 1996-2010.
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1996 38 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 48
1997 85 6 2 2 1 4 4 1 6 1 4 3 0 0 0 0 119
1998 47 3 2 0 0 4 3 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 64
1999 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
2000 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
2001 43 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 51
2002 36 7 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 53
2003 55 2 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 65
2004 54 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 63
2005 45 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 50
2006 56 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 62
2007 32 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 37
2008 38 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 45
2009 52 9 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 70
2010 50 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 60
1996-2000 179 16 4 2 1 9 8 2 9 1 4 5 2 0 1 1 244
2001-2006 289 16 2 4 3 2 0 5 3 2 5 7 6 0 0 0 344
2007-2010 172 21 1 1 0 2 1 1 5 1 0 6 0 1 0 0 212
Total 640 53 7 7 4 13 9 8 17 4 9 18 8 1 1 1 800
Where the left-most column shows the year along with three sub-periods and the last column presents 
the total number of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) in the concerned year and period. The middle 
16 columns present the total number of SEOs of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) incorporated 
in the law of the state mentioned in the heading of concerned column. The bottom row shows the total 
number of SEOs incorporated under the law of the concerned state as headed in the column for 800 
out of 1,340 SEOs issued by the 196 U.S. REITs during the period 1996-2010.
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4.3.5.1   Distribution of Costs of SEOs across States of Incorporation
Table 4.2.7 reports the lower underwriting discounts and the higher underpricing for 
SEOs incorporated in Maryland, but the test results on differences of both means and 
medians fail to support the statistical significance. Table 4.2.7 also reports that 
Maryland SEOs incurred a higher amount of non-underwriting other direct expenses.
This test results indicate that the incorporation law might not explain the costs of 
SEO.
Table 4.2.7: Tests of differences in costs of Maryland and non-Maryland incorporated SEOs 
issued by the 196 U.S. REITs during 199-2010.
Variable N unddisc seodirexp directcosts offdisc undprice totalcosts
Maryland REIT SEOs 640 4.16 0.47 4.62 1.94 1.25 5.86
Other REIT SEOs 160 4.23 0.44 4.67 2.18 0.90 5.56
Difference 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.24 0.35 0.30
t-statistics 0.51 0.67 0.30 0.92 1.20 0.92
p-value 0.61 0.51 0.76 0.36 0.23 0.36
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Z) 1.04 0.80 0.72 0.23 1.36 0.99
p-value 0.30 0.43 0.47 0.82 0.17 0.32
The column headed unddisc denotes the underwriting discounts paid to the underwriters, seodirexp
denotes the non-underwriting other SEO related expenses directly incurred by the issuing firm, 
directcosts denotes the total direct costs consisting of unddisc and seodirexp, offdisc is the 
percentage change of offer price below the closing market price prior to the offer with respect to offer 
price, undprice denotes the indirect costs of underpricing as a percentage difference of offer price 
below the closing market price of the offer day with respect to the offer price and the totalcosts
denotes the total costs consisting of directcosts and undprice. All costs are as percentage of offer 
proceeds.
4.3.6 Costs of REIT SEOs across Property Types
4.3.6.1   Year Wise Distributions of REIT SEOs across Property Types 
Table 4.2.8 presents the year and three sub-periods’ distributions of the sample REIT 
SEOs across property types. The table shows that 15% of the SEOs (119/800), which 
is the highest in a year, were issued in 1997, and the Retail property type issues the 
highest number. 
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Table 4.2.8: Year and three sub-period wise distributions of 800 U.S. REIT SEOs across 
property types during 1996-2010.
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1996 12 3 9 10 0 5 3 4 2 48
1997 33 8 22 18 1 12 17 5 3 119
1998 18 3 19 9 0 6 3 5 1 64
1999 2 0 3 0 2 1 0 1 0 9
2000 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4
2001 3 21 13 1 1 1 4 6 1 51
2002 2 20 19 1 1 3 3 3 1 53
2003 5 17 18 7 3 7 3 4 1 65
2004 17 16 8 2 6 8 0 6 0 63
2005 12 9 6 3 2 11 1 4 2 50
2006 11 9 7 2 1 17 8 5 2 62
2007 4 17 2 1 1 3 2 7 0 37
2008 6 11 6 2 2 1 3 13 1 45
2009 18 9 15 6 1 8 3 8 2 70
2010 13 5 13 6 3 9 2 9 0 60
1996-2000 67 14 54 37 4 24 23 15 6 244
2001-2006 50 92 71 16 14 47 19 28 7 344
2007-2010 41 42 36 15 7 21 10 37 3 212
Total 158 148 161 68 25 92 52 80 16 800
The table consists of 11 columns with the first and the last column representing the year along with 
three sub-periods and the number of total SEOs in corresponding year and sub-period, respectively. 
The middle 9 columns present the number of SEOs issued with concentration in 9 different property 
types during the corresponding year and sub-periods. The bottom row reports the total number of 
SEOs issued by 9 different properties along with the grand total.
4.3.6.2   Costs of REIT SEOs across Property Types
Table 4.2.9 presents the distribution of the costs of raising equity capital for the 
SEOs across different property types. The table consists of five panels with 
properties with similar characteristics in each panel. Each panel presents the average 
costs of raising seasoned equity capital by U.S. REITs with investments in similar 
property.  
Panel A presents the distribution of different levels of costs for Industrial/Office 
property, Panel B for mortgage based securities (MBS) property, Panel C for Retail 
property, Panel D for Residential property, and Panel E for Miscellaneous property. 
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The distribution shows that the property type of Retail issued the highest number of 
161 SEOs, followed by Industrial/Office with 158 SEOs. In terms of the distribution 
of different levels of costs, SEOs with the property type of MBS and Specialty pay 
the highest (4.60%) and the lowest (3.55%) underwriting discounts to underwriters. 
Home financing under MBS paid higher discounts to underwriters than did 
Commercial Financing. 
Panel B also shows that the SEOs with MBS in Home Financing leave more money 
through underpricing than Commercial Financing. The property of Home Financing 
under MBS and Shopping Center under Retail incurred the highest and the lowest 
total costs at 6.97% and 5.11%, respectively. However, the SEOs with Self-Storage 
and Healthcare property leave the highest and the lowest underpricing at 2.34% and 
0.55%, respectively. This finding is consistent with the evidence of higher and lower 
auditor fees for REITs investing in multiple market segments and financial assets, 
and those in relatively predictable lease terms and cash flows, respectively 
(Danielsen, Harrison, Van Ness and Warr, 2009).
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Table 4.2.9: Distribution of costs of raising equity capital across Property Types for 800 U.S. 
REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
Property Type N unddisc seodirexp directcosts offdisc undprice totalcosts
Panel A
Industry/Office 158 3.89 0.45 4.34 2.15 1.40 5.74
Office 93 3.82 0.48 4.31 2.34 1.08 5.39
Industry 38 3.90 0.47 4.35 2.12 2.22 6.57
Mixed and others 27 4.14 0.31 4.45 1.54 1.34 5.79
Panel B
MBS 148 4.60 0.46 5.05 1.82 1.45 6.50
Home Financing 102 4.83 0.41 5.24 1.80 1.73 6.97
Commercial Financing 46 4.08 0.57 4.62 1.85 0.83 5.45
Panel C
Retail 161 4.04 0.48 4.49 2.26 0.98 5.47
Shopping Center 97 3.81 0.52 4.29 2.13 0.82 5.11
Regional 24 3.69 0.29 3.96 3.71 1.71 5.67
Free Standing/
outlet centers
40 4.79 0.50 5.29 1.70 0.91 6.20
Panel D
Residential 68 4.04 0.38 4.41 1.71 1.23 5.64
Apartment 66 4.03 0.38 4.40 1.74 1.21 5.61
Manufactured Homes 2 4.62 0.32 4.93 0.58 1.83 6.77
Panel E
Specialty 25 3.55 0.62 4.17 2.12 1.53 5.70
Lodging Resorts 92 4.18 0.49 4.67 2.00 1.24 5.91
Diversified 52 4.55 0.59 5.14 1.86 0.58 5.72
Healthcare 80 4.28 0.38 4.67 1.79 0.55 5.22
Self-Storage 16 4.04 0.35 4.39 1.54 2.34 6.73
Total 800
Where the first column shows the property type consisting of property sector and sub-sectors in five 
panels and the second column is the inner column showing the number of Seasoned Equity Offerings 
(SEOs) by property sub-sector, the column labelled N shows the number of SEOs issued by property 
main sector and the next six columns present the equally-weighted average costs of 800 U.S. Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) SEOs SEOs issued by 196 REITs across different property sectors 
during the period 1996-2010. 
Each of the panels from A to D presents the average costs for both property type and sub-sectors. The 
column heading unddisc denotes the underwriting discounts paid to the underwriters, seodirexp
denotes the non-underwriting other SEO related expenses directly incurred by the REIT firm, 
directcosts denote the total direct costs consisting of unddisc and seodirexp, offdisc is the percentage 
change of offer price below the closing market price prior to the offer with respect to offer price, 
undprice denotes the indirect costs of underpricing as a percentage change of offer price below the 
closing market price on the offer day with respect to offer price and totalcosts denotes the average of 
sum  of direct costs and underpricing. All costs are as a percentage of offer proceeds.
4.3.6.3   Differences of Costs between Healthcare and other REIT SEOs
The findings of Brau and Heywood (2008) suggest an inter-temporal pattern of 
healthcare REITs that is different from general REITs. The significant positive initial 
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returns, with t-statistics of 2.04 for healthcare REIT SEOs, in this study strongly 
support the informational advantage of managers in choosing the optimal time of 
issuing SEOs and also the effect of investors’ sentiment. 
The results presented in Table 4.2.10 show that the underpricing of Healthcare REIT 
SEOs is significantly lower than that of other property types. The table also shows 
that all other costs, particularly the components of the total direct costs, are not 
statistically different from those of SEOs with other property types. The study has 
also tested the differences in costs between other individual property types but found 
statistically insignificant differences. 
Overall, Tables 4.2.9 and 4.2.10 suggest that property management and the inherent 
risks are considered by both the underwriters and the investors, hence, concentration 
in a particular property might have an influence on determining the costs of raising 
REIT equity capital.
Table 4.2.10: Tests of differences costs of Healthcare against other SEOs issued by 196 U.S. in 
REITs during 1996-2010.
Variable N unddisc seodirexp directcosts offdisc undprice totalcosts
Healthcare REIT SEOs 80 4.28 0.38 4.67 1.79 0.55 5.22
Other REIT SEOs 720 4.16 0.47 4.62 2.01 1.25 5.87
Difference 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.22 0.70 0.65
t-statistics 0.69 1.49 0.22 0.62 1.82 1.51
p-value 0.49 0.14 0.83 0.54 0.07 0.13
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Z) 0.53 1.54 0.21 1.91 1.64 1.25
p-value 0.60 0.12 0.84 0.06 0.10 0.21
The column headed unddisc denotes the underwriting discounts paid to the underwriters, seodirexp
denotes the non-underwriting other SEO-related expenses directly incurred by the REIT firm, 
directcosts denote the total direct costs consisting of unddisc and seodirexp, offdisc is the percentage 
change of offer price below the closing market price prior to the offer with respect to offer price, 
undprice denotes the indirect costs of underpricing as a percentage change of offer price below the 
closing market price on the offer day with respect to offer price and totalcosts denotes the average of 
sum  of direct costs and underpricing. All costs are as percentage of offer proceeds.
4.3.7 Descriptive Statistics of Levels of SEO Costs across Sub-Samples
Table 4.2.11 presents the descriptive statistics of different levels of costs for different 
sub-samples of REIT SEOs in order of first quartile, mean, second quartile, third 
quartile, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis. The left-
most column shows the name of different levels of costs with the number of 
observations in the second column labelled by N. The next nine columns report the 
statistics of each level of cost. The table contains six panels from A to F, and each of 
CHAPTER FOUR DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
127
the panels presents the descriptive statistics of the different levels of costs of a 
particular category of sub-sample.
Panel A of the table presents the descriptive statistics with full sample observations 
during 1996-2010. It shows that the direct costs (directcosts) averaged 4.63%, 
consisting of average underwriting discounts (unddisc) of 4.17% and averaged non-
underwriting other direct expenses (seodirexp) of 0.46%. The row of total costs 
presents the statistics of total costs consisting of both direct costs and underpricing. 
The underpricing averaged 1.18% and is statistically significant (different from 
zero), with t-statistics of 10.28, and ranges from -7.14% (i.e., overpricing by 7.14%) 
to 32.39% with positive skewness (not normally distributed) and leptokurtic in 
magnitude (peakedness in distribution). The inter-quartile difference of underpricing 
is 2.44%. It indicates the absolute difference of underpricing between 75 percentiles 
and 25 percentiles of SEOs. Investigation of the data reveals that 13% (105/800), 
30% (242/800) and 57% (453/800) of the observations have an offer price exactly the 
same, below, and more than the offer-day closing transaction price, respectively. The 
result is consistent with the contemporary REIT SEO evidence.42
The underwriting discounts to the underwriters for facilitating the issue averaged 
4.17% with an inter-quartile range of 1.12%. The underwriting discounts are 
negatively skewed and leptokurtic in magnitude. The positively skewed and 
leptokurtic non-underwriting other direct expenses averaged 0.46%, with an inter-
quartile dispersion of 0.35%. The data reveals that 24% (190/799) and 25% 
(198/800) of the observations paid underwriting discounts and incurred non-
underwriting direct expenses greater than the corresponding third quartile of 5.12% 
and 0.53%, with 47% (379/799) and 48% (384/800) lying within the inter-quartile 
range, respectively. The distribution of the components of the direct costs also 
reveals that unlike industrial and REIT IPOs, such costs are not clustered. The study 
has also investigated the clustering of such costs at any integer percentages but have 
not detected any evidence. This suggests a relatively higher cross-sectional variation 
in SEO direct costs and hence supports an area of investigation on their determinants. 
The results also support the notion of Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) that underpricing 
42 Ghosh, et al. (2000) report 0.74% underpricing with 178 equity REIT SEOs over 1991-1996. 
Ghosh, et al. (1998) also report 1.06% underpricing with 180 equity REIT SEOs during 1997. 
Goodwin (2008) reports underpricing of 1.21% with 698 REIT SEOs over 1994-2006.
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(1.18%) is the sum of offer discount (1.99%) and offer-day return (-0.75%). These 
two components of SEO underpricing are both positively skewed and leptokurtic in 
magnitude. 
Panels B and C present the descriptive statistics of costs for equity and mortgage 
SEOs, respectively. These two panels show that the average underwriting discounts, 
non-underwriting other direct expenses, total direct costs, underpricing and total 
costs are higher for mortgage than for equity REIT SEOs. This is in sharp contrast to 
REIT IPOs where equity IPOs incur higher issuing costs than mortgage IPOs. It 
suggests that the initial valuation and marketing is more uncertain for equity REITs 
which invest in income producing properties but, after seasoning, the equity REITs 
might become more certain than that of mortgage REITs. These findings are 
consistent with the existing contemporary evidence.43
Panel D reports the descriptive statistics for REIT SEOs with more than one 
underwriter in their syndicate to show the effect of the number of underwriters in an 
underwriting syndicate (Carter and Dark 1990; Corwin and Schultz, 2005). The panel 
implies that the number of syndicate members positively affects all levels of costs. 
Panel E of the table presents the descriptive statistics of different levels of costs for 
the sample of REIT SEOs with respect to the different level of representative 
underwriting. The panel shows that 32% (353/800) of the SEOs has a level of 
representative underwriting of 100%. The panel also shows that these SEOs incur 
relatively lower costs on all levels, except non-underwriting other direct expenses, 
with respect to the full sample, equity and mortgage samples. The evidence of the 
level of representative underwriting shows an inverse effect on underwriting 
discounts (Bairagi and Dimovski, 2012b).
Panel F presents the descriptive statistics of different levels of costs for SEOs 
underwritten by an underwriting syndicate led by Merrill Lynch. Further 
investigation shows that Merrill Lynch-led syndicates dominate the REIT SEOs with 
nearly 20% (159/800) of the SEOs in number and 35% (36%) in dollars of 2010 
(nominal dollars). It also shows that the average costs of all levels, except non-
43 Chen and Lu (2006) report higher initial returns for equity than mortgage IPOs (3.20% vs 0.63%). 
Goodwin (2008) reports higher underpricing for REIT SEOs concentrated in mortgage property.
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underwriting other direct expenses, of SEOs underwritten by a Merrill Lynch-led 
syndicate are higher in comparison to the full sample results.
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Table 4.2.11: Descriptive Statistics of costs of raising equity capital (as %) of different 
subsample of 800 SEOs U.S. REITs during 1996-2010.
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Panel -A: Full sample
unddisc* 799 4.00 4.17 4.75 5.12 0.00 7.64 1.52 -1.21 3.42
seoexp 792 0.18 0.46 0.30 0.53 0.00 5.88 0.52 3.81 26.36
directcosts 800 4.15 4.63 5.10 5.54 0.13 11.06 1.76 -0.59 3.57
offdisc 800 0.00 1.99 1.16 2.62 -4.76 30.88 2.98 3.37 23.63
undprice 800 -0.31 1.18 0.27 2.13 -7.14 32.39 3.24 3.36 24.38
offerret 800 -2.06 -0.75 -0.58 0.53 -19.50 25.50 3.18 0.21 11.44
totalcosts 800 3.84 5.80 5.36 7.21 -2.54 36.40 3.65 2.30 16.18
Panel -B: Equity SEOs
unddisc 646 4.00 4.07 4.55 5.10 0.00 7.64 1.54 -1.15 3.17
seoexp 642 0.18 0.46 0.29 0.51 0.00 5.88 0.54 4.06 28.16
directcosts 647 4.07 4.52 5.03 5.50 0.13 11.06 1.79 -0.50 3.51
offdisc 647 0.00 2.03 1.02 2.75 -4.76 30.88 3.11 3.26 22.35
undprice 647 -0.34 1.12 0.22 1.89 -6.53 32.39 3.31 3.71 26.83
offerret 647 -2.08 -0.85 -0.59 0.40 -19.50 25.50 3.22 0.27 12.82
totalcosts 647 3.65 5.64 5.30 6.85 -1.76 36.40 3.69 2.66 18.73
Panel -C: Mortgage SEOs
unddisc 153 4.44 4.61 5.00 5.49 0.37 6.50 1.36 -1.62 5.17
seoexp 150 0.17 0.47 0.34 0.59 0.03 2.07 0.44 1.73 5.75
directcosts 153 4.56 5.08 5.24 6.00 0.75 8.54 1.57 -1.04 4.36
offdisc 153 0.45 1.79 1.36 2.33 -3.80 20.00 2.30 3.70 27.60
undprice 153 0.00 1.41 0.57 2.79 -7.14 16.44 2.93 1.24 7.61
offerret 153 -2.01 -0.35 -0.45 1.47 -9.17 7.75 2.97 -0.06 3.70
totalcosts 153 4.58 6.49 6.10 8.58 -2.54 20.33 3.41 0.61 4.75
Panel -D: Number of total underwriters>1  
unddisc 559 4.25 4.64 4.99 5.23 0.00 7.01 1.03 -2.03 8.32
seodirexp 555 0.17 0.48 0.31 0.57 0.00 5.88 0.55 3.75 25.84
directcosts 559 4.50 5.12 5.22 5.70 0.40 11.06 1.33 -0.51 6.27
offdisc 559 0.00 2.12 1.03 2.75 -3.80 30.88 3.25 3.38 22.42
undprice 559 -0.25 1.40 0.40 2.45 -7.14 32.39 3.61 3.21 21.46
offerret 559 -2.06 -0.65 -0.46 0.79 -19.50 25.50 3.48 0.23 10.72
totalcosts 559 4.68 6.52 5.92 7.83 -2.54 36.40 3.70 2.67 18.49
Panel -E: Representative underwriting = 1 or 100%
unddisc 352 1.59 3.58 4.50 5.11 0.04 7.64 1.87 -0.44 1.64
seodirexp 347 0.19 0.46 0.30 0.56 0.01 3.57 0.46 2.94 15.08
directcosts 353 1.90 4.03 5.00 5.49 0.13 9.68 2.10 -0.20 2.04
offdisc 353 0.00 1.53 0.99 2.33 -4.76 13.54 2.10 2.19 11.29
undprice 353 -0.41 0.53 0.00 1.22 -6.53 10.61 1.98 1.23 6.71
offerret 353 -2.01 -0.95 -0.69 0.00 -10.47 7.64 2.20 -0.51 6.46
totalcosts 353 2.70 4.56 4.80 5.79 -2.54 20.21 2.82 0.89 6.04
Panel -F: Underwriting syndicate led by Merrill Lynch Group                                    
seoproceeds 159 78.75 217.18 138.00 268.13 10.50 1003.20 220.10 2.09 7.15
numtotund 159 4.00 10.11 7.00 12.00 1.00 50.00 9.64 1.88 6.51
unddisc 159 4.25 4.52 4.75 5.13 0.00 6.25 0.97 -2.24 9.24
seodirexp 159 0.13 0.34 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.93 0.33 2.41 9.87
directcosts 159 4.39 4.86 5.06 5.42 0.44 8.18 1.10 -1.17 6.93
offdisc 159 0.00 2.91 1.11 5.19 -1.64 30.88 4.46 2.94 15.68
undprice 159 -0.23 2.41 0.31 3.11 -5.44 32.39 5.40 2.76 12.42
offerret 159 -2.06 -0.44 -0.35 0.49 -19.50 25.50 4.28 0.97 12.90
totalcosts 159 4.78 7.27 5.58 8.03 -1.06 36.40 5.28 2.79 13.26
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Where the first column shows the different level of issuing costs for 800 Seasoned Equity Offerings 
(SEOs) issued by 196 U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) during the period 1996-2010. The 
column labelled N presents the number of SEOs with the concerned costs information and the next 9 
columns present the 1st quartile, 2nd quartile, 3rd quartile, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis, respectively, for each level of cost. The row heading unddisc denotes the 
underwriting discounts paid to the underwriters, seodirexp denotes non-underwriting other direct 
SEO-related expenses incurred by the issuing REIT firm, directcosts denotes direct costs consisting of 
unddisc and seodirexp, offdisc is the percentage of offer price below the closing market price prior to 
the offer with respect to offer price, undprice denotes indirect costs of underpricing as a percentage of 
offer price below the closing market price of the offer day with respect to offer price, offret denotes 
offer-day return as a percentage of difference between the closing market price the day before offer 
and offer day with respect to closing market price the day before offer and totalcosts is the sum of 
direct costs and underpricing. All costs are as percentage of offer proceeds. 
*Underwriting discount for one SEO (Urstadt Biddle Properties (UBA0910) has not been reported in 
its prospectus. It reports that underwriters have agreed to purchase the shares at $18.05 after deducting 
expenses.
4.3.8 Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables (Non-Dummy)
Table 4.2.12 is the replication of Table 4.2.11 with a number of non-dummy 
variables of REIT SEOs. It shows that the nominal (dollar adjusted in 2010) SEO 
offer proceeds averaged $138.97 ($157.49) million and are positively skewed with 
leptokurtic magnitude. The closing market price of the share prior to the offer, on the 
day of offer and the final offer price averaged $24.96, $24.74 and $24.53, 
respectively. It shows that offer prices are set at lower than the prior offer closing 
market price. This is consistent with empirical evidence in both industrial and REIT 
SEOs, but inconsistent with the demonstration by Loderer, et al. (1991) that under 
efficient market conditions with unrestricted trading, offer prices are set higher than 
the prior offer closing price. Relative offer which is the ratio of offer volume and 
prior offer outstanding shares averaged 20.77% and is lower than the 27.29% 
reported by Goodwin (2008), but consistent with the 21% reported by Jeon and 
Ligon (2011). Corwin (2003) documents higher underpricing for a relatively larger 
offer size. Return volatility prior to the offer is the standard deviation of stock returns 
for 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer, and measures the risk and 
residual volatility of the offer (Corwin, 2003; Huang and Zhang 2011). The return 
volatility averaged 2% with an inter-quartile range of 1%. Underwriter rank averaged 
7.91 using Carter and Manaster’s (1990) rankings of 0-9, as updated in J. Ritter’s 
home page, with an inter-quartile range of 2.0 and negatively skewed but leptokurtic 
in magnitude. The level of representative underwriting averaged 80.49% and is 
analogous to the allocations to managing underwriters (Corwin and Schultz, 2005). It 
is negatively skewed and nearly mesokurtic in magnitude. The number of book-
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managing underwriters averaged 1.59 with an inter-quartile range of 1. The number 
of representative and total underwriters averaged 2.14 and 6.11, respectively. Both of 
these syndicate sizes are positively skewed and leptokurtic in magnitude. The 
skewness measures the deviation of the distribution from symmetry and the kurtosis
indicates the density of the distribution. 
Table 4.2.12: Descriptive Statistics of explanatory (non-dummy) variables used in SEO costs 
analysis for U.S. REITs during 1996-2010.
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seoproceeds 800 48.63 138.97 85.60 156.00 1.78 1991.25 173.13 4.07 28.53
realseoproceeds 800 58.88 157.49 97.84 179.18 2.35 1991.25 184.76 3.64 22.89
priormktprice 800 14.25 24.96 22.78 31.88 2.70 136.81 15.24 2.33 14.13
clmktprice 800 14.00 24.74 22.64 31.54 2.62 135.24 14.98 2.28 13.84
offprice 800 14.00 24.53 22.50 31.42 2.25 134.50 14.95 2.29 13.98
reloff in % 799 6.21 20.77 12.84 25.16 0.17 330.24 27.36 5.36 49.98
retvol in % 800 1.10 2.00 1.40 2.10 0.00 12.50 1.81 3.14 13.67
undrank 800 7.00 7.91 8.00 9.00 0.00 9.00 1.37 -2.05 9.49
repundwriting in % 800 65.00 80.49 85.66 100.00 16.00 100.00 21.83 -0.79 2.49
numrepund 800 1.00 2.14 2.00 3.00 1.00 9.00 1.50 1.50 4.96
numtotund 800 1.00 6.11 4.00 8.00 1.00 50.00 6.96 2.45 10.63
Where the first column shows the different level of possible explanatory (non-dummy) variables for 
800 out of 1,340 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) issued by 196 U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs) over the period 1996-2010. The column labelled N shows the number of REIT SEOs with the 
available variable. The next 9 columns present the 1st quartile, 2nd quartile, 3rd quartile, minimum, 
maximum, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis respectively for each level of cost respectively. 
Among the variables, seoproceeds is the average proceeds in million dollars raised by SEOs, 
realseoproceeds is the average proceeds raised in millions scaled in 2010 dollars using U.S. GDP 
deflator, priormktprice, clmktprice and offprice denotes closing market price on the day prior to 
offer, closing market price on the day of offer and the offer price, respectively; undrank is the average 
rank of lead underwriters where there are more than one lead underwriter as per the Carter and 
Manaster (1990) rank of 0-9 as updated in Ritter’s home page, repundwriting is the percentage of 
shares underwritten by underwriters representing the underwriting syndicate, numrepund is the 
number of representative underwriters, numtotund is the number of total underwriters, reloff denotes 
the percentage of shares offered relative to the shares outstanding prior to the offer, retvol is the post 
return volatility of the returns of stock price over 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to SEO.
4.3.9 Descriptive Statistics of Dichotomous Variables
Table 4.2.13 presents the descriptive statistics of some of the dummy variables used 
in the analysis chapters. The table shows that 81% of the SEOs are equity type, and 
63% and 80% are umbrella partnership REITs (Ghosh, et al., 2000; Goodwin, 2008)
and incorporated in Maryland, respectively (Kahan and Kamar, 2002). 51% are self-
managed, 89% are listed on the NYSE (Corwin, SA 2003), 97% are listed on the 
NYSEAMEX (Corwin and Harris, 2001), 24% are issued after bursting the global 
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financial crisis in August 2007, 54% have at least one SEO prior to the current one 
(Mola and Loughran, 2004), and 32% are audited by the REIT SEO-dominating 
auditor, Ernst & Young (Wang and Wilkins, 2007).
Table 4.2.13: Descriptive Statistics of dummy variables used in SEO costs analysis for U.S. 
REITs during 1996-2010.
Name of
Variables
Mean Standard
Deviation
Skewness Kurtosis
reittype 80.87 39.35 -1.57 3.47
upreit 62.62 48.41 -0.52 1.27
maryland 80.00 40.03 -1.50 3.25
merrill 20.00 40.00 1.51 3.28
nyse 89.25 30.99 -2.53 7.42
nyseamex 96.88 17.41 -5.39 30.03
selfmgt 51.00 50.02 -0.04 1.00
postgfc 23.62 42.50 1.24 2.54
preseo 54.25 49.85 -0.17 1.03
topauditor 31.62 46.53 0.79 1.62
The first column presents the variables, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th column reports mean, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis, respectively. Among the variables, reittype is the dummy variable with 1 for a 
REIT with an equity ownership and 0 otherwise, upreit is the dummy variable with 1 for a REIT SEO 
with an umbrella partnership REIT (UPREIT) structure and 0 otherwise, merrill is the dummy 
variable with 1 for the REIT SEO underwritten by Merrill Lynch led syndicate and 0 otherwise, nyse
is the dummy variable with 1 for REIT SEO listed on the NYSE and 0 otherwise, nyseamex is the 
dummy variable with 1 for REIT SEO listed on the NYSE as well as the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) and 0 otherwise, selfmgt is the dummy variable with 1 for a REIT SEO with self-
management and 0 otherwise, postgfc is the dummy variable with 1 for REIT SEO issued after the 
beginning of global financial crisis, preseo is the dummy variable with 1 if the REIT has at least one 
SEO during the year before offer and topauditor is the dummy variable with 1 for REIT SEO audited 
by an auditor who dominates the REIT SEO market share in terms of the offer volume in 2010 dollars 
and 0 otherwise.
4.3.10 Bivariate Distribution of Costs
4.3.10.1 Bivariate Distribution of Underwriting Discounts with Respect to the 
Offer Proceeds and Syndicate Size
Table 4.2.14 presents the bivariate distribution of underwriting discounts for 16 
different portfolios formed in terms of 4 quartiles of SEO proceeds, and 4 quartiles of 
a syndicate size to grasp the effect of syndicate size on underwriting discounts. 
This study has used offer size to control for the effect of economies of scale because 
Kim, et al. (2010) document SEO offer size as exogenous in explaining both 
underwriting spreads or discounts and initial returns.44 Consistent with Corwin and 
44 They use offer discounts, which is the percentage change of offer price from closing price prior to 
offer with respect to offer price. Prior day closing price is used in the literature as exogenous (Huang 
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Schultz (2005), these findings report significantly higher underwriting discounts 
(with respect to mean) at 4.43% for multiple book managing underwriters, and 
5.10% (4.82%) for SEO offer proceeds (in 2010 dollars), less than the third quartile 
of $49 million ($59 million). 
The bivariate results reported in Table 4.2.14 show that underwriting discounts range 
from 4.05% to 5.51% if the syndicate size ranges from greater than 1 to greater than 
the third quartile, or 8. It also shows that underwriting discounts are lower for larger 
issues with a given syndicate size. The fourth quartile of SEO proceeds shows that 
underwriting discounts are the lowest at 1.38% for one-member syndicates and tend 
to rise with larger syndicate size. The table also reports that the average underwriting 
discounts decline within a given quartile of syndicate size as offer proceeds increase, 
or, alternatively, it reports higher average underwriting discounts in a given quartile 
of offer proceeds as syndicate size increases. Moreover, the differences of average 
underwriting discounts between the fourth and first quartile in a given quartile of 
SEO size are statistically significant at <1% with rising mean difference for rising 
offer proceeds.45 The results without controlling for the offer size (in the row 
labelled full sample) also show the significantly increasing effect of syndicate size. 
This bivariate relation supports the increasing effect of syndicate size on 
underwriting discounts. 
Table 4.2.14: Bivariate relationship underwriting discounts with respect to syndicate size and 
SEO proceeds in millions.
SEO Proceeds
in millions
Underwriting syndicate size
1 2 3 4 (4-1)
=1 >1&<=4 >4&<=8 >8 ǻW-stat) Total
and Zhang 2011) but, consistent with Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) and in conformity with 
IPO underpricing, Jeon and Ligon (2011) use underpricing as SEO initial returns.
45 Mean difference of underwriting discounts between the fourth and fisrt quartile increases over rising 
quartiles of both SEO size and syndicate size.
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<=$49
Observations
4.05
113
4.84
62
5.35
15
5.51
14
1.45(67.90)***
204
>49&<=$86
Observations
2.61
67
4.62
61
4.77
42
5.25
28
2.64(26.73)***
198
>86&<=$156
Observations
2.01
40
4.43
47
4.70
58
4.81
52
2.79(13.31)***
197
>$156
Observations
1.38
20
3.02
28
4.65
66
4.47
86
3.09(10.75)***
200
Full sample 3.09 4.41 4.75 4.77 1.68(23.20)***
Total observations 240 198 181 180 799
The table presents the bivariate relation of underwriting discounts in percentage of offer proceeds in 
16 portfolios with respect to 4 offer proceeds (nominal dollars) and 4 syndicate sizes. The left-most 
column represents the offer proceeds in millions in 4 rows ranging from less than first quartile, 
between 1st quartile to second quartile, between 2nd quartile to third quartile and beyond third quartile. 
Four columns present the 4 syndicate sizes. The bottom row and right-most column present the total 
observations in each column and row, respectively. The size follows the average costs in each 
portfolio. The column second to the right presents the difference of average underwriting discounts 
between 1st and 4th portfolio in each quartile along with student’s t statistics in parenthesis. *** 
denotes the level of significance at 1%.
4.3.10.2   Bivariate Distribution of Underwriting Discounts with Respect to the 
Level of Representative Underwriting and SEO Size
Table 4.2.15 reports the effects of the level of underwriting by the representative 
underwriters who are usually well-reputed underwriters and are placed at the initial 
position of the syndicate list. This study has tabulated the average underwriting 
discounts for 16 portfolios constructed in terms of 4 by 4 quartiles of the level of 
representative underwriting and SEO size, respectively. The reported results suggest 
lower underwriting costs for a higher level of representative underwriting, even with 
and without controlling for offer size. The portfolios at the lowest (highest) offer 
proceeds and the lowest (highest) level of representative underwriting pay, on 
average, 5.29% (2.86%) underwriting discounts. This is also statistically significant 
at <1%. Thus, the bivariate findings suggest underwriting discounts are a negative 
function of the level of representative underwriting.
Table 4.2.15: Bivariate relationship of underwriting discounts with respect to the level of 
representative underwriting and SEO proceeds.
SEO Proceeds
in millions
Levels of representative Underwriting in %
1 2 3 4 (1-4) Total
<=0.65 >0.65&<=0.86 >0.86&<1 =1 ǻW-stat)
<=$49 5.29 5.04 4.03 4.25 1.04(30.07)***
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Observations 22 34 6 142 204
>49&<=$86
Observations
4.88
46
4.92
44
4.17
9
3.29
99
1.59(22.46)***
198
>86&<=$156
Observations
4.69
56
4.58
58
4.43
19
3.10
64
1.59(7.73)***
197
>$156
Observations
4.36
79
4.46
62
4.03
12
2.86
47
1.50(6.67)***
200
Full sample 4.67 4.70 4.22 3.58 1.09(22.07)***
Total observations 203 198 46 325 799
The table presents the bivariate relation of underwriting discounts as percentage of offer proceeds in 
16 portfolios with respect to 4 offer proceeds (nominal dollars) and 4 syndicate sizes. The left-most 
column represents the offer proceeds in millions ranging from less than first quartile, between 1st
quartile to second quartile, between 2nd quartile to third quartile and beyond third quartile. Four 
columns present the 4 syndicate sizes. The bottom row and right-most column present the total 
observations in each column and row, respectively. The number of observations follows the average 
costs in each portfolio. The column second to the right presents the difference of average underwriting 
discounts between 1st and 4th portfolio in each size quartile along with the student’s t statistics in 
parenthesis. *** denotes the level of significance at 1%. The average underwriting discounts for all 
portfolios are statistically significant.
4.3.10.3   Bivariate Distribution of Underpricing with respect to Underwriting 
Discounts and SEO offer Size.
Table 4.2.16 reports the tabulated results of the bivariate relation of underpricing 
with respect to offer size and underwriting discounts in 16 portfolios constructed in 
terms of 4 by 4 quartiles of offer size and underwriting discounts with the full sample 
of SEOs. These results of both bivariate and univariate tabulation support for a 
substitute pattern of relation between SEO underpricing and underwriting discounts 
and are strongly significant for larger offer size. The results suggest that indirect 
costs decrease as the direct costs increase for larger SEOs.
Table 4.2.16: Bivariate relationship of underpricing with respect to underwriting discounts and 
nominal SEO offer size in millions of dollars during 1996-2010.
SEO 
Proceeds
in millions
Underwriting Discount in %
1 2 3 4 (1-4) Total
<=0.04 >0.04&<=0.0475 >0.0475&<0.0512 >0.0512 ǻW-stat)
<=$49
Observations
0.36
47
0.56
30
0.23
63
0.14
65
0.22(8.61)***
205
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>49 &<=$86
Observations
0.68***
62
1.14*
26
0.72*
48
1.29**
62
-0.61(2.07)**
198
>86 
&<=$156
Observations
1.66***
48
1.30***
59
0.95***
50
0.59**
40
1.07(8.21)***
197
>$156
Observations
3.28***
73
2.89***
64
0.51**
39
1.05**
24
2.23(12.56)***
200
Full sample
Observations
1.65***
230
1.72***
179
0.58***
200
0.72***
191
0.92(23.53)***
800
Total 
observations
203 198 46 353 800
The table presents the bivariate relation of underpricing in percentage of offer proceeds in 16 
portfolios with respect to 4 offer proceeds (nominal dollars) and 4 levels of underwriting discounts. 
The left-most column presents the offer proceeds in millions for four quartiles. Next four columns 
present the 4 quartiles of underwriting discounts. The bottom row and right-most column present the 
total observations in each column and row, respectively. The number of observations follows the 
average costs in each portfolio. The column second to the right presents the difference of average 
underpricing between 1st and 4th portfolios in each offer size quartile along with student’s t statistics in 
parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The row 
of full sample presents the average underpricing in four quartiles of underwriting discounts without 
controlling the size effect.
4.3.10.4   Bivariate Distribution of Underwriting Discounts with Respect to SEO 
Size and Merrill Lynch led Syndicate Size
Table 4.2.17 presents the tabulated results of both bivariate and univariate average 
underwriting discounts for 19 portfolios constructed in terms of 4 SEO offer size and 
4 syndicate size quartiles,  and for 3 portfolios for single-member syndicates for 159 
REIT SEOs underwritten by the Merrill Lynch-led syndicate. This syndicate has led 
nearly 35% of the dollar volume of SEO proceeds during the sample period of 1996-
2010. The average offer size of SEOs underwritten by Merrill Lynch-led syndicates 
is significantly larger than those by other syndicates. Table 4.2.17 shows that 
underwriting discounts are significantly lower for SEOs underwritten by only Merrill 
Lynch who charged significantly higher discounts when its syndicate included more 
members. This suggests that dominance and size of the underwriting syndicate might 
explain the indirect costs of SEOs.
Table 4.2.17: Bivariate relationship of underwriting discounts for REIT SEOs underwritten by 
Merrill Lynch-led Syndicate with respect to syndicate size, and SEO proceeds (in millions).
SEO Proceeds
in millions
Underwriting syndicate size
1 2 3 4 5 (5-1)
=1 >1&<=4 >4&<=7 >7&<=12 >12 ǻW-stat) Total
<=$79
Observations
4.18
12
4.81
11
4.93
9
5.00
2
5.02
6
0.84(4.77)***
40
>79&<=$138 4.15 4.28 4.81 4.56 4.86 0.71(0.85)
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Observations 3 6 14 10 8 41
>138&<=$268
Observations
2.48
3
4.42
5
4.19
9
4.42
11
5.15
10
2.66(2.30)***
38
>$268
Observations
Nil 4.00
1
4.49
12
4.31
13
4.48
14 40
Full sample 3.89 4.55 4.61 4.39 4.82 0.93(3.19)***
Total 
observations 18 23 44 36 38
159
The table presents the bivariate relation of underwriting discounts in percentage of offer proceeds in 
20 portfolios with respect to 4 offer proceeds (Panel, F. Table 4.2.11) and 5 syndicate sizes. The left-
most column represents the offer proceeds in millions in 4 rows ranging from less than the first 
quartile, between first quartile to second quartile, between second quartile to third quartile and beyond 
third quartile in order. The five columns present the 5 syndicate sizes. The bottom row and right-most 
column present the total observations in each column and row, respectively. The number of 
observations follows the average costs in each portfolio. The column second to the right presents the 
difference of average underwriting discounts between 1st and 5th portfolio in each quartile along with 
the student’s t statistics in parenthesis. *** denotes the level of significance at <1%. 
4.3.10.5   Bivariate Distribution of Underpricing with Respect to SEO Offer Size 
and Book-Managing Underwriters
Panel A of Table 4.2.18 presents the average underpricing for 12 portfolios 
constructed in terms of four quartiles of offer size, and three groups of book-
managing underwriters. It shows that average underpricing for SEOs underwritten 
and managed solely by Merrill Lynch leaves less money on the table through 
underpricing, however, money left on the table increases for SEOs with both larger 
offer size and multiple book-managing underwriters. The difference of average 
underpricing is economically and statistically more significant for larger offer size 
with more book-managing underwriters.
However, the literature on underwriter reputation reveals that higher ranked 
underwriters provide better certification, which results in lower valuation uncertainty 
and, hence, ultimately results in lower underpricing. A number of recent studies on 
industrial SEOs have also confirmed this.46 To investigate whether the certification 
effect of high-quality underwriters affects the underpricing of REIT SEOs, the study 
has tabulated and reported in Table 4.2.19 another bivariate relationship of 
underpricing with respect to offer size and underwriter reputation rank. The table 
presents the average underpricing for 16 portfolios constructed in terms of four size 
46 Mola and Loughran (2004), Jeon and Ligon (2011), Huang and Zhang (2011) document lower 
underpricing or offer discounts for industrial SEOs with higher-ranked underwriters. Ghosh, et al.
(2000) and Goodwin (2008) report a marginally significant negative effect for REIT SEOs.
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quartiles and four reputation quartiles for SEOs underwritten and led by underwriters 
other than Merrill Lynch (panel G of Table 4.2.11). 
The data reveal that 80% of these SEOs are underwritten by syndicates other than the 
Merrill Lynch group. Both the bivariate and univariate results support the existing 
evidence of better certification by higher-ranked underwriters. The economic and 
statistical significances are strong for larger and smaller offer size, respectively. It 
suggests that larger offers leave more money on the table (Corwin, 2003). Tables 
4.2.18 and 4.2.19 suggest that the negative effect of underwriter reputation on 
underpricing may be effective for offer size up to a limit, and that industry-
dominating underwriting syndicates alongwith the structure may also determine 
underpricing. The difference of underpricing of 159 SEOs underwritten by the 
Merrill Lynch-led syndicate and those of 641 SEOs by non-Merrill Lynch led 
syndicates is both economically (1.54%) and statistically (t-statistics of 4.59) 
significant (not reported). It suggests that indirect costs increase over SEO offer size 
for a given number of book-managing underwriters.
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Table 4.2.18: Bivariate relationship of underpricing of REIT SEOs underwritten by Merrill 
Lynch-led syndicate with respect to number of book-running managers and SEO proceeds in 
$millions.
SEO Proceeds
in millions
Panel A
Size of book-running managers
1 2 3 3-1
=1 >1&<=2 >2 ǻW-stat) Total
<=$79
Observations
0.80
29
0.72
9
5.61
2
4.81(0.79)
40
>79&<=$138
Observations
0.94
18
0.97
16
3.34
7
2.41(2.01)**
41
>138&<=$268
Observations
0.22
13
3.67***
13
4.01**
12
3.79(3.41)***
38
>$268
Observations
0.87
10
2.29*
12
8.45***
18
7.58(4.77)***
40
Full sample 0.73
70
1.95***
50
6.02***
39
5.23(7.08)***
159
The table presents the bivariate relation of underpricing as a percentage of offer proceeds in 12 
portfolios with respect to 4 offer proceeds (Panel, F. Table 4.2.11) and 3 book-running managers. The 
left-most column represents the offer proceeds in millions in 4 rows ranging from less than or equal to 
the first quartile, between greater than 1st quartile to less than or equal to the second quartile, between 
greater than the 2nd quartile to less than or equal to the 3rd quartile and beyond third quartile in order. 
The three columns present the 3 book-running managers. The bottom row and right-most column 
present the total observations in each column and row, respectively. The number of observations 
follows the average costs in each portfolio. The column second to the right presents the difference of 
average underwriting discounts between 4th and 1st portfolio in each quartile along with the student’s 
t statistics in parenthesis. ***, and ** denote the level of significance at <1% and <5%, respectively.
Table 4.2.19: Bivariate relationship of underpricing with respect to lead underwriters’ 
reputation of syndicate led by non-Merrill Lynch group and SEO proceeds in millions.
SEO Proceeds
in millions
Reputation of Underwriters 
1 2 3 4 (1-4) Total
<=7 >7&<=8 >8&<9 =9 ǻW-stat)
<=$45
Observations
0.62**
99
-0.01
39
Nil -0.54*
25
1.15(28.38)***
163
>45&<=$74
Observations
1.55***
48
0.26
55
0.99
9
0.47
45
0.69(10.47)***
157
>74&<=$130
Observations
1.16***
31
0.93***
53
-0.03
19
1.06***
57
0.10(0.62)
160
>$130
Observations
2.67***
19
1.63***
41
1.10***
34
1.37***
67
1.30(3.68)***
161
Full sample 1.13*** 0.69*** 0.73** 0.82*** 0.30(12.16)***
Total observations 197 188 62 194 641
The table presents the bivariate relation of underpricing as a percentage of offer proceeds in 16 
portfolios with respect to 4 offer proceeds (Panel, G. Table 4.2.11) and 4 reputation quartiles. The left-
most column represents the offer proceeds in millions in 4 rows ranging from less than or equal to the 
first quartile, between greater than 1st quartile to less than or equal to the second quartile, between 
greater than the 2nd quartile to less than or equal to the 3rd quartile and beyond third quartile in order. 
The four columns present the 4 reputation quartiles. The bottom row and the right-most column 
present the total observations in each column and row, respectively. The number of observations 
follows the average costs in each portfolio. The column second to the right presents the difference of 
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average underwriting discounts between 4th and 1st portfolio in each quartile along with the student’s 
t statistics in parenthesis. *** denotes the level of significance at <1%.
4.4   Conclusion
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics of the costs of raising equity capital by 
127 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and 800 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) for 
U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) from 1996-2010. The chapter documents 
economies of scale of underwriting costs, unlike underpricing which is a positive 
function of offer proceeds for both IPOs and SEOs. The IPOs experienced a 
declining trend for both direct and indirect costs, whereas SEOs experienced a 
declining trend only for direct costs during this sample period. The statistics report 
the total direct costs average 8.43%, consisting of underwriting fees of 6.47% and 
non-underwriting other direct expenses of 1.96%, and the indirect cost of 
underpricing averages 3.07% for IPOs. These costs are substantially lower for REIT 
SEOs, which incurred average underwriting discounts of 4.17%, non-underwriting 
direct expenses of 0.46% and indirect underpricing of 1.18%, than those of both 
REIT IPOs and industrial IPOs and SEOs. These results indicate that REITs on 
average incur 8.43% cash expenses to pay for underwriters and other expenses and 
leave 3.07% of gross initial equity to subscribing investors. Whereas, these cash 
expenses and money left through underpricing are 4.63% and 1.18% of gross equity 
raised for SEOs, respectively.
Ownership and organizational structure, state of incorporation and underlying 
property types of REITs affect costs of raising equity capital. Maryland is the 
dominant state in selling its corporate law to REITs. By extending its management-
friendly corporate regulations, it could attract 85% of this sample REIT IPOs. REITs 
incorporated in Maryland pay lower compensation to underwriters but leave more 
money on the table for initial investors for both IPOs and SEOs. Furthermore, the 
structure of management, an industry-dominating auditor, a trading exchange where 
issues are listed, the reputation of underwriters, and the underwriting syndicate 
structure also influence such costs of both IPOs and SEOs. Above all, underwriting 
costs appear complementary and are a substitute for indirect costs of IPOs and SEOs, 
respectively. 
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The results of these descriptive measures along with the bivariate and univariate 
relation will help in analyzing the individual effect of determinants explaining the 
direct and indirect costs. Table 4.3 in the Appendix summarized the key findings of 
dependent and independent variables for REIT and industrial IPO stocks in panels A 
and B, respectively. These findings will contribute to the literature on underwriting 
and non-underwriting direct expenses for both IPOs and SEOs by complementing the 
prior empirical evidence in regard to economies of scale in direct costs and the 
effects of the underwriting syndicate structure on indirect costs.  
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Appendix
Table 4.3.: Key Findings for REIT versus Industrial Stock IPOs.
Panel A: Key Dependent Variables
Variables REITsIPOs in this study
Previous Industrial
IPOs
Direct costs
Underwriting Fees
          
6.47% 8.67% (Ritter, 1987)8.73% (Barry, et al., 1991)
7.31% (Lee et al., 1996)
6.36% (Corwin, 2001)
7.60% (Bhabra and Pettway, 2003)
7.43% (Kim et al., 2010)
Non-Underwriting Direct 
Expenses
1.96% 3.69% (Lee et al., 1996)
5.36%-7.48% (Ritter, 1987)
2.98%- 6.31% (Barry, et al. (1991)
1.57% (Corwin, 2001)
Underpricing 3.07% 12.05% (Lee et al., 1996)
10.02% (Corwin, 2001)
39.51% (Corwin and Schultz, 2005)
18.7% (Loughran and Ritter, 2004)
21.24% (Kim et al., 2010)
18.2% (Liu and Ritter, 2011)
Direct Costs Ecnomies of scale Economies of scale
Declining trend over 
time
Declining trend over time
(Kim et al., 2010)
Underpricing Declining trend over 
time
Increasing trend over 
time (Kim et al., 2010)
Panel B: Key findings of independent variables of REIT and previous Industrial IPO Stocks
REIT IPOs Industrial IPOs
Direct
Costs
Underpricing Direct
Costs
Underpricing
Offer size - + +/- +/-
Offer price - - - -
Underwriter reputation - - +/- +/-
Top Auditor (REIT Dominating) - - N/A -
Offer size - + +/- +/-
Offer price - - - -
Underwriter reputation - - +/- +/-
Top Auditor (REIT Dominating) - - N/A -
Number of Potential Risk Factors - N/A N/A +
Internally Managed REITs + + N/A N/A
Trading Exchange (NYSE) - - + -
Equity REIT Type + + N/A N/A
Umbrella Partnership REITs (UPREITs) + + N/A N/A
Industrial/Office REITs + + N/A N/A
IPOs during hot periods N/A + N/A +
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CHAPTER FIVE
DIRECT COSTS of IPOs
5.1   Introduction
This chapter investigates the total direct costs consisting of underwriting fees and 
non-underwriting other direct expenses of raising equity capital for U.S. Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) by issuing 127 initial public offerings (IPOs) for the  
period 1996-2010. REITs like other IPOs, however, need to incur substantial total 
direct costs including, for example, fees for hiring underwriters, legal advisors, 
accountants, auditors, and expenses for advertising, printing, listing and related 
expenses. Underwriting fees are directly paid to the underwriters who facilitate the 
total IPO floating process, whereas, other direct expenses, also known as non-
underwriting direct expenses, are directly incurred by the issuer for expenses other 
than underwriting fees. Sometimes, other direct expenses are incurred by the 
underwriters who are subsequently reimbursed by the issuer. As REITs, like other 
firms seeking to list on a stock exchange, are generally initially funded through 
external equity capital raised by IPOs, these direct costs are particularly important 
considerations for REITs.
REIT IPO issuers retain only the net proceeds after deducting total direct costs 
(hereafter direct costs) from gross proceeds to use in their operations. These direct 
costs, thus, inversely affect the net proceeds and may constitute a substantial loss of 
capital to the issuing firm (Lee and Masulis, 2009). The significance of direct costs 
for REIT IPOs is also strengthened by the findings of Dolvin and Pyles (2009) who 
imply direct costs are an important consideration for issuers in raising equity capital. 
Moreover, REITs, in comparison to other stocks, leave relatively less money on the 
table through underpricing due to their relatively precise valuation (Dolvin and 
Pyles, 2009) and higher transparency (Buttimer, et al., 2005). For example, a very 
recent study on REIT IPO underpricing by Bairagi and Dimovski (2011) reports 
underpricing of 3.18% for IPOs issued from 1996-2010, which is much lower than 
that left by industrial IPOs over recent times and even across countries.47
47 For example, Corwin and Schultz (2005) and Liu and Ritter (2011) report underpricing of 39.51% 
and 24% for U.S. industrial IPOs during 1997-2002 and 1993-2008, respectively. Engelen and Essen 
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Further, the cross-sectional variation of underwriting fees in REIT IPOs is much 
more than their industrial counterparts. For example, Chen and Ritter (2000) find the 
underwriting spreads for more than 90% of medium size IPOs in the USA during 
1995-1998 cluster at around 7% with an increasing trend over time. Similarly, an 
increasing trend of clustering in the USA is also reported in Kim, et al. (2010) in the 
1990s with a 21-year sample period during 1980-2000. The clustering in IPO 
underwriting spreads is also evident in Hong Kong (Butler and Huang, 2003; 
Torstila, 2003) and across other countries (Torstila, 2003). Torstila (2003) reports 
less clustering across countries in Europe, with a maximum of 95% in Hong Kong. 
Chen and Ritter (2000) also document higher underwriting spreads in the USA than 
other countries, particularly Australia, Japan, Hong Kong and Europe. All these 
studies on underwriting fees and clustering of IPO underwriting fees across countries 
and over time have concentrated on industrial IPOs. 
The findings of Chen and Lu (2006) support a lower clustering of underwriting
spreads in REIT IPOs and report that only 31% of their sample IPOs pay exactly 7%. 
The greater cross-sectional variation in REIT IPO underwriting spreads may be 
attributed, for example, to the different level of risk associated with different types of 
properties held, or intended to be held, by the IPO-issuing REIT, or to the 
organizational structure of an UPREIT versus a traditional REIT, or to the equity 
versus mortgage REIT, or to the incorporation laws of Maryland versus other states.
There exist, however, a number of empirical studies covering the direct costs of 
raising equity capital for firms in industries other than REIT IPOs (Lee, et al., 1996; 
Ritter, 1987). Most of the existing studies so far on U.S. REIT IPOs have 
concentrated on the indirect costs of initial underpricing, that is, until Chen and Lu 
(2006) discussed the direct cost of underwriting spreads. The non-underwriting other 
direct expenses (Beatty and Welch, 1996) and their determinants have not yet been 
explored in the REIT literature, even though some of the non-underwriting direct 
expenses such as legal and accountants’ fees are determined by the issue 
complexities rather than the IPO size, and that expenses for printing and distribution 
of issue (offer) documents are related to both issue size and method (Gerbich, et al.,
1995).
(2010) report 24.97% across 21 countries for the period 2000-2005, and Boulton, et al. (2011) report 
36.5% with 10,783 IPOs across 37 countries for the period 1998-2008.
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Thus, an empirical study on direct costs of raising equity capital and, more 
particularly, the determinants of both underwriting fees and non-underwriting direct 
expenses would be well-suited for REIT IPOs. Chen and Lu (2006) explored the U.S. 
REIT IPO underwriting fees using a data set up to 1999, and found a downward 
trend in such fees. Additionally, they predicted such fees to decrease over time due to 
the increased familiarity of REIT IPOs to both underwriters and initial investors. 
This study attempts to explore the direct costs of raising equity capital for U.S. REIT 
IPOs, including during the period of the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The 
inclusion of the GFC is significant for REITs because it was triggered by the sharp 
downturn in real estate values causing the bankruptcy of many financial institutions 
(Laopodis, 2009). Further, this sample includes the REIT IPOs issued after 
implementation of the REIT Modernization Act 1999, which became effective from 
January 2001 and was expected to reduce the systematic risk of the issuing firm 
(Howe and Jain, 2004).
The findings document a declining trend in the total direct costs and their two 
components of underwriting fees and non-underwriting other direct expenses during 
this sample period. These findings support economies of scale in direct costs in 
relation to the size of IPO amounts in both real and nominal dollars. In addition, the 
findings of the study document that the National Association of REIT (NAREIT) 
monthly industry index returns’ volatility over the 12 months prior to the offer 
significantly negatively determine the underwriting fees. The quarterly NAREIT 
industry dividend yield prior to the IPO also appears to positively determine both the
direct costs and their two components. The number of underwriters and adverse risk 
factors negatively determine the direct costs; however, the effects are strongly 
significant for underwriting fees. The number of adverse risk factors inversely affects 
the direct costs by reducing, particularly, the underwriting fees due to the lower 
litigation risks of the underwriters. Underwriting fees are also negatively determined 
by higher offer price per share. 
REIT IPOs with equity ownership in a portfolio of assets and those listed on the 
NYSE incurred higher direct costs. Also, underwriters are found to charge higher 
underwriting fees for REITs with a higher ownership limit for an individual investor 
due to the aftermarket liquidity effect. The positive effect of the umbrella partnership 
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REIT structure in influencing the total direct costs is significant but has marginally 
insignificant negative and positive effects on underwriting fees and non-underwriting 
other direct expenses, respectively. The direct costs are also higher for IPOs 
underwritten by a REIT IPO-dominating underwriting syndicate led by Merrill 
Lynch. Issuers hiring the Merrill Lynch group incur higher non-underwriting other 
direct expenses. This factor might be attributed to meeting the requirements of 
Merrill Lynch. Larger offers with a Merrill Lynch-led underwriting syndicate, 
however, incur lower direct costs. Further, the effects of some of the determinants of 
underwriting fees are not consistent but non-underwriting other direct expenses are 
relatively more consistent across the sample period.
The findings suggest that the direct costs of raising equity capital can be minimized 
by optimally controlling for offer size, offer price per share, ownership limit, the 
number of underwriters and the number of potential adverse risk factors. The study 
will benefit the issuer in making decisions on issue size, underwriting syndicate size 
and also on some of the non-underwriting other direct expenses. It will also benefit 
the underwriters and investors, in general, and those involved in REIT IPOs in 
particular. 
Limiting the study to REITs reduces the inherent confounding cross-industry effects 
of non-real estate firms. It also reduces the cross-trading exchange effects because 
most of the REITs in this sample are listed on the NYSE (82%). It is worth 
mentioning that after 2004 all REITs are listed only on the NYSE. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reports the 
preliminary results with some analysis. Section 5.3 reports main empirical analysis. 
Section 5.4 summarizes the findings and, finally, section 5.5 concludes the chapter 
and indicates some implications.
5.2   Preliminary Results
This section presents some of the preliminary results to better understand the 
findings of the study. The preliminary results are depicted in both tabular and 
graphical modes with accompanying analysis.
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5.2.1 Analysis of Preliminary Results
Table 5.1 presents the longitudinal and categorical distribution of data on different 
levels of costs for U.S. REIT IPOs from 1996-2010. The data include the average 
gross proceeds raised, average offer or issue price, volatility of NAREIT price index 
return, underwriting fees, other direct expenses, and the equally-weighted average 
direct issuing costs.
The column of the total direct costs is not the simple sum of the columns of gross 
underwriting fees (spreads) and the non-underwriting other direct expenses, rather, it 
is the average of those costs in each of the segments examined. The total sample 
period is divided into the three sub-periods to grasp the periodical differences in the 
direct costs, as predicted by Chen and Lu (2006). The first, second and third periods 
from 1996-1999, 2001-2006 and 2007-2010 contain 49, 55 and 24 IPOs, with the 
direct costs averaging 8.71%, 8.41% and 7.89%, respectively. The IPOs during the 
third sub-period experience the lowest total direct costs of (7.89%) in spite of the 
rising industry return volatility (NAREIT index) over the periods. The volatility of 
the NAREIT all price index return ranges from 3.22% to 10.64%, however, both the 
direct costs and their components consistently decrease over the periods.
It is evident from this table that the direct costs for equity REITs (8.91%) are higher 
than those for mortgage REITs (7.68%). The higher total direct costs for equity 
REITs are due to the higher costs of both underwriting fees and non-underwriting 
direct expenses. These higher costs for equity REITs are attributed to more 
uncertainty being associated with assessing cash flows for operating properties of the 
equity REITs. 
In terms of the listing and trading exchange, the sample is also categorized into 104 
for the NYSE, 23 for the Nasdaq/Amex, with average total direct costs of 8.37% and 
8.69%, respectively. Examining both underwriting fees and non-underwriting other 
direct expenses, it is evident that the NYSE experiences the lowest average 
underwriting fees, and Nasdaq/Amex experiences the highest non-underwriting 
direct expenses. The lower underwriting fees might be one of the motivating factors 
for REIT issuers behind choosing only the NYSE after 2004 as the listing exchange. 
IPOs in 2003 and 2009 paid the highest underwriting fees of 6.96% (gross spread) 
and the lowest non-underwriting direct expenses of 0.54%, respectively, during the 
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sample period. However, levels of direct costs experienced an upward trend in 2010 
because of lower average proceeds raised by IPOs.
Table 5.1 also reports that the underwriting fees followed a declining trend across the 
three sub-periods which is consistent with the declining trend of Chen and Lu (2006),
who report 7.19% in the 1980s and 6.65% in the 1990s. This supports the prediction 
of Chen and Lu (2006) that  both investors and investment bankers have become 
more familiar with REIT IPOs. Moreover, by considering 755 matching industrial 
IPOs, they conclude that REIT IPOs paid comparatively higher costs to underwriters. 
This study reports 66% of sample IPOs (84/127) pay below 7%, 3% (4/127) pay 
above 7%, and 31% (39/127) pay exactly 7% in underwriting fees. This suggests that 
the cross-sectional variation in underwriting fees of REIT IPOs is greater than that in 
industrial IPOs (Corwin and Schultz, 2005).
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Table 5.1: Time Series and Categorical distribution of 127 U.S. REIT IPOs  during 1996-2010.
Year No. of IPOs
Average 
Proceed
s Raised
Average
Price 
per 
share
NAREIT
Index
Volatility%
Gross 
Underwriting 
Fees%
Other 
Direct 
Expenses
%
Total 
Direct 
Costs%
1996 4 248.89 19.44 2.00 6.44 1.94 8.38
1997 27 197.03 17.19 3.00 6.70 2.05 8.75
1998 15 130.86 15.17 3.00 6.36 2.24 8.60
1999 2 146.00 10.00 4.00 6.57 2.98 9.54
2002 3 202.73 16.67 3.00 6.75 2.60 9.35
2003 7 309.32 13.36 3.00 6.96 1.40 8.36
2004 29 222.59 13.09 5.00 6.53 2.05 8.57
2005 11 296.93 14.68 5.00 6.23 1.78 8.01
2006 5 391.48 17.15 4.00 6.05 1.84 7.88
2007 4 403.89 16.50 4.00 6.31 0.74 7.05
2008 2 220.00 22.00 5.00 6.62 0.54 7.16
2009 9 288.90 18.44 17.00 5.68 1.25 6.93
2010 9 191.95 16.22 9.00 6.59 2.83 9.38
1996-2000 48 178.55 16.41 3.22 6.57 2.14 8.71
2001-2006 55 262.76 14.01 4.52 6.49 1.92 8.41
2007-2010 24 265.97 17.58 10.64 6.21 1.70 7.89
Equity 77 248.63 15.89 4.59 6.54 2.37 8.91
Mortgage 50 205.22 15.17 6.11 6.35 1.34 7.68
NYSE 104 252.93 16.08 5.49 6.41 1.96 8.37
Nasdaq/Amex 23 134.81 13.42 3.79 6.71 1.99 8.69
All 127 231.54 15.60 5.18 6.47 1.96 8.43
The average gross proceeds are in millions of dollars. The nunber of IPOs is the total number of IPOs 
issued during the year, three sub-periods, equity REIT type, and listing exchange. Next five columns 
present the figures, on average, as a percentage of gross proceeds. The last row labeled ‘All’ presents 
overall average data except number of IPOs which is the total number of IPOs during the sample 
period.
Figure 5.1 depicts the trend of average direct costs, along with their two components 
consisting of underwriting fees and non-underwriting other direct expenses, of 
raising equity capital by issuing U.S. REIT IPOs during 1996-2010. The figure 
supports a consistently declining trend in the direct costs during 1999-2009. The up 
trend of levels of direct costs might be attributed to the smaller IPOs in 2010 
($191.95 million versus $231.54 million of overall average).
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Figure 5.1: Year wise diagram of average direct costs, underwriting fees and non-underwriting other 
direct expenses for U.S. REIT IPOs during 1996-2010.
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 are again presented here to depict the trend of the two 
components of direct costs. More specifically, Figure 5.2 presents the scatter diagram 
of underwriting fees as a percentage of the proceeds and the natural logarithm of the 
proceeds, to graphically depict the effect of increasing offer size on underwriting fees 
along with the trend line. The fitted line of the figure supports the downward sloping 
trend of underwriting fees. Chen and Lu (2006) document the U-shape pattern in 
underwriting fees but my results do not support a U-shape pattern. The study has 
confirmed this through univariate regressions incorporating a quadratic function of 
IPO proceeds.
Similarly, Figure 5.3 presents the scatter diagram of non-underwriting other direct 
expenses as a percentage of the proceeds and the natural logarithm of the proceeds, 
to graphically depict the effect of increasing offer size on non-underwriting direct 
expenses, along with the fitted trend line. The figure also supports the downward 
trend line which implies economies of scale in such expenses.
CHAPTER FIVE DIRECT COSTS of IPOs
152
.0
4
.0
5
.0
6
.0
7
.0
8
.0
9
.1
U
nd
er
w
rit
in
g 
fe
e 
in
 %
2 3 4 5 6 7
log of IPO amount in million dollars
Underwriting fees Fitted values
Figure 5.2: Scatter diagram of underwriting fees in % (UNDFEES) and Log natural of IPO Proceeds 
(LNIPOPROCEEDS) for U.S. REIT IPOs during 1996 to 2010.
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
IP
O
 D
ire
ct
 E
xp
en
se
s 
as
 a
 %
 o
f I
P
O
 P
ro
ce
ed
s
2 3 4 5 6 7
log of IPO amount in million dollars
direct ipo expenses as % of offer price Fitted values
Figure 5.3: Scatter diagram of non-underwriting direct expenses (DIRIPOEXP) and Log natural of 
IPO proceeds (LNPROCEED) for U.S. REIT IPOs during 1996-2010.
Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics for variables used in this chapter as 
defined in Table 5.6 in the Appendix of this chapter and shows that the IPO 
proceeds, in dollars of 2010 and nominal dollars during the sample period, averaged 
$273.01 million and $231.54 million, respectively. The direct costs averaged 8.43%, 
consisting of 6.47% average underwriting fees and 1.96% average non-underwriting 
other direct expenses, and these are positively skewed and leptokurtic in magnitude. 
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The weighted-average reputation rank for lead underwriters is 7.56 with maximum 9 
and minimum 2, however, this is less than the 8.06 reported in Ghosh, et al. (2000).
The average gross underwriting fees are 6.47% and range from 4% to 10%. The 
number of representative and total underwriters in the syndicate averaged 3.02 and 
13.85, respectively, during the period, with a maximum of 45 and a minimum of 1 in 
this sample, which is higher than that of 3.62 reported in Ghosh, et al. (2000). The 
number of risk factors averaged 49.69. The monthly industry return volatility prior to 
the offer averaged 5.18%, and the quarterly industry dividend yield 3-months prior to 
the offer is 5.87%. The ownership limit for an individual investor averaged 9.27% of 
outstanding equity and is negatively skewed. The number of IPOs issued during the 
prior year (PYNUMIPO) averaged 10.74, whereas REITs with equity type, listed on 
the NYSE and with UPREIT structure, averaged 61%, 82% and 57%, respectively, in 
this sample.
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables used for direct costs of raising equity by 127 U.S. 
REIT IPOs during 1996-2010.
Variable Mean Median Min Max Sd Skewness Kurtosis Sample
IPOPROCEEDS (Real) 273.01 210.60 13.40 1510.74 219.93 2.37 11.33 127
IPOPROCEEDS (Nominal) 231.54 199.68 10.00 1386.00 191.06 2.62 13.59 127
DIRECTCOSTS in % 8.43 8.03 4.50 19.69 1.95 2.36 13.28 127
UNDFEES in % 6.47 6.48 4.00 10.00 0.66 0.39 9.86 127
IPODIREXP in % 1.96 1.58 0.09 12.69 1.65 2.77 16.07 127
OFFPRICE 15.60 15.00 5.00 26.00 4.46 -0.01 2.44 127
UNDRANK 7.56 8.00 2.00 9.00 1.53 -0.99 3.21 125
INDVOL in % 5.18 3.94 1.62 17.37 0.04 2.25 7.47 127
QINDYIELD 5.82 5.75 3.94 7.91 0.81 0.45 3.36 127
NUMREPUND 3.02 3.00 1.00 9.00 1.75 0.97 3.59 124
NUMTOTUND 13.85 9.00 1.00 45.00 10.62 1.13 3.39 124
NUMRISKFACT 49.69 47.00 14.00 112.00 18.25 0.74 3.63 127
OWNLIM in % 9.29 9.80 4.10 9.90 0.01 -2.49 8.36 115
REITTYPE 60.63 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.49 -0.44 1.19 127
UPREIT 56.69 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.50 -0.27 1.07 127
NYSE 81.89 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.39 -1.66 3.74 127
MERRIL 12.60 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.33 2.25 6.08 127
PYNUMIPO 10.69 8.00 0.00 29.00 8.88 1.17 2.85 127
Where IPOPROCEED (Real) and IPOPROCEED (Nominal) represent the gross proceeds as scaled in 
million dollars of 2010 and nominal, respectively; DIRECTCOSTS is the total direct costs consisting 
of underwriting fees and non-underwriting other direct expenses; UNDFEES is the fees directly paid 
to the underwriters; IPODIREXP is the percentage of IPO-related direct expenses; OFFPRICE is the 
dollar offer price per share; UNDRANK is the average reputation rank for lead underwriters; 
INDVOL represents standard deviation of monthly returns over 12 months prior to the offer; 
QINDYIELD is the mean monthly REIT industry yield over 3-months prior to IPO; NUMREPUND is 
the number of representative underwriters in the underwriting syndicate; NUMTOTUND is the total 
number of underwriters in the syndicate; NUMRISKFACT represents the number of adverse risk 
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factors specifically listed in the prospectus; OWNLIM is the ownership restriction for an individual 
investor defined as the maximum limit of owning as a percentage of outstanding equity; REITTYPE is 
the dummy variable with value of 1 for equity REIT and 0 for mortgage REIT; NYSE is the dummy 
variable with value of 1 for REIT listed on the NYSE and 0 for otherwise, UPREIT is the dummy 
variable with value of 1 for umbrella partnership REIT and 0 for traditional REIT; and PYNUMIPO is 
the number of IPOs in the year prior to the offer.
5.3   Regression Analysis
This section consists of three OLS multiple regression tables with a brief discussion 
on the structure of the analysis and on the findings. Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 present 
the regression results on the total direct costs, underwriting fees, and non-
underwriting other direct expenses, respectively. 
5.3.1 Analysis of Results
Table 5.3 consists of five specifications, with the total direct costs as a percentage of 
the gross proceeds as the dependent variable. After adjusting for the missing data of 
some control variables in the IPO prospectuses, the complete adjusted observations 
in specifications from 1 to 4 become 124 out of 127 total observations. Collinearity 
might be between REIT Type of equity (REITTYPE) and umbrella partnership 
structure (UPREIT) (Pearson correlation of 0.56 with p<1%), between NAREIT 
industry price index return volatility (INDVOL) and the number of risk factors 
(LNNUMRISKFACT) (Pearson correlation of 0.46 with p<1%), and between 
INDVOL and POSTGFC (Pearson correlation of 0.77 with p<1%). To avoid the 
effect of multicollinearity between REITTYPE and UPREIT, these two have been
used mutually exclusively in specifications 1 and 2. Similarly, specifications 3 and 4 
exclude POSTGFC and INDVOL, respectively. The dummy variable of 
MARYLAND is excluded from specifications 3 and 4 due to its insignificant effect. 
Specification 5 is for IPOs issued during the sub-period of 2001-2010. To control for 
any time fixed effect on the dependent variable, year dummies have been 
incorporated in all specifications, however, their coefficients and t-statistics are not 
specifically reported. 
The table reports the total direct costs are significantly negatively determined by the 
offer size (LNIPOPROCEEDS). This strongly supports the economies of scale, total 
direct costs decline with rising IPO offer proceeds, in total direct costs documented 
in industrial IPOs (Corwin and Harris, 2001). This happens due to the fixed 
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components of total direct costs (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2000; Bhagat and Frost, 
1986). Its higher economic significance in specification 5 supports the declining 
trend of total direct costs over time. The negative coefficient of reputation rank of 
lead underwriters (UNDRANK) suggests that issuers can reduce the total direct costs 
of raising equity capital by hiring well-reputed lead underwriters in their 
underwriting syndicate, because well-reputed underwriters reduce the pricing or 
valuation uncertainty (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). This is consistent with the 
negative effect on underwriting spread documented in Carter and Dark (1990) and 
Pugel and White (1988) for industrial IPOs and Chen and Lu (2006) for REIT IPOs. 
The negative coefficient of the industry return volatility (INDVOL) is inconsistent 
with Chen and Lu’s (2006) positive effect on REIT underwriting spread. However,
this effect is significant in specification for IPOs issued after 2000. This anomaly 
might be the effect of declining underwriting spread over time but INDVOL 
abnormally increased during the global financial crisis. It is worth mentioning that 
INDVOL more than doubled the average of 5.18% during 2009-2010. The 
(marginally significant) negative coefficient of the logarithm of the number of 
adverse risk factors (LNNUMRISKFACT) is consistent with the reduced information 
asymmetry and litigation risk of underwriters who identify and state more adverse 
risk factors (Beatty and Welch, 1996; Leone et al., 2007). This finding suggests that 
REITs may reduce the direct costs of raising initial equity capital by identifying and 
stating more adverse risk factors.
The table reports that the NAREIT industry dividend yield (QINDYIELD), the 
organizational structure of an umbrella partnership REIT, the REIT with equity 
ownership of assets (REITTYPE), the NYSE trading exchange, and the Merrill 
Lynch (MERRILL), significantly positively determine the total direct costs. The 
quarterly aggregate dividend yield is the aggregate dividend yield averaged over a 
three-month period prior to the IPO, and is taken from NAREIT (www.reit.com).
The significant positive coefficient of QINDYIELD supports the notion that the 
higher NAREIT dividend yield reduces the demand for REITs to go to the public
(Hartzell, et al., 2005). It suggests that the dividend yield signals the potential 
investors about the post-market returns of the offer. The significantly higher total 
direct costs for UPREIT IPOs might be attributed to the issuer’s complexities 
(Gerbich, et al., 1995) and more expenses in organizing UPREITs.
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The significant positive coefficients of REITTYPE support the notion that the 
tangible assets holding might reflect cash flows of equity REIT IPOs which are more 
volatile and less predictable (Chen and Lu, 2006). This finding suggests that the 
higher level of uncertainty of assessing equity REITs drives total direct costs up than 
for mortgage REITs. The significant positive coefficient of NYSE is consistent with 
higher listing fees of the NYSE (Corwin and Harris, 2001; Foucault and Parlour, 
2004).
The significant positive coefficient of MERRILL is inconsistent with lower 
underwriting spreads for IPOs underwritten by Merrill Lynch as reported in 
descriptive statistics of Chen and Lu (2006). Chen and Lu (2006) report that the 
Merrill Lynch group underwrites most of the IPOs in their sample whereas 
inspection of this sample reveals that Merrill Lynch-led underwriting syndicates 
underwrite only 19% of the sample IPO proceeds in dollars 2010. Merrill Lynch 
group can do this either because they have sufficient expertise or they can cut the 
spread to increase their market share. This contrast is reconciled by running a 
separate regression with offer proceeds greater than the sample mean and the third 
quartile (not reported here). The regression coefficients of the dummy variable 
MERRILL became negative; however, they remained statistically significant in one 
specification with offer proceeds greater than the third quartile. This finding 
indicates that the REIT-dominating Merrill Lynch-led underwriting syndicate(s)
charge higher fees for riskier smaller IPOs but charge lower fees for larger IPOs. 
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Table 5.3: Regression results of factors influencing total direct costs of raising equity capital for 
U.S. REIT IPOs during 1996-2010.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.137*** 0.106*** 0.145*** 0.142*** 0.208***
3.401 2.920 3.617 3.665 4.229
LNIPOPROCEEDS -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.018***
-3.348 -3.501 -3.580 -3.446 -3.301
INDVOL -0.175 -0.155 -0.151 -0.212*
-1.419 -1.230 -1.260 -1.777
QINDYIELD 0.009** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008***
2.414 2.940 2.897 2.936 2.985
UNDRANK -0.002 -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.002
-1.294 -1.741 -1.857 -1.864 -0.980
TOPAUDITOR -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.000
-1.383 -0.698 -0.639 -0.764 -0.009
LNNUMTOTUND -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 0.004
-1.347 -1.462 -1.576 -1.462 0.620
LNNUMRISKFACT -0.011* -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.019**
-1.714 -0.928 -0.824 -0.786 -2.365
NYSE 0.008* 0.006 0.007* 0.007* 0.012*
1.820 1.499 1.894 1.919 1.948
POSTGFC -0.004 -0.002 0.004
-0.452 -0.261 0.359
UPREIT 0.006** 0.001 0.005
2.273 0.128 1.116
REITTYPE 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.004
4.102 4.264 3.332 0.827
MERRILL 0.007* 0.008* 0.007* 0.008* 0.007
1.685 1.890 1.810 1.915 1.651
MARYLAND 0.002 0.003 0.002
0.434 0.869 0.435
R-squared 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.64
Adj. R-squared 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50
Observations 124 124 124 124 78
This table reports OLS regression results of factors determining the direct costs incurred by the issuers 
of U.S. REIT IPOs for the period 1996-2010, along with both R2 and adjusted R2. The number of 
complete observations (N) is presented in the last row.
The dependent variable is the total direct costs averaged, 8.43%, as a percentage of gross proceeds 
raised. Sample size becomes 124 in specifications from 1 to 4, and 78 in specification 5 after adjusting 
for the missing data of variables used in the regressions, and after excluding outliers beyond mean +/-
3 standard deviations of the total direct costs. Heteroskedasticity consistent robust t-statistics are 
reported below each coefficient. ***, **, * denote the level of significance at less than 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. The results in the table are based on the following equation:
GLUHFWFRVWV ȕ0ȕ1OQLSRSURFHHGVȕ2LQGYROȕ3TLQG\LHOGȕ4XQGUDQNȕ5topauditor 
                      ȕ6OQQXPWRWXQGȕ7OQQXPULVNIDFWȕ8Q\VHȕ9SRVWJIFȕ10upreit
                  ȕ11UHLWW\SHȕ12PHUULOOȕ13PDU\ODQGİ
The other variables are as defined in Table 5.6 in the Appendix. White’s (1980) cross terms are 
excluded due to insufficient observations with year dummies. The regression diagnostic of Ramsey 
(Regression Specification Error Test) or RESET (1969) Stability Statistic is performed to assess any 
model mis-specification due to omitted variables.
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Table 5.4 consists of five specifications with underwriting fees as a percentage of the 
gross proceeds as the dependent variable. Specification 1 is with the maximum 
possible number of observations of 115, whereas, specification 2 is with observations 
of 113 after adjusting for the missing data of some variables, particularly ownership 
limit (OWNLIM), and excluding outliers lying beyond mean ± 3 standard deviations 
of underwriting fees. Specification 2 excludes INDVOL because of its variance 
inflation factor being greater than 10, and because it is correlated with 
LNNUMRISKFACT (Pearson correlation of 0.46 with p<1%). Specification 2 also 
excludes LNOFFPRICE because of its higher correlation with LNIPOPROCEED 
(Pearson correlation of 0.48 with p<1%), and UPREIT because of its higher 
correlation with REITTYPE. Specification 3 excludes only UPREIT, whereas, 
specification 4 includes all possible variables after adjusting for missing data, and 
specification 5 includes observations for the sub-period 2002-2010.
The table reports that the logarithm of IPO offer proceeds (LNIPOPROCEEDS), 
logarithm of offer price per share (LNOFFPRICE), logarithm of number of 
representative underwriters (LNNUMREPUND), logarithm of the number of adverse 
risk factors (LNNUMRISKFACT), industry return volatility (INDVOL), and 
Maryland (MARYLAND) significantly negatively explain the underwriting fees. 
While the NAREIT industry dividend yield (QINDYIELD), ownership limit of an 
individual owner (OWNLIM),  and the trading exchange (NYSE), significantly 
positively explain the underwriting fees (spread).
The significant negative coefficient of IPO offer proceeds is the result of fixed 
component in costs incurred by underwriters. The significant negative coefficient of 
the natural logarithm of the offer price per share suggests that a higher offer price 
resolves the uncertainty of the offer (Chen and Mohan, 2002; Kutsuna, et al., 2008).
The empirical evidence of offer price, however, inconclusively predicts positive or 
negative effects on IPO underwriting fees (Bradley, et al. 2006; Chen and Mohan, 
2002). This finding suggests that REIT IPOs with higher offer price reduces the 
inherent valuation uncertainty. The significant negative effect of the logarithm of the 
number of representative underwriters is consistent with the distributional efficiency 
of larger syndicate size (Carter and Dark, 1990). It is worth mentioning here that the 
representative underwriters represent the syndicate in dealing with issuers and even 
with dealers and they are included in the total number of underwriters. The 
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significant negative coefficient of the LNNUMRISKFACT supports the notion of 
reduced information asymmetry and litigation risk for REITs stating more adverse 
risk factors. The significant negative coefficient of INDVOL might be the effect of 
declining underwriting spread over time whereas the INDVOL were more than 
double of its mean of 5.18% during the post global financial crisis. This result is 
consistent with the argument of Bairagi and Dimovski (2012b) that the IPO-issuing 
firms following higher industry return volatility incur relatively more non-
underwriting other direct expenses. This is possible because some of the non-
underwriting other direct expenses incurred by the underwriters are reimbursed by 
the issuing firm.48 This finding is reinforced by the argument of Mola and Loughran 
(2004) that underwriters can not transparently charge higher direct compensation for 
riskier firms in the presence of competition. The negative effect of MARYLAND 
implies that underwriters can cut their direct remuneration due to their expertise in 
dealing with more REIT IPOs incorporated under Maryland incorporation law.
The significant positive coefficient of QINDYIELD is consistent with reduced
demand for REITs to go public (Hartzell, et al., 2005). The significant positive 
coefficient of OWNLIM suggests that the expected lower post IPO liquidity for an 
IPO with a higher ownership limit require more underwriting efforts. This is 
consistent with Butler, et al.’s (2005) lower underwriting spreads for SEOs with 
higher liquidity. Higher underwriting spread for NYSE listed IPOs is consistent with 
(Corwin and Harris, 2001).
48 IPO prospectuses state where reimbursement takes place between underwriting and non-
underwriting direct expenses.
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Table 5.4: Regression results of factors influencing underwriting fees of raising initial equity 
capital for U.S. REIT IPOs during 1996-2010.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.101*** 0.083*** 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.098***
7.524 6.895 7.767 7.845 5.948
LNIPOPROCEEDS -0.001** -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.003**
-2.095 -2.489 -1.259 -1.486 -2.450
LNOFFPRICE -0.005*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
-2.710 -2.400 -2.081 -2.235
INDVOL -0.103*** -0.101*** -0.098*** -0.103***
-3.110 -2.931 -2.797 -2.725
QINDYIELD 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.002* 0.003*
1.546 1.391 1.876 1.673 1.882
UNDRANK -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
-1.965 -0.611 -0.675 -0.275
TOPAUDITOR -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
-1.272 -1.191 -1.333 -0.976
LNNUMREPUND -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** -0.003*
-1.753 -2.473 -2.194 -1.878
LNNUMRISKFACT -0.005*** -0.004** -0.004** -0.003** -0.003
-2.887 -2.108 -2.367 -2.130 -0.844
OWNLIM 0.073** 0.089** 0.091** 0.080** 0.031
2.585 2.388 2.486 2.304 0.729
UPREIT -0.002 -0.001
-1.520 -0.561
REITTYPE 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
0.422 0.393 1.093 0.444
NYSE 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006***
1.043 1.039 1.093 3.361
MERRILL 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004
1.220 1.126 1.289 1.573
MARYLAND -0.003** -0.002 -0.001 -0.004
-2.356 -1.445 -0.867 -1.408
Observations 115 113 113 113 73
R-squared 0.50 0.51 0.57 0.58 0.65
Adj. R-squared 0.40 0.38 0.44 0.46 0.50
This table reports the OLS results of factors influencing the underwriting fees paid by the issuers of 
U.S. REIT IPOs over the period 1996-2010, along with both R2 and adjusted R2. The dependent 
variable is underwriting fees, averaging 6.47%, as a percentage of total proceeds raised. The number 
of complete observations (N) is presented in the last row. The results in the table are based on the 
following equation:
XQGIHHV ȕ0ȕ1OQLSRSURFHHGVȕ2LQGYROȕ3TLQG\LHOGȕ4XQGUDQNȕ5topauditor 
               ȕ6OQQXPWRWXQGȕ7OQQXPULVNIDFWȕ8RZQOLPȕ9XSUHLWȕ10reittype 
            ȕ11Q\VHȕ12PHUULOOȕ13PDU\ODQGİ
Sample sizes become 113 in specifications from 1 to 4, and 73 in specification 5, after adjusting for 
the missing data of some variables used in the regressions, particularly OWNLIM, and excluding 
outliers lying beyond mean +/- 3 standard deviations of underwriting fees. The other variables are as 
defined in Table 5.6 in the Appendix.
***, **, and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. White (1980)
heteroskedasticity consistent robust t-statistics are reported beneath each coefficient. The regression 
diagnostic of Ramsey (Regression Specification Error Test) or RESET (1969) Stability Statistic is 
investigated to assess any model mis-specification due to omitted variables.
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Table 5.5 presents the OLS multiple regression results on factors influencing 
expenses other than underwriting fees (spreads) directly incurred by the issuer. These 
expenses can also be termed as non-underwriting direct expenses, and are calculated 
as a percentage of gross proceeds and used as the dependent variable in all four 
specifications. Specification 1 uses the maximum possible number of observations of 
125 out of 127, whereas, specification 2 uses 122 observations after adjusting for 
missing data and excluding outliers lying beyond mean ± 3 standard deviations of the 
dependent variable. Specifications 2 and 3 mutually exclusively replace UPREIT and 
REITTYPE. Furthermore, specifications 3 and 4 include observations of 45 and 73 
for the sub-periods 1996-1999 and 2002-2010, respectively.
The results report that the logarithm of IPO offer proceeds (LNIPOPROCEEDS), 
REIT IPO dominating auditor (TOPAUDITOR), the logarithm of the number of total 
underwriters (LNNUMTOTUND), and the logarithm of the number of adverse risk 
factors (LNNUMRISKFACT), significantly negatively determine these expenses.
While the NAREIT industry dividend yield (QINDYIELD),  Merrill Lynch led 
(MERRILL), and Maryland incorporated IPOs (MARYLAND) significantly incur 
higher positively influence these expenses. The significant negative coefficient of the 
LNIPOPROCEEDS supports the notion of the economies of scale in non-
underwriting other direct expenses (Lee et al., 1996; Ritter, 1987). The negative 
effect of TOPAUDITOR might be attributed to the certification and reliability of 
financial statements audited by a REIT dominating auditor. The significant negative 
coefficient of LNNUMTOTUND and LNNUMRISKFACT imply that the effect of 
distributional efficiency of hiring larger syndicate and lower litigation risk of 
disclosing more adverse risk factors might require REIT IPO issuers to incur lower 
non-underwriting other direct expenses. 
The positive coefficient of QINDYIELD suggests that issuers need to incur higher 
expenses during the higher quarterly dividend yield prior to the offer. The positive 
effect of REITTYPE supports the valuation uncertainty of tangible assets which 
require issuers to incur more non-underwriting direct expenses for equity REIT IPOs. 
The positive coefficient of MERRILL suggests that issuers need to incur more non-
underwriting expenses to meet the requirements of hiring Merrill Lynch led 
underwriting syndicate. Similarly, the positive coefficient of MARYLAND implies 
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that issuers need to incur more on these expenses to meet the legal requirements of 
Maryland incorporation law.
Table 5.5: The OLS regression results of factors influencing non-underwriting direct expenses 
of raising equity capital by U.S. REIT IPOs during 1996-2010.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.065* -0.240 -0.021 0.074**
(1.838) (-1.491) (-0.127) (2.354)
LNIPOPROCEEDS -0.011*** -0.006*** -0.003 -0.008***
(-4.499) (-3.676) (-1.431) (-3.955)
UNDRANK -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
(-0.376) (0.970) (0.909) (0.954)
INDVOL -0.142 0.004 0.172 -0.046
(-1.067) (0.055) (0.125) (-0.662)
QINDYIELD 0.006* 0.006* 0.005 0.005
(1.847) (1.911) (0.241) (1.666)
TOPADITOR -0.003 -0.009* -0.001
(-1.174) (-1.981) (-0.056)
LNNUMTOTUND -0.005** -0.007** -0.001
(-2.400) (-2.555) (-0.333)
LNNUMRISKFACT -0.009* 0.001 0.006 -0.016**
(-1.690) (0.010) (1.056) (-2.012)
PYNUMIPO 0.008 0.001 -0.004
(1.576) (0.507) (-0.523)
UPREIT 0.006 0.007
(1.061) (1.585)
REITTYPE 0.009*** -0.001
(4.020) (-0.231)
NYSE 0.003 0.006 0.002
(0.920) (1.292)    (0.371)
MERRILL 0.008* 0.005 0.004 0.004
(1.737) (1.157) (0.492) (0.779)
MARYLAND 0.008** 0.007** 0.004 0.004
(2.289) (2.543) (0.948) (1.122)
R-squared 0.353 0.468 0.509 0.519
Adj. R-squared 0.235 0.336 0.280 0.336
Observations 125 122 45 77
This table reports OLS results of factors influencing the non-underwriting other expenses directly 
incurred by the issuers of U.S. REIT IPOs over the period 1996-2010. The dependent variable is the 
non-underwriting other direct expenses as a percentage of total proceeds and averaged 1.96%, at 1% 
level of significance. Sample size becomes 125 in specification 1, and 122 in specification 2 with full 
sample observations, and 45 in specification 3, and 77 in specification 4, after adjusting for the 
missing data of variables used in the regressions and excluding outliers (if any) beyond mean +/- 3
standard deviations of non-underwriting other direct expenses, respectively, for the sub-periods 1996-
1999 and 2002-2010, respectively. The results are based on the following OLS regression equation. 
LSRGLUH[S ȕ0ȕ1OQLSRSURFHHGVȕ2LQGYROȕ3TLQG\LHOGȕ4XQGUDQNȕ5topauditor
                 ȕ6OQQXPWRWXQGȕ7OQQXPULVNIDFWȕ8S\QXPLSRȕ9XSUHLWȕ10reittype 
                 ȕ11Q\VHȕ12PHUULOOȕ13PDU\ODQGİ
White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent robust t-statistics are reported beneath each coefficient. 
The regression diagnostic of Ramsey (Regression Specification Error Test) or RESET (1969) Stability 
Statistic is reported to assess any model mis-specification due to omitted variables. Other variables are 
as defined in Table 5.6 in the Appendix of this chapter. ***, **, and * indicate the level of 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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5.4   Findings
The major findings of this study are as follows:
a) The direct costs consisting of both underwriting fees and non-underwriting 
direct expenses followed a declining trend over the sample period and 
experienced economies of scale with respect to the IPO proceeds. This 
finding is consistent with REITs (Chen and Lu, 2006) but inconsistent with 
industrial IPOs (Kim et al., 2010).
b) The larger offer price per share reduces the issue uncertainty and appears to 
negatively affect the underwriting fees. This is consistent with the argument 
of Kutsuna et al. (2008) for Japanese REIT IPOs and Chen and Mohan (2002) 
for U.S. Industrial IPOs.
c) NAREIT monthly industry index return volatility over 12 months prior to the 
offer inversely affects the underwriting fees, and the quarterly NAREIT 
industry yield prior to the IPO positively affects both the underwriting fees 
and the non-underwriting other direct expenses.
d) The number of underwriters negatively influences the direct costs, for 
example, the number of both representative and total underwriters 
significantly negatively affect underwriting fees and non-underwriting other 
direct expenses. This is consistent with Carter and Dark (1990).
e) The number of adverse risk factors inversely affects the direct costs, 
particularly by affecting the underwriting fees because of the lower litigation 
risk of underwriters. This is consistent with reduced information asymmetry 
and litigation risk (Beatty and Welch, 1996; Leone et al., 2007).
f) Equity REITs and those listed on the NYSE incurred higher direct costs.
g) Underwriters charge higher underwriting fees for REITs with a higher 
ownership limit for individual investors because of the aftermarket liquidity 
effect.
h) The effect of an UPREIT structure in influencing the direct costs is 
significant, but has insignificant marginal negative and positive effects on the 
underwriting fees and non-underwriting other direct expenses, respectively. 
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i) The direct costs of raising equity capital increase for IPOs underwritten by 
Merrill Lynch-led syndicates which dominate the REIT IPO underwriting 
business. However, for larger offers, the study finds lower direct costs for 
IPOs underwritten by Merrill Lynch-led syndicates.
j) The consistency of the effects of some of the determinants is more 
pronounced for non-underwriting direct expenses during the sample period.
5.5   Conclusion
This study documents a declining trend for the total direct costs of raising equity 
capital for 127 REIT IPOs during the period 1996-2010. The study is particularly 
important because REITs leave less money on the table through underpricing, and 
their operations are initiated with the funds from the IPO. Hence, the direct costs of 
raising equity capital by issuing IPOs are a major component of their costs of capital. 
The study is also important because it includes the recent Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) period which was caused by the bankruptcy of many financial institutions due 
to the sharp downturn in real estate values (Laopodis 2009). The study contributes to 
the REIT IPO literature with cross sectional determinants of both total direct costs 
and non-underwrting other expenses directly incurred by the issuers. The existing 
cross sectional evidence is confined to the underwriting spread.
The study finds that equally-weighted total direct costs, underwriting fees and non-
underwriting other direct expenses averaged 8.43%, 6.47%, and 1.96%, respectively. 
Consistent with prior evidence, these findings report economies-of-scale on both the 
underwriting fees and the non-underwriting other direct expenses over increased 
offer size. The direct costs of raising equity capital by issuing IPOs are negatively 
determined by IPO offer size, reputation of the underwriters, and the number of 
adverse risk factors disclosed in the offer prospectus; whereas, these costs are 
positively determined by quarterly NAREIT49 industry dividend yield, trading on the 
NYSE, the organizational structure of REITs with an umbrella partnership structure, 
49 National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts
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the ownership structure of REITs with equity type, and a Merrill Lynch-led 
dominating underwriting syndicate. 
The higher offer price per share, the number of representative underwriters, 
disclosing adverse potential risk factors and industry return volatility negatively 
influence underwriting fees, but quarterly industry dividend yield prior to the offer, 
and the ownership limit for individual investors, positively determine underwriting 
fees. 
This study also investigates non-underwriting other direct expenses that can be up to 
approximately 30% of the direct cost of underwriting fees and are a function of issue 
complexities and method (Gerbich, Levis and Venmore-Rowland, 1995). The study 
finds that the number of total underwriters negatively influences such expenses, 
while NAREIT monthly return volatility over 12 months, NAREIT quarterly 
dividend yield, equity REITs, and Maryland incorporation laws determine such 
expenses. Even though the relationships between underwriting fees and some of their 
determinants are found to be dynamic, they are statistically persistent for non-
underwriting direct expenses over the sample period.
The findings suggest that the direct costs of raising initial equity capital can be 
minimized by optimally controlling for the offer size, offer price, ownership limit, 
number of underwriters and number of potential risk factors. The organizational 
structure of REITs with an umbrella partnership and equity ownership in assets 
significantly positively determines the direct costs. 
The study will benefit the issuer in making decisions on issue size, underwriting 
syndicate size and also on some of the non-underwriting direct expenses. It will also 
benefit the underwriters and investors in general, and particularly those involved in 
REIT IPOs. 
Further studies may introduce a number of other variables in determining 
underwriting fees, as suggested by our RESET test, and improve the R-square. The
costs of matching industrial IPOs could also be used to test the significance of the 
difference in direct costs across industries.
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Appendix
Table 5.6: Definition of variables used in the specifications of Direct Costs of IPOs
Variable Exp 
Sign Definition and References
LNIPOPROCEEDS - The natural logarithm of real gross IPO proceeds in the dollar of 
2010 (Barry, Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1991; Chen and Lu, 
2006; Ibbotson, et al., 1994; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997)
LNOFFPRICE - Log natural of dollar offer price per share (Beatty and Welch, 1996; 
Bradley, et al., 2006; Kutsuna, et al., 2008)
UNDRANK - Average reputation rank of lead underwriters as per Carter and 
Manaster (1990) which is sourced from Ritter’s homepage (Dunbar, 
2000)
INDVOL + The standard deviation of monthly NAREIT price index returns 
over 12 months prior to the offer (Chen and Lu, 2006)
QINDYIELD + REIT industry dividend yield over 3-month period prior to the IPO 
(Hartzell, et al., 2005) as sourced from NAREIT monthly dividend 
yield
OWNLIM + Ownership restriction for an individual investor for owning a 
maximum percentage of outstanding equity (Michaely and Shaw, 
1994)
LNNUMREPUND - Logarithm of the number of representative underwriters in the 
underwriting syndicate
LNNUMTOTUND - Logarithm of the number of total underwriters in the underwriting 
syndicate (Carter and Dark, 1990; Corwin and Schultz, 2005)
LNNUMRISKFACT - The logarithm of the number of adverse risk factors specifically 
listed in the offer prospectus (Beatty and Welch, 1996; Bhabra and 
Pettway, 2003; Leone, Rock and Willenborg, 2007; Simunic and 
Stein, 1987)
TOPAUDITOR - Dummy variable representing unity for auditor differentiated with 
the highest market share in the industry during the sample period 
and zero otherwise (Beatty and Welch, 1996; Wang and Wilkins, 
2007)
PYNUMIPO +/- Number of total IPOs completed during the year immediately prior 
to the offer (Benveniste, et al. 2003; Ellul and Pagano, 2006)
REITTYPE + Dummy variable representing unity for equity REIT and zero
otherwise (Chen and Lu, 2006; Dolvin and Pyles, 2009)
POSTGFC +/- Dummy variable representing unity for offers issued after 
beginning of global financial crisis in August 2007 and zero 
otherwise (Gordon and Valentine, 2009)
NYSE + Dummy variable representing unity for the offers listed on NYSE 
and zero otherwise (Corwin and Harris, 2001; Kooli and Suret, 
2002)
UPREIT - Dummy variable representing unity for umbrella partnership REITs 
and zero otherwise (Chen and Lu, 2006; Dolvin and Pyles, 2009; 
Ling and Ryngaert, 1997);
MERRILL +/- Dummy variable representing unity for underwriting syndicate led 
by Merrill Lynch group and zero otherwise
MARYLAND +/- Dummy variable representing unity for IPO incorporated in 
Maryland and zero otherwise
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CHAPTER SIX
INDIRECT COSTS of IPOs
6.1   Introduction
This chapter analyses and presents factors determining the underpricing for raising 
initial equity capital with a sample of 127 REIT IPOs issued during 1996-2010. The 
analysis is performed with the ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression 
estimates to detect the marginal effect of an explanatory variable. In the finance 
literature, IPO underpricing50 has garnered far more attention from practitioners, 
investors, media and the public than any other corporate events (Boulton, et al.,
2011) and, thence, is well-blessed with vast amounts of both theoretical and 
empirical research evidence covering the past forty years in more than forty countries 
(Engelen and Essen, 2010).
Thus, while the finance literature is blessed with an abundance of both theoretical 
and empirical studies on IPO underpricing, the REITs deserve a more elaborate 
concurrent study on their costs of raising equity capital and, more particularly, on 
implicit underpricing due to their unique features and cross-sectional variations. 
Further, as the levels of underpricing in both the traditional industrial and REIT IPOs 
are time-variant and, more particularly, as REITs experience both overpricing and 
underpricing in response to changes in their structure over time (discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 4), the determinants and the trends in their underpricing justify 
empirical research using contemporary evidence.
This chapter, therefore, intends to explain the determinants of underpricing for REIT 
IPOs incorporating a number of variables empirically documented in the body of 
both REIT and traditional IPO literature. Figure 4.1.5 in Chapter 4 on descriptive 
statistics shows a declining trend for underpricing during the sample period, which is 
consistent with the REIT IPO underpricing literature (Chen and Lu, 2006) but 
inconsistent with industrial IPOs (Kim, et al., 2010). The declining trend of 
underpricing, however, experienced two key peaks, in 1997 and 2004, which are 
50 It is the percentage difference in offer price compared to the first-day closing market price, and it is 
underpricing (overpricing) if the offer price is below (above) the closing market price.
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consistent with hot IPO periods (Buttimer, et al., 2005; Chen and Ritter, 2000; 
Loughran and Ritter, 2004). The inter-temporal variations in traditional industrial 
IPO underpricing are documented in the literature (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; 
Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Lowry, et al., 2010). To control the time fixed effects, 
this study has incorpoared year dummies in all specifications (Engelen and Essen, 
2010).
Consistent with Dolvin and Pyles (2009), this study documents offer size as a 
significant determinant of underpricing. It incorporated underwriting fees and non-
underwriting other direct expenses as explanatory variables of underpricing, and 
documents underwriting fees as complementary to (Beatty and Welch, 1996; Chen 
and Mohan, 2002; Kim, et al., 2010; Mola and Loughran, 2004) and non-
underwriting other direct expenses as a substitute for underpricing (Chemmanur and 
Yan, 2009; Chen and Mohan, 2002; Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001). Consistent with 
their certification role and better signaling effects, this study reports both a top-
ranked underwriter representing the syndicate, and an auditor dominating the REIT 
IPO market share in the sample (Ernst & Young), have both economic and 
statistically strong negative effects on underpricing for larger IPOs. Similarly, IPOs 
incorporated in Maryland, those that have an umbrella partnership structure, those 
that have investment in industrial/office and healthcare properties, provide investors 
with higher initial returns. The positive signaling effect of the NYSE, due to its 
higher credibility, larger investor base and lower trading costs, significantly reduces 
adverse selection and thereby reduces underpricing for larger IPOs. Indicating that 
corporate working capital is the intended use of proceeds leaves more money on the 
table, but IPOs with a higher equity offer size relative to their post-IPO outstanding 
equity, leave significantly less money on the table.
After controlling for time fixed effects, the study suggests that REIT firms can 
optimally determine initial offer size by considering both direct underwriting fees 
and also non-underwriting other direct expenses to minimize the underpricing of 
initial equity capital. The study also reports that the reputation of the representative 
underwriters in hiring the syndicate is more powerful than that of the lead or book-
running underwriter, and is stronger with a larger offer size.
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The study will contribute to the REIT IPO literature by providing evidence of 
declining underpricing, and, more particularly, indicating the significance of the 
reputation of the group of underwriters in the syndicate, the offer size relative to the 
post-offer outstanding equity, and the intended purpose of the investment as 
determinants of underpricing. It will also provide the literature with evidence of the 
significantly higher indirect costs of raising equity capital during the financial 
recession. Practitioners, particularly, may benefit from the study especially when 
hiring the underwriting syndicate and auditor, and also in determining direct costs.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 presents and analyses the 
OLS regression results with full sample oberservation while section 6.3 presents and 
analyses the results of different sub-samples. Section 6.4 concludes the chapter with 
policy implications.
6.2   Analysis of Full Sample Results
Table 6.2 consists of five regression specifications, with specification 1 as the 
benchmark of the regressions. Specification 2 replaces REITTYPE by UPREIT due 
to the collinearity between them. Specification 3 replaces the variable of 
HOTPERIODS with D1999 and D2004 and excludes two insignificant variables, that 
is, UPREIT and REITTYPE. These two are excluded from specification 2 because of 
their significantly higher correlation of 0.56 with less than a 1% level of significance.
Specification 4 excludes the dummy variable of POSTGFC because of its higher 
collinearity with LNIPOPROCEEDS. 
The post-estimation test of the variance inflation factor, or VIF, which is used as a 
rule of thumb for detecting collinearity (Liu and Ritter, 2011), reports 17.20 for this 
variable. A value of VIF greater than 10 implies a problem of collinearity, and less 
than 5 is regarded as free of problems with collinearity (Lee, et al., 2011). The 
investigation of the post-estimation VIF in the specifications in Table 6.2 reports VIF 
less than 5, except for POSTGFC. Specification 5 further excludes two insignificant 
dummy variables of MARYLAND and NYSE to detect the stability of the effect of 
other predictor variables. The variables used in OLS regressions are as defined in 
Table 6.4.
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6.2.1 IPO Offer Size
The IPO offer size is used in the underpricing literature as an exogenous determinant 
and is important for REIT IPOs which raise larger amounts than the traditional IPOs 
(Dolvin and Pyles, 2009; Kim, et al., 2010). The REIT literature supports the positive 
effect of the offer size on underpricing. For example, Ling and Ryngaert (1997) and 
Dolvin and Pyles (2009) report an insignificant positive effect, but Bairagi and 
Dimovski (2011) document a significant positive effect. Thus, the existing evidence 
supports both positive and negative effects of offer size on underpricing and, more 
particularly, a positive effect for REITs. 
The OLS multiple regression results in Table 6.2 report that dollar-adjusted IPO offer 
proceeds positively determine the initial offer-day underpricing, with a significance 
of less than 5% in specification 3 which controls all variables in the analysis. 
However, it also remains significantly positive even in three other specifications 
which exclude some control variables. This finding is consistent with Dolvin and 
Pyles’s (2009) evidence that the offer size is a significant determinant of 
underpricing in REITs, and that larger offers require more underwriting efforts.51
6.2.2 Underwriting Fees
Underwriters expect, or deliberately determine, the underpricing when they 
determine their fees on the day before the offer. As issuers are usually concerned 
about maximizing their net proceeds from the offer (Rock, 1986), both deserve joint 
determination. Chen and Mohan (2002) partition the observations in terms of 
underwriter spread, and report that high spread groups underprice substantially more 
than low-spread groups. This strongly reinforces the complementary association 
between the underwriting spread and underpricing. The results support the 
complementary relationship between underwriting spread and underpricing.
However, despite the lacking of statistical significance, its direction contrasts with 
the REIT evidence (Chen and Lu, 2006).
51 For robustness, the study also tested (not reported) whether the underpricing follows the U-shape 
pattern (Dunbar, 2000) but the result does not suggest any U-shape effect of offer size.
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6.2.3 IPO Direct Expenses
Chen and Mohan (2002) suggest that riskier issues have both higher underwriting 
spreads and other expenses. However, they also argue that underwriting spread is an 
endogenous determinant of underpricing, and use non-underwriting other expenses in 
the equation of underwriting spread. Their findings suggest that non-underwriting 
other direct expenses have an indirect negative effect on underpricing through 
underwriting spread. 
The significant negative coefficient of IPO direct expenses (IPODIREXP) supports 
the literature that other direct IPO expenses are substitutes for underpricing. This 
finding is also consistent with Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) that underpricing is a 
substitute for costly marketing expenditure, because promotional activities reduce the 
extent of the adverse selection problem and raise the fraction of uninformed investors 
who participate in the IPO (Carter and Manaster, 1990). This finding suggests that 
adopting promotional activities may reduce the indirect cost of initial equity capital
for REITs.
6.2.4 Reputation of Underwriters 
Underwriter reputation and initial returns are well-documented in the IPO literature 
(Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Carter, Dark and Singh, 1998; Logue, 1973; Maksimovic 
and Unal, 1993; Titman and Trueman, 1986). However, the evidence shows an 
inconclusive effect of underwriter reputation because the literature supports both 
lower (Carter and Manaster, 1990) and higher (Beatty and Welch, 1996; Habib and 
Ljungqvist, 2001; Loughran and Ritter, 2004) underpricing for IPOs with well-
reputed underwriters. 
This study uses the reputation of representative underwriters who represent 
syndicates in dealing with issuers and dealers. The name of the underwriters who 
represent the syndicate is stated in the underwriting section of the offer prospectus, 
and their reputation is taken following Carter and Manaster’s (1990) rankings of 0-9,
as updated on Ritter’s home page. The motivation behind using this ranking is that it 
considers the rank of all representative underwriters instead of only the lead 
underwriters. In the ranking of the lead underwriters’ reputation, one underwriter’s 
rank is considered and it is averaged where there is more than one underwriter in a 
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parallel position (Jeon and Ligon, 2011). In representative underwriting, the study
averaged the reputation of all underwriters who are in the list as representative 
underwriters. As the certification role of the underwriting syndicate reduces the 
information asymmetry and valuation uncertainty, and representative underwriters 
are involved in dealing with issuers and dealers, this study conjectures that the 
average rank of representative underwriters can have more explanatory power, 
particularly on underpricing. 
The mean of lead underwriter rank in my sample is 7.56, whereas, it is 7.34 for 
representative underwriters. The univariate results of both of these ranks have an 
insignificant negative effect on underpricing. However, 14% (17/125) of IPOs have 
an average rank of representative underwriter equal to exactly 9. The study defined 
this 14% underwriting syndicate as top-ranked representative underwriters and used 
it in my regression as TOPRANKREPUND. The full sample results show that a top-
ranked representative underwriter syndicate has a statistically significant negative 
effect on underpricing. It strongly supports the certifying role of underwriters in 
REITs (Chen and Lu, 2006; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997), however, it contrasts to the 
local oligopolies in the underwriting market of Liu and Ritter (2011). It suggests that 
REIT IPO issuers do not pay any premium for the top-ranked underwriters by 
allowing them to underprice as usually happens in industrial IPOs, which might be 
attributable to the tangible asset base of the REIT.
6.2.5 Top Auditor
The literature shows that IPOs with higher-quality auditors are not so underpriced 
(Balvers, McDonald and Miller, 1988; Beatty, 1989; Titman and Trueman, 1986).
Following Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) and Wang and Wilkins (2007), this study 
defines the REIT-specialist auditor as one who dominates the REIT IPO auditing 
service in terms of market share based on the U.S. GDP inflated IPO offer size 
during this sample period. Ernst &Young in this sample has audited 25% (29%) 
market share in terms of dollar adjusted (nominal dollars) IPO offer size and 23% of 
IPOs in number. The significant negative coefficient of the dummy variable, 
TOPAUDITOR, supports the existing literature that the reputation of an auditor in an 
IPO can convey signals to investors and, more particularly, the accuracy of the 
valuation of the issuing firm, because the investors’ main source of information is the 
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financial statements prepared by the auditor. This suggests that REITs may reduce 
their indirect cost of initial equity capital by hiring REIT dominating auditor.
6.2.6 Property Type
The literature shows that the real estate sector consists of different types of properties 
and the nature of these different property types affects ex-ante uncertainty of the IPO 
differently. For example, Ling and Ryngaert (1997) state that the degree of risk 
varies between industrial warehouse and factory outlets, and the importance of 
management commitment also varies between industrial properties and the more 
management-intensive hotels. Chen and Lu (2006) and Ling and Ryngaert (1997) all 
report significant differences in underpricing across property types. 
In Table 6.1, the study has further presented the descriptive statistics of underpricing 
across 9 major property types to better understand their effect on underpricing. They 
show that 75% (21/28) of the sample IPOs with industrial/office have positive 
underpricing, with an average of 6.4% (significant at <1%). To control for the 
difference of underpricing across property types, my OLS multiple regressions 
incorporate major property types, however, find only industrial/office and healthcare 
to have a significant effect. The significant positive effect of industrial/office 
property is consistent with Ling and Ryngaert (1997), and even Chen and Lu (2006)
report the highest initial returns for industrial/office in their descriptive statistics 
without incorporating in regressions. Brau and Heywood (2008) report slightly 
negative insignificant underpricing of 13 healthcare REIT IPOs in their sample of 
1978-2007, and their findings suggest information asymmetry and waves of investor 
sentiment for healthcare REIT IPOs (Buttimer, et al., 2005) which predict positive, 
as against zero, underpricing according to the capital demand hypothesis. Brau and 
Heywood (2008) also suggest an inter-temporal pattern of healthcare REITs that is 
different from general REITs, because Chen and Lu (2006) report 1.74% 
underpricing with 9 healthcare REITs, which is also much lower than this result of 
3.7% for 5 healthcare REIT IPOs.
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Table 6.1: Statistics of underpricing across different property types for 127 REIT IPOs during
1996-2010.
Property Type
Mean
Standard
Deviation
t
statistics
p
value #>0 #<0 #=0
Sample
Size
Industrial/Office 6.4% 8.9% 3.77 0.001 21 3 4 28
Mortgage-backed Securities 1.1% 6.8% 1.08 0.287 17 18 10 45
Retail 1.1% 6.0% 0.66 0.520 4 4 5 13
Residential 0.7% 1.1% 1.46 0.205 3 0 3 6
Diversified 7.8% 13.3% 1.43 0.212 4 2 0 6
Lodging Resort 1.2% 2.9% 1.49 0.161 7 2 4 13
Healthcare 3.7% 4.4% 1.88 0.133 3 0 2 5
Specialty 6.6% 8.6% 2.29 0.052 7 2 0 9
Self-Storage 2.3% 3.2% 1.00 0.500 1 0 1 2
Total Sample 127
Table consists of 9 columns with left-most column presenting the property type and the rest of the 
columns presenting the mean, standard deviation, t statistics, p-value, number of IPOs with positive 
underpricing, number of IPOs with negative underpricing, number of IPOs with zero underpricing, 
and number of sample IPOs in each property type, respectively.
6.2.7 The percentage of shares offered in an IPO
To control for any variation in underpricing due to the shares offered in the IPO, the
regression specifications incorporate the natural logarithm of shares offered in the 
IPO (LNSHOFFIPO) with respect to the post-IPO outstanding volume, and expect an 
inverse relation with underpricing. The shares offered in the IPO relative to the post-
IPO volume in this sample averaged 71.16%, which is much greater than the 43% 
reported by Ritter (1984) for his 242 IPOs during 1977-1982, and the 30.83% of 
Chung, Li, and Yu (2005). Inspection of the data reveals that 7% of IPOs (9/127) are 
without any existing ownership. Consistent with Bairagi and Dimovski (2011), the 
results report a significant negative coefficient of LNSHOFFIPO in all specifications, 
and suggest that share retention by the existing shareholders is a significant 
consideration for REIT IPO underpricing.
6.2.8 Intended Uses of IPO Proceeds
As per the requirements of the SEC, a typical IPO prospectus states the intended use 
of the proceeds, including recapitalization through debt payment, corporate working 
capital, acquisition and development of property, and short-term investment. The 
chapter on descriptive statistics details both the percentage of proceeds intended to 
be used in any specific use, and the dummy of each use. However, the regression 
results report that the intended use for working capital is significant and positively 
influences underpricing, because the issuer’s intention to use proceeds for operating 
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expenses or working capital creates greater uncertainty about the firm’s corporate 
objectives (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr., 2003). This finding is consistent with both 
Leone, et al. (2007) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003). This finding suggests that 
REITs can reduce the indirect cost of initial equity capital by more specifically 
identifying and disclosing the uses of IPO proceeds.
6.2.9 Maryland State of Incorporation
The regression specifications in this study predict positive relationships between the 
indicator variable of Maryland and underpricing. Table 4.1.8 in Chapter 4 on 
descriptive statistics shows that 85% (108/127) of IPOs are incorporated in 
Maryland, and that the underpricing of Maryland-incorporated IPOs is greater than 
those incorporated in other states (3.11% vs 2.83%) with an insignificant mean but a 
significant median difference. The OLS regression results report the positive 
coefficient of MARYLAND which is consistent with the prediction because 
Maryland corporate laws favor management through its strong anti-takeover 
protection and management entrenchment (Hartzell, et al., 2008), but is only 
marginally significant in specification 4. This suggests REITs to be more strategic 
regarding the benefits of the investors.
6.2.10 Umbrella Partnership REIT 
The valuation uncertainties arising from conflicts of interest in managing UPREIT 
properties (Harrison, Panasian and Seiler, 2011; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997) require 
more money to be left for subscribing investors. Hence, underwriters of UPREIT 
IPOs tend to leave more money on the table through underpricing. The mean 
underpricing for 72 UPREIT IPOs is 3.23%, which is higher than the 2.86% for the 
55 traditional REIT IPOs in this sample, even though both mean and median 
differences are statistically insignificant. The findings of Chen and Lu (2006) report 
a significant positive coefficient in one specification, however, the coefficient 
becomes insignificant when they include underwriting fees (spread). The 
insignificant negative effect of Bairagi and Dimovski (2011) is consistent with Ling 
and Ryngaert (1997), however, Bairagi and Dimovski (2011) have not controlled the 
time fixed effect in their regression. This study controls the inter-temporal variation 
in underpricing (Lowry, et al., 2010) by incorporating year dummies, but still reports 
CHAPTER SIX       INDIRECT COSTS of IPOs
176
an insignificant positive effect of UPREIT on underpricing. However, the direction 
of the coefficient is consistent with expectations.
6.2.11 REIT type
The REIT literature predicts higher underpricing for IPOs with equity ownership 
than with mortgage ownership due to the inherent asset base. For example, Below, et 
al. (1995) report higher underpricing for equity REIT IPOs from 1972-1988, which is 
consistent with Wang, et al. (1992). Chen and Lu (2006) report 3.2% for 132 equity 
REIT IPOs compared with 0.63% for 17 mortgage REIT IPOs, and attribute the 
difference to higher transparency of mortgage REITs which have less volatile and 
more predictable cash flows. The descriptive statistics of this study show that 77 
equity REIT IPOs are underpriced, on average, by 4.20%, which is significantly 
higher than the 1.32% for 50 mortgage REIT IPOs. Though both mean and median 
differences are statistically significant, the effect of REIT type on underpricing is 
insignificant in the multiple regression specifications. Hence, this finding suggests
that REIT type is not a significant consideration of underpricing for IPOs.
6.2.12 Listing Exchange 
The credible certification of the NYSE reduces the valuation uncertainty of the firm 
which, in turn, requires lower underpricing (Affleck-Graves, Hegde, Miller and 
Reilly, 1993; Corwin and Harris, 2001). This study reports larger IPOs are listed on 
the NYSE and, after 2004, all REIT IPOs are listed on the NYSE. The inspection of
the data confirms that 82% (104/127) of the sample REIT IPOs with average nominal 
offer size (real) of $253 million ($295 million) are initially listed on the NYSE, 
against 18% with average nominal offer size (real) of $135 million ($172 million) 
listed on the AMEX or NASDAQ. This difference of nominal offer size (real) is 
significant with t statistics of 2.75 (2.49). This is consistent with Corwin and Harris 
(2001) who report 76.9% (337/438) of their sample IPOs were listed on the NYSE 
during 1991-1996.
The negative coefficient of the dummy variable of the NYSE is in line with the prior 
evidence that the NYSE has higher liquidity, lower trading costs, a better 
certification role with lower valuation uncertainty and a larger investor base. This 
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evidence suggests that REITs listed on the NYSE also enjoy the similar benefits like 
that of industrial firms.
6.2.13 IPOs during hot periods
The inspection of the data reveals that REIT IPOs are relatively clustered in 1997 
and 2004, and these years defined as hot IPO periods. This study also combines these
periods and terms it as HOTPERIODS (Kaserer and Kraft, 2003). Ljungqvist, Nanda 
and Singh (2006), in their model of IPO issuance in both sentiment-driven and 
irrational markets, argue that sentiment-driven markets end immaturely and push 
aside the institutional investors. Their model justifies the underpricing as 
compensation to the institutional investors for the risk of holding the stock during a 
sentiment-driven period which ends without any warning. 
The regression results show that the coefficients of years 1997 and 2004 individually, 
and of HOTPERIODS (sum of dummy of year 1997 and 2004), positively explain 
the REIT IPO underpricing. The regression results particularly support the investor 
sentiment hypothesis in positively driving the underpricing (raising the initial price) 
during the period of IPO clustering.52 This finding suggests that during the periods of 
more IPOs, REITs also leave more money for subscribing investors.
6.2.14 Global Financial Crisis
The GFC might have raised the valuation uncertainty of the IPO stock in the 
secondary market and, as a result, underwriters might have left more money on the 
table through underpricing IPOs during that period. The regression coefficient of 
POSTGFC is positive and marginally significant after controlling for the time fixed 
effect in specifications 1 to 3. This finding contradicts the descriptive statistics and 
univariate results which report insignificant overpricing (-0.72 with t = 0.82). After 
controlling for the time fixed effects, the variance inflation factor (VIF) of 
POSTGFC is above 17. Hence, this variable is excluded in specifications 4 and 5. 
However, data inspection reveals that larger IPOs issued during the GFC left more 
52 The capital demand hypothesis predicts zero underpricing, whereas information asymmetry requires 
higher underpricing for greater information asymmetry, however, information asymmetry disappears 
during periods of numerous completed IPOs (Helwege and Liang, 2004).
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money on the table through underpricing (statistically insignificant). Overall, the 
marginal effect of POSTGFC is not conclusive.
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Table 6.2: Results of multiple regressions of factors determining underpricing for 127 U.S. 
REIT IPOs during 1996-2010.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.255** -0.262* -0.256* -0.183 -0.158
(-2.023) (-1.984) (-1.978) (-1.442) (-1.244)
LNIPOPROCEEDS 0.020* 0.019* 0.020* 0.022** 0.020*
(1.786) (1.805) (1.822) (1.987) (1.896)
UNDFEES 1.828 2.016 1.834 1.863 1.671
(1.294) (1.359) (1.286) (1.314) (1.155)
IPODIREXP -0.915* -0.993* -0.908* -0.883* -0.845*
(-1.724) (-1.899) (-1.751) (-1.724) (-1.777)
TOPRANKREPUND -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.036** -0.038***
(-2.651) (-2.693) (-2.639) (-2.514) (-2.638)
TOPAUDITOR -0.023* -0.022 -0.024* -0.027** -0.025**
(-1.799) (-1.647) (-1.835) (-2.093) (-2.047)
PTINDOFF 0.036* 0.035* 0.037* 0.033 0.035*
(1.816) (1.698) (1.820) (1.631) (1.685)
PTHLTCARE 0.043** 0.042** 0.043** 0.043** 0.034**
(2.095) (2.066) (2.202) (2.173) (2.152)
LNSHOFFIPO -0.117** -0.118** -0.117** -0.112** -0.095**
(-2.425) (-2.473) (-2.425) (-2.348) (-2.216)
CORPORD 0.034** 0.034** 0.034** 0.035** 0.035***
(2.482) (2.364) (2.547) (2.550) (2.650)
MARYLAND 0.030 0.028 0.030 0.030*
(1.622) (1.535) (1.635) (1.663)
NYSE -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017
(-0.771) (-0.784) (-0.753) (-0.771)
D1997 0.127** 0.041 0.038*
(2.433) (1.611) (1.739)
D2004 0.130** 0.042* 0.042***
(2.468) (1.983) (2.654)
HOTPERIODS 0.127** 0.126**
(2.379) (2.355)
POSTGFC 0.088* 0.090* 0.088*
(1.847) (1.835) (1.861)
UPREIT 0.009
(0.545)
REITTYPE 0.001
(0.069)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.421 0.423 0.421 0.409 0.392
Adj. R-squared 0.264 0.266 0.271 0.264 0.260
Observations 118 118 118 118 118
The dependent variable is UNDPRICE which is the percentage change in offer price from the first-
day closing market price with respect to the offer price, and is averaged at 3.07% with 127 REIT IPOs 
issued during 1996-2010. Specification 1 is the benchmark of the regressions. Specification 2 replaces 
REITTYPE by UPREIT due to collinearity between them. Specification 3 replaces the variable of 
HOTPERIODS with D1999 and D2004 and excludes two insignificant variables, i.e., UPREIT and 
REITTYPE. These two are excluded from specification 2 because of their significantly higher 
correlation of 0.56 with less than 1% level of significance. Specification 4 excludes the dummy 
variable of POSTGFC because of its higher collinearity with LNIPOPROCEEDS. The other variables 
are as defined in Table 6.4 in the Appendix. The estimation result in the table is reported based on the 
following OLS regression specification:
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6.3 Analysis of Sub-samples
This section analyses the results, as reported in Table 6.3, of different sub-samples. 
Table 6.3 presents the OLS regression results of 5 sub-samples to grasp the better 
explanatory power of some variables, and also to confirm the consistency of other 
variables. Specification 1 is for REIT IPOs issued during 1996-1999, specification 2 
is for those issued during 2001-2010, specification 3 is for those with the real IPO 
offer size of less than or equal to the $211 million (median size), specification 4 is 
for those with real offer size of greater than $211 million and finally specification 5 
is for 30 REIT IPOs with offer size greater than $357 million (the third quartile of 
the offer size in dollars of 2010). The variables UPREIT and REITTYPE are used 
separately in specifications due to a higher correlation between them. The variable 
PTHLTCARE is automatically omitted (by STATA) from specification 4 and 5 due 
to collinearity and finally, the insignificant dummy variable of property type of 
industrial/office, PTINDOFF, is excluded from the specification #5. 
The separate specifications with sub-samples of 1996-1999 and 2001-2010 are run to 
detect any change in the effect of any explanatory variable over time (Liu and Ritter, 
2011; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Specifications 3, 4 and 5 are on three subsamples 
based on offer size (Chung, et al., 2005). The results show that the direction and 
magnitude of the coefficient of dollar adjusted offer (LNIPOPROCEEDS) size in 
specifications 1 and 2 are in line with the prediction that larger offer size require 
more underwriting and promotional efforts (Baron, 1982). Its direction and 
magnitude explore some suggestive information in specifications 3, 4 and 5. More 
specifically, both the direction and magnitude of its coefficients consistently increase 
over increasing offer size. These results further strongly support the positive effect of 
the offer size on IPO underpricing and suggest that larger offer size needs more 
promotional and underwriting efforts, and also that it is more relevant for REITs 
issuing relatively larger IPOs (Dolvin and Pyles, 2009).
The direction and magnitude of the coefficient of underwriting fees (UNDFEES) 
over five sub-samples strongly reinforce the complementary relation between 
underwriting fees and underpricing. This relation is strongly significant for the later 
sub-period of 2001-2010, and for sub-samples with a larger offer size. The economic 
significance of the relationship is stronger in specifications 4 and 5 wherein the lower 
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extreme of the offer size ranges from the median to the third quartile, respectively. 
This is consistent with the notion that underwriters cover the higher risks of 
marketing larger offers by explicitly charging higher underwriting fees and implicitly 
underpricing (Chen and Mohan, 2002).
The significant negative coefficient of IPODIREXP in specification 1 suggests that 
the substitute relationship (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009; Chen and Mohan, 2002; 
Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001) between non-underwriting direct IPO expenses and IPO 
underpricing is significant during the prior sub-period. The significant negative 
coefficient in specification 5 suggests that the relation is stronger when firms raise 
larger amounts. It may imply that issuers spend more on promotional activities 
because it is very cost-efficient for larger offers.
The direction and magnitude of the negative coefficient of top-ranked representative 
underwriters (TOPRANKREPUND) in all sub-samples are consistent with the full 
sample results, and suggest the importance of the certification role of underwriters in 
REIT IPOs. The higher economic significance in specification 1, however, suggests 
that the certification role of top-ranked underwriters was more evident in the 1990s 
than in the later sub-period (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997), and also that the significance 
becomes gradually stronger in sub-samples with larger offer size (specifications 4 
and 5). The direction of the coefficient of the REIT IPO-dominating auditor (Ernst
&Young) is in line in all sub-samples but is statistically insignificant. It reveals that 
the significance of auditor domination in this sample has not changed over time or 
even with IPO offer size. The coefficient of the two property types, industrial/office 
and healthcare, in all specifications is positive but significant in specification 1 only, 
which indicates that concentration of investment in industrial/office and healthcare 
(PTINDOFF and PTHLTCARE) positively influences underpricing due to the 
varying degrees of risk associated with industrial property (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997)
and the inter-temporal pattern of healthcare REIT IPOs (Brau and Heywood, 2008).
The insignificant coefficients of these two variables in specifications 3, 4 and 5 
imply that the effect of concentration in property type is not influenced by the offer 
proceeds. The coefficient of the log of the percentage of shares offered in IPOs with 
respect to the post-IPO shares outstanding (LNSHOFFIPO) remains statistically 
significant and consistent over the five subsamples, which implies that there is no 
significant change in its effect on underpricing over time and over offer proceeds.
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The magnitude and statistical significance of the dummy variable of the uses of IPO 
proceeds (CORPORD) over the sub-samples suggest that the effect of disclosing the 
uses of offer proceeds for corporate purposes is not constant over time or offer 
proceeds. Both the economic and statistical significance of disclosing intended uses 
of offer proceeds for working capital purposes decrease over sub-samples with larger 
offer proceeds. It suggests that disclosing the intended use of offer proceeds for 
working capital purposes, by IPOs with smaller offer proceeds, affects underpricing 
significantly more than for IPOs with larger offer proceeds. It supports the greater 
uncertainty of the corporate objective of the firm in disclosing working capital 
purposes as an intended use of the proceeds, and it is stronger for firms with a 
smaller offer size than with a larger offer size. 
The significant positive coefficient in specifications 1 and 5 suggest that there exist 
significant inter-temporal variations in underpricing of REIT IPOs incorporated in 
Maryland, and that larger issues incorporated in Maryland prefer to underprice more 
in exchange for better management entrenchment options and anti-takeover 
protection (Hartzell, et al., 2008).
The significantly lower underpricing for IPOs with larger offer proceeds strongly 
supports the findings of Corwin and Harris (2001) that IPOs with larger offer size 
prefer to list on the NYSE. It suggests that REITs with larger IPOs can reduce 
indirect cost of underpricing by listing on the NYSE.
The significant positive coefficients of D1997 and D2004 with numerous completed 
IPOs in the full sample results are consistent in the smallest and largest offer size 
sub-samples. More particularly, larger IPOs are more underpriced in 1997 than in 
2004. This also suggests a declining trend of underpricing ove time. The results over 
different sub-samples support the presence of high initial returns (Ibbotson, et al.,
1988; Ibbotson, et al., 1994; Lowry, et al., 2010) and irrationally optimistic investors 
(Ljungqvist, et al., 2006) for IPOs issued during hot periods (Pástor and Veronesi, 
2005). The presence of irrationally sentimental investors was more pronounced in 
1997 than in 2004, because they kept aside the smart money of institutional investors 
from investing in larger offers for a short while (Ljungqvist, et al., 2006) and, hence, 
institutional investors demanded higher initial returns to compensate them for their 
risk of keeping stock inventory during an irrationally sentiment-driven hot period.
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The direction of the coefficient of the dummy variable POSTGFC is in line with the 
expectation that IPOs issued during and after the recent global financial crisis left 
more money on the table to induce investors. The only significant coefficient in 
specification 4 implies that IPOs with a larger offer size after the global financial 
crisis needed more underpricing to induce subscribing investors.
The coefficient of the dummy variable of umbrella partnership REIT (UPREIT) in 
specifications 3 to 5 provides evidence of valuation uncertainty, and the conflicts in 
managing UPREIT properties. It is also consistent with the expectation of higher 
underpricing for IPOs with an UPREIT structure. The result is very informative and 
explanatory because the full sample results in Table 6.3 show an insignificant 
positive coefficient. More particularly, the coefficient changes from both economic 
and statistically insignificantly negative to highly significantly positive as sub-
samples change from less than, or equal to the second quartile, to above the second 
quartile and, finally, greater than the third quartile in specifications 3 to 5. It suggests 
that larger IPOs with an UPREIT structure compensate subscribing investors for the 
valuation uncertainty arising from the conflicts of interest in managing UPREIT 
properties (Harrison, Panasian and Seiler, 2011; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997).
The coefficient of the dummy variable of the equity REIT type is statistically 
insignificant in specifications 1 and 2. This variable has been dropped from 
subsequent specifications because its addition cannot change the adjusted R2, and its 
effect remains insignificant.
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Table 6.3: Results of multiple regressions of factors determining underpricing for different sub-
samples of U.S. REIT IPOs during 1996-2010.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.113 -0.330** 0.125 -0.466* -0.829***
(0.665) (-2.488) (0.578) (-2.011) (-3.302)
LNIPOPROCEEDS 0.014 0.021 -0.001 0.039 0.066**
(0.749) (1.415) (-0.039) (1.556) (3.005)
UNDFEES -1.029 3.295** -1.333 7.720*** 8.876**
(-0.514) (2.328) (-0.605) (3.116) (3.139)
IPODIREXP -1.544* -0.787 -0.821 -0.490 -1.952**
(-1.753) (-1.370) (-1.188) (-0.468) (-2.400)
TOPRANKREPUND -0.074** -0.025* -0.034 -0.047*** -0.062**
(-2.301) (-1.873) (-0.799) (-2.888) (-2.335)
TOPAUDITOR -0.037 -0.007 -0.031 -0.008 0.005
(-1.340) (-0.623) (-1.138) (-0.512) (0.245)
PTINDOFF 0.058* 0.016 0.054 0.018
(2.007) (0.555) (1.337) (0.755)
PTHLTCARE 0.083** 0.020 0.036
(2.286) (1.076) (1.215)
LNSHOFFIPO -0.190* -0.082** -0.151** -0.161** -0.158**
(-1.839) (-2.159) (-2.137) (-2.115) (-3.071)
CORPORD 0.042 0.036** 0.071*** 0.015 -0.011
(1.611) (2.246) (3.104) (0.656) (-0.417)
MARYLAND 0.048** -0.014 0.039 -0.003 0.075*
(2.119) (-0.678) (1.235) (-0.107) (2.242)
NYSE -0.068* 0.028 -0.005 -0.057 -0.086***
(-1.830) (1.640) (-0.153) (-1.600) (-3.450)
D1997 0.057 0.047 -0.094 0.064**
(1.686) (1.453) (-1.419) (2.398)
D2004 0.069*** 0.060* -0.072 -0.025
(5.168) (2.018) (-1.161) (-0.930)
POSTGFC 0.083 0.047 0.084** 0.038
(1.649) (0.894) (2.649) (1.371)
UPREIT -0.025 0.040 0.053***
(-0.960) (1.567) (3.483)
REITTYPE -0.014 0.021
(-0.367) (1.636)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.514 0.501 0.509 0.619 0.911
Adj. R-squared 0.271 0.291 0.187 0.350 0.715
Observations 46 72 59 59 30
The dependent variable is UNDPRICE which is the percentage change in offer price from first-day 
closing market price with respect to offer price, and is averaged at 3.07% with 127 REIT IPOs for the  
period 1996-2010. Specification 1 is for REIT IPOs issued from 1996-1999, specification 2 is for 
those issued from 2001-2010, specification 3 is for those with a real IPO offer size of less than or 
equal to $211 million (median size), specification 4 is for those with a real offer size of greater than 
$211 million and, finally, specification 5 is for 30 REIT IPOs with an offer size greater than $357 
million (the third quartile of offer size in dollars of 2010). UPREIT and REITTYPE are separately 
used in specifications due to higher correlation between them. The variable PTHLTCARE is 
automatically omitted (by STATA) from specifications 4 and 5 due to collinearity and, finally, the 
insignificant dummy variable of property type of industrial/office, PTINDOFF, is excluded from 
specification 5. The other variables are as defined in Table 6.4 in the Appendix. The estimation result 
in the table is reported based on the following OLS regression equation:
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6.4 Conclusion
This chapter presents the OLS multiple regression results and analysis of 
underpricing for the sample of 127 REIT IPOs issued during 1996-2010. The 
analysis follows the prior empirical evidence of REIT IPO underpricing and, more 
particularly, extends the study of Chen and Lu (2006) who report both overpricing 
and underpricing in their two periodical sub-samples of 1980-1989 and 1990-1999,
respectively. The overpricing in the prior sub-period is consistent with the literature 
(Wang, et al., 1992). This study incorporates the explicitly-incurred direct 
underwriting fees and also the non-underwriting other direct expenses in explaining 
the implicitly foregone indirect cost of underpricing, which is an indirect 
compensation to the underwriters (Chen and Ritter, 2000). The incorporation of 
direct costs is important in explaining underpricing because expected underpricing is 
simultaneously predicted while the underwriting fees are determined with the 
underwriters (Chen and Mohan, 2002). Moreover, direct costs also partially 
positively explain underpricing (Dimovski, 2010). IPOs are usually offered below 
the initial day secondary market price to induce uninformed investors and to avoid 
the winner’s curse problem (Baron, 1982; Rock, 1986). Hence, underpricing 
ultimately reduces the net proceeds to the issuing firms, however, the empirical 
evidence indicates it fluctuates over time (Loughran and Ritter, 2004), across 
countries (Boulton, et al., 2011; Engelen and Essen, 2010), across industries 
(Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr., 2003; Ritter, 1984), and even within an industry 
(Helwege and Liang, 2004).
Consistent with Dolvin and Pyles (2009), this study documents offer size as a 
significant determinant of underpricing because it reports some variables strongly 
explain underpricing over increasing offer size. More particularly, it documents 
underwriting fees as complementary (positive) (Chen and Mohan, 2002; Kim, et al.,
2010; Mola and Loughran, 2004) and non-underwriting other direct expenses as 
substitutes to underpricing (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009; Chen and Mohan 2002; 
Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001). Consistent with the certification role and the better 
signaling effects, the hiring of both a top-ranked underwriter representing the 
syndicate and an auditor dominating the REIT IPO market share in the sample (Ernst 
& Young) reduces underpricing. The effect is stronger both economically and 
statistically with larger offer size. Similarly, IPO-issuing firms incorporated under 
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Maryland corporate law, with an umbrella partnership structure, investing in 
industrial/office and healthcare properties, and issued during the post-global financial 
crisis, provide investors with higher initial returns over rising offer proceeds. Due to 
the higher credibility, the larger investor base and the lower trading costs of the 
NYSE, listing on the NYSE signals positive information on the firm which reduces 
adverse selection and, thereby, underpricing. This effect is also economically and 
statistically greater for a larger offer size. IPOs disclosing their intended use of 
proceeds for corporate working capital, leave more money on the table, but those 
with a higher equity offer size relative to the post-IPO outstanding equity, leave 
significantly less money on the table.
After controlling for the inter-temporal variation by incorporating year dummies, the 
study reports a declining trend of underpricing over the sample period, and suggests 
that increasing an equity offering with respect to post-offer outstanding equity 
(Ritter, 1984) and hiring an underwriting syndicate with top-ranked representative 
underwriters can significantly reduce implicitly foregone money on the table through 
underpricing. Moreover, the study also suggests that the uncertainty in the corporate 
objectives of the firm positively influences the underpricing.
The study implies that REIT firms may optimally determine the initial offer size by 
considering both direct underwriting fees and also non-underwriting other direct 
expenses to minimize the underpricing of raising equity capital. The study 
contributes to the REIT IPO literature by providing evidence of the declining trend of 
REIT IPO underpricing, and, more particularly, the significance of the reputation of a 
group of underwriters in the syndicate, the offer size relative to the post-offer 
outstanding equity, and the intended objectives of the investment in determining 
underpricing. It also contributes to the literature with evidence of the significantly 
higher costs of  raising equity capital during the financial recession. Practitioners 
particularly may benefit from the study, especially when hiring an underwriting 
syndicate and an auditor, and also in determining the direct costs.
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Appendix
Table 6.4: Definition of variables used in the underpricing specifications.
Variable Pred.
Sign Definition including uses in previous studies
LNIPOPROCEEDS + Natural logarithm of gross IPO proceeds scaled by U.S. GDP 
deflator in 2010 (Baron, 1982; Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Dolvin 
and Pyles, 2009; Ibbotson, et al., 1994; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997; 
Michaely and Shaw, 1994)
UNDFEES +/- Underwriting fees directly paid to the underwriters as a 
percentage of IPO proceeds (Chen and Mohan, 2002; Chen and 
Lu, 2006; Kim, et al., 2010; Kutsuna and Smith, 2004)
IPODIREXP - Non-underwriting IPO direct expenses as a percentage of total 
IPO proceeds (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009; Chen and Mohan, 
2002; Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001)
TOPRANKREPUND -/+ Dummy variable with value of 1 if average reputation rank of 
representative underwriters as per Carter and Manaster (1990)M
as sourced from Ritter’s homepage (Dunbar, 2000), is equal to 9 
and zero otherwise (Beatty and Welch, 1996; Habib and 
Ljungqvist, 2001; Liu and Ritter, 2011)
TOPAUDITOR - Dummy variable representing unity for auditor differentiated with 
the highest IPO market share during the sample period and zero 
otherwise (Balvers, et al., 1988; Beatty, 1989; Wang and Wilkins, 
2007)
PTINDOFF + Dummy variable with value of 1 if the property type of the IPO 
issuing REIT is industry/office and zero otherwise (Chen and Lu, 
2006; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997)
PTHLTCARE + Dummy variable with value of 1 if the property type of the IPO 
issuing REIT is healthcare and zero otherwise (Brau and 
Heywood, 2008; Chen and Lu, 2006)
LNSHOFFIPO - The log natural of the percentage of shares offered divided by the 
post-IPO total number of shares (Bairagi & Dimovski 2011; 
Chung, et al., 2005; Kaserer and Kraft 2003; Kutsuna and Smith, 
2004; Ritter, 1984)
CORPORD + Dummy variable with 1 for general corporate working capital as 
one of the intended uses of the proceeds and zero otherwise 
(Leone, Rock and Willenborg, 2007; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr., 
2003)
MARYLAND + Dummy variable with value of 1 if the IPO-issuing REIT is 
incorporated in the state of Maryland and zero otherwise 
(Hartzell, et al., 2008)
NYSE - Dummy variable representing unity for IPO-issuing REIT listed 
on the NYSE and zero otherwise (Corwin and Harris, 2001; Kooli 
and Suret, 2002)
YEAR1997 + Dummy variable representing unity for IPOs issued during 1997 
and zero otherwise (Buttimer, et al., 2005)
YEAR2004 + Dummy variable representing unity for IPOs issued during 2004 
and zero otherwise (Buttimer, et al., 2005)
HOTPERIODS + Sum of the dummy variable of D1997 and D2004 (Kaserer and 
Kraft, 2003)
POSTGFC - Dummy variable representing unity for offers issued after August 
2007 (Gordon and Valentine, 2009) and zero otherwise
UPREIT +/- Dummy variable representing 1 for firm with umbrella 
partnership structure and zero otherwise (Chen and Lu, 2006; 
Harrison, Panasian and Seiler, 2011; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997)
REITTYPE + Dummy variable representing unity for equity REIT and zero 
otherwise (Chen and Lu, 2006; Dolvin and Pyles, 2009)
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DIRECT COSTS of SEOs
7.1   Introduction
This chapter presents the analyses using the univariate and OLS multiple regression 
results on the factors determining the total direct costs and their two major 
constituents of underwriting discounts (spreads) and non-underwriting other direct 
expenses of raising equity capital by issuing Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) for 
U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) for the period 1996-2010.
7.1.1 Motivation of the Chapter
As REITs have hardly any tax-based incentive to raise debt capital and must 
mandatorily pay out at least 90% (after implementation of the REIT Modernization 
Act 1999) of their taxable income as dividends to maintain their tax-exempt 
corporate status, they are mostly dependent on the seasoned equity market for their 
growth funding (Ott, Riddiough and Yi, 2005). By visiting the SEO market more 
frequently than industrial firms, REITs may reduce their information asymmetry and, 
hence, their indirect costs through underpricing. Further, as the investors and even 
issuers are able to more efficiently estimate the post-offer stock price for a seasoned 
equity offering, due to its existing value in the prior market and the higher 
transparency of its assets (Cannon and Cole, 2011), one can expect that the total 
direct costs are the major decision-making factors for issuers when they need to go to 
the seasoned equity market. Although the underwriting discount is significantly 
lower for REIT SEOs than for industrial SEOs, it is still a substantial capital loss to 
the SEO-issuing REITs because it soaks up more than 4% of the net proceeds. 
However, the REIT SEO literature reported no empirical evidence on the 
determinants of cross-sectional variation in their total direct costs until the recent 
work by Gokkaya, et al. (2011), who explore only the determinants of direct costs 
paid to the underwriters. Also, the literature to date had reported no empirical 
evidence on the cross-sectional variation of underwriting spreads in industrial SEOs
until Butler, et al.’s (2005) study, which argues substantially more cross-sectional 
variation in underwriting spreads for SEOs than for IPOs. Observation of the scatter 
diagram on underwriting discount and the offer proceeds of this study implicitly 
CHAPTER SEVEN DIRECT COSTS of SEOs
189
explores the cross-sectional variations in REIT SEO underwriting discount, 
indicating that it is substantially stronger than that depicted for industrial SEOs. 
However, the literature still lacks any evidence on the factors determining the cross-
sectional variations of non-underwriting other direct expenses for REIT SEOs. 
This study, therefore, intends to explore the cross-sectional determinants of different 
levels of direct costs with the REIT SEO sample. The study carries significance 
because it extends the existing evidence with more cross-sectional determinants than 
those already used in the finance literature. For example, it incorporates the level of 
underwriting by the representative underwriters (b, 2012; Hansen and Torregrosa, 
1992), the syndicate size (Jeon and Ligon, 2011), the treasury interest rate (Ling and 
Ryngaert, 1997), the state of incorporation (Hartzell, et al., 2008), the industry 
differentiated auditor (Wang and Wilkins, 2007), and the industry differentiated 
underwriter (Liu and Ritter, 2011) in explaining the variations in direct costs. The 
study is also important because it covers the potential effects of the recent global 
financial crisis (GFC) which occurred in August 2007 (Gordon and Valentine, 2009)
due to a sharp downturn in real estate prices in the United States (Laopodis, 2009),
the REIT Modernization Act 1999 (Howe and Jain, 2004) which became effective 
from January 2001, and the start of S&P500 incorporating some of the REITs in its 
index from 2001. This study includes REIT SEOs issued after the occurrence of the 
GFC to detect any significant effect of a real estate-led GFC on the direct costs of 
seasoned equity capital. The REIT Modernization Act 1999 (RMA) was intended to 
affect the liquidity, risk and internally-generated capital. Thus, this study will 
contribute to the literature by exploring the substantial differences in explaining the 
total direct costs and their two major constituents consisting of the underwriting 
discount directly allowed to the underwriters and the non-underwriting other 
expenses directly incurred by the REIT SEO issuers. The extension of some of the 
determinants which are used in explaining the direct and indirect costs of both REIT 
and industrial IPOs and SEOs warrants this significant research. The incorporation of 
these control variables enhances the research’s significance because Loderer, 
Sheehan and Kadlec (1991) suggest that the IPO models can be extended to the SEO 
models, and some of the control variables may differently affect indirect costs and 
direct costs of both IPOs and SEOs (Kim, et al., 2010).
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7.1.2 Findings of the Chapter
The findings of this study report that all levels of the direct costs of REIT SEOs have 
experienced a consistently declining trend over the sample period 1996-2010. This 
declining trend of SEO direct costs is consistent with the evidence of reduced 
industrial SEO underwriting spreads (Kim, et al., 2010). All levels of the direct costs 
are found as a diminishing function of gross SEO offer proceeds, which 
complements the well-documented notion of economies of scale in direct costs with 
respect to the offer proceeds (Bairagi and Dimovski, 2012b; Chen and Ritter, 2000; 
Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Kim, et al., 2010; Lee and Masulis, 2009; Lee, et al., 1996).
The closing higher market price on the day before an offer exogenously reduces the 
risk and uncertainty of the offer while negatively affecting the SEO underwriting 
discount (Gokkaya, et al., 2011; Huang and Zhang, 2011). This negative effect of a 
higher closing market price complements the valuation certainty (Bradley, et al., 
2006), low risk (Beatty and Welch, 1996; Chen and Mohan, 2002), and less difficulty 
(Butler, et al., 2005) in selling such SEOs to institutional investors. The total direct 
costs are significantly lower for SEOs with the higher level of underwriting by the 
representative underwriters. This complements the findings of Bairagi and Dimovski 
(2012b) that the SEO underwriting discount is a negative function of the level of 
representative underwriting, and that IPO underwriting spreads are negatively 
determined by the fraction of shares credited to the managing underwriters (Hansen 
and Torregrosa, 1992).
Moreover, the study reports that SEOs with an umbrella partnership structure (Chen 
and Lu, 2006; Hartzell, Sun and Titman, 2006), which are facilitated by prestigious 
underwriters (Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Lee and Masulis, 2009), and audited by a REIT 
SEO-dominating auditor (Wang and Wilkins, 2007), have at least one SEO during 
the year prior to the offer (Ghosh, et al., 2000; Gokkaya, et al., 2011; Mola and 
Loughran, 2004), have equity ownership of assets (Chen and Lu, 2006) and are 
incorporated in the management-friendly state of Maryland (Hartzell, et al., 2008),
incur significantly lower total direct costs. 
The study also documents that the total direct costs are significantly higher for SEOs 
with a larger offer size relative to the prior outstanding shares (Corwin, 2003), with a 
larger syndicate size (Corwin and Schultz, 2005; Jeon and Ligon, 2011), with a REIT 
CHAPTER SEVEN DIRECT COSTS of SEOs
191
SEO-dominating underwriter (Butler, et al., 2005; Liu and Ritter, 2011), and with a 
multiple book-managing underwriter (Jeon and Ligon, 2011). The distributional 
efficiency of the larger syndicate size makes the relationship quadratic with total 
direct costs, that is, the total direct costs initially increase with syndicate size but, 
after a certain level, the total direct costs tend to decline with rising syndicate size 
(Jeon and Ligon, 2011).
Further, the study finds that the non-underwriting other direct expenses of SEOs are 
significantly lower for REITs which have raised seasoned equity at least once during 
the year prior to the offer, have hired a Merrill Lynch-led REIT SEO-dominating 
underwriting syndicate, and have traded on the NYSE. However, REITs with equity 
ownership in assets have a significant positive effect on the non-underwriting other 
direct expenses. The higher other direct expenses for SEOs with equity ownership of 
assets could be attributed to the more active management required for an equity 
REIT than for a mortgage REIT. 
Overall, the findings of the study document that SEO offer proceeds are a critical 
determinant of the total direct costs. The structure of the underwriting syndicate 
particularly the reputation, participation and size, significantly determines the total 
direct costs. The structure (operating and ownership structure) and state of 
incorporation are also appear to significantly influence the total direct costs of raising 
equity capital. After controlling for the time fixed effects, the study finds no 
significant effect of the real estate-led recent global financial crisis and the REIT 
Modernization Act 1999 on the total direct costs of raising seasoned equity capital. 
The findings of the study also suggest that the total direct costs of raising seasoned 
equity capital for REITs are not a trivial portion of total proceeds, and can be 
minimized by controlling the size of the proceeds to be raised and by more carefully 
selecting the underwriting syndicate. The results are, thus, targeted to be beneficial 
for the issuers and also for the subscribing investors.
7.1.3 Structure of the Chapter
The chapter provides a brief overview of the underwriting costs of SEOs in Section 
7.2, followed by a preliminary analysis with descriptive statistics and graphical 
presentation in Section 7.3. Section 7.4 analyses and compares the OLS multiple 
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regression results with empirical evidence of factors determining the different levels 
of direct costs. Section 7.5 presents the analysis of factors determining the level of 
underwriting by the representative underwriters. Section 7.6 summarizes the findings 
and, finally, Section 7.7 concludes the chapter with policy implications.
7.2   Underwriting Costs of SEOs
The widely-used underwriting process involves the firm commitment efforts of 
underwriters which allow them to buy an SEO from an issuer at an offer price 
discount to compensate them for their risk-bearing services. 
7.3   Preliminary Analysis
This section presents and briefly discusses the preliminary findings of the study, with 
descriptive statistics, univariate relationships between the levels of total direct costs, 
and their key determinants and graphical presentations. 
7.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 7.1 presents the descriptive statistics which report that the total direct costs, 
underwriting discount and non-underwriting other direct expenses average 4.63%, 
4.17% and 0.46%, respectively. The SEO offer proceeds in dollars of 2010 
(seoproceeds), the closing market price per share on the day prior to the offer 
(priormktprice), the level of representative underwriting (reprundwriting), the offer 
size relative to the outstanding shares prior to the offer (reloff), the yields on ten-year 
U.S. treasury bonds (tenyrtrsint), the number of total underwriters in the 
underwriting syndicate (numtotund) and the average reputation rank of lead 
underwriters (undrank), average $157 million, $24.96, 80.49%, 20.77%, 4.73%, 6.11 
and 7.91, respectively. 
The table also shows that 39.62% of SEOs, on average, have more than one book-
managing underwriter (multbookmngrs), 31.62% have a REIT SEO-dominating 
auditor (Ernst &Young) (topauditor), 45% have raised seasoned equity at least once 
during the year prior to the current offer (preseo), 80.87% are equity type (reittype), 
62.62% are of UPREIT structure (upreit), 89.25% are listed on the NYSE for trading 
(nyse), 19.88% have a Merrill Lynch-led underwriting syndicate (merrill), 51% use 
internal management (selfmgt), 19.75% have investments in property types of 
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industrial/office (ptoffind), 80% are incorporated under Maryland corporate laws 
(maryland), 23.62% were issued after bursting of the global financial crisis (postgfc), 
and 69.50% were issued after the REIT Modernization Act 1999 (postrma). The 
Pearson correlation coefficients of yields on ten-year treasury bonds are significantly
negatively associated with both postgfc (-0.65) and postrma (-0.80).
Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics of major explanatory and indicator (dummy) variables used in 
the analysis of factors determining the direct costs of raising equity capital for 800 U.S. REIT 
SEOs during 1996-2010.
Variable Q1 Mean Q2 Q3 min max sd sk kurt
directcosts % 4.15 4.63 5.10 5.54 0.13 11.06 1.76 -0.59 3.57
unddisc % 4.00 4.17 4.75 5.12 0.00 7.64 1.52 -1.21 3.42
seodirexp % 0.18 0.46 0.30 0.53 0.00 5.88 0.52 3.81 26.36
seoproceeds $in ml 58.88 157 97.84 179.18 2.35 1991 185 3.64 22.89
priormktprice $ 14.25 24.96 22.78 31.88 2.70 136.81 15.24 2.33 14.13
repundwritng% 65.00 80.49 85.66 100.00 16.00 100.00 21.83 -0.79 2.49
reloff% 6.21 20.77 12.84 25.16 0.17 330.24 27.36 5.36 49.98
tenyrtrsint% 3.94 4.73 4.59 5.55 2.40 7.01 1.09 0.18 2.27
numtotund 1.00 6.11 4.00 8.00 1.00 50.00 6.96 2.45 10.63
undrank 7.00 7.91 8.00 9.00 0.00 9.00 1.37 -2.05 9.49
multbookmngrs% 0.00 39.62 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 48.94 0.42 1.18
topauditor % 0.00 31.62 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 46.53 0.79 1.62
preseo % 0.00 45.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 49.78 0.20 1.04
reittype % 100.00 80.87 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 39.35 -1.57 3.47
upreit % 0.00 62.62 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 48.41 -0.52 1.27
nyse % 100.00 89.25 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 30.99 -2.53 7.42
merrill % 0.00 19.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 39.93 1.51 3.28
selfmgt % 0.00 51.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 50.02 -0.04 1.00
ptoffind % 0.00 19.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 39.84 1.52 3.31
maryland % 100.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 40.03 -1.50 3.25
postgfc % 0.00 23.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 42.50 1.24 2.54
postrma % 0.00 69.50 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 46.07 -0.85 1.72
Where Q1, Q2, min, max, sd, sk and kurt denote first quartile, second quartile, third quartile, 
minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis, respectively. directcosts, unddisc 
and seodirexp denote direct costs, underwriting discounts (spreads) and non-underwriting direct 
expenses as a percentage of SEO proceeds in dollars of 2010, respectively. The variables are as 
defined in Table 7.8 in the Appendix.
7.3.2 Univariate Analysis
The univariate relationships between major explanatory variables and the total direct 
costs and their two major constituents are presented in Table 7.2. The table consists 
of three panels presenting the total direct costs, underwriting discount and SEO non-
underwriting other direct expenses in panels A, B and C, respectively. Each panel 
reports the average costs of seven explanatory variables from their lowest to highest 
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quartile. The table shows that both the total direct costs and the underwriting 
discount constantly decline as SEO offer proceeds (seoproceeds), closing market 
price on the day prior to the offer (prirormktprice), level of representative 
underwriting (repundwriting), and average reputation rank of lead underwriters 
(undrank) increase from the lowest to highest quartile. Similarly, SEO non-
underwriting other direct expenses decline across the lowest to highest quartile of 
SEO proceeds (seoproceeds) and closing market price on the day prior to the offer 
(priormktprice). The average costs in each of the panels consistently increase over 
the quartiles with rising relative offer size (reloff). It indicates that the larger offer 
size relative to the outstanding equity on the day prior to the offer creates more 
placement pressure (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Huang and Zhang, 
2011) for both underwriters and issuers to market the offer.
The average costs of SEOs over four quartiles of the number of total underwriters in 
the syndicate show that the issuing costs experience an increasing trend up to the 
third quartile in panels A and B, and up to the second quartile in panel C and, 
thereafter, the average costs increase slightly in the fourth quartile of panels A and B, 
and the third and fourth quartile in panel C. It suggests that the syndicate size may 
have a quadratic effect on SEO issuing costs and, more particularly, the rising 
syndicate size up to a level may raise the issuing costs. Thereafter, however, the 
larger syndicate may contribute to reduce the issuing costs due to the effects of 
distributional efficiency. Underwriter reputation rank has no consistent linear effect 
on SEO non-underwriting other direct expenses. Similarly, yields on the ten-year 
U.S. Treasury bonds (tenyrtrsint) have no linear effect on the direct costs. 
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Table 7.2: Univariate relationship between dependent variables and some of the explanatory 
variables of raising equity capital for 800 U.S. REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
Panel A
Direct Costs as a percentage of 
SEO Proceeds
Lowest Q2 Q3 Highest
seoproceeds 5.05 4.72 4.48 4.35
priormktprice 5.43 4.93 4.50 3.60
repundwritng 5.09 5.22 4.09 4.03
reloff 3.73 4.16 4.80 5.78
numtotund 3.48 4.95 5.27 5.21
undrank 5.03 4.74 4.35 4.21
tenyrtrsint 4.25 4.13 5.28 5.44
Panel B
Underwriting Discounts as a 
percentage of SEO Proceeds
Lowest Q2 Q3 Highest
seoproceeds 4.41 4.20 4.10 4.08
priormktprice 4.78 4.43 4.10 3.36
repundwritng 4.67 4.70 3.66 3.58
reloff 3.41 3.80 4.39 5.07
numtotund 3.09 4.41 4.78 4.77
undrank 4.39 4.30 3.98 3.84
tenyrtrsint 3.97 3.73 4.62 4.87
Panel C
Non-Underwriting Direct Expenses as 
a percentage of SEO Proceeds
Lowest Q2 Q3 Highest
seoproceeds 0.69 0.52 0.38 0.27
priormktprice 0.65 0.55 0.40 0.24
repundwritng 0.41 0.53 0.40 0.46
reloff 0.33 0.37 0.43 0.72
numtotund 0.41 0.55 0.49 0.44
undrank 0.65 0.44 0.34 0.39
tenyrtrsint 0.30 0.41 0.67 0.57
The variables are as defined in Table 7.8 in the Appendix.
7.3.3 Graphical Presentation of Direct costs
The scatter diagrams of the total direct costs and the level of representative 
underwriting (repundwriting), SEO gross proceeds in dollars of 2010, offer size 
relative to the outstanding shares on the day prior to the offer, the average rank of 
lead underwriters and the total number of underwriters are depicted in Figures 7.1 to 
7.6, respectively, to complement the univariate relationship between these two 
variables. The fitted values of the scatter diagrams consistently support the univariate 
relationship between the direct costs and the reported explanatory variables. 
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Figure 7.1: Scatter diagram between the total direct costs (directcosts) and the level of representative 
underwriting (repundwriting) for 800 REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
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Figure 7.2: Scatter diagram between the total direct costs (directcosts) and the SEO proceeds in dollars 
of 2010 (seoproceeds) for 800 REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
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Figure 7.3: Scatter diagram between the total direct costs (directcosts) and the SEO offer size relative 
to the outstanding shares on the day prior to the offer (reloff) for 799 REIT SEOs duirng 1996-2010.
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Figure 7.4: Scatter diagram between the total direct costs (directcosts) and the average underwriting 
rank of lead underwriters (undrank) for 800 REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
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Figure 7.5: Scatter diagram between the total direct costs (directcosts) and the number of total 
underwriters in the underwriting syndicate (numtotund) for 800 REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
Figure 7.6 following shows the year-wise longitudinal linear presentation of the total 
direct costs for 800 REIT SEOs during 1996-2010. The figure shows that the total 
direct costs experienced a declining trend during the period, with 2001 and 2004 
experiencing, on average, the highest and the lowest, respectively.
Figure 7.6: Year-wise longitudinal presentation of the total direct costs (directcosts) for 800 REIT 
SEOs during 1996-2010.
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7.4   Regression Analysis
This section consists of four OLS multiple regression tables with discussion on the 
structure of analysis followed by a brief analysis of the results found in the 
regressions. The OLS regression results are used to predict the individual marginal 
contribution of each variable in explaining the variation in the total direct costs and 
their two major constituents. 
Table 7.3 presents the OLS regression results on the total direct costs consisting of 
the underwriting discount and the non-underwriting other direct expenses. Similarly, 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 present the individual analysis of the direct costs particularly on 
the underwriting discount and the non-underwriting other direct expenses. Finally, 
Table 7.7 reports the regression results on factors determining the level of 
representative underwriting.
7.4.1 Structure of the Analysis
Table 7.3 consists of five specifications with the total direct costs as a percentage of 
the gross proceeds as the dependent variable. After adjusting for the missing data of 
some control variables in the SEO prospectuses, the complete adjusted observations 
in specifications 1 to 3 become 799, 798 and 791 out of 800 total observations in 
Tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5, respectively. Specification 3 in each of the three tables 
excludes two dummy variables of postgfc and postrma due to their close association 
with yield on ten-year treasury bonds (tenyrtrsint) (Pearson correlation between 
postgfc and tenyrtrsint is -0.65 with p<0.001 and between postrma and tenyrtrsint is -
0.80 with p<0.001). Specifications 4 and 5 in each of these three tables exclude the 
dummy variables of tenyrtrsint along with postgfc and postrma, due to their close 
correlation. Further, specifications 4 and 5 of these three tables are for those SEOs 
raising proceeds less than or equal to the third quartile, and greater than the third 
quartile, respectively, of proceeds scaled in dollars of 2010 based on the U.S. GDP 
deflator.
To control for any time fixed effect on dependent variables, each of the regression 
specifications except specification 1 in all the tables, incorporates year dummies, 
however, their coefficients and heteroskedasticity consistent robust t-statistics are not 
specifically reported. Each OLS regression specification reports heteroskedasticity 
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consistent robust t-statistics in the parenthesis beneath the corresponding coefficient. 
The bottom three rows of each specification consecutively report the number of 
included observations, R-square and Adjusted R-square. The variables used in all 
four regression tables are defined with references in Table 7.8, however, the short 
definition of each variable is accompanied at the bottom of each table. 
7.4.2 Analysis of Results
7.4.2.1 Determinants of Total Direct Costs
Table 7.3 reports that the logarithm of SEO offer size (lnseoproceeds), the logarithm 
of the closing market price per share on the day prior to the offer (lnpriormktprice), 
and the indicator variable for the SEO-issuing firm with at least one SEO during the 
year prior to the offer (preseo), significantly negatively determine the total direct 
costs consisting of the underwriting discount and the non-underwriting SEO other 
direct expenses. 
The coefficient of the natural logarithm of SEO proceeds strongly suggests that the 
total direct costs enjoy the popular wisdom of economies of scale with respect to the 
proceeds raised. These results are consistent with prior evidence of SEO total direct 
costs (Lee, et al., 1996) and, more particularly, of the underwriting spread (Butler, et 
al., 2005; Chen and Ritter, 2000; Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Lee and Masulis, 2009).
These results are robust because incorporation of the quadratic function of offer 
proceeds in the regressions (not reported) confirms this. The economic significance 
of lnseoproceeds in specifications 4 (offer size is less than or equal to the third 
quartile of proceeds) and 5 (offer size is greater than the third quartile of proceeds)
reveals that the effect of offer size is higher for smaller offer proceeds, and lower for 
very large offer proceeds. Further, the statistical significance in terms of robust t 
statistics is higher for smaller offer proceeds. These findings support the expectation 
of Bhagat and Frost (1986) and Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) that the direct costs 
decrease sharply for smaller offerings, and slowly for larger offerings due to the 
inherent diversifiable unsystematic risk.
An inspection of the data reveals that the average offer price and the average closing 
market price the day before SEO offer are $24.53 and $24.96, respectively. The use 
of the logarithm of these two prices in the regressions do not significantly alter 
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statistical significance. Following prior SEO literature, this study used the logarithm 
of the prior closing market price of the stock in all regression specifications, and the 
results show that the stock price of an SEO-issuing REIT significantly reduces the 
direct costs. The results also show that the effect is economically stronger and well-
pronounced for the SEOs raising less proceeds. This is consistent with Butler, et al.’s
(2005) finding with industrial SEOs that lower priced SEO stock is difficult to place 
with institutional investors and less informational asymmetries for more expensive 
REIT shares (Gokkaya et al, 2011). This finding suggests that higher priced stocks
reflect the quality and the certainty of the firm REIT.
This study has used the percentage of underwriting by the representative 
underwriters because they underwrite a relatively large proportion (80% in this case) 
of the offer, and sometimes both lead and representative underwriters equally 
underwrite the offer. Lead underwriters are always included in the list of 
representative underwriters and may need to incur some sunk costs in seeking out 
investors and processing transactions. As their costs are similar to other market 
makers, they enjoy some economies of scale with volume. Hence, they may take into 
account both the uncertainty of the pricing of the offer and the level of underwriting 
in the offer to reap the benefit of economies of scale. Therefore, they tend to 
underwrite a larger portion of the more certain offers, and vice versa. To control for 
the effect of the level of underwriting on the total direct costs, this study incorporated 
the logarithm of a percentage of shares underwritten by the underwriters who 
represent the underwriting syndicate in dealing with the issuer and dealers. The 
descriptive statistics (Table 7.1) of the sample reveal that the level of representative 
underwriting averages 80%, ranging from 16% to 100%. The univariate relation of 
the logarithm of the percentage of representative underwriting with the total direct 
costs, after incorporating time fixed effect, is negative and statistically significant 
with p<0.01 (robust |t| is 9.35). The OLS multiple regression results report a
statistically significant negative coefficient of the variable LNREPUNDWRITING in 
all the specifications except with larger offer proceeds. In addition, both the 
economical and the statistical significance of this variable are stronger in the 
specifications with smaller offer proceeds.
Thus, the result indicates that the level of the representative underwriting strongly 
negatively determines the total direct costs for REIT SEOs. This finding is consistent 
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with Corwin and Schultz’s (2005) report that the book-managing underwriter will 
refuse to allow multiple book managers in a syndicate unless s/he gets sizable 
allocations, and also with Jeon and Ligon’s (2011) finding that underwriting spreads 
increase with multiple book-managing underwriters. However, larger offers usually 
engage more underwriters and, in that case, the allocation for representative 
underwriters may decrease. It is, thus, consistent with the literature that prestigious 
underwriters demand higher spreads for larger offers (Beatty and Welch, 1996). This 
supports the positive coefficient for the very large offer proceeds.
This study has used the relative offer size to control for the effect of price pressure 
on the total direct costs of raising seasoned equity. As the relative offer size 
adversely affects the uncertainty costs of adverse selection and placement pressure, 
underwriters of REIT SEOs may face difficulty in placing SEOs with a relatively 
larger offer size. This is particularly relevant for REIT SEOs because REITs are 
extremely dependent on seasoned equity due to the mandatory requirement of 90% 
income distribution. The descriptive statistics of this study reveal (Table 7.1) that the 
relative offer size varies from 0.17% to 330% with a standard deviation of 27%. The 
univariate relationship between the total direct costs and the logarithm of the relative 
offer size is positive and highly significant with robust |t| of 10.94. The OLS multiple 
regression specifications in total direct costs report positive coefficients of the 
logarithm of the relative offer size with p<0.01. The effect is less pronounced with 
larger offer proceeds but consistent with the placement pressure hypothesis of 
Corwin (2003).
Consistent with the univariate results, the OLS regression coefficient of 
TENYRTRSINT in the total direct costs is significantly positive in the specification 
without the year fixed effect. However, after controlling for the year fixed effects, 
the direction of the coefficient switches from positive to negative. This finding 
suggests that the treasury yield is an insignificant determinant of the total direct 
costs. This finding is inconsistent with Bairagi and Dimovski (2012b) who document 
interest on ten-year treasury securities as a significant positive determinant of SEO 
underwriting discount. This study attributes this inconsistency to the time variant 
effect of the treasury yield which is uncontrolled in Bairagi and Dimovski (2012b).
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The extensive evidence of both IPOs and SEOs shows that the reputation of the lead 
underwriter(s) reflects the quality and information asymmetry of the issuing firm, 
because the issues facilitated by the prestigious underwriters are larger, less risky and 
are issued by established firms (Carter and Manaster, 1990). Jeon and Ligon (2011)
and Lee and Masulis (2009) report underwriter reputation to have significant 
negative effects on the SEO underwriting spread. Butler, et al. (2005) posit that well-
reputed underwriters may earn substantial reputational rents from SEO underwriting 
because they may work harder for an SEO to make the issue successful. Butler, et al. 
(2005), however, report an insignificant positive effect of underwriter reputation on 
the SEO underwriting spread.
The regression results of this study report a significant negative coefficient of lead 
underwriter reputation (UNDRANK). This is in sharp contrast to the significant 
positive coefficient of the REIT SEO underwriting spread found by Gokkaya, et al. 
(2011). This study attributes this contrast to the different sample periods in these two 
studies. This might also be the effect of the declining competition between 
underwriters for underwriting spread over time (Liu and Ritter, 2011). The greater 
economic significance of the underwriter’s reputation for larger SEO proceeds in 
specification 5 reinforces the notion that very reputable underwriters prefer larger 
and less risky REIT SEOs to competitively charge lower spread. 
A number of studies assume an imperfectly competitive underwriting industry in 
explaining capital raising costs (Hoberg, 2007). To detect any cost difference for 
hiring a top-ranked industry-dominating underwriter, this study has used a dummy 
variable, with 1 for a Merrill Lynch-led underwriting syndicate and 0 otherwise, 
because Merrill Lynch has underwritten the largest share of the REIT SEOs in terms 
of the proceeds. Inspection of this data reveals that Merrill Lynch-led underwriting 
syndicates underwrite nearly 30% of the gross SEO proceeds by underwriting nearly 
20% of SEOs. The regression results report a significant positive coefficient for the 
dummy variable of Merrill. This result supports the existence of an industry-
differentiated underwriter in REITs which can earn premium rent for their reputation 
and market power. The lower economic significance in specification of larger 
proceeds suggests that the differentiated underwriters dominate small proceed issues. 
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the average total direct costs for SEOs 
underwritten by the Merrill Lynch-led syndicates are significantly higher than the
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overall sample average (4.52% vs 4.17%), and these costs are also higher for smaller 
proceeds than for larger proceeds (4.57% vs 4.52%).
Inspection of REIT SEO sample shows that around 6% of the sample SEOs have an 
underwriting syndicate with more than one book-manager. The OLS multiple 
regression results report that the coefficient of the dummy variable of 
multbookmngrs (with 1 if the syndicate has more than one book-manager and zero 
otherwise) is positive and statistically significant, with p<0.01 in specifications 
except specification 5. This finding suggests that an additional book-managing 
underwriter in the syndicate influences the total direct costs for REIT SEOs.
To control for the distributional effect of a larger syndicate, the specifications of this 
study incorporate both the number of total underwriters and the square of the number 
of total underwriters. The results show that the coefficients of the number of total 
underwriters are positive and statistically significant, with p<0.01. It suggests that 
additional underwriters, irrespective of their role in the syndicate, positively affects 
the total direct costs. Consistent with the expectation that the larger offers tend to 
include more underwriters to reduce the risk of an unsuccessful distribution, the 
regression specification with larger offer proceeds reports relatively higher economic 
significance of the syndicate size for the total direct costs.
The significant negative coefficient of the logarithm of the square of the number of 
total underwriters suggests that the relation of the total direct costs with the number 
of total underwriters is actually quadratic. This finding is consistent with the 
evidence of quadratic relations of underwriting spreads and the number of co-
managers reported, as reported by Jeon and Ligon (2011) with industrial company 
SEOs. These findings suggest that the number of underwriters in the syndicate is a 
positive function of offer proceeds and positively determines the total direct costs, 
particularly for larger REIT SEOs.
This study has used Ernst & Young as the top-ranked REIT-dominating auditor in 
terms of market share with respect to the adjusted proceeds in dollars of 2010, 
because the data reveal that Ernst & Young conduct audits for nearly 32% of SEOs 
in number, and 34% in proceeds. The theory and empirical evidence predict that the 
hiring of a differentiated and prestigious auditor may affect the direct costs of raising 
equity capital through affecting information asymmetry and auditing costs. The 
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direction of such effect, however, may depend on the degree and type of 
differentiation. To control for the effect of hiring an industry-dominating auditor, this 
study has used a dummy variable of topauditor with 1 for Ernst & Young and 0 for 
other audit firms. A significant negative coefficient of topauditor suggests that the 
SEO issuers can reduce the total direct costs by hiring an industry-dominating 
auditor. This may be attributable to the effect of the reputation and reliability of the 
financial statements prepared and audited by the REIT SEO-dominating auditor.
Pre-SEO is an indicator variable with value 1 if the SEO-issuing REIT has raised 
seasoned equity at least once during the year prior to the current SEO. Underwriters 
can better predict investors’ behavior for issuers which visit the seasoned equity 
market more frequently. The descriptive statistics report that, on average, 45% of the 
SEO-issuing REITs have raised seasoned equity at least once during the year prior to 
the current SEO. The univariate relationship between the dummy variable PRESEO 
and the total direct costs with year fixed effect is significantly negative (robust |t| of 
3.70). The OLS multiple regressions report significant negative coefficients in 
specifications except for those with larger offer proceeds. The regression results also 
report a greater economic significance of the coefficient for the offers with smaller 
proceeds. Hence, the results suggest that the REITs raising equity capital more 
frequently from the seasoned equity market can reduce their costs of capital through 
disseminating information in prior SEOs.
To detect the effect of the global financial crisis on the total direct costs of raising 
equity capital, this study has incorporated the dummy variable POSTGFC, with a 
value of 1 for SEOs issued after August 2007, in specifications 1 and 2. The results 
report that the effect of POSTGFC is time variant, however, indicate no significant 
effect on the direct costs after controlling for the time fixed effect.
The data set reveals that 63% of the SEOs have an UPREIT structure and the total 
direct costs for these SEOs (501 SEOs) average 4.43%, compared with 4.95% for 
other REIT SEOs (299 SEOs) with |t| statistics of 4.10. To detect the marginal effect 
of an UPREIT structure on the total direct costs, this study uses the dummy variable  
UPREIT, with 1 if the REIT is an umbrella partnership structure and 0 otherwise. 
The results report that the coefficient of the dummy variable of UPREIT is negative 
and significant at less than 1% in all the specifications other than those with larger 
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offer proceeds for the total direct costs. These findings are consistent with Chen and 
Lu’s (2006) lower discount for SEOs with an UPREIT structure. 
To determine the marginal effect of REIT ownership type on the total direct costs, 
this study uses the dummy variable REITTYPE with 1 for equity REIT and zero 
otherwise. The marginally significant negative coefficient of this dummy variable in 
specification with larger SEOs suggests the existing valuation effect of the stock 
prices of the secondary market which requires less marketing efforts by underwriters. 
Inspection of the data reveals that 89% of the SEOs are traded on the NYSE, and the 
average total direct costs of these SEOs are significantly lower than those of the 
Nasdaq and Amex-listed SEOs (4.48% vs 5.76%, with t statistics of 6.57). The OLS 
multiple regression results report significantly lower total direct costs for SEOs with 
larger offer proceeds. Overall, NYSE, as a trading exchange, significantly negatively 
determines the total direct costs for larger REIT SEOs.
This study has used the dummy variable MARYLAND to find the effects of the state 
of incorporation on the total direct costs. The findings of the regression results report 
negative coefficients of MARYLAND and also show that the coefficient is strongly 
significant, both economically and statistically, in the specification of SEOs with 
smaller offer proceeds. This result supports the notion that the underwriters might 
need less marketing effort for REIT SEOs incorporated in Maryland, which is a 
management-friendly state, and that underwriters are more knowledgeable about 
Maryland corporate laws (Hartzell, et al., 2008).
The regression results report an insignificant coefficient of the dummy variable 
selfmgt, with value 1 for SEOs with self-management and 0 otherwise except for the 
specifications of 2 and 3. These two specifications report the marginal significance of 
the coefficient, and show an insignificant coefficient of the dummy variable if upreit 
is excluded from these two specifications (which has a relatively higher correlation 
with selfmgt). However, the magnitude of the coefficient is negative in the 
specification of larger SEOs. This result is consistent with Ambrose and Linneman’s 
(2001) finding that after controlling for the size and the property sector effect, 
internally-advised REITs enjoy an insignificant advantage.
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To control for the effect of property type, this study uses the dummy variable 
ptoffind, with the binary value of 1 if the REIT has a portfolio of assets in 
industrial/office property and 0 otherwise. The study has based the NAREIT 
classification of REITs into different property types. The data in this study show that 
nearly 20% of the REIT SEOs have investment in industrial/office property, and this 
sector raises significantly larger average SEO proceeds of $182 million against $151 
million by other sectors, with |t| of 1.88 on difference. The data also show that the 
total direct costs for the industrial/office property type are significantly lower than 
those of other property types, with |t| of 2.26 (4.34% against 4.69%). The regression 
results indicate that the REITs with investment in industrial/office property incur 
lower total direct costs for SEOs with larger proceeds.
To control for the effect of the REIT Modernization Act 1999, this study 
incorporates the dummy variable POSTRMA, using 1 for SEOs issued after 2000 
and 0 otherwise in explaining all levels of direct costs. The regression results report 
that the effect is negative but is time variant because, after incorporating the time 
fixed effects, the level of significance disappears. Hence, this study documents that 
the total direct costs of raising seasoned equity capital for REITs have not been 
significantly reduced as expected after enactment of RMA1999.
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Table 7.3: Regression results of factors influencing total direct costs of raising external equity 
capital for U.S. REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES directcosts directcosts directcosts directcosts directcosts
lnseoproceeds -0.0057*** -0.0052*** -0.0052*** -0.0063*** -0.0037***
(-7.740) (-7.086) (-7.117) (-4.923) (-2.657)
lnpriormktprice -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001**
(-4.415) (-4.329) (-4.334) (-3.831) (-2.249)
lnrepundwriting -0.0055*** -0.0064*** -0.0064*** -0.0089*** 0.0015
(-3.608) (-3.958) (-3.981) (-4.529) (0.618)
lnreloff 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0034*** 0.0017
(4.777) (4.765) (4.767) (4.220) (1.408)
tenyrtrsint 0.1677* -0.0339 -0.0342
(1.846) (-0.280) (-0.286)
multbookmngrs 0.0028*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0034*** 0.0008
(2.728) (3.086) (3.103) (2.868) (0.411)
lnnumtotund 0.0080*** 0.0080*** 0.0080*** 0.0077*** 0.0111***
(9.370) (9.327) (9.343) (7.774) (7.219)
lnnumtotundsqr -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(-6.061) (-5.908) (-5.914) (-5.781) (-4.383)
undrank -0.0018*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0011** -0.0036***
(-4.347) (-3.500) (-3.503) (-2.441) (-4.111)
topauditor -0.0025*** -0.0020** -0.0020** -0.0018 -0.0015
(-2.675) (-2.107) (-2.116) (-1.539) (-1.027)
preseo -0.0031*** -0.0032*** -0.0032*** -0.0037*** -0.0006
(-3.531) (-3.710) (-3.713) (-3.541) (-0.489)
reittype -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0057**
(-0.287) (-0.421) (-0.424) (0.151) (-2.494)
upreit -0.0041*** -0.0035*** -0.0035*** -0.0040*** -0.0012
(-3.811) (-3.344) (-3.348) (-3.345) (-0.624)
nyse -0.0034* -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0017 -0.0061**
(-1.810) (-1.643) (-1.645) (-0.805) (-2.281)
merrill 0.0040*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0028** 0.0023*
(4.053) (3.145) (3.147) (2.009) (1.834)
selfmgt 0.0015 0.0016* 0.0016* 0.0018 -0.0003
(1.569) (1.708) (1.710) (1.588) (-0.237)
ptoffind -0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0026*
(-1.642) (-1.070) (-1.076) (-0.328) (-1.850)
maryland -0.0019* -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0028** -0.0002
(-1.691) (-1.432) (-1.434) (-2.093) (-0.106)
postgfc -0.0029** 0.0001
(-2.116) (0.057)
postrma -0.0095*** -0.0045
(-4.602) (-0.694)
Constant 0.0934*** 0.0997*** 0.0887*** 0.1065*** 0.0946***
(12.761) (9.245) (8.549) (11.318) (8.596)
Observations 799 799 799 600 199
R-squared 0.560 0.592 0.592 0.589 0.758
Adj. R-squared 0.548 0.574 0.575 0.566 0.713
The table consists of 5 OLS multiple regression specifications to determine the individual effect of 
factors determining the total direct costs of raising equity capital for U.S. Real Estate Investment 
Trusts with a sample of 800 Seasoned Equity Offerings for a period of 15 years from 1996 to 2010. 
The dependent variable is the total direct costs which average 4.63%. Specification 1 is with the full 
sample observations, specification 2 is with the full sample observations but incorporates year fixed 
effect, and specification 3 excludes two dummy variables of postgfc and postrma because of their 
collinearity with tenyrtrsint. Specifications 4 and 5 exclude postgfc, postrma and tenyrtrsint, however, 
specification 4 is for SEOs with offer proceeds (in dollars of 2010) less than or equal to third quartile 
proceeds of $179.18 million, and specification 5 is for SEOs with offer proceeds of greater than 
$179.18 million.
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Heteroskedasticity consistent robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote level of 
significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. The other variables are as defined in Table 7.8
in the Appendix. The results in the table are based on the following OLS specification:
GLUHFWFRVWV ȕ1OQVHRSURFHHGVȕ2OQSULRUPNUSULFHȕ3OQUHSXQGZULWLQJȕ4OQUHORIIȕ5tenyrtrsint 
                  ȕ6PXOWERRNPQJUVȕ7lnnumtotuQGȕ8OQQXPWRWXQGVTUȕ9WRSDXGLWRUȕ10preseo
                  ȕ11UHLWW\SHȕ12XSUHLWȕ13Q\VHȕ14XQGUDQNȕ15PHUULOOȕ16VHOIPJWȕ17ptoffind
                  ȕ18PDU\ODQGȕ19SRVWJIFȕ20postrma İ…………………. (2)
7.4.2.2 Determinants of Underwriting Discount
Table 7.4 reports that the logarithm of SEO proceeds (lnseoproceeds), the SEO price 
per share on the day before the offer (lnpriormktprice), and the level of 
representative underwriting (lnrepundwriting) significantly negatively determine the 
underwriting discount. The lower underwriting discount for larger SEOs is 
inconsistent with Gokkaya et al. (2011) but supports the notion of economies of scale 
which leads underwriters to charge lower discount for larger proceeds due to the 
fixed components of some of their underwriting efforts and expenses. The lower 
underwriting discount charged for higher priced stocks is consistent with the quality 
and certainty of the firm for higher priced stocks (Chen and Mohan, 2002). This also 
supports Butler et al.’s (2005) argument that small priced stocks are difficult to sell 
to institutional investors. This finding is consistent with Bairagi and Dimovsi’s 
(2012b) lower underwriting discount for higher priced REIT SEOs. 
The significant lower underwriting discount for higher level of representative 
underwriting is consistent with Bairagi and Dimovski’s (2012b) REIT evidence. The 
inspection of the data reveals that the level of representative underwriting is 100% 
for 44% of SEOs (352/800) and results in an underwriting discount of 3.58%. The 
underwriting discount averages 3.12% for the level of representative underwriting of 
100% with offer proceeds larger than the third quartile. Similarly, the underwriting 
discount averages 4.40% for the level of representative underwriting less than 100% 
with the offer proceeds larger than the third quartile. This investigation of the data 
confirms that representative underwriters demand lower underwriting discounts if 
they can underwrite the entire offer. This is also consistent with the evidence of 
industrial SEOs that managing underwriters demand higher level of underwriting to 
include additional underwriters in the syndicate (Corwin and Schultz, 2005).
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The significant negative coefficient of the dummy variable of topauditor suggests 
that the reliability of financial statements auditied by the REIT SEO dominating 
auditor motivates the underwriters to demand lower discount. Similarly, the 
significant negative coefficient of underwriter reputation (undrank) is consistent with
higher quality and less information asymmetry of the issuing firms, because 
prestigious underwriters facilitate larger, less risky and established firms (Carter and 
Manaster, 1990). This result is also consistent with lower spreads for industrial SEOs 
documented in Jeon and Ligon (2011) and Lee and Masulis (2009).
The significant negative coefficient of Maryland incorporated SEOs (Maryland) 
reflects the underwriters’ expertise developed over underwriting REITs incorporated 
in Maryland. As more REITs are incorporated in Maryland, underwriters become 
well familiar with corporate law and litigation risk. 
The significant positive coefficient of the logarithm of relative offer size (lnreloff) is 
consistent with the price pressure hypothesis of Corwin (2003) and suggests that 
underwriters demand higher discounts for relatively larger REIT SEOs. 
The empirical evidence of SEO underwriting shows a mixed effect of multiple book-
managing underwriters on underwriting spreads. Consistent with the conjecture that a 
large number of underwriters in the syndicate raises the underwriting spreads, Jeon 
and Ligon (2011) report increased underwriting spreads for industrial SEOs with 
multiple book-managing underwriters. Butler, et al. (2005), however, document 
reduced underwriting spreads for SEOs with multiple book-managing underwriters
and argue that coordination of the multiple book-managers can more efficiently 
manage the selling and underwriting syndicates than a single-book manager. Around 
6% SEOs of this sample are underwritten by syndicates having multiple book-
managers and these syndicates charge significantly higher underwriting discounts
with respect to both the overall sample (4.59% vs 4.17%) with t statistics of 4.20, and 
those with small offer proceeds (4.43% vs 4.17%) with t-statistics of 3.95. The 
significant negative coefficient of the dummy variable for multiple book managers 
(multbookmngrs) confirms that REITs need to allow higher discounts for SEOs 
hiring underwriting syndicate with multiple book-managers.
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The significant positive and negative coefficient of the logarithm of number of total 
underwriters (lnnumtotund) and the logarithm of square of number of total 
underwriters (lnnumtotundsqr), respectively suggest that larger underwriting 
syndicates demand higher discounts but they demand lower discount after adding a 
certain number of underwriters. This finding is consistent with the evidence of 
quadratic relations of underwriting spreads and the number of co-managers, as 
reported by Jeon and Ligon (2011) with industrial company SEOs.
The significantly lower underwriting discount for REITs frequently raising seasoned 
equity capital might be ascribed to the lower information asymmetry due to the 
dissemination of more information during prior SEOs (Ghosh, et al., 2000; Goodwin, 
2008; Mola and Loughran, 2004).
The significant negative coefficient of the dummy variable UPREIT supports the
Chen and Lu’s (2006) lower discount for SEOs with an UPREIT structure. The 
significant negative coefficient of the dummy variable REITTYPE reflects the less 
marketing effort required by underwriters because equity stocks are already priced in 
the market. The significant negative coefficient of the NYSE in the last specification 
suggests that underwriters could demand lower discounts due to the effect of more 
certainty for larger SEOs and broader investor base of the NYSE. 
REITs managed by own employees, holding industrial/office properties, issued 
during the post global financial crisis (GFC) and after the post modernization era do 
not significantly affect underwriting discounts.
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Table 7.4: Regression results of factors influencing underwriting discounts (spreads) of raising 
external equity capital for 800 U.S. REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES unddisc unddisc unddisc unddisc unddisc
lnseoproceeds -0.0038*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0039*** -0.0028**
(-5.976) (-5.335) (-5.366) (-3.513) (-2.311)
lnpriormktprice -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001**
(-4.367) (-4.254) (-4.264) (-3.434) (-2.348)
lnrepundwriting -0.0057*** -0.0065*** -0.0065*** -0.0094*** 0.0015
(-4.472) (-4.831) (-4.850) (-6.072) (0.597)
lnreloff 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0009
(3.318) (3.260) (3.260) (2.832) (0.847)
tenyrtrsint 0.1611** -0.0320 -0.0334
(2.046) (-0.307) (-0.324)
multbookmngrs 0.0031*** 0.0034*** 0.0034*** 0.0034*** 0.0013
(3.419) (3.739) (3.767) (3.417) (0.732)
lnnumtotund 0.0073*** 0.0072*** 0.0072*** 0.0069*** 0.0107***
(9.564) (9.550) (9.573) (7.833) (7.511)
lnnumtotundsqr -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(-5.653) (-5.394) (-5.399) (-5.852) (-3.755)
topauditor -0.0026*** -0.0020** -0.0020** -0.0018* -0.0015
(-3.021) (-2.395) (-2.397) (-1.657) (-1.144)
preseo -0.0014* -0.0016** -0.0016** -0.0017* -0.0002
(-1.815) (-2.064) (-2.065) (-1.845) (-0.163)
reittype -0.0021* -0.0023* -0.0023* -0.0019 -0.0062***
(-1.721) (-1.911) (-1.929) (-1.384) (-2.899)
upreit -0.0035*** -0.0029*** -0.0029*** -0.0031*** -0.0014
(-3.787) (-3.273) (-3.281) (-2.998) (-0.833)
nyse -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0011 -0.0044*
(-0.477) (-0.213) (-0.209) (0.664) (-1.834)
undrank -0.0015*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** -0.0009** -0.0030***
(-4.302) (-3.380) (-3.376) (-2.433) (-4.034)
merrill 0.0043*** 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0034*** 0.0023*
(4.706) (4.186) (4.186) (2.853) (1.935)
selfmgt 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 0.0002
(1.494) (1.518) (1.520) (1.274) (0.185)
ptoffind -0.0017* -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0021
(-1.754) (-1.141) (-1.136) (-0.353) (-1.616)
maryland -0.0020** -0.0016* -0.0016* -0.0029** 0.0001
(-1.972) (-1.658) (-1.663) (-2.434) (0.022)
postgfc -0.0016 0.0006
(-1.309) (0.267)
postrma -0.0088*** -0.0013
(-5.073) (-0.356)
Constant 0.0726*** 0.0760*** 0.0709*** 0.0672*** 0.0812***
(11.709) (9.654) (8.204) (7.539) (8.300)
Observations 798 798 798 599 199
R-squared 0.538 0.575 0.575 0.566 0.763
Adj. R-squared 0.526 0.557 0.557 0.542 0.719
The table consists of 5 OLS multiple regression specifications to determine the individual effect of 
factors determining the underwriting discounts (spreads) of raising equity capital for U.S. Real Estate 
Investment Trusts with a sample of 800 Seasoned Equity Offerings for a period of 15 years from 1996 
to 2010. The dependent variable is the underwriting discount which averaged 4.17%. Specification 1 
is with full sample observations, specification 2 is with full sample observations but incorporates year 
fixed effect, and specification 3 excludes two dummy variables of postgfc and postrma because of 
their collinearity with tenyrtrsint. Specifications 4 and 5 exclude postgfc, postrma and tenyrtrsint,  
however, specification 4 is for SEOs with offer proceeds (in dollars of 2010) less than or equal to the 
third quartile proceeds of $179.18 million, and specification 5 is for SEOs with offer proceeds of 
greater than $179.18 million.
CHAPTER SEVEN DIRECT COSTS of SEOs
213
Heteroskedasticity consistent robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote level of 
significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. The other variables are as defined in Table 7.8
in the Appendix. The results in the table are based on the following OLS specification:
XQGGLVF ȕ1OQVHRSURFHHGVȕ2OQSULRUPNUSULFHȕ3OQUHSXQGZULWLQJȕ4OQUHORIIȕ5tenyrtrsint 
              ȕ6PXOWERRNPQJUVȕ7OQQXPWRWXQGȕ8OQQXPWRWXQGVTUȕ9WRSDXGLWRUȕ10preseo
              ȕ11UHLWW\SHȕ12XSUHLWȕ13Q\VHȕ14XQGUDQNȕ15PHUULOOȕ16VHOIPJWȕ17ptoffind
              ȕ18PDU\ODQGȕ19SRVWJIFȕ20postrma İ…………………. (2)
7.4.2.3 Determinants of Non-Underwriting Other Direct Expenses
Table 7.5 reports the logarithm of SEO proceeds (lnseoproceeds) and the logarithm 
of SEO offer price prior to the offer (lnpriormktprice) are significantly negatively 
related to the non-underwriting expenses directly incurred by the issuers. The former 
is due to the fixed portion of these expenses which results in economies of scale with
larger proceeds (Ritter, 1987; Lee et al., 1996; Corwin and Harris, 2001) while the 
latter is due to the valuation certainty and less difficulty in placing higher priced 
stocks (Chen and Mohan, 2002; Butler et al., 2005). These findings contribute to the 
literature that REITs like other industrial SEOs also enjoy economies of scale and 
less difficulty of raising seasoned equity by larger SEOs and higher priced stocks, 
respectively. The negative coefficient of PRESEO, NYSE and MERRILL suggest 
REITs frequently raising seasoned equity, traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
and underwritten by Merrill Lynch or Merrill Lynch led underwriting syndicate 
require issuers to incur less SEO related expenses. Lower expenses for SEOs visiting 
equity market more frequently prior to the current one might be attributed to the less 
information asymmetry for such SEOs, lower expenses for SEOs traded on the 
NYSE might be ascribed to the larger investor base and higher liquidity of the NYSE 
(Corwin and Harris, 2001) and lower expenses for SEOs underwritten by Merrill 
Lynch suggest that issuers might need less promotional effort due to the expertise of 
Merrill Lynch.
The table also reports that multiple book managing underwriters do not affect SEO 
related other expenses and that these expenses are positively driven by higher 
relative offer size and larger syndicate. The positive effect of relative offer size might 
be attributed to the higher promotional effort of issuers raising relatively larger 
proceeds. The insignificant coefficient of lnnumtotundsqr suggests that the syndicate 
size has no quadratic effect on SEO related expenses.  
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Table 7.5: Regression results of factors influencing non-underwriting direct expenses of raising 
external equity capital for 800 U.S. REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES seodirexp seodirexp seodirexp seodirexp seodirexp
lnseoproceeds -0.0021*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0027*** -0.0010**
(-9.780) (-9.176) (-9.196) (-7.055) (-2.579)
lnpriormktprice -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0001
(-2.238) (-2.057) (-2.057) (-2.870) (-1.134)
lnreloff 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0007**
(5.475) (5.044) (5.049) (4.184) (2.588)
multbookmngrs -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0005
(-0.600) (-0.436) (-0.465) (-0.132) (-0.930)
lnnumtotund 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0006 0.0005*
(1.988) (2.010) (2.010) (1.590) (1.756)
lnnumtotundsqr -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001**
(-0.936) (-1.139) (-1.141) (-0.262) (-2.389)
preseo -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0021*** -0.0004
(-5.499) (-5.402) (-5.408) (-5.232) (-1.109)
reittype 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0019*** 0.0002
(2.873) (2.928) (2.941) (3.169) (0.284)
upreit -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0003
(-1.296) (-1.070) (-1.061) (-1.545) (0.632)
nyse -0.0028*** -0.0028*** -0.0028*** -0.0027** -0.0022**
(-2.718) (-2.714) (-2.726) (-2.198) (-2.319)
merrill -0.0005* -0.0007* -0.0007* -0.0009* -0.0001
(-1.688) (-1.904) (-1.905) (-1.781) (-0.376)
selfmgt 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0006
(0.480) (0.722) (0.718) (0.967) (-1.418)
maryland 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002
(0.522) (0.491) (0.498) (0.515) (-0.365)
postgfc -0.0012*** -0.0006
(-3.697) (-0.877)
postrma -0.0007 0.0009
(-1.459) (1.000)
Constant 0.0205*** 0.0180*** 0.0180*** 0.0231*** 0.0099***
(14.635) (10.936) (10.960) (8.864) (3.807)
Observations 791 791 791 592 199
R-squared 0.329 0.346 0.346 0.352 0.396
Adj. R-squared 0.316 0.322 0.323 0.321 0.301
The table consists of 5 OLS multiple regression specifications to determine the individual effect of 
factors determining the SEO other direct expenses of raising equity capital for U.S. Real Estate 
Investment Trusts with a sample of 800 Seasoned Equity Offerings for a period of 15 years from 1996 
to 2010. The dependent variable in all of the specifications is the SEO non-underwriting other direct 
expenses as a dependent variable average 0.46%. All specifications incorporate year fixed effect 
except specification 2, specification 2 is with full sample observations but incorporated year fixed 
effect, and specification 3 excludes two dummy variables of postgfc and postrma because of their 
collinearity with tenyrtrsint. Specifications 4 and 5 exclude postgfc, postrma and tenyrtrsint,  however, 
specification 4 is for SEOs with offer proceeds (in dollars of 2010) less than equal to third quartile 
proceeds of $179.18 million, and specification 5 is for SEOs with offer proceeds of greater than 
$179.18 million.
Heteroskedasticity consistent robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote level of 
significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. The other variables are as defined in Table 7.8
in the Appendix. The results in the table are based on the following OLS specification:
VHRGLUH[S ȕ1OQVHRSURFHHGVȕ2OQSULRUPNUSULFHȕ3OQUHORIIȕ4multbookmngrs 
                  ȕ5OQQXPWRWXQGȕ6OQQXPWRWXQGVTUȕ7SUHVHRȕ8UHLWW\SHȕ9upreit 
                  ȕ10Q\VHȕ11PHUULOOȕ12VHOIPJWȕ13PDU\ODQGȕ14SRVWUPDȕ15postrma İ ….(3)
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7.5   Determinants of the level of Representative Underwriting
This section presents the factors determining the level of representative underwriting, 
which is the percentage of shares underwritten by the underwriters who represent the 
syndicate in dealing with issuers and dealers. Like the level of underwriting by the 
syndicate managers (Hansen and Torregrosa, 1992), this level is also the fraction 
allocated to the syndicate members who represent the syndicate. The underwriting 
section of the prospectus specifically mentions the members representing the 
syndicate and usually the representative underwriters are positioned on the top of the 
list. Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) report syndicate managers, on average, 
underwrite 37% of total shares offered and this fraction significantly negatively 
determines the underwriting spreads. 
This study reports that the level of representative underwriting averages 80%, 
ranging from 16% to 100%, and significantly negatively determines the total direct 
costs and particularly the underwriting discount. This section presents the univariate 
relationship between the level of representative underwriting and some of the 
explanatory continuous variables in Table 7.6 and the marginal effect through OLS 
regressions in Table 7.7. This study expects that the level of underwriting by the 
representative underwriters is a function of both the level of certainty and the 
competition for the offers.
Table 7.6: Univariate relationship between the level of representative underwriting 
(repundwriting) and some of the explanatory variables of raising equity capital for 800 U.S. 
REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
Panel A
The level of representative underwriting 
as a percentage of total shares offered
Lowest Q2 Q3 Highest
seoproceeds 90% 83% 77% 73%
priormktprice 75% 82% 83% 82%
reloff 87% 80% 78% 77%
numtotund 100% 80% 72% 64%
numrepund 83% 71% 78% 88%
The variables are as defined in Table 7.8 in the Appendix.
Table 7.7 consists of 5 specifications on factors determining the level of 
representative underwriting. Each of the 5 specifications except specification 1 
adjusted the year fixed effect by incorporating year dummies. Specification 2 is 
similar to specification 1 except for incorporating year dummies. Specifications 3 
and 4 are for SEOs raising proceeds equal to or less than the third quartile, and 
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greater than the third quartile of SEO proceeds in dollars of 2010, respectively 
(Corwin and Schultz, 2005). Specification 5 is for SEOs with a level of 
representative underwriting of less than 1.
The regression results show that the coefficient of the logarithm of real offer 
proceeds in all the specifications is negative but significant in specifications 1, 2 and 
5. Specification 5 is for 446 SEOs with the level of representative underwriting less 
than 1 (100%). It indicates that the fraction of shares assigned to representative 
underwriters significantly declines as offer size increases, and it is very pronounced, 
both economically and statistically, for SEOs with the level of representative 
underwriting less than 1 or 100%. These findings support the expectation that 
representative underwriters reduce their placement risk by allocating shares to other 
non-representative underwriters for larger SEOs.
The significant positive coefficient of the logarithm of the closing market price of an 
SEO-issuing REIT prior to the offer is consistent with the certainty related to the 
offer price. As institutional investors may be the larger subscribers for SEO shares 
and they shun the small price stock (Butler, et al., 2005), representative underwriters 
may prefer the larger fraction of such SEOs. Both the economic and statistical 
significance of this variable in specification 4, which is for larger offer proceeds, also 
support that the larger offer size might have a higher offer price (Chen and Mohan, 
2002). The inspection of data supports this expectation and shows that the closing 
market price prior to the offer is relatively large for SEOs with a larger offer size 
($28.90 against an overall average of $24.96).
The negative coefficient of multiple-book-managers (multbookmngrs) implies that 
the fraction of shares underwritten by the representative underwriters declines if the 
SEOs have more than one book-managing underwriter. It is consistent with the 
expectation that the book-managing underwriters, who do not represent the 
syndicate, demand sizable allocations to participate as book-manager (Corwin and 
Schultz, 2005).
The number of the total underwriters and the representative underwriters in all the 
specifications are significantly negative and positive, respectively. There is another 
significant effect. If there are more members of both categories in the syndicate, on 
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the level of representative underwriting, it indicates that the representative 
underwriters retain larger allocations. Similarly, the level of representative 
underwriting decreases with increased syndicate size to attract the participation of 
non-representative underwriters who also need minimum allocations. 
The significant negative coefficients of the dummy variables of equity REIT type 
(reittype), Merrill Lynch-led syndicate (merrill), Maryland incorporation (maryland) 
and REIT Modernization Act 1999 (postrma), indicate that the representative 
underwriters take lower allocations for SEOs with equity type property, which are 
underwritten by a Merrill Lynch-led syndicate, incorporated in Maryland and were 
issued after the introduction of the REIT Modernization Act 1999. 
The negative coefficient of the equity REIT may be attributed to there being less 
certainty in the rental income of tangible assets in equity REITs. The negative 
coefficient of the dummy variable of Merrill may be attributed to the relatively larger 
offer proceeds and syndicate size for SEOs underwritten by Merrill Lynch led 
syndicates. Inspection of data confirms this because the averages of both the offer 
proceeds ($240 million against $157 million) and the number of total underwriters 
(10.10 against an overall average of 6.20) are greater than the overall sample 
average. The negative coefficient of Maryland and postrma may be attributed to the 
intention of underwriters to competitively participate in SEOs incorporated in 
Maryland and issued after the adoption of the REIT Modernization Act.
The coefficients of the dummy variable of umbrella partnerships (upreit) and 
property type of industrial/office (ptoffind) are positive and marginally significant. 
The positive coefficient of UPREIT structure might be attributed to the lower 
liquidity risk and higher investor attraction (Chen and Lu, 2006), and the lower 
acquisition costs of properties (Harrison, Panasian and Seiler, 2011; Hartzell, Sun 
and Titman, 2006). Similarly, the positive coefficient of the dummy variable of 
ptoffind may be attributed to the better underlying performance of the 
industrial/office property REITs (Gokkaya, et al., 2011). The dummy variable of the 
NYSE is incorporated in the model to control for the notion that the representative 
underwriters might want to retain a larger fraction of the shares of SEOs listed on the 
NYSE due to its depth and broader investor base. The magnitude of the coefficient 
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supports the notion, but its statistical significance indicates that the trading exchange 
has no significant effect in explaining the level of representative underwriting.
The dummy variable of PRESEO representing unity for at least one SEO during the 
year prior to the offer, has no effect on explaining the level of representative 
underwriting. However, the significant coefficient of the logarithm of the offer size 
relative to the outstanding shares prior to the offer (lnreloff), in the specification of 
the level of representative underwriting of less than 100%, might be attributed to the 
fact that the syndicates underwriting SEOs with a relatively larger offer size are 
comprised of more representative underwriters.
Overall, the statistical significance of the marginal effect of explanatory variables 
used in explaining the level of underwriting by the representative underwriters, 
suggests that the offer size and the number of total underwriters significantly 
negatively determines the level of underwriting by representative underwriters. The 
representative underwriters want lower levels of allocations for SEOs of equity type, 
incorporated in Maryland, issued after the introduction of the REIT Modernization 
Act 1999 and underwritten by a Merrill Lynch-led syndicate. Similarly, they want 
more allocations for SEOs with an umbrella partnership structure and 
industrial/office property type.
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Table 7.7: OLS multiple regression results of factors influencing the level of representative 
underwriting in raising equity capital for 800 U.S. REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES repundwriting repundwriting repundwriting repundwriting repundwriting
lnseoproceeds -0.0112* -0.0101* -0.0042 -0.0177 -0.0281***
(-1.940) (-1.788) (-0.484) (-0.969) (-3.267)
lnpriormktprice 0.0004* 0.0005* 0.0002 0.0009*** 0.0006
(1.741) (1.878) (0.487) (2.624) (1.162)
lnreloff 0.0022 0.0004 -0.0024 -0.0002 0.0228**
(0.448) (0.078) (-0.374) (-0.015) (2.452)
multbookmngrs -0.0248** -0.0261** -0.0341** -0.0025 -0.0012
(-2.241) (-2.149) (-2.288) (-0.142) (-0.076)
lnnumtotund -0.2241*** -0.2231*** -0.2214*** -0.2213*** -0.1307***
(-35.012) (-34.006) (-26.046) (-21.084) (-11.182)
lnnumrepund 0.2667*** 0.2651*** 0.2609*** 0.2787*** 0.2611***
(22.217) (21.896) (16.328) (16.095) (15.315)
preseo -0.0055 -0.0075 -0.0108 0.0016 -0.0163
(-0.690) (-0.905) (-1.067) (0.114) (-1.407)
reittype -0.0346** -0.0370*** -0.0390** -0.0213 -0.0697***
(-2.539) (-2.645) (-2.375) (-0.771) (-3.721)
upreit 0.0174* 0.0139 0.0156 0.0176 0.0400***
(1.832) (1.528) (1.373) (1.073) (2.880)
nyse 0.0040 0.0061 0.0015 0.0121 0.0277
(0.258) (0.378) (0.076) (0.482) (1.358)
merrill -0.0127 -0.0187* -0.0349** 0.0130 -0.0313**
(-1.133) (-1.711) (-2.235) (0.843) (-2.347)
ptoffind 0.0155* 0.0166* 0.0210* 0.0065 0.0040
(1.670) (1.815) (1.773) (0.421) (0.255)
maryland -0.0235*** -0.0210** -0.0198* -0.0131 -0.0342**
(-2.670) (-2.313) (-1.781) (-0.746) (-2.297)
postrma -0.0196* -0.0917** -0.0704* -0.0040 0.0302
(-1.665) (-2.202) (-1.795) (-0.059) (0.429)
Constant 1.0433*** 1.0838*** 1.0719*** 0.9641*** 0.9118***
(34.944) (25.959) (20.802) (8.032) (11.028)
Observations 799 799 600 199 446
R-squared 0.762 0.770 0.736 0.852 0.597
Adj. R-squared 0.757 0.762 0.723 0.829 0.571
The table consists of 5 OLS multiple regression specifications to determine the individual effect of 
factors determining the level of representative underwriting for U.S. REITs with the sample of 800 
Seasoned Equity Offerings for a period of 15 years from 1996 to 2010. Specification 1 is with full 
sample observations; specification 2 is with full sample observations except incorporating year fixed 
effect; and specifications 3 and 4 are for SEOs with offer proceeds less than or equal to the third 
quartile proceeds of $179.18 million and for SEOs with offer proceeds of greater than $179.18 million 
(in dollars of 2010); and specification 5 is with the level of representative underwriting 
(repundwriting) less than 1.
Heteroskedasticity consistent robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote level of 
significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. The other variables are as defined in Table 7.8
in the Appendix. The results in the table are based on the following OLS specification:
UHSXQGZULWLQJ ȕ1OQVHRSURFHHGVȕ2OQSULRUPNUSULFHȕ3OQUHORIIȕ4multboomngrs 
                           ȕ5OQQXPWRWXQGȕ6OQQXPUHSXQGȕ7SUHVHRȕ8UHLWW\SHȕ9upreit 
                        ȕ10Q\VHȕ11PHUULOOȕ12SURIILQGȕ13maryland 
                             ȕ14postrma İ…..(4)
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7.6   Findings
The major findings of the study are summarized as follows:
a) The total direct costs, consisting of both the underwriting discount and the 
non-underwriting other direct expenses, experienced a declining trend over 
the sample period and enjoyed economies of scale with size of SEO proceeds 
in both real and nominal dollars. Both the levels of underwriting discount and 
the non-underwriting other direct expenses also experienced a declining trend 
and enjoyed economies of scale with SEO proceeds.
b) The certainty effect of the closing market price on the day before an SEO 
negatively determines the three levels of direct costs.
c) The level of representative underwriting negatively determines the total direct 
costs by affecting underwriting discounts (Bairagi and Dimovski, 2012b; 
Hansen and Torregrosa, 1992).
d) The effect of the number of total underwriters in the underwriting syndicate is 
quadratic on the total direct costs, and particularly on the underwriting 
discount, that is, the average total direct costs initially increase with syndicate 
size but, ultimately, decrease with rising syndicate size after a certain level 
(Jeon and Ligon, 2011).
e) The offer size relative to the firm size prior to the offer positively affects the 
placement pressure of the offer and, hence, all levels of direct costs 
(Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Huang and Zhang, 2011).
f) Multiple book-managing underwriters positively influence the total direct 
costs, and particularly the underwriting discount (Gao and Ritter, 2010; Jeon 
and Ligon, 2011).
g) Issuers pay a lower underwriting discount to underwriters, but incur higher 
non-underwriting other direct expenses for equity type REIT SEOs.
h) The direct costs are significantly lower for SEOs with higher-ranked 
underwriters, which are audited by a top auditor, have raised seasoned equity 
capital at least once during the year prior to the offer, are listed on the NYSE, 
and are incorporated under Maryland corporation law.
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i) The total direct costs and the underwriting discount are lower for SEOs with 
UPREIT structure due to the lower liquidity risk (Chen and Lu, 2006) and the 
lower acquisition costs of a property (Harrison, Panasian and Seiler, 2011).
j) A Merrill Lynch-led underwriting syndicate positively influences the total 
direct costs of raising equity capital for SEOs. This might be attributed to the 
higher underwriting discount demanded by the Merrill Lynch group as 
compensation for their reputation capital. However, the study finds 
significantly lower non-underwriting other expenses directly incurred by the 
issuer for such SEOs.
k) The level of representative underwriting is determined by the offer size, offer 
price, syndicate size, REIT organizational structure and the incorporation law 
of the REIT.
7.7   Conclusion
This study documents the declining trend of the total direct costs of raising equity 
capital for 800 REIT SEOs during the period 1996 to 2010. The study confirms the 
well-established wisdom of economies of scale in all levels of direct costs with 
respect to the offer proceeds. The study is particularly important because REITs need 
to visit the seasoned equity market more frequently to fund their growth
opportunities from equity capital, due to their inhibited source of internally-generated 
capital. Consistent with prior evidence (Chen and Lu, 2006; Dolvin and Pyles, 2009),
offer proceeds are documented as a key determinant of SEO direct expenses. A 
relatively larger offer size significantly raises all levels of direct costs.
Further, offer proceeds are found to have a multiplier effect on the total direct costs 
because the level of representative underwriting, which is a negative function of 
gross offer proceeds, significantly negatively determines the total direct costs. The 
limitations of accumulating internal capital due to the mandatory distribution of most 
of the taxable income as dividends to the shareholders, makes REITs visit the 
seasoned equity market more frequently than their industrial counterparts. This 
frequent visiting of the seasoned equity market reduces the information asymmetry 
when evaluating tangible assets. The reduced information asymmetry results in more 
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transparency and efficiency in evaluating REIT SEO prices. The direct costs of 
raising seasoned equity are not substantially less in REIT SEOs with respect to 
industrial SEOs (Butler, et al., 2005; Gokkaya, et al., 2011; Jeon and Ligon, 2011; 
Lee, et al., 1996). Hence, the direct costs, particularly the total direct costs, are a 
major decision-making factor for REIT issuers in evaluating any new project or 
funding growth opportunities. 
Furthermore, the SEO literature shows more cross-sectional variations in SEO 
underwriting spreads in comparison to those of IPOs, which have a clustering of 
spreads at certain percentages (Butler, et al., 2005; Chen and Ritter, 2000). The study 
of the total direct costs of REIT SEOs, thus, warrants research significance. The 
literature so far reports two studies on determinants of REIT SEO underwriting 
discount (Bairagi and Dimovski, 2012b; Gokkaya, et al., 2011). This study is based 
on and extends the works of Bairagi and Dimovski (2012b) by incorporating a 
number of relevant but new explanatory variables, and covering the cross sectional 
variation separately in total direct costs and non-underwriting other direct expenses. 
It also complements some of the findings of Gokkaya, et al. (2011).
The study reports that the equally-weighted total direct costs, underwriting discount 
and non-underwriting other direct expenses, as a percentage of gross proceeds, 
average 4.63%, 4.17%, and 0.46%, respectively. The study covers the recent global 
financial crisis (GFC) period which was caused by the bankruptcy of many financial 
institutions due to a sharp downturn in real estate values (Laopodis, 2009). The study 
also incorporates the post-REIT modernization period, which reduces the systematic 
risk, and increases both the liquidity and the internal sources of capital. Since their 
inception, REITs have passed a number of structural changes in their regulations 
which might affect the underwriting evaluation and, hence, the underwriting spreads 
(Chen and Lu, 2006). After controlling for the time fixed effects, the findings report 
that the total direct costs are not significantly changed after eruption of the GFC and 
effectiveness of the REIT Modernization Act 1999.
Beyond the SEO offer size, REIT characteristics and underwriting syndicate 
structure are documented to have different effects on the levels of direct costs. More 
particularly, the market price prior to the offer significantly negatively determines all 
levels of direct costs due to its inherent certainty effect on subscribing investors. This 
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certainty effect of higher-priced stock is also attributed to the positive influence of 
the level of underwriting activities by the representative underwriters. Consistent 
with the reduced information asymmetry for REITs which frequent visit the seasoned 
equity market, the study documents that the direct costs of SEO issuers are 
significantly less for REITs which have visited the seasoned equity market at least 
once during the year prior to the SEO. The certification effect of a REIT SEO-
dominating auditor (Ernst &Young), the tax advantage of an umbrella partnership 
structure, and the management-friendly state of Maryland negatively determine the 
different levels of REIT SEO direct costs. The direct costs also vary across REIT 
type and trading exchange. Particularly, the underwriting discount is significantly 
lower, but non-underwriting other direct expenses are significantly higher for SEOs 
with equity ownership of assets. The liquidity effect of the NYSE may require 
issuers to incur significantly lower non-underwriting other direct expenses.
The total direct costs are less for SEOs using well-reputed lead underwriters. This is 
consistent with the certification role of reputable underwriters. However, the study 
also documents that the total direct costs are significantly higher for SEOs using a 
Merrill Lynch-led underwriting syndicate which dominates the REIT SEO 
underwriting market during this sample period. Beyond the reputation of the lead and 
dominating underwriters, the study also documents that the size of both book-
managing and all underwriters can influence the levels of direct costs. More 
specifically, it documents significantly more total direct costs for SEOs with multiple 
book-managing underwriters with quadratic relations between syndicate size and 
underwriting discount (Jeon and Ligon, 2011).
The findings suggest that the direct costs of raising equity capital can be minimized 
by strategically determining offer size, offer price, and by choosing the underwriting 
syndicate. The study will benefit the managers of REITs, particularly those intending 
to raise seasoned equity capital. The study will contribute to their making decisions 
on issue size, choosing an underwriting syndicate and also on some of the non-
underwriting other direct expenses. 
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Appendix
Table 7.8: Definition of variables used in the regression specifications of Direct Costs of SEOs
Variable Exp 
Sign Definition and references
DIRECTCOSTS Total direct costs consisting of underwriting discount and non-
underwriting other direct expenses as a percentage of gross SEO 
proceeds (Butler, et al., 2005; Lee and Masulis, 2009; Lee, et al., 
1996; Mola and Loughran, 2004; Ritter, 1987)
UNDDISC Underwriting discount (spreads) as a percentage of gross SEO 
proceeds (b, 2012; Butler, et al., 2005; Chemmanur, Paeglis and
Simonyan, 2010; Chen and Ritter, 2000; Gao and Ritter, 2010; 
Huang and Zhang, 2011; Mola and Loughran, 2004)
SEODIREXP SEO non-underwriting other direct expenses as a percentage of 
gross SEO proceeds (Butler, et al., 2005; Chemmanur, Paeglis and 
Simonyan, 2010; Lee and Masulis, 2009; Lee, et al., 1996; Mola 
and Loughran, 2004)
LNSEOPROCEEDS - Natural logarithm of gross SEO proceeds in the dollar of 2010 
(Bairagi and Dimovski, 2012b; Barry, et al., 1991; Butler, et al.,
2005; Chemmanur, Paeglis and Simonyan, 2010; Chen and Lu, 
2006; Chen and Ritter, 2000; Ibbotson, et al., 1994; Jeon and 
Ligon, 2011; Lee and Masulis, 2009; Lee, et al., 1996; Ling and 
Ryngaert, 1997)
LNPRIORMKTPRICE - Natural logarithm of market price prior to the offer (Beatty and 
Welch, 1996; Bradley, et al., 2006; Butler, et al., 2005; Corwin and 
Schultz, 2005; Huang and Zhang, 2011; Kutsuna, et al., 2008; 
Mola and Loughran, 2004; Smith, 1977)
LNREPUNDWRITING - Natural logarithm of the proportion of shares underwritten by the 
underwriters who represent the underwriting syndicate (Bairagi 
and Dimovski, 2012b; Hansen and Torregrosa, 1992)
LNRELOFF + The natural logarithm of the proportion of shares offered in SEO 
relative to the number of shares outstanding prior to the offer 
(Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Huang and Zhang, 
2011)
TENYRTRSINT + Yields of 10-year U.S. Treasury Bonds during the month of issuing 
SEO (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997)
UNDRANK - Average reputation rank of lead underwriters as per Carter and 
Manaster (1990) and sourced from Ritter’s homepage (Butler, et 
al., 2005; Dunbar, 2000; Jeon and Ligon, 2011)
MULTBOOKMNGRS +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs with more than one 
book-managing underwriter and zero otherwise (Butler, et al.,
2005; Gao and Ritter, 2010; Jeon and Ligon, 2011)
LNNUMTOTUND - Natural logarithm of the number of total underwriters in the 
underwriting syndicate (Carter and Dark, 1990; Corwin and 
Schultz, 2005; Jeon and Ligon, 2011)
LNNUMTOTUNDSQR - Natural logarithm of square of the number of total underwriters in 
the underwriting syndicate (Jeon and Ligon, 2011)
NUMREPUND The number of representative underwriters in the syndicate
TOPAUDITOR - Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs audited by a REIT 
dominating auditor in terms of the highest market share in the 
industry during the sample period and zero otherwise (Beatty and 
Welch, 1996; Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Mayhew and Wilkins, 
2003; Wang and Wilkins, 2007)
PRESEO +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs with at least one 
SEO during the year immediately prior to the offer (Ghosh, et al.,
2000; Mola and Loughran, 2004)
REITTYPE + Dummy variable representing unity for SEO with equity REIT and 
zero otherwise (Chen and Lu, 2006; Dolvin and Pyles, 2009)
POSTGFC +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs issued after 
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beginning of global financial crisis in August 2007 and zero 
otherwise (Gordon and Valentine 2009)
NYSE - Dummy variable representing unity for SEO issuing REIT listed 
on the NYSE and zero otherwise (Affleck-Graves, et al., 1993; 
Butler, et al., 2005; Corwin and Harris, 2001; Kooli and Suret, 
2002)
UPREIT - Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs with umbrella 
partnership structure and zero otherwise (Chen and Lu, 2006; 
Dolvin and Pyles, 2009; Ghosh, et al., 2000; Goodwin, 2008; 
Harrison, Panasian and Seiler, 2011; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997)
MERRILL +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs with an underwriting 
syndicate led by Merrill Lynch group and zero otherwise 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Dunbar, 2000; Puri, 1999);
SELFMGT +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs with internal 
management and zero otherwise (Gokkaya, et al., 2011)
PTINDOFF +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs with property type of 
industrial/office in their asset and zero otherwise (Ghosh, et al.,
2000; Gokkaya, et al., 2011; Goodwin, 2008)
MARYLAND +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEO issuing REIT 
incorporated in Maryland and zero otherwise (Daines, 2001; 
Hartzell, et al., 2008; Kahan and Kamar, 2000)
POSTRMA +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs issued after 2000 
because REIT Modernization Act 1999 became effective from 
January 2001 and zero otherwise (Howe and Jain, 2004)
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CHAPTER EIGHT
INDIRECT COSTS of SEOs
8.1   Introduction
This chapter investigates the indirect costs53 of raising seasoned equity capital for 
U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT) with a sample of 800 Seasoned Equity 
Offerings (SEOs) issued during the period 1996-2010. More particularly, this chapter 
presents the analyses using the univariate OLS multiple and tobit regression results 
on the factors determining the indirect costs of raising seasoned equity capital for 
U.S. REITs during the sample period. The demonstration of Loderer, et al. (1991)
assumes that, under market efficiency, offer price should be lower than offer-day 
closing market price but higher than the pre-offer closing market price, because 
investors do not need to pay any brokerage commission.
The SEO literature confirms indirect costs are substantially present and increasing 
over time along with the changes in economic conditions, preference of issuers, SEO 
environment, regulatory laws, and SEOs themselves. This led me to posit a change in 
the cross-sectional pattern of SEO indirect costs over time. The SEO literature so far 
shows that existing empirical evidence covers periods up to 2007. As the change in 
economic environment may affect the rising trend of indirect costs of raising 
seasoned equity (Kim and Shin, 2004), similarly the recent global financial crisis 
(GFC) which struck in August 2007 (Gordon and Valentine, 2009) might be a 
structural event for determining indirect costs for SEOs issued during the GFC 
period. Hence, a new study of determinants of cross-sectional variation in indirect 
costs warrants attention. More particularly, a study of cross-sectional determinants of 
SEO indirect costs would benefit the Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) industry 
which needs more seasoned equity to fund their capital intensive assets. Moreover, 
the GFC is believed to have been caused by the sharp downturn in real estate prices 
triggered by subprime mortgage lending (Laopodis, 2009). As this industry works 
53 The money left on the table for subscribing investors through underpricing, i.e., pricing the offer 
below the closing market price on the offer-day, or through discounting, i.e., setting the offer price at a 
discount from the closing market price on the day before the offer (Parsons and Raviv, 1985; Smith,
1977).
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within a highly-regulated financial sector and issues SEOs more frequently than 
industrial taxpaying firms, the determinants of indirect costs are expected to be 
different from those for industrial firms (Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Mola and 
Loughran, 2004). So far the studies by Ghosh, et al. (2000) and Goodwin (2008)
provide evidence on the cross-sectional determinants of REIT SEO indirect costs. 
However, Goodwin (2008) only incorporates the period up to 2006. This study, 
therefore, intended to investigate the determinants of cross-sectional variation in 
indirect costs of REIT SEOs covering the GFC period and incorporating a number of 
new variables, along with controlling those used in prior empirical findings on SEO 
indirect costs. 
8.1.1 Motivation of the Chapter
The literature shows that REITs rely more on the secondary equity market than the 
primary equity market for their equity capital needs than industrial firms do, and this 
reliance is more prevalent after 1994 (Chan, et al., 2003). This is attributed to the 
availability of more information on seasoned equity offerings than on unseasoned 
equity offerings (IPOs), because investors might require more information before 
committing their funds. Further, the mandatory distribution of taxable income, of 
nearly 90% to the investors, leaves minimal retained earnings for financing a REITs’ 
capital intensive investments. Hence, REITs compulsorily issue frequent SEOs to 
meet their equity capital needs (Ghosh, et al., 2000; Ott, et al., 2005).
The restriction on manipulative short-selling after 25 August of 1988 is responsible 
for the rising of SEO indirect costs over time for industrial firms (Kim and Shin, 
2004). The indirect costs, as reported in this study, also show a rising trend over 
time, however, this trend might not be attributed to the short-sales of REIT SEOs, 
because the efficient pricing of REIT assets reduces investors’ predictability on 
negative returns of REIT stock, which makes them less short on REIT stocks 
(Cannon and Cole, 2011). As both the incorporation law and the court rulings on 
corporate disputes of REITs are different from that of industrial firms, they might 
have an influence on the indirect costs of REIT SEOs. In addition, the umbrella 
partnership organization structure adopted in 1992, the lifting of the management 
restrictions in 1986, and the enacting of the REIT Modernization Act 1999 from 
January 2001, are some of the changes in the REIT environment. Another change in 
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the economic environment is the real estate-led recent global financial crisis which 
struck in August 2007. Consistent with the industrial SEOs, this study on REIT
SEOs also reports an increasing trend of indirect costs despite the ubiquitous 
differences in regulations and surrounding environments. It implies that some of the 
cross-sectional determinants of indirect costs for REIT SEOs are unique and 
industry-specific. Thus, this study on cross-sectional determinants of indirect costs 
for REIT SEOs, which extends the sample period past 2006 (Goodwin, 2008) and the 
global financial crisis, will significantly contribute to the literature.
The study is also significant because it has incorporated a number of new but 
relevant variables and documents their significance in explaining the variation in 
indirect costs. The new variables include the direct underwriting discount (Mola and 
Loughran, 2004), representative underwriters in the syndicate (Huang and Zhang, 
2011), the state of incorporation (Hartzell, et al., 2008), and industry-differentiated 
underwriters (Liu and Ritter, 2011).
8.1.2 Findings of the Chapter
Consistent with the industrial SEOs, this study documents the evidence of rising 
indirect costs, irrespective of their definition and computation, for REIT SEOs over 
the sample period from 1996 to 2010. The direct underwriting discount is found to be 
a substitute for the indirect costs. The closing higher market price on the day before 
the offer exogenously reduces the uncertainty of the offer and, hence, negatively 
affects the SEO indirect costs (Huang and Zhang, 2011).
The study determines that the indirect costs are significantly greater for SEOs with a 
larger offer size relative to the prior outstanding shares, higher prior stock return 
volatility (Corwin, 2003; Huang and Zhang, 2011), a REIT SEO-dominating 
underwriter (Butler, et al., 2005; Liu and Ritter, 2011), and an UPREIT structure.
Overall, the findings of the study document that SEO offer proceeds are critical 
determinants of the indirect costs. The structure of the underwriting syndicate, 
particularly the reputation, dominance and role of the underwriters in the syndicate, 
significantly determine the indirect costs. After controlling for the time fixed effects, 
the study finds significantly higher indirect costs of raising seasoned equity capital 
for REITs issued during the real estate-led recent global financial crisis. The findings 
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of the study also suggest that the indirect costs of raising seasoned equity capital for 
REITs are still a significant cost despite the higher transparency in the valuation of 
tangible assets and frequent visiting of a seasoned equity market for funding their 
capital intensive assets. The study also suggests that the indirect costs can be 
minimized by controlling the size of the proceeds to be raised and by more carefully 
selecting the underwriting syndicate. The results are, thus, expected to make a 
contribution to the issuers and also to the subscribing investors when making 
decisions regarding raising equity and investing, respectively.
8.1.3 Structure of the Chapter
The chapter is structured to provide a brief overview of the indirect costs of SEOs in 
Section 8.2, followed by a preliminary analysis with descriptive statistics and 
graphical presentation in Section 8.3. Section 8.4 analyses and compares the OLS 
and tobit multiple regression results with empirical evidence of factors determining 
the different levels of indirect costs. Section 8.5 summarizes the findings and, finally, 
Section 8.6 concludes the chapter with policy implications.
8.2   Indirect Costs of SEOs
As the shares of the SEO-issuing firms are already priced in the secondary market, 
and the final offer price is set at the eleventh hour of the offer, the effect of valuation 
uncertainty for seasoned equity offerings can be significantly less than unseasoned 
offerings. The majority of the indirect costs of raising seasoned equity capital, 
however, are borne by the existing owners of the issuing firm (Smith, 1977), and are
influenced by a number of factors including the valuation uncertainty, placement 
costs and the information acquisition costs of underwriters (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 
2003). The literature suggests that the underwriters deliberately underprice an issue 
by setting the offer price below the expected closing market price on the offer-day 
because, once they set the offer price54, they cannot sell the shares at a higher price, 
and because setting the offer price above the expected closing market price results in 
excess supply (Smith, 1977).
54 The offer price is determined by the underwriters at the eleventh hour of the offer and usually 
within 24 hours of the offer (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Smith, 1977).
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The literature shows that the indirect costs of underpricing are necessarily used to 
mitigate winner’s curse problems by attracting uninformed investors to participate in 
the offers (Rock, 1986), to reduce the legal liability of the underwriters (Ibbotson, 
1975; Tinic, 1988), to absorb the temporary price pressure generated by the supply of 
additional shares through a secondary offering (Corwin, 2003), to signal the quality 
of the issue (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989),
to expect production of more information (Baron, 1982; Benveniste and Spindt, 
1989; Chemmanur, 1993) and to indirectly pay underwriters who are not adequately 
compensated through direct remuneration (Chen and Lu, 2006; Ljungqvist, 2003; 
Mola and Loughran, 2004; Yeoman, 2001). Thus, the literature supports the 
existence of indirect costs contrary to the costs savings hypothesis of Loderer, et al.
(1991). These indirect costs of SEO offerings, however, can be reduced by the 
marketing efforts of underwriters (Huang and Zhang, 2011; Smith, 1977). The 
literature, thus, suggests that the indirect costs cannot be eliminated but can be 
reduced by choosing the underwriting syndicate which provides the best research 
coverage along with aggressive marketing of the SEO (Mola and Loughran 2004).
8.3   Preliminary Analysis
This section presents and briefly discusses the preliminary findings of the study 
including descriptive statistics, the univariate relationship between the indirect costs 
and their key determinants along with graphical presentations. 
8.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 8.1 presenting the descriptive statistics reports that the indirect costs of offer 
discount, underpricing and offer-day return, average 1.99%, 1.18% and -0.75%, 
respectively. Investigation of the data reveals that the closing market price on the 
offer-day is, on average, 2.72% (underpriced) higher for 57% of the SEOs, equal 
(exactly) for 13% of the SEOs, and 1.20% (overpriced) lower for 30% of the SEOs. 
Similarly, the offer price is, on average, 2.99% (offer discount) lower than the prior 
day closing market price for 67% of the SEOs, equal (exactly) for 31% of the SEOs, 
and 1.55% (offer premium) higher than the prior closing market price for 2% of the 
SEOs. Further investigation of the data shows that the underpricing is 0.81% lower 
than offer price discounting and this difference is statistically significant with |t| of 
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6.79. It indicates that the market price on the day before offer possesses information 
and significant information asymmetry exists in REIT SEOs. 
The SEO offer proceeds in dollars of 2010 (seoproceeds), closing market price on the 
day prior to the offer (priormktprice), offer price (offprice), closing market price on 
the day of offer (clmktprice), offer size relative to the outstanding shares prior to the 
offer (reloff), volatility of returns for 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the 
offer (retvol), the number of representative underwriters in the underwriting 
syndicate (numrepund) and the average reputation rank of lead underwriters 
(undrank), average $157 million, $24.96, $24.53, $24.74, 80.49%, 20.77%, 2%, 6.14 
and 7.91, respectively. 
The table also shows that 39.62% of SEOs, on average, have more than one book-
managing underwriter (multbookmngrs), 31.62% of SEOs have a REIT SEO-
dominating auditor (Ernst &Young) (topauditor), 45% of SEOs have raised seasoned 
equity at least once during the year prior to the current offer (preseo), 62.62% of 
SEOs have an UPREIT structure (upreit), 89.25% of SEOs are listed on the NYSE 
for trading (nyse), 19.88% have a Merrill Lynch-led underwriting syndicate (merrill), 
51% use internal management (selfmgt), 19.75% of SEOs have investment in 
industrial/office property (ptoffind), 80% of SEOs are incorporated under Maryland 
incorporation laws (maryland), 23.62% were issued after the recent global financial 
crisis struck (postgfc).
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Table 8.1: Descriptive statistics of major explanatory and indicator (dummy) variables used in 
the analysis of factors determining the indirect costs of underpricing of raising external equity 
capital for 800 U.S. REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
Variable Q1 Mean Q2 Q3 min max sd sk kurt
offdisc 0.00 1.99 1.16 2.62 -4.76 30.88 2.98 3.37 23.63
undprice -0.31 1.18 0.27 2.13 -7.14 32.39 3.24 3.36 24.38
offerret -2.06 -0.75 -0.58 0.53 -19.50 25.50 3.18 0.21 11.44
unddisc % 4.00 4.17 4.75 5.12 0.00 7.64 1.52 -1.21 3.42
seoproceeds $in ml 58.88 157 97.84 179.18 2.35 1991 185 3.64 22.89
priormktprice $ 14.25 24.96 22.78 31.88 2.70 136.81 15.24 2.33 14.13
offprice $ 14.00 24.53 22.50 31.42 2.25 134.50 14.95 2.29 13.98
clmktprice $ 14.00 24.74 22.64 31.54 2.62 135.24 14.98 2.28 13.84
reloff% 6.21 20.77 12.84 25.16 0.17 330.24 27.36 5.36 49.98
retvol% 1.10 2.00 1.40 2.10 0.00 12.50 1.81 3.14 13.67
numrepund 1.00 2.14 2.00 3.00 1.00 9.00 1.50 1.50 4.96
undrank 7.00 7.91 8.00 9.00 0.00 9.00 1.37 -2.05 9.49
multbookmngrs% 0.00 39.62 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 48.94 0.42 1.18
topauditor % 0.00 31.62 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 46.53 0.79 1.62
preseo % 0.00 45.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 49.78 0.20 1.04
upreit % 0.00 62.62 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 48.41 -0.52 1.27
nyse % 100.00 89.25 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 30.99 -2.53 7.42
merrill % 0.00 19.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 39.93 1.51 3.28
selfmgt % 0.00 51.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 50.02 -0.04 1.00
ptoffind % 0.00 19.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 39.84 1.52 3.31
maryland % 100.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 40.03 -1.50 3.25
postgfc % 0.00 23.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 42.50 1.24 2.54
Where Q1, Q2, min, max, sd, sk and kurt denote first quartile, second quartile, third quartile, 
minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis, respectively. offdisc, undprice and 
offerret denote the percentage of offer price below the closing market price the day before offer with 
respect to offer price, the percentage of offer price below the closing market price on the day of offer 
with respect to offer price, and the percentage change of the closing market price on the day of offer 
with respect to the closing market price on the day before offer, respectively; The variables are as 
defined in Table 8.7 in the Appendix.
8.3.2 Univariate Analysis
Table 8.2 presents the univariate relationship between major explanatory variables 
and the three levels of indirect costs. The table consists of 3 panels presenting the 
offer discount, underpricing and offer-day return in panels A, B and C, respectively. 
Each panel reports the average indirect costs of 7 explanatory variables from their 
lowest to highest quartile. The table shows that the average offer discount, 
underpricing and offer-day returns constantly increase as SEO offer proceeds 
(seoproceeds), relative offer size (reloff) and return volatility (retvol) increase in 
their quartiles. All three panels report that the average indirect costs increase steadily 
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until the third quartile of the number of representative underwriters (numrepund) but 
then decrease in the fourth quartile. The average indirect costs of offer discount and 
underpricing decrease in the second and fourth quartiles from the corresponding prior 
quartiles of lead underwriter’s average reputation, but the offer-day negative returns 
decrease only in the fourth quartile from the third quartile. 
Similarly, the average indirect costs of offer discount, underpricing and offer-day 
returns increase in the second and fourth quartiles from the corresponding prior 
quartiles of the underwriting discount (spreads), but these costs are relatively lower 
in the next two quartiles than the corresponding previous two quartiles. The table 
reports the indirect costs of offer discount and underpricing consistently decrease 
until the third quartile and, thereafter, these costs slightly increase in the fourth 
quartile of the closing market price on the day prior to the offer. However, on 
average, these costs decrease with an increasing offer price. The offer-day negative 
returns, however, increase across all four quartiles of the closing market price prior 
to the offer. It indicates that the offer-day closing price is lower than the pre-offer 
closing price.
Overall, the table indicates that the larger offer size relative to the firm and more 
price volatility prior to the offer create more price pressure and price uncertainty 
(Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Huang and Zhang, 2011).
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Table 8.2: Univariate relationship between indirect costs of and some of their determinants of 
raising external equity capital for 800 U.S. REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
Panel A
Indirect Costs of offer price discount 
with respect to SEO offer price
Lowest Q2 Q3 Highest
unddisc 2.78 3.16 0.78 1.19
seoproceeds 1.25 1.79 2.29 2.63
priormktprice 2.88 1.79 1.40 1.88
reloff 1.15 1.96 2.36 2.49
retvol 1.04 1.22 1.65 4.14
numrepund 1.60 2.72 3.37 1.04
undrank 1.73 1.71 2.28 2.18
Panel B
Indirect Costs of underpricing with 
respect to SEO offer price
Lowest Q2 Q3 Highest
unddisc 1.65 1.72 0.58 0.72
seoproceeds 0.38 0.84 1.19 2.30
priormktprice 2.34 1.04 0.60 0.73
reloff 0.20 0.92 1.36 2.22
retvol 0.52 0.78 0.83 2.73
numrepund 0.75 1.83 2.26 0.69
undrank 1.18 0.90 1.33 1.32
Panel C
Indirect Costs of offer day return with 
respect to SEO offer price
Lowest Q2 Q3 Highest
unddisc -1.08 -1.30 -0.18 -0.44
seoproceeds -0.83 -0.90 -1.00 -0.28
priormktprice -0.44 -0.70 -0.76 -1.10
reloff -0.92 -0.98 -0.91 -0.20
retvol -0.51 -0.42 -0.77 -1.26
numrepund -0.81 -0.81 -1.00 -0.32
undrank -0.48 -0.76 -0.90 -0.82
The variables are as defined in Table 8.7 in the Appendix.
8.3.3 Graphical Presentation of Indirect Costs of Underpricing
The scatter diagrams of the indirect costs of underpricing and the underwriting 
discount (unddisc), logarithm of SEO gross proceeds in dollars of 2010 
(lnseoproceeds), logarithm of closing market price prior to the offer 
(lnpriormktprice), logarithm of offer size relative to the outstanding shares on the day 
prior to the offer (lnreloff), logarithm of prior stock return volatility (lnretvol), 
logarithm of number of representative underwriters (lnnumrepund) and average rank 
of lead underwriters (undrank), are depicted in Figures 8.1 to 8.7, respectively, to 
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complement the univariate relationship between underpricing and increasing 
quartiles of these determinants. The fitted values of the scatter diagrams consistently 
support the univariate relationship between the indirect costs and the reported 
explanatory variables.
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Figure 8.1: Scatter diagram between the indirect costs of underpricing (undprice) and the underwriting 
discount (unddisc) for 800 REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
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Figure 8.2: Scatter diagram between the indirect costs of underpricing (undprice) and the logarithm of 
SEO proceeds in dollars of 2010 (lnseoproceeds) for 800 REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
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Figure 8.3: Scatter diagram between the indirect costs of underpricing (undprice) and the logarithm of 
prior market price (lnpriormktprice) for 800 REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
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Figure 8.4: Scatter diagram between the indirect costs of underpricing (undprice) and the logarithm of
relative offer size (lnreloff) for 800 REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
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Figure 8.5: Scatter diagram between the indirect costs of underpricing (undprice) and the logarithm of 
prior stock return volatility (lnretvol) for 800 REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
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Figure 8.6: Scatter diagram between the indirect costs of underpricing (undprice) and the logarithm of 
number of representative underwriters (lnnumrepund) for 800 REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
CHAPTER EIGHT INDIRECT COSTS of SEOs
238
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
U
nd
er
pr
ic
in
g 
as
 a
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 o
ffe
r p
ric
e
0 2 4 6 8 10
Average underwriter rank
Underpricing Fitted values
Figure 8.7: Scatter diagram between the indirect costs of underpricing (undprice) and the average 
reputation of lead underwriters (undrank) for 800 REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
Moreover, Figure 8.8 following depicts the trend of indirect costs over time for 800 
REIT SEOs during 1996-2010. Consistent with industrial SEO indirect costs, the 
figure depicts that the indirect costs of REIT SEOs have also increased over time 
during this sample period. The figure also depicts two peaks in years 2001 and 2009 
which might be attributed to the dot.com bubble (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr, 2003; 
Loughran and Ritter, 2004) and the global financial crisis (Gordon and Valentine, 
2009), respectively.
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Figure 8.8: Scatter diagram of the indirect costs of underpricing (undprice) over time for 800 REIT 
SEOs during 1996-2010.
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8.4   Regression Analysis
This section consists of four tables comprising 2 OLS and 2 Tobit multiple 
regression results, with a brief discussion on the structure of the analysis followed by 
a brief analysis of the results found in the regressions. The OLS multiple regression 
results are used to predict the individual effect of each variable in explaining the 
variation in indirect costs. The Tobit regressions are presented to confirm that the 
results are not driven by the outliers.
Tables 8.3 and 8.4 present the OLS and Tobit multiple regression results of the 
indirect cost of the underpricing, respectively. Tobit regression is run by winsorizing 
the underpricing at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
8.4.1 Structure of the Analysis
Table 8.3 consists of five specifications, with the indirect costs of underpricing as a 
percentage of offer price as the dependent variable. After adjusting for the missing 
data of some control variables in the SEO prospectuses and, in particular, converting 
some values into log forms, the complete adjusted maximum observations in 
specifications 1 become 795 in all the tables. Specifications 3 and 4 in each of these 
four tables exclude lnretvol and postgfc, respectively, due to their close association 
with each other (Pearson correlation of 0.61 p<0.001). Specifications 2 and 3 in each 
of these four tables are with SEOs raising proceeds less than or equal to the third 
quartile, and greater than the third quartile, respectively, of proceeds scaled in dollars 
of 2010 based on the U.S. GDP deflator. Similarly, specifications 4 and 5 are with 
SEOs issued before 2001 and after 2000, respectively. The regression results are 
separately reported for two sub-periods to confirm that the regression estimates are 
not driven by the sample period (Mola and Loughran 2004).
To control for any time fixed effect on the dependent variables, each of the 
regression specifications in all the tables incorporates year dummies, however, their 
coefficients and heteroskedasticity consistent robust t-statistics are not specifically 
reported. Each OLS regression specification reports heteroskedasticity consistent 
robust t-statistics in the parenthesis beneath the corresponding coefficient. The 
bottom three rows of each specification consecutively report the number of included 
observations, R-square and Adjusted R-square in Tables 8.3 and 8.5. However, the 
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last two rows of Tables 8.54and 8.6 report Log Pseudo likelihood and Pseudo R-
squared. The variables used in all four regression tables are defined with references 
in Table 8.7 in the Appendix, however, a short definition of each variable is 
accompanied at the bottom of each table. 
8.4.2 Major Regression Results
The OLS and Tobit regression results as reported in Tables 8.3 and 8.4 show that the 
underwriting discounts (unddisc), the logarithm of the closing market price on the 
day prior to the offer (lnpriormktprice), the logarithm of the number of representative 
underwriting (lnnumrepund), and the reputation rank of the lead underwriter 
(undrank), significantly negatively determine the indirect cost of underpricing. 
The logarithms of offer proceeds (lnseoproceeds), the offer size relative to the prior 
outstanding shares (lnreloff), and the stock return volatility prior to the offer 
(lnretvol) significantly positively determine the indirect cost of underpricing. The 
tables also report that SEOs with an umbrella partnership structure (upreit), 
underwritten by Merrill Lynch-led underwriting syndicate (Merrill), managed by 
internal management (selfmgt), and issued during the global financial crisis (postgfc) 
leave more money on the table. 
8.4.3 Analysis of Findings
This section presents a brief analysis of the marginal contribution of individual 
determinants in explaining the money left on the table through underpricing, and also 
associates these findings with existing empirical evidence. 
8.4.3.1   Underwriting Discounts/Spreads 
The univariate relationship between underwriting discount and indirect costs of 
underpricing shows that indirect cost increases with the increasing underwriting 
discount up to the second quartile and, thereafter, indirect cost decline. To control for 
the effect of the offer size on underpricing, this study divided the sample into smaller 
and larger offer sizes (Corwin and Schultz, 2005). To confirm the consistency of the 
effect of underwriting discount over time, this study has split the sample into two 
periods and run separate regressions on each sample period (Kim, et al., 2010). The 
results report underwriting discount significantly negatively determines the indirect 
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cost of underpricing, and confirms the indirect cost as a substitute for direct costs. 
The sub-sample and sub-period results of both OLS and Tobit regressions further 
confirm the substitute relationship because both the economic and statistical
significance of smaller offer size are consistent with economies of scale in direct 
underwriting costs, and because underwriting discount has experienced a declining 
trend over time (Bairagi and Dimovski, 2012b; Kim, et al., 2010). This result is 
consistent with Chen and Lu (2006) who report underwriting spreads as substitute for 
underpricing of REIT IPOs. 
8.4.3.2   SEO Offer Size 
The placement pressure hypothesis posits that the larger offers are more difficult to 
place in the market because they require greater distribution efforts (Baron, 1982).
The evidence on IPO underpricing, however, suggests that larger offers have less 
asymmetric information because they are usually issued by larger firms with more 
publicly-available information. The evidence of industrial firms reports the offer size 
negatively determines SEO indirect cost (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Kim, et al.,
2010), however, this effect is inconclusive (Jeon and Ligon, 2011).
Similarly, the studies with REIT SEOs also inconclusively report the effect of the 
offer size on indirect costs (Ghosh, et al., 1998; Ghosh, et al., 2000; Goodwin, 2008).
The positive effect of the offer size is consistent with that of the REIT IPO 
underpricing in this study. The significant positive effect of the offer size might be 
attributed to the temporary liquidity pressure and dilution effect. It is well supported 
by the higher economic and statistical significance of the offer size in regressions 
with SEOs issued after 2000.
8.4.3.3   Market Price Prior to the Offer 
To control for the valuation uncertainty along with the difficulty in placing low 
priced SEOs, this study has used the closing market price prior to the offer instead of 
the nominal offer price, because the nominal offer price is endogenous and the prior 
closing price has no spillover effect (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Huang and Zhang, 
2011). The study reports a significant negative effect of the offer price, and suggests 
that higher priced REIT SEOs are easier to place in the market (Butler, et al., 2005).
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8.4.3.4   Relative Offer Size 
To control for the liquidity uncertainty (Mola and Loughran, 2004) and the 
temporary downward price pressure (Corwin, 2003), this study incorporates the 
logarithm of the relative offer size in each of the specifications of both OLS and 
Tobit regressions, and reports the positive coefficient in underpricing (Kim and Shin, 
2004. It indicates that the larger offer size relative to the firm’s capacity influences 
the fixation of offer price at significantly lower than the pre-offer market price. The 
higher economic and statistical significance in specification 2 in both OLS and Tobit 
regressions also suggest that the effect of relatively larger offerings is higher in SEOs 
with a smaller offer size during this sample period.
8.4.3.5   Prior Stock Return Volatility 
The empirical evidence documents that the stock return volatility prior to the offer, 
the standard deviation of stock returns for 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the 
offer, significantly positively influences the underpricing of SEOs (Altinkiliç and 
Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Huang and Zhang 2011; Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Kim 
and Park, 2005). However, the findings of Kim, et al., (2010) report an insignificant 
positive effect, whereas, Goodwin (2008) reports an insignificant negative effect on 
indirect cost. The significant positive coefficient of this study suggests that REITs 
need to leave more money on the table through underpricing the SEOs with larger 
return volatility prior to the current SEO.
8.4.3.6 Number of Representative Underwriters 
Consistent with prior evidence (Huang and Zhang, 2011; Smith, 1977), this study 
uses the number of underwriters who represent the underwriting syndicate as a proxy 
for marketing efforts, and argues that more representative underwriters in the 
syndicate can provide better analyst coverage, efficiently promote the offering, and 
can also reduce the downside risk of investors. They can do this because they usually 
underwrite a substantial portion of the total offering and are both the lead and 
managing underwriters. The significant negative coefficient of the logged number of 
representative underwriters (lnnumrepund) confirms that more representative 
underwriters is effective in promoting REIT SEOs, and thereby, reduces the 
unexpected underpricing.
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8.4.3.7   Underwriter Reputation 
The REIT literature reports a significant negative effect of underwriter reputation on 
REIT SEO unexpected underpricing (Ghosh, et al., 2000; Goodwin, 2008).
Consistent with the prior REIT SEO evidence, this study reports a significant 
negative effect of underwriter reputation on underpricing. This finding is consistent 
with industrial SEO evidence (Kim and Shin, 2004; Mola and Loughran, 2004 and 
Huang and Zhang, 2011).
8.4.3.8   UPREIT Structure
Consistent with prior evidence (Ghosh, et al., 2000; Goodwin, 2008), this study 
reports SEOs with UPREIT structure leave a significantly more money through 
underpricing, and the effect is most pronounced for larger SEOs. This finding 
supports the adverse effect of an UPREIT structure on financial transparency and 
valuation uncertainties (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997; Ghosh, et al., 2000; and Harrison, 
et al., 2011).
8.4.3.9   REIT SEO Dominating Underwriting Syndicate 
The descriptive statistics of this study report that SEOs underwritten by Merrill 
Lynch-led syndicates, with well-reputed multiple book-managers, leave more money 
on the table through underpricing. To control for the the ability of industry-
dominating underwriting syndicate, this study incorporates a dummy variable, with 1 
for SEOs underwritten by a Merrill Lynch-led syndicate, and reports a significant 
positive coefficient on the indirect cost of underpricing. The study, thus, suggests 
that the underwriting syndicate with dominating power can extract compensation 
through unexpected underpricing (Liu and Ritter, 2011; Mola and Loughran, 2004).
8.4.3.10   Global Financial Crisis 
This study predicts more money left for investors through underpricing to attract 
their investment in SEOs issued during the global financial crisis period. The dummy 
variable of postgfc, representing 1 for SEOs issued after the GFC struck, reports a
significant positive coefficient on underpricing. Thus, this study suggests that REITs 
raising seasoned equity need to leave more money for subscribing investors through 
unexpected underpricing in the post-global financial crisis period. The economic 
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significance of specifications with larger SEOs strongly confirms the effect of the 
GFC. 
8.4.3.11   Maryland State of Incorporation
The descriptive statistics of this study report that 80% of SEOs are incorporated in 
Maryland, a management-friendly state for REITs. The strong anti-takeover 
protection and management entrenchments provided by the Maryland incorporation 
laws (Hartzell, et al., 2008), however, might raise conflicts of interest between 
management and shareholders, hence, issuers need to leave more money through 
underpricing. To control for the effect of incorporation law on indirect cost, this 
study controls the dummy variable MARYLAND, with 1 for Maryland incorporated 
SEOs and zero otherwise, in all specifications of underpricing. The descriptive 
statistics report that underpricing is higher for SEOs incorporated in Maryland. The 
results of both OLS and Tobit regressions suggest insignificant unexpected 
underpricing for Maryland incorporated SEOs. This anomaly might be attributable to 
the announcement effect already incorporated in the valuation and commission-free 
purchasing from underwriters (Loderer, et al., 1991).
8.4.3.12   Self-Management 
This study has used a dummy variable for SEOs managed by internally-hired 
management instead of external professional management, to control for any effect 
of management play or active management on the indirect cost of raising seasoned 
equity. It is worth mentioning that REITs were precluded from self-management 
until the private letter rulings of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1986. The 
regression results report that the underpricing for SEOs managed by internally-hired 
employees is significantly higher. This might be consistent with the prediction of 
Brockman, et al. (2008), that their managing performance has increased due to better 
monitoring, hence, investors might prefer professional external management.
8.4.3.13   Other Control Variables
This study has also used a number of other control variables found in the SEO 
literature, but their effects are reported as insignificant in explaining variations in 
REIT SEO indirect cost. Examples follow:
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8.4.3.13.1 Multiple Book-Managing Underwriters 
Multiple book-managing underwriters in an underwriting syndicate can efficiently 
manage the distribution and coordination function of the syndicate (Butler, et al.,
2005). This study has, therefore, controlled the dummy variable of multiple book-
managing underwriters to detect its coordination effect on indirect cost and expected 
reduced indirect cost for SEOs with more than one book-managing underwriter (Jeon 
and Ligon, 2011). However, the results report an insignificant effect on indirect cost.
8.4.3.13.2   Top Auditor 
IPO underpricing literature shows that IPOs with top-ranked and leading auditor are 
less underpriced because cash flows audited by such auditors reflect lower 
uncertainty (Balvers, et al., 1988; Beatty, 1989; Michaely and Shaw, 1995).
Following Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) and Wang and Wilkins (2007), this study has 
used Ernst & Young as the REIT SEO-dominating auditor based on their market 
share of auditing, because specialization in an industry raises auditing expertise to
detect financial fraud (Carcello and Nagy, 2004).
8.4.3.13.3   SEOs issued prior to the current one 
Frequently raising seasoned equity reflects reduced information asymmetry because 
prior SEOs have provided investors with more information (Ghosh, et al., 2000; 
Mola and Loughran, 2004). The evidence in SEO literature shows an insignificant 
effect of prior SEOs on the indirect cost (Ghosh, et al., 2000; Mola and Loughran, 
2004), however, Goodwin (2008) documents the significant negative effect of the 
number of SEOs issued during the prior year. Consistent with prior evidence, this 
study has used the dummy variable, preseo, if the REIT has issued at least one SEO 
during the year prior to the current SEO.
8.4.3.13.4   New York Stock Exchange 
This study incorporated the dummy variable of trading exchange, NYSE, to control 
for its influence on indirect costs, because the evidence shows that the NYSE has a 
broader investor base and higher liquidity (Corwin and Harris, 2001; Grammatikos 
and Papaioannou, 1986; Kadlec and McConnell, 1994; Sanger and McConnell, 
1986). REIT literature specifically reports REITs traded on the NYSE experience 
higher liquidity and less information asymmetry (Cannon and Cole, 2011; Clayton 
and MacKinnon, 2000). Moreover, the evidence on industrial SEOs reports less 
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underpricing for SEOs traded on the NYSE (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 
2003; Kim and Park, 2005).
8.4.3.13.5   Industrial/Office Property 
Another dummy variable controlled in this study is for industrial/office property 
because the literature shows that REIT stock performance is related to the underlying 
property sector (Chen and Peiser, 1999; Mueller and Laposa, 1996). Ling and 
Ryngaert (1997) report significant underpricing for IPOs across property sectors and 
argue that risk varies across property types. Goodwin (2008) controlled the property 
sector in her specifications of indirect costs but reports an insignificant effect. Chen 
and Lu (2006) report significantly higher initial returns for industrial/office property
IPOs. The descriptive statistics of this study report healthcare property leaves less 
money on the table (Brau and Heywood, 2008) and industrial/office property SEOs 
have raised significantly more seasoned equity. Hence, the regression specifications 
of this study use industrial/office property to detect its effect on indirect cost.
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Table 8.3: OLS regression results of factors influencing the indirect costs of underpricing of 
raising equity capital for U.S. REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES undprice undprice undprice undprice undprice
unddisc -0.2067** -0.2417** -0.0985 -0.2777* -0.2246**
(-2.318) (-2.466) (-0.345) (-1.825) (-2.068)
lnseoproceeds 0.0066*** 0.0039* 0.0070 0.0032** 0.0090***
(3.346) (1.691) (1.017) (2.261) (3.235)
lnpriormktprice -0.0095*** -0.0083*** -0.0145** -0.0035 -0.0080**
(-3.278) (-2.832) (-2.087) (-0.945) (-2.257)
lnreloff 0.0024 0.0034* 0.0047 0.0011 0.0045*
(1.359) (1.797) (0.967) (0.830) (1.702)
lnretvol 0.0077** 0.0020 0.0036 0.0111***
(2.515) (0.609) (0.961) (2.735)
multbookmngrs 0.0012 -0.0024 0.0073 -0.0033 -0.0016
(0.509) (-0.937) (1.321) (-1.070) (-0.487)
lnnumrepund -0.0040** -0.0035* 0.0008 -0.0047** 0.0018
(-2.089) (-1.760) (0.145) (-2.173) (0.546)
undrank -0.0036*** -0.0036*** 0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0035***
(-4.168) (-3.877) (0.032) (-1.446) (-3.287)
topauditor -0.0030 -0.0023 -0.0037 -0.0003 -0.0038
(-1.403) (-0.988) (-0.724) (-0.117) (-1.413)
upreit 0.0041* 0.0021 0.0145** 0.0054* 0.0042
(1.666) (0.705) (2.355) (1.821) (1.305)
preseo -0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0040 -0.0008 -0.0037
(-0.675) (-0.424) (-0.645) (-0.340) (-1.314)
nyse 0.0030 0.0019 0.0040 -0.0022 0.0037
(1.000) (0.653) (0.323) (-0.570) (0.997)
merril 0.0114*** 0.0123*** 0.0108* 0.0017 0.0147***
(3.231) (2.664) (1.696) (0.621) (3.049)
selfmgt 0.0059** 0.0055** 0.0058 0.0028 0.0059*
(2.336) (2.073) (0.923) (1.064) (1.814)
ptoffind 0.0008 0.0008 -0.0003 0.0067** -0.0040
(0.302) (0.306) (-0.041) (2.563) (-0.969)
maryland 0.0012 0.0030 -0.0004 -0.0022 0.0042
(0.466) (1.294) (-0.044) (-0.871) (1.042)
postgfc 0.0131* 0.0153* 0.0313*** 0.0128*
(1.856) (1.756) (3.338) (1.707)
Constant 0.0862*** 0.0623** -0.0092 0.0619** 0.0771***
(4.060) (2.313) (-0.182) (2.172) (3.555)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 795 596 199 241 554
R-squared 0.256 0.186 0.371 0.200 0.273
Adj. R-squared 0.226 0.141 0.259 0.127 0.237
The table consists of 5 OLS multiple regression specifications to determine the individual effect of 
factors determining the indirect costs of underpricing of raising equity capital for U.S. Real Estate 
Investment Trusts using a sample of 800 Seasoned Equity Offerings for a period of 15 years from 
1996 to 2010. The dependent variable is the indirect costs of underpricing which average 1.18%. 
Specification 1 is with the full sample of observations, specification 2 is for SEOs with less than equal 
to the third quartile of SEO proceeds scaled in dollars of 2010 ($179 million), specification 3 is for 
SEOs with greater than equal to the third quartile of SEO proceeds scaled in dollars of 2010 ($179 
million), specifications 4 and 5 are for SEOs issued before and after the REIT Modernization Act 
1999 which became effective from January 2001. To avoid the effect of multicollinearity between 
lnretvol and postgfc, these two variables are mutually exclusively used in specifications 3 and 4. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote level of 
significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. The variables are as defined in Table 8.7 in 
the Appendix. The results in the table are based on the following OLS specification:
XQGSULFH ȕ0 + ȕ1unddisc + ȕ2OQVHRSURFHHGVȕ3OQSULRUPNUSULFHȕ4OQUHORIIȕ5lnretvol 
               ȕ6PXOWERRNPQJUVȕ7OQQXPUHSXQGȕ8XQGUDQNȕ9WRSDXGLWRUȕ10XSUHLWȕ11preseo
               ȕ12Q\VHȕ13PHUULOOȕ14VHOIPJWȕ15ptoffind ȕ16PDU\ODQGȕ17postgfc ……. (1)
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Table 8.4: Tobit regression results of factors determining the underpricing of U.S. REIT SEOs 
during 1996-2010.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
unddisc -0.1672** -0.2210** 0.0381 -0.2733* -0.1724*
(-2.011) (-2.391) (0.173) (-1.884) (-1.727)
lnseoproceeds 0.0061*** 0.0046** 0.0047 0.0031** 0.0083***
(3.942) (2.414) (0.848) (2.336) (3.818)
lnpriormktprice -0.0084*** -0.0089*** -0.0102* -0.0033 -0.0071**
(-3.526) (-3.307) (-1.863) (-0.949) (-2.525)
lnreloff 0.0022 0.0026* 0.0051 0.0011 0.0040**
(1.576) (1.837) (1.263) (0.847) (1.973)
lnretvol 0.0065** 0.0024 0.0039 0.0091**
(2.407) (0.758) (1.103) (2.557)
multbookmngrs 0.0009 -0.0022 0.0055 -0.0034 -0.0012
(0.435) (-0.909) (1.213) (-1.144) (-0.409)
lnnumrepund -0.0040** -0.0035* -0.0009 -0.0044** 0.0007
(-2.161) (-1.848) (-0.190) (-2.218) (0.248)
undrank -0.0037*** -0.0039*** 0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0037***
(-5.054) (-5.054) (0.044) (-1.505) (-4.370)
topauditor -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0025 0.0001 -0.0029
(-1.083) (-0.894) (-0.552) (0.059) (-1.168)
upreit 0.0047** 0.0031 0.0129*** 0.0053* 0.0051*
(2.272) (1.340) (2.620) (1.854) (1.904)
preseo -0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0049 -0.0005 -0.0038
(-0.869) (-0.338) (-1.077) (-0.247) (-1.577)
nyse 0.0029 0.0017 0.0053 -0.0020 0.0040
(1.035) (0.594) (0.480) (-0.545) (1.131)
merril 0.0088*** 0.0105*** 0.0068 0.0014 0.0111***
(3.175) (2.983) (1.412) (0.542) (3.008)
selfmgt 0.0042** 0.0046** 0.0030 0.0027 0.0036
(2.072) (2.130) (0.578) (1.077) (1.426)
ptoffind 0.0012 0.0013 -0.0004 0.0066*** -0.0034
(0.497) (0.505) (-0.085) (2.647) (-1.029)
maryland 0.0012 0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0025 0.0041
(0.494) (1.240) (-0.255) (-1.100) (1.193)
postgfc 0.0135** 0.0147* 0.0326*** 0.0137*
(1.976) (1.758) (3.964) (1.952)
Constant 0.0601*** 0.0504** -0.0097 0.0625** 0.0551**
(3.353) (2.511) (-0.238) (2.311) (2.573)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 795 596 199 241 554
Log Pseudolikelihood 1769 1396 403 658 1170
Pseudo R-squared -0.075 -0.052 -0.133 -0.043 -0.086
The table consists of 5 tobit regression specifications to determine the individual effect of factors determining the 
underpricing of raising seasoned equity capital for U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) using a sample of 
800 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) for a period of 15 years from 1996 to 2010. The dependent variable is the 
underpricing defined as the percentage change of the offer price from offer-day closing market price with respect 
to offer price which average 1.18% and is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Specification 1 is with the 
full sample of observations, specification 2 is for SEOs with less than or equal to the third quartile of SEO 
proceeds scaled in dollars of 2010 ($179 million), specification 3 is for SEOs with greater than or equal to the 
third quartile of SEO proceeds scaled in dollars of 2010 ($179 million), specifications 4 and 5 are for SEOs 
issued before and after the REIT Modernization Act 1999 which became effective from January 2001. To avoid 
the effect of multicollinearity between lnretvol and postgfc, these two variables are mutually exclusively used in 
specifications 3 and 4. Heteroskedasticity consistent robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote level 
of significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. The other variables are as defined in Table 8.7 in the 
Appendix. The results in the table are based on the following Tobit specification:
XQGSULFH ȕ0 + ȕ1unddisc + ȕ2OQVHRSURFHHGVȕ3OQSULRUPNUSULFHȕ4OQUHORIIȕ5lnretvol 
             ȕ6PXOWERRNPQJUVȕ7OQQXPUHSXQGȕ8XQGUDQNȕ9WRSDXGLWRUȕ10XSUHLWȕ11preseo 
               ȕ12Q\VHȕ13PHUULOOȕ14VHOIPJWȕ15SWRIILQGȕ16PDU\ODQGȕ17postgfc İ …. (2)
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Tables 8.5 and 8.6 present the OLS and Tobit multiple regression results,
respectively of offer price discount as indirect cost of REIT SEOs to confirm the 
consistency of the determinants (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Hansen, 2001). The 
results report that the indirect cost through expected underpricing (offer price 
discount) is positively determined by the logarithm of the relative offer size and the 
logarithm of the prior stock return volatility. The results also report that the offer 
price discount is significantly lower for REIT SEOs which pay higher underwriting 
discount and are incorporated under Maryland corporation law. This finding suggests 
that underwriters set offer price higher than the prior day closing market price for 
REIT SEOs incorporated under Maryland corporation law. This finding is in contrast 
to the expectation of higher underpricing because of strong anti-takeover protection 
by Maryland corporate law. However, this anomaly might be attributed to the 
existing valuation of REITs in the seasoned equity market and the announcement 
effect of SEOs. The expected effects of most of the other variables, even 
insignificant and inconsistent over sub-samples, are consistent with those reported in 
tables of unexpected underpricing.
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Table 8.5: OLS regression results of factors influencing the indirect cost of offer price discount 
of raising equity capital for U.S. REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES offdisc offdisc offdisc offdisc offdisc
unddisc -0.4285*** -0.3922*** -0.5513* -0.4003*** -0.4335***
(-5.189) (-4.707) (-1.766) (-2.688) (-3.961)
lnseoproceeds -0.0016 -0.0026 0.0032 -0.0002 -0.0022
(-1.016) (-1.187) (0.767) (-0.153) (-1.026)
lnpriormktprice -0.0027 -0.0011 -0.0057 -0.0014 -0.0014
(-1.079) (-0.403) (-1.180) (-0.467) (-0.448)
lnreloff 0.0053*** 0.0056*** 0.0047 0.0025** 0.0072***
(3.443) (3.055) (1.023) (2.132) (2.930)
lnretvol 0.0085*** 0.0072*** 0.0089*** 0.0094***
(3.605) (2.889) (2.965) (2.733)
multbookmngrs -0.0016 -0.0021 0.0015 0.0033 -0.0052*
(-0.834) (-0.936) (0.381) (1.052) (-1.922)
lnnumrepund -0.0017 -0.0010 -0.0026 -0.0026 0.0016
(-1.232) (-0.655) (-0.784) (-1.394) (0.601)
undrank 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0002 0.0005
(0.184) (0.475) (-0.602) (-0.138) (0.448)
topauditor 0.0004 0.0020 -0.0034 0.0006 0.0005
(0.233) (0.841) (-0.916) (0.349) (0.187)
upreit 0.0006 -0.0011 0.0078 0.0009 0.0008
(0.272) (-0.369) (1.434) (0.371) (0.234)
preseo 0.0006 -0.0011 0.0065 -0.0016 0.0008
(0.351) (-0.574) (1.432) (-0.991) (0.325)
nyse 0.0023 0.0017 0.0066 0.0003 0.0027
(0.915) (0.626) (0.915) (0.068) (0.931)
merril 0.0030 0.0022 0.0052 0.0012 0.0039
(0.943) (0.477) (1.082) (0.606) (0.875)
selfmgt 0.0030 0.0035 -0.0027 0.0027 0.0026
(1.410) (1.347) (-0.719) (1.234) (0.969)
ptoffind 0.0003 0.0012 0.0006 0.0041* -0.0018
(0.127) (0.483) (0.168) (1.781) (-0.611)
maryland -0.0040** -0.0037* -0.0050 -0.0017 -0.0052**
(-2.320) (-1.856) (-1.267) (-0.918) (-1.983)
postgfc 0.0023 0.0023 0.0198 0.0023
(0.503) (0.461) (1.496) (0.468)
Constant 0.0896*** 0.0891*** 0.0524 0.0731*** 0.0976***
(5.075) (5.115) (0.932) (3.649) (4.513)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 795 596 199 241 554
R-squared 0.441 0.421 0.512 0.234 0.409
Adj. R-squared 0.418 0.390 0.425 0.165 0.380
The table consists of 5 OLS multiple regression specifications to determine the individual effect of 
factors determining the indirect costs of underpricing of raising equity capital for U.S. Real Estate 
Investment Trusts using a sample of 800 Seasoned Equity Offerings for a period of 15 years from 
1996 to 2010. The dependent variable is the indirect costs of offer discount which average 1.99%. 
Specification 1 is with the full sample of observations, specification 2 is for SEOs with less than or 
equal to the third quartile of SEO proceeds scaled in dollars of 2010 ($179 million), specification 3 is 
for SEOs with greater than or equal to the third quartile of SEO proceeds scaled in dollars of 2010 
($179 million), specifications 4 and 5 are for SEOs issued before and after the REIT Modernization 
Act 1999 which became effective from January 2001. To avoid the effect of multicollinearity between 
lnretvol and postgfc, these two variables are mutually exclusively used in specifications 3 and 4. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote level of 
significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. The variables are as defined in Table 8.7
presented in the Appendix. The results in the table are based on the following OLS specification:
RIIGLVF ȕ0 + ȕ1unddisc + ȕ2OQVHRSURFHHGVȕ3OQSULRUPNUSULFHȕ4OQUHORIIȕ5lnretvol 
            ȕ6PXOWERRNPQJUVȕ7OQQXPUHSXQGȕ8XQGUDQNȕ9WRSDXGLWRUȕ10XSUHLWȕ11preseo 
            ȕ12Q\VHȕ13PHUULOOȕ14VHOIPJWȕ15SWRIILQGȕ16PDU\ODQGȕ17postgfc İ««. (3)
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Table 8.6: Tobit regression results of factors determining the indirect cost of offer price discount 
of U.S. REIT SEOs during 1996-2010.
VARIABLES (1) (3) (5) (7) (9)
unddisc -0.3822*** -0.3623*** -0.3731* -0.3984*** -0.3685***
(-5.920) (-5.298) (-1.836) (-3.357) (-4.468)
lnseoproceeds -0.0011 -0.0016 0.0029 0.0005 -0.0018
(-1.031) (-1.053) (0.967) (0.394) (-1.259)
lnpriormktprice -0.0017 -0.0010 -0.0028 -0.0022 -0.0007
(-0.980) (-0.515) (-0.847) (-0.825) (-0.332)
lnreloff 0.0040*** 0.0043*** 0.0019 0.0024** 0.0050***
(3.942) (3.826) (0.647) (2.211) (3.384)
lnretvol 0.0084*** 0.0070*** 0.0091*** 0.0087***
(4.299) (3.182) (3.328) (3.326)
multbookmngrs -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0002 0.0027 -0.0049**
(-0.956) (-0.818) (-0.083) (0.951) (-2.246)
lnnumrepund -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0020 -0.0034** 0.0012
(-1.351) (-0.958) (-0.727) (-2.123) (0.630)
undrank -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0002
(-0.104) (0.180) (-0.265) (-0.614) (0.354)
topauditor 0.0004 0.0015 -0.0028 0.0006 0.0002
(0.303) (0.929) (-0.921) (0.354) (0.127)
upreit 0.0012 -0.0002 0.0083** 0.0019 0.0013
(0.735) (-0.127) (2.001) (0.902) (0.586)
preseo -0.0002 -0.0021 0.0063* -0.0020 -0.0000
(-0.180) (-1.554) (1.952) (-1.396) (-0.011)
nyse 0.0007 0.0002 0.0038 -0.0007 0.0013
(0.326) (0.090) (0.691) (-0.206) (0.543)
merril 0.0010 -0.0012 0.0050 0.0015 0.0011
(0.466) (-0.438) (1.466) (0.800) (0.394)
selfmgt 0.0022 0.0027 -0.0032 0.0021 0.0019
(1.421) (1.452) (-1.018) (1.085) (0.949)
ptoffind 0.0011 0.0019 0.0019 0.0040* -0.0004
(0.630) (0.890) (0.605) (1.863) (-0.154)
maryland -0.0046*** -0.0040** -0.0052 -0.0020 -0.0062***
(-2.909) (-2.278) (-1.496) (-1.199) (-2.609)
postgfc 0.0026 0.0024 0.0188* 0.0027
(0.624) (0.519) (1.777) (0.612)
Constant 0.1128*** 0.1157*** 0.0262 0.0783*** 0.1153***
(8.595) (8.613) (0.721) (4.435) (6.850)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 795 596 199 241 554
Log Pseudolikelihood 2028 1559 489 716 1355
Pseudo R-squared -0.174 -0.165 -0.218 -0.058 -0.168
The table consists of 5 tobit regression specifications to determine the individual effect of factors 
determining the underpricing of 800 U.S. REIT SEOs for a period of 15 years from 1996 to 2010. The 
dependent variable is the underpricing defined as the percentage change of the offer price from the 
offer-day closing market price with respect to offer price which average 1.18% and is winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. Specification 1 is with the full sample of observations, specification 2 is 
for SEOs with less than or equal to the third quartile of SEO proceeds scaled in dollars of 2010 ($179 
million), specification 3 is for SEOs with greater than or equal to the third quartile of SEO proceeds 
scaled in dollars of 2010 ($179 million), specifications 4 and 5 are for SEOs issued before and after 
the REIT Modernization Act 1999 which became effective from January 2001. To avoid the effect of 
multicollinearity between lnretvol and postgfc, these two variables are mutually exclusively used in
the specifications of 3 and 4. Heteroskedasticity consistent robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, 
**, * denote level of significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. The other variables are 
as defined in Table 8.7 presented in the Appendix. The results in the table are based on the following 
Tobit specification:
RIIGLVF ȕ0 + ȕ1unddisc + ȕ2OQVHRSURFHHGVȕ3OQSULRUPNUSULFHȕ4OQUHORIIȕ5lnretvol 
            ȕ6PXOWERRNPQJUVȕ7OQQXPUHSXQGȕ8XQGUDQNȕ9WRSDXGLWRUȕ10upreit + ȕ11preseo 
             ȕ12Q\VHȕ13PHUULOOȕ14VHOIPJWȕ15SWRIILQGȕ16PDU\ODQGȕ17postgfc İ …. (4)
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8.5   Findings
The major findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
a) Consistent with the industrial firms, the indirect costs of raising seasoned 
equity capital for REIT SEOs experienced an increasing trend over the 
sample period and, notably, rise with the size of the SEO proceeds.
b) The direct costs of underwriting discount (spreads) are found to be a 
substitute for indirect costs, that is, SEOs with higher direct costs leave less 
money on the table.
c) The certainty effect of the closing market price on the day before the SEO 
exogenously negatively determines the indirect costs of both expected and 
unexpected underpricing. However, it is statistically significant and well 
pronounced for unexpected underpricing.
d) The offer size relative to the firm size, and the stock return volatility prior to 
the offer, are the two major significant positive determinants of the indirect 
costs of underpricing and offer price discount due to temporary price pressure 
and the liquidity uncertainty of the offer, respectively.
e) Consistent with the significant negative effect of the number of managing 
underwriters, as documented in Huang and Zhang (2011), this study finds the 
number of representative underwriters in the underwriting syndicate 
significantly negatively determines unexpected underpricing.
f) Further, the study finds that the indirect costs are significantly lower for 
SEOs with higher-ranked lead underwriters, which are incorporated under 
Maryland incorporation law, but are significantly higher for those issued 
during the post-global financial crisis (GFC), which are underwritten by the 
dominating underwriting syndicate led by Merrill Lynch group, and also have 
an UPREIT structure.
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8.6   Conclusion
This study documents the rising trend of the indirect costs of both expected and 
unexpected underpricing of raising seasoned equity capital, using a sample of 800 
Real Estate Investment Trusts’ (REITs) Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) during 
the period 1996-2010. The study reports that the equally-weighted indirect costs of 
expected (offer price discount) and unexpected underpricing, as a percentage of offer 
price or proceeds, average 1.99%, and 1.18%, respectively. In contrast to the 
complementary evidence documented with industrial SEOs, this study documents a 
substitute relationship between underwriting discount and indirect costs, and 
indicates that the underwriters are able to indirectly manage their remuneration 
through allocating underpriced SEOs to their favored clients. This is most likely 
when their direct remuneration cannot adequately compensate them for their efforts 
and reputation. These documented relationships of REIT SEOs might be attributed to 
the highly-regulated financial sector and higher transparency in asset valuation. 
Consistent with prior evidence of REIT IPOs, the study documents the amount of the 
proceeds as a key determinant of SEO indirect costs (Chen and Lu 2006; Dolvin and 
Pyles, 2009), because a relatively larger offer size leaves more money on the table 
through offer discount and underpricing, and because there exists a significant 
difference in indirect cost between smaller and larger SEOs. The positive effect of 
the offer size is further strengthened by the significant positive effect on indirect 
costs of the offer size relative to the firm size, and this is attributed to the temporary 
price pressure created by a relatively larger offer because the relatively larger offer 
reflects the market’s capacity to absorb the firm’s offer. The prior stock return 
volatility of the SEO-issuing firm significantly positively raises the indirect costs of 
seasoned equity due to higher ex-ante liquidity uncertainty. 
Beyond the SEO offer size, REIT characteristics and underwriting syndicate 
structures are documented to explain the indirect costs. The indirect costs are less for 
SEOs underwritten by well-reputed lead underwriters. This is consistent with the 
certification role of reputable underwriters. The study also documents that the size 
and the role of underwriters, and particularly the representative underwriters in the 
syndicate, have a significant negative influence on the indirect costs. It also reports 
that the prior closing market price does not reflect significant information because 
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offer day return is not zero. However, the certainty effect of higher-priced stock 
significantly negatively determines the indirect costs due to its inherent ability to 
attract institutional investors. 
The study is particularly important because REITs need to visit the seasoned equity 
market frequently to fund their capital intensive investment growth. Their need for 
external equity capital is due to the requirements of distributing the majority of their 
internally-generated capital. The release of more information through frequently 
raising seasoned equity capital is expected to reduce the information asymmetry and 
may contribute to reducing the level of underpricing (Ghosh, et al., 2000). However, 
the literature indicates that, despite raising seasoned equity more frequently and the 
higher transparency in asset valuation, REIT SEO underpricing still exists, in fact, 
with a rising trend, and constitutes nearly 50% of the industrial SEO underpricing 
(Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Ghosh, et al., 2000; Goodwin, 2008; 
Huang and Zhang, 2011; Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Kim and Shin, 2004; Kim and Park, 
2005). Hence, the indirect costs of SEOs are still one of the key factors influencing 
any capital budgeting decision for REITs.
The literature so far reports two studies on cross-sectional determinants of REIT 
SEO indirect costs (Ghosh, et al., 2000; Goodwin, 2008). This study extends the 
prior evidence by explaining the cross-sectional variation of the indirect costs by 
incorporating a number of new determinants, particularly underwriting syndicate 
structure, and extending the sample period to cover the post-global financial crisis 
and extracting its effect on the indirect costs of seasoned equity capital for REITs. It 
complements some of the prior findings on both industrial and REIT SEOs. After 
controlling for time fixed effects, the findings report that the indirect costs are 
significantly higher for SEOs issued after the GFC occurred. The study of the 
indirect costs of REIT SEOs, particularly incorporating the recent data along with 
more cross-sectional determinants, thus, warrants further research. 
Overall, the findings suggest that the indirect costs of raising seasoned equity capital 
cannot be eliminated but can be minimized by optimally determining SEO proceeds
and by strategically hiring the underwriting syndicate. The study will benefit the 
managers of REITs, particularly those intending to raise seasoned equity capital. It 
will contribute them in making capital budgeting decisions while undertaking any 
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new investment project and, more particularly, in making decisions on frequency and 
size of SEOs and hiring of the underwriting syndicate. The study suggests that a 
trade-off between frequency and size may minimize indirect cost of REIT SEOs 
because of the opposite direction of these two determinants. It may also benefit 
subscribing investors who intend to invest in the secondary real estate capital market 
because the study confirms that the offer price is significantly less than both the pre-
offer and post-offer closing price.
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Appendix
Table 8.7: Definition of variables used in the regression specifications of SEO Indirect Costs.
Variable Exp 
Sign Definition and References
UNDDISC +/- Underwriting discount (spreads) as a percentage of gross SEO proceeds 
(Bairagi and Dimovski, 2011; Chen and Lu, 2006; Chen and Ritter, 2000; 
Kim, et al., 2010; Ljungqvist, 2003; Mola and Loughran, 2004; Yeoman, 
2001)
LNSEOPROCEEDS +/- The natural logarithm of real gross SEO proceeds in the dollar of 2010 
(Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Ghosh, et al., 1998; Ghosh, et al., 2000; 
Goodwin, 2008; Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Kim, et al., 2010)
LNPRIORMKTPRICE - Natural logarithm of market price prior to offer (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; 
Butler, et al., 2005; Corwin, 2003; Goodwin, 2008; Huang and Zhang, 2011; 
Kim and Park, 2005; Mola and Loughran, 2004)
LNRELOFF + The natural logarithm of the proportion of shares offered in SEO relative to 
the number of shares outstanding prior to the offer (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 
2003; Corwin, 2003; Huang and Zhang, 2011; Kim and Shin, 2004; Mola and 
Loughran, 2004)
LNRETVOL + Natural logarithm of the percentage of stock return volatility in terms of 
standard deviation of returns for 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the 
offer (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Goodwin, 2008; Huang and 
Zhang, 2011; Kim, et al., 2010; Kim and Park, 2005)
UNDRANK - Average reputation rank of lead underwriters as per Carter and Manaster 
(1990), which is sourced from Ritter’s homepage (Booth and Smith, 1986; 
Butler, et al., 2005; Dunbar, 2000; Ghosh, et al., 2000; Goodwin, 2008; Huang 
and Zhang, 2011; Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Kim and Shin, 2004; Mola and 
Loughran, 2004)
MULTBOOKMNGRS +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs with more than one book-
managing underwriter and zero otherwise (Butler, et al., 2005; Gao and Ritter, 
2010; Jeon and Ligon, 2011)
LNNUMREPUND - The natural logarithm of the square of number of total underwriters in the
underwriting syndicate (Huang and Zhang, 2011; Jeon and Ligon, 2011)
TOPAUDITOR - Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs audited by a REIT-dominant 
auditor in terms of the highest market share in the industry during the sample 
period and zero otherwise (Beatty and Welch, 1996; Carcello and Nagy, 2004; 
Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; Wang and and Wilkins, 2007)
PRESEO +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs with at least one SEO during the 
year immediately prior to the offer (Ghosh, et al., 2000; Goodwin, 2008; Mola 
and Loughran, 2004)
NYSE - Dummy variable representing unity for SEO-issuing REIT listed on NYSE 
and zero otherwise (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Kim and 
Park, 2005)
UPREIT +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs with umbrella partnership 
structure and zero otherwise (Chen and Lu, 2006; Dolvin and Pyles, 2009; 
Ghosh, et al., 2000; Goodwin, 2008; Harrison, Panasian and Seiler, 2011; Ling 
and Ryngaert, 1997)
MERRILL +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs with an underwriting syndicate 
led by Merrill Lynch group and zero otherwise (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 
1994; Dunbar, 2000; Liu and Ritter, 2011; Mola and Loughran, 2004; Puri, 
1999)
SELFMGT +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs with internal management and 
zero otherwise (Ambrose and Linneman, 2001; Brockman, et al., 2008; 
Capozza and Seguin, 2000)
PTINDOFF +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs with property type of office and 
industry in their asset and zero otherwise (Chen and Lu, 2006; Ghosh, et al.,
2000; Goodwin, 2008; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997)
MARYLAND +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEO-issuing REIT incorporated in 
Maryland and zero otherwise (Daines, 2001; Hartzell, et al., 2008; Kahan and 
Kamar, 2000)
POSTGFC +/- Dummy variable representing unity for SEOs issued after beginning of global 
financial crisis in August 2007 and zero otherwise (Gordon and Valentine, 
2009; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997)
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION
9.1   Introduction
This chapter provides the conclusion to the thesis on the costs of raising equity 
capital for U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). This thesis investigated 127 
IPOs and 800 SEOs of REITs issued during 1996-2010. The thesis consists of four 
major interrelated studies analysing the direct costs of IPOs, indirect costs of IPOs, 
direct costs of SEOs, and indirect costs of SEOs, presented in Chapters Five to Eight, 
respectively. REITs originated as trust entities in the U.S. in the 1960s to give small 
investors an opportunity to indirectly invest in real estate properties. Their 
organizational regulations give them privileges of tax exemption provided they meet 
a number of regulatory requirements such as at least 75% of their assets be invested 
in real estate, five or fewer persons can not hold more than 50% of outstanding 
equity, and at least 90% of taxable income be distributed as dividend. These 
regulatory requirements make them different from industrial firms which usually 
have a track record of operating history prior to raise equity from capital market.
Whereas, REITs usually commence their operations by raising equity through IPOs 
and subsequently fund their growth investment by raising equity through SEOs. 
Hence, there exists a substantial difference in both regulations and costs of equity 
capital for REITs and industrial firms. This thesis will thus contribute to the REIT 
literature by demonstrating integrated costs of raising equity capital along with their 
cross sectional determinants.
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 9.2 presents the major results; Section 9.3 
presents the limitations and directions for future research, and Section 9.4 concludes 
the chapter with some policy implications.
9.2   Major Findings
Chapter Four, which presents the descriptive statistics for different dimensions of the 
costs of issuing both IPOs and SEOs, depicts that the direct costs of both IPOs and 
SEOs experienced a declining trend, and that the underpricing of IPOs declined but 
that of SEOs increased during the sample period. It suggests either that underwriting 
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business has been very competitive or underwriters have become experienced with 
REITs over time and, thence, charge lower underwriting fees which supports Chen 
and Lu’s (2006) findings. The declining trend of IPO underpricing over time 
suggests that investors have also become familiar with the REIT IPOs and their 
valuation. The total direct costs and indirect cost average 8.43% and 3.07% for REIT 
IPOs and 4.63% and 1.18% for REIT SEOs, respectively. These costs are 
substantially higher for industrial firms. For example, the total direct costs reported 
for industrial IPOs are 14.03%-17.74% in Ritter (1987) and 11% in Lee, et al. 
(1996). The indirect cost of IPO underpricing reported in the U.S. by Liu and Ritter 
(2011) is 24% while this averages 24.97% across 21 countries (Engelen and Essen, 
2010) and 36.5% across 37 countries (Boulton, et al., 2011). Similarly, the costs of 
seasoned equity are also substantially lower for REITs. The total direct costs for 
industrial SEOs are reported as 6.17% in Smith (1977), 7.11% in Lee, et al. (1996)
and 6.65% in Corwin (2003). Gokkaya et al. (2011) find 0.84% lower underwriting 
discount for REITs than for industrial SEOs. Indirect cost of industrial SEOs is 
4.03%, 2.75% and 3.16% as reported in Chemmanur, et al. (2010), Gao and Ritter 
(2010) and Huang and Zhang (2011), respectively. Substantially lower costs of both 
initial and seasoned equity capital are attributed to the tangibility of assets held, the 
certainty of income estimation and the transparency of regulation of REITs.
The findings in Chapters Five to Eight support the notion of the economies of scale 
of direct costs (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2000; Corwin and Harris, 2001) and higher 
indirect costs with larger offer proceeds (Dolvin and Pyles, 2009) for both IPOs and 
SEOs. Economies of scale are attributed to the fixed components of direct costs 
while higher indirect costs are usually attributed to the placement pressure and 
greater underwriting efforts required for larger offer sizes. The certifying role of the 
industry-dominating auditor (Ernst & Young) appears to reduce the IPO underpricing 
and the SEO direct costs (Wang and Wilkins, 2007). These chapters support the 
opinion that the levels of direct costs may explain the indirect costs of both IPOs and
SEOs, in line with Kim, et al. (2010). The offer price of IPOs and the closing market 
price of SEOs prior to an offer negatively determine the costs of IPOs and SEOs, 
respectively. This study makes a contribution with the finding that IPOs and SEOs 
issued during the GFC period leave more money on the table through underpricing. 
Additionally, this study finds that IPOs listed on the NYSE incur higher direct costs 
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but leave less money through underpricing. These might be attributed to the higher 
listing fees and liquidity, respectively, of the NYSE. The effect of the listing fees of 
the NYSE is well supported by the lower non-underwriting other direct expenses of 
the SEOs which are already listed on the NYSE.
The REIT organizational structure of an umbrella partnership (UPREIT) also affects 
the costs of both IPOs and SEOs. UPREIT IPOs incur lower underwriting fees but 
higher other direct expenses, while UPREIT IPOs and SEOs leave more money on 
the table. The lower underwriting fees might be attributable to the higher wealth and 
liquidity effect explained in Chen and Lu (2006) and Han (2006), while higher other 
direct expenses and underpricing might be attributed to the conflicts of interests as 
well as issue complexities resulting from the UPREIT structure (Chen and Lu, 2006; 
Gerbich, et al., 1995).
The incorporation laws of Maryland, which is a management-friendly state for 
REITs, is found to affect the costs of both IPOs and SEOs. More particularly, 
underwriters charge lower spreads for both IPOs and SEOs while underpricing and 
other direct expenses are higher for IPOs. As the majority of REITs are incorporated 
in Maryland, underwriters might accrue expertise in the corporate law of Maryland 
which allows them to charge lower underwriting costs. Additionally, REITs 
incorporated in Maryland enjoy more insulation from outside pressure, anti-takeover 
protection and, hence, limit stockholders from realizing their takeover premium 
(Hartzell, et al., 2008). These aspects suggest possible higher underpricing for 
Maryland-incorporated IPOs. 
Merrill Lynch is the REIT industry-dominating underwriter and Merrill Lynch-led 
underwriting syndicates positively influence the costs of both IPOs and SEOs. This is 
consistent with the existence of oligopolies in REIT underwriting, where dominant 
underwriters can reap premium rents through higher spreads and underpricing, and is 
also consistent with the broad findings of Liu and Ritter (2011). This study also finds 
that underwriting syndicate size determines the costs of both IPOs and SEOs, 
however, the effect is more pronounced for the SEOs. The direct costs for IPOs and 
SEOs are a negative and quadratic function of the underwriting syndicate size. The 
negative effect on IPO direct costs is consistent with the distributional efficiency of a 
larger syndicate size (Carter and Dark, 1990), however, this finding is inconsistent 
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with Corwin and Schultz (2005) who predict higher costs because underwriting 
spreads are distributed among the syndicate members. The prediction of Corwin and 
Schultz (2005) is evident in the SEO direct costs which show higher direct costs for 
multiple book-running managers. The quadratic effect on the SEO direct costs is 
consistent with Jeon and Ligon’s (2011) results. SEO direct costs, particularly the 
underwriting spreads, are documented as a negative function of the level of 
underwriting by the underwriters representing the syndicate. This also supports the 
prediction of Corwin and Schultz (2005) that high-quality underwriters require a 
substantially larger allocation to lead the syndicate. Moreover, the SEOs with more 
representative underwriters in the syndicate leave less money on the table. 
Furthermore, consistent with the certification role of well-reputed underwriters, this 
study finds that both IPOs and SEOs hiring reputable underwriters leave less money 
for subscribing investors. This evidence suggests that underwriting syndicate 
structure, particularly the role, position, reputation and dominance of an underwriter 
in the industry, may explain the cross-sectional variation of the costs of raising 
equity capital.
This thesis has also documented a number of new variables usefully explaining the 
costs of IPOs. For example, the number of adverse risk factors and the ownership 
limit for an individual investor, as stated in the prospectuses, negatively and 
positively influence the IPO direct costs, respectively. The higher equity offer size 
relative to the post-IPO equity suggests less money is left through underpricing. The 
effect of the number of risk factors might be attributable to the reduced information 
asymmetry and litigation risk, while that of the ownership limit might be attributable 
to the adverse effect on the aftermarket liquidity of an IPO, as identified in Butler, et 
al. (2005). The higher equity offer size relative to the post-IPO equity is opposite to 
the share overhang which predicts a positive association between retained ownership 
and underpricing (Loughran and Ritter, 2004).
This thesis has also controlled for a number of variables used in prior empirical 
studies on such costs. For example, the monthly industry returns’ volatility over one 
year prior to the IPO, negatively explains the direct costs of IPOs. The finding is in 
sharp contrast to the evidence of Chen and Lu (2006). A plausible explanation for 
this inconsistency might be the sample period or underwriters requiring issuers to 
invest more in promotional expenses for such IPOs (Bairagi and Dimovski, 2012a).
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The quarterly dividend yield prior to an offer and the IPOs with equity ownership in
properties positively influence the direct costs of IPOs. The dividend yield signals 
that the post-offer industry yields affect the supply of IPOs (Hartzell, et al., 2005).
IPOs disclosing their intended use of proceeds for corporate working capital, and
intending to invest in industrial/office and healthcare properties, which were issued 
during hot-periods, appear to leave more money on the table. The effect 9999of the 
working capital is consistent with the notion of uncertainty in corporate objectives 
and inadequate cash flows (Leone, et al., 2007).
The direct costs are lower for SEOs which have had at least one SEO prior to the 
current one, while they are higher for SEOs with a larger offer size relative to the 
pre-offer outstanding equity. The SEOs with higher stock return volatility prior to the 
offer, and with internal management, leave more money on the table for the 
subscribing investors. 
9.3   Policy Implications
Overall, the findings suggest the costs of raising equity capital for both IPOs and 
SEOs fluctuate over time, and these costs are a function of different dimensions of 
underwriting syndicates, the organizational structure of the firm, the trading 
exchange, incorporation laws, firm-specific as well as offer-specific characteristics, 
and industry performance. Offer size emerges as the key determinant of both direct 
and indirect costs of both IPOs and SEOs. These findings, therefore, contribute to 
REIT managers’ better understanding of the factors influencing the direct and 
indirect costs of raising both initial and seasoned equity capital. Particularly, they 
may minimize the indirect cost of IPOs by making an optimum trade-off between 
non-underwriting direct expenses and underpricing of IPOs because this study 
documents these costs as substitute to each other. Similarly, they may also reduce the 
indirect cost of SEOs by making an optimum trade-off between size and frequency of 
SEOs. Investors who intend to invest in the secondary real estate capital market may 
also use this finding that the offer price is significantly less than both the pre-offer 
and post-offer closing market price. Additionally, the GFC appears to have driven up 
such costs. Thus, managers will need to be vigilant in timing their investment and 
financing decisions.
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9.4   Limitations and Directions for Future Research
The conclusion and implications of this thesis are based on the findings derived in a 
highly-regulated financial sector in the U.S. Findings such as the ownership limit for 
an individual investor positively determining the underwriting fees, and the offer size 
relative to the post-offer equity negatively determining the underpricing of IPOs, 
may be tested more broadly internationally. The findings in this U.S. study may well 
be examined in REIT markets around the world, especially now that REITs have 
recently been introduced and are becoming well-accepted by investors in Asian and 
European countries. Future studies may incorporate a number of other variables as 
suggested by the RESET test, particularly, in determining IPO underwriting fees. 
The matching industrial IPOs may also be used to test the significance of difference 
in direct costs of raising initial equity capital between REITs and industrial firms.
This thesis contributes to the literature in regard to the different dimensions of an 
underwriting syndicate. The number, reputation and level of underwriting by 
underwriters representing a syndicate specifically negatively determine costs of both 
IPOs and SEOs. These dimensions need further cross-industry and cross-country 
evidence. Future research may also confirm whether the ability of an industry 
dominating underwriter leads to premium direct and indirect benefits.
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